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Attorney Fees: Seventh Circuit to Consider Whether Exceeding Powers Challenge to Arbitrators’ Attorney’s Fees Award Warrants FRAP 38 Sanctions

June 19th, 2024 Appellate Practice, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Attorney Fee Shifting, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Bad Faith, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Exceeding Powers, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, FAA Section 11, FAA Section 9, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Insurance Contracts, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Retrospectively-Rated Premium Contracts, Section 10, Section 11, Section 9, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Vacate, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Attorney Fees, Vacate Award | Attorney's Fees, Vacatur 1 Comment »

Introduction

Attorney's Fees | Contract Interpretation Most challenges to arbitration awards—including attorney fees awards— fail because the standards of review are so demanding. The bar is exceedingly high by design. Otherwise—the reasoning goes—courts would “open[] the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (citations and quotations omitted; some parenthetical material in original).

But the narrow margin for success is not a free pass for challengers to advance arguments that do not, in a court’s view, have a legitimate, good faith basis in the facts and the law, or in a reasonable argument for reversal or modification of the law.

A recent case in point is Circuit Judge Easterbrook’s decision in American Zurich Ins. Co. v. Sun Holdings, Inc., No. 23-3134, slip op. at 1 (7^th Cir. June 3, 2024) (Easterbrook, J.). The award challenger claimed the arbitrators exceeded their power by imposing as a sanction an award of $175,000.00 in attorney fees because the contract allegedly barred such an attorney fees award. The problem was that the arbitrators at least arguably interpreted the language in question and concluded that it did not bar the award of attorney fees in question. Moreover, the attorney fees award comported with New York law and the American Arbitration Association Commercial Rules, both of which the parties made part of their agreement.

The Seventh Circuit has signaled that it believes there was no good faith basis for the challenge and that the challenger has offered none, apart from its insistence that its interpretation was the only one even barely plausible. The challenger appears to have further undermined its litigation position by engaging in what the Seventh Circuit believes was recalcitrant behavior in the arbitration proceedings, and, according to the Court, not acknowledging the existence of controlling Seventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court authority controverting its position. The challenger compounded that by asserting—contrary to FAA Sections 10 and 11— additional award challenges that the Court concluded were simply attempts to second guess various determinations made by the arbitrators.

That this strategy backfired should come as no surprise. It resulted in the Court issuing an order to show cause providing the challenger 14 days “to show cause why sanctions, including but not limited to an award of attorneys’ fees, should not be imposed for this frivolous appeal.” Zurich, slip op. at 5 (citing Fed. R. App. P. 38). At the time of this writing no decision has been made by the Court concerning whether it will, in fact, impose sanctions.

Background: The Award of Attorney Fees

Petitioner Sun Holdings, Inc. (“Sun” or the “Award Challenger”) is a Texas- Continue Reading »

SCOTUS Decides Spizzirri, Saying that FAA Section 3 Stays of Litigation Pending Arbitration are Mandatory if Requested

May 21st, 2024 Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Practice, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 16, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Look Through, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Section 16, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Stay Pending Appeal, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Textualism, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off

Section 3 Stay of Litigation On May 16, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) in Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. ___, No 22-1218, slip op. (U.S. May 16, 2024), decided 9-0 that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) does not “permit[] a court to dismiss the case instead of issuing a stay when the dispute is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay pending arbitration.” 601 U.S. at ___; slip op. at 1.

In an opinion written by Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court concluded that the “text, structure, and purpose” of Section 3 and the FAA all “point to the same conclusion: When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration , the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.” 601 U.S. at ___, slip op. at 3. The Court therefore held that if a lawsuit “involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a Section 3 stay, the Court must stay the litigation. 601 U.S. at ___; slip op. at 6.

The Court’s opinion resolves a long-standing and deepening split in the circuits, which the Court left open in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 87 n.2 (2000), and Lamps Plus v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 181 n.1 (2019). That split in the circuits is discussed in note 1 of the Court’s opinion. 601 U.S. at ___ n.1, slip op. at 2-3 n.1 (citing cases).

Background

The underlying merits litigation that resulted in an order granting a motion to compel arbitration—but a dismissal despite the request for a Section 3 stay— was a state court action between current and former drivers for a delivery service and the operators of that service. Claims were made under state and federal employment laws based on alleged misclassification of the drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. Claimants sought damages for sick leave and overtime wages.

Defendants removed the case to federal district court in Arizona and moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the action. Claimants conceded arbitrability but argued that the action should be stayed under Section 3.

Ninth circuit precedent granted district courts considering an application to stay litigation under Section 3 the discretion to either stay or dismiss the action. Relying on that precedent, the district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that all claims in the litigation had been ordered to arbitration.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but two judges concurred, suggesting that this Ninth Circuit precedent was wrong and that SCOTUS should resolve the split in the circuits concerning whether a requested Section 3 stay was mandatory when claims in the litigation are subject to arbitration and a stay is requested.

SCOTUS granted certiorari, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and resolved the split. Continue Reading »

Section 9 | Confirming Awards Part III | Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide

June 22nd, 2020 Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Awards, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Confirmation of Awards, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Section 9, Uncategorized 4 Comments »

In the last two segments of the Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide, we discussed the substantive and procedural requirements for confirming under Section 9 Chapter One Domestic Awards, that is, domestic awards that fall under Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act, but not under Chapter Two, which implements the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. (See here and here.) Now we address additional, FAQs concerning the confirmation under Section 9 of Chapter One Domestic Awards.

Does an Application to Confirm under Section 9 a Chapter One Domestic Award Require One to File a Full-Blown Law Suit to Confirm an Award?

Fortunately, the answer is no. Like all other applications for relief under the FAA, an application to confirm an award under Section 9 is a summary or expedited proceeding, not a regular lawsuit. Rule 81(a)(6)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Federal Rules “to the extent applicable, govern proceedings under the following laws, except as these laws provide for other procedures. . . (B) 9 U.S.C., relating to arbitration. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B).

Section 6 of the FAA “provide[s] for. . . procedures” other than those applicable to ordinary civil actions because it requires applications for relief under the FAA to be made and heard as motions:

Any application to the court hereunder shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise . . . expressly provided [in the FAA].
9 U.S.C. § 6.

A Section 9 action to confirm an award is, of course, “[a]n application to the court” under the FAA, and thus, unless the FAA otherwise provides, must be “made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions. . . .”

Confirming Arbitration Awards under Section 9: What Papers does a Party File to Apply for Confirmation of an Award?

Manifest Disregard of the Law | Manifest Disregard of the Agreement | Second Circuit Remands Award to Arbitrator for Do-Over

October 25th, 2019 Authority of Arbitrators, Award Vacated, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Contract Interpretation, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Exceeding Powers, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Manifest Disregard of the Agreement, Manifest Disregard of the Law, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Manifest Disregard of the Law, Vacatur Comments Off

Second Chance to Make Award not in Manifest Disregard of Law or Agreement

Arbitrators are human and occasionally they make awards that cannot be squared with logic and law, and courts may, in appropriate circumstances, vacate those awards as being in manifest the agreement, or in some circuits, in manifest disregard of the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered such an award in Weiss v. Sallie Mae, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-2362, slip op. (Sept. 12, 2019), and solved the problem in a way that imposed minimal costs and delay on the parties and, at the same time, gave effect to the parties’ reasonable contractual expectations, including that the arbitrator would make an award with a colorable basis in the law or the parties’ agreement, not one in manifest disregard of the law or the agreement. It is therefore a good example of a case that promotes arbitration as an alternative to litigation.

Background

W is a student-loan borrower who in 2011 defaulted on a loan issued by S (N is the successor of S, but we shall refer to both as “S”). W gave S her phone number (“Phone Number 1”) when she obtained the loan and consented to S contacting her via an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). S made ATDS calls to her using Phone Number 1 prior to her default on the loan in 2011.

Also prior to her 2011 default W obtained a second telephone number (“Phone Number 2”) but did not give S consent to contact her on that number via an ATDS.

After W’s 2011 default, S contacted W seven or eight times a day at Phone Number 2 via an ATDS, attempting to collect the debt. S made 774 ATDS calls to Phone Number 2 during the period September 16, 2011 through July 1, 2013.

The Arbitration

A dispute arose between W and S about whether S’s ATDS calls had violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and W commenced an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The action was stayed after the parties stipulated to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a student-loan promissory note.

The Award: Was it in Manifest Disregard of the Law or the Agreement?

Following a hearing an arbitrator made an award granting W $108,000 in statutory damages under the TCPA. But the award held that W was a class member in a class action that S had settled. The class-action settlement (the “Arthur Settlement”) “included as a class member, ‘any person who received ATDS calls from [S] between October 27, 2005 and September 14, 2010.’” Slip op. at 5 (citation omitted).

W did not contend that the calls S made to Phone Number 1 violated the TCPA (W had consented to those calls), and W contended that, accordingly, she was not bound by the settlement, even though she had received ATDS on Phone Number 1 during the specified period. The arbitrator, however, found that argument “‘unpersuasive,’” and “ruled that Weiss was a class member and that ‘the proof was conclusive that [S] provided [W] with the required notice of the settlement and of her rights and obligations under the terms of the settlement.’” Slip op. at 5-6 (citation omitted).

The Arthur Settlement “notice offered class members the opportunity to file a ‘consent Revocation’ document by September 15, 2012; absent such a filing, ‘the ATDS calls would not stop and the borrower’s prior consent to give them [sic] would be deemed to have been given.’” Slip op. at 6 (citation omitted; bracketed text in original).

While W contended that she was not aware of the Arthur Settlement, S testified that notice was successfully emailed to W.

The agreement implementing the Arthur Settlement featured a general release, “under which class members were ‘deemed to have fully released and forever discharged [S]’. . . from any and all claims and causes of action, inter alia, ‘that arise out of or are related in any way to the use of an [ATDS]. . . used by any of the Released Parties in connection with efforts to contact or attempt to contact Settlement Class Members including, but not limited to, claims under or for violations of the [TCPA].’” Slip op. at 6 (citations omitted; some bracketed text in original).

Even though the general release, to which the arbitrator determined W was bound, deemed W to have “waived ‘any and all’ TCPA claims effective the date of final judgment in the Arthur Settlement action[,]” the arbitrator’s award did not acknowledge the existence of that release. Slip op. at 6-7. “Instead,” said the Court, “the arbitrator interpreted [W]’s failure to submit a consent revocation pursuant to the Arthur class notice as precluding recovery for any calls placed to [Phone Number 2] after the September 15, 2012 deadline but also as permitting recovery for ATDS calls placed to [Phone Number 2] between September 6, 2011, and September 16, 2012.” Slip op. at 7.

The arbitrator awarded TCPA statutory damages in the amount of $108,500 ($500 per call for 217 calls during the applicable period). W moved to confirm the award and S cross-moved to vacate it.

The district court vacated the award, finding that “by neglecting to ‘apply—or even address—an explicit, unambiguous term of the settlement agreement,’ which “clearly and unambiguously bars recovery for claims until and including the date of the agreement,’ the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.” Slip op. at 7. W appealed.

Confluence of the Arcane: Headings Clauses, Arbitration Law and Reinsurance

November 28th, 2016 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Contract Interpretation, Reinsurance Contracts, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off

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Introduction

A Headings Clause typically provides that contract provision headings and captions are for reference purposes only, and do not negate, modify or otherwise affect the provisions to which they relate. While arguments can be made for or against Headings Clauses, they are fairly common in commercial contracts.

Contract dispute outcomes rarely turn on the interpretation or application of these clauses. But on November 16, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Infrassure, Ltd. v. First Mutual Trasp. Assur. Co., No. 16-306, slip op. (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order), which not only turned on the meaning and application of a headings clause, but did so in the context of an arbitration-law dispute in a reinsurance case. A confluence of the arcane, indeed!

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Infrassure: Background

Infrassure was a dispute between the parties to a facultative reinsurance contract. The facultative reinsurance contract (the “Certificate”) contained two different arbitration clauses. One was in the body of the pre-printed contract (the “Form Arbitration Clause”). The other was in Endorsement No. 2 (the “Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause”). Endorsement No. 2 was titled “LONDON ARBITRATION AND GOVERNING LAW (UK AND BERMUDA INSURERS ONLY).”

The Form Arbitration Clause provided for arbitration of “any dispute arising out of the interpretation, performance or breach of this Certificate.” It designated a specific set of arbitration rules to govern the arbitration, and provided that “[a]ll arbitrators will be disinterested active or former officers of insurance or reinsurance companies.”

The Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause provided for arbitration of “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof,” and prescribed different arbitration rules. It did not require arbitrators to be active or former officers of insurance or reinsurance companies.

Which Arbitration Clause Applies?

The parties disputed which arbitration clause applied. Reinsurer Infrassure, Ltd. (“Infrassure” or the “Reinsurer”), argued for the Form Arbitration Clause, with its more stringent arbitrator qualification requirements. Cedent First Mutual Transportation Assurance Company (“First Mutual” or the “Cedent”), a New York State captive insurer of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, apparently wanted to appoint (or nominate) arbitrators or arbitrator candidates who were not current or former officers or directors of insurance or reinsurance companies. It therefore argued that the Endorsement 2 Arbitration Clause applied.

Infrassure, which is a Swiss company, argued that the Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause did not apply because the title of the endorsement contained the parenthetical limitation “(UK and Bermuda Insurers only)” (the “Parenthetical Limitation”). It asserted in the alternative that the Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause should be construed to impose the same arbitrator qualification criteria as the Form Arbitration Clause imposed.

The Headings Clause

First Mutual argued that the Certificate’s headings clause (the “Headings Clause,” which the Court refers to as the “Titles Clause”) rendered inapplicable the Parenthetical Limitation. The Headings Clause stated: “The several titles of the various paragraphs of this Certificate (and endorsements … attached hereto) are inserted solely for convenience of reference and will not be deemed in any way to limit or affect the provisions to which they relate.”

“This argument [was] thin,” observed the Court, but a reported opinion was in order, because the dispute “requires us to construe wording that apparently has not been construed before, and that is in a contract that may share features with other standard forms and endorsements.” Slip op. at 4.

Court Holds that Headings Clause did Not Strip the U.K.-and-Bermuda-Insurer-only Limitation on the Scope of Endorsement No. 2

The Court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs (an esteemed member of the reinsurance bar before he was appointed to the Second Circuit), held that the Headings Clause was “unambiguous,” but did not negate the Parenthetical Limitation, even though that limitation appeared in the heading or title of Endorsement No. 2.

The Parenthetical Limitation, said the Court, “is not part of the title itself, though it shares the same line and bolded format.” The Heading Clause’s “purpose. . . is not to strip away an express indication as to the context in which a particular provision operative, but to ensure that the text of a provision is not discounted or altered by the words of its heading.” Slip op. at 4.

Court finds Further Support for its Conclusion by Applying First Mutual’s Heading Clause Interpretation to other Contract Provisions

The Court found confirmation of the accuracy of its conclusion “by consulting other [Certificate] provisions,” including “critical” ones, which would “would have no meaning at all if the Titles Clause were mechanically applied.” Id.

To illustrate, the Court referred to paragraph 14 of the Certificate, which, states:

Program Policy Limits

Various as per the attached schedule.

Id. (emphasis in original)

The Court observed that applying the Ceding Company’s interpretation of the Headings Clause to Paragraph 14 would reduce that paragraph to “the cryptic provision, ‘Various as per the attached schedule.’” Id. The “heading ‘Program Policy Limits,’ instructs the reader that the phrase ‘Various as per the attached schedule refers to program policy limits, as opposed to some other concern of the reinsurance agreement.” Id. That heading, said the Court, does not purport to contradict, alter or otherwise ambiguate the text that follows, but explains what the otherwise contextually ambiguous (indeed, meaningless) text was intended to mean in the context of the whole contract.

According to the Court, “other provisions beside Paragraph 14 likewise would be rendered meaningless if the [Headings Clause] were applied in the way pressed by First Mutual.” Slip op. at 4.

Given the Court’s holding, it was unnecessary to consider Infrassure’s alternative argument that the arbitrator selection provisions of the Form Arbitration Agreement should be made part of the Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Agreement. All the Court had to say about this argument was “we need not reach [it], which is just as well for well for Infrassure.” Slip op. at 5.

Photo Acknowledgements:

All photos used in the text portion of this post are licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law. The Yay Images abbreviations of the photographer’s name for each of the three images, in order of their appearance, are:

Image 1: VIPDesignUSA

Image 2: steheap

Image 3: speedfighter

No Good Deed Should Go Unpunished: Functus Officio and Merion Constr. Mgt., LLC v. Kemron Environmental Serv., Inc.—Part I

May 3rd, 2014 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Construction Industry Arbitration, Final Awards, Functus Officio, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, New Jersey State Courts, Practice and Procedure, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, Uncategorized Comments Off

Courts usually err in favor of not vacating awards in close cases. As a result, Courts usually vacate awards only where there is a very clear, fundamental disconnect between the award and the parties’ arbitration agreement. Vacating an award in those circumstances enforces the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, which is exactly what the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and state arbitration codes are supposed to do. (See, e.g., L. Reins. & Arb. L. Forum post here.)

Today’s case, Merion Constr. Mgt., LLC v. Kemron Environmental Serv., Inc., No. A-2428-12T4, slip op. (N.J. App. Div. March 13, 2014), involved two disputed awards: the original arbitration award (the “Original Award”) and a subsequent, modified award (the “Modified Award”). The arbitrator (the “Arbitrator”) issued the Modified Award to correct a mistake in the Original Award, which had inadvertently omitted items of claimed damage that one of the parties had requested the Arbitrator to award. The Arbitrator said he intended to include those damage items in the Original Award. The Modified Award thus accurately reflected the parties’ agreement and submission and the Original Award did not.

Which Award should have been confirmed? Relying on the functus officio doctrine, and an American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) Rule concerning arbitral modification and correction of awards, the intermediate state appellate court reversed a trial court judgment confirming the Modified Award, and held that the Original Award should have been confirmed.

A few years back the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court prefaced one his opinions with the following truism: “People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA plans.” Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 509 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.). Had Merion Construction been decided correctly, then the New Jersey appellate court might have prefaced its opinion with a similar truism: “People make mistakes. Even arbitrators.” But based on how the case was decided a more fitting preface would have been: “No good deed should go unpunished. Even those perpetrated by arbitrators.” Continue Reading »

International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Publishes Philip J. Loree Jr.’s October 2010 Article on Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

October 7th, 2010 Uncategorized Comments Off

The October 2010 issue of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, the excellent newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (”CPR”), featured an article I wrote on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 08–1214 (June 24, 2010). The article is entitled “Despite Granite Rock’s Procedural Dodge, Court Issues A Straightforward Decision on Bargaining Agreements,” 28 Alternatives 175 (October 2010).

The article discusses Granite Rock in detail, and argues, among other things, that:

the Court deliberately dodged consideration of an important factor in the case — a signed contract that potentially could have answered the question — by reflexively applying a procedural rule that forced the court to put the fact aside, instead of remanding for proper consideration.

. . . .

The tradeoff the Court made when it elevated institutional concerns over deciding a case based on its undisputed facts was not a fair one. While the Court pointed out that consideration of the belatedly raised argument would have resulted in the Court ruling for the first time on an issue not considered by the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps not one fully briefed, that justification presupposes that consideration of the retroactive CBA would have required intensive analysis of a controversial issue.

But there was no real controversy here. The plain terms of a fully executed contract clearly and unambiguously contravened the key assumption on which the majority opinion rested: that there was a formation-date dispute.

28 Alternatives at 175 & 178.

The article is the second of a two-part series. The first part discussed and critically analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, West Inc. v. Jackson, No. 09-497 (June 21, 2010). That part was entitled “Rent-A-Center‘s Roadmap Extends Beyond Contracts. . . To Congress and the Supreme Court’s New Term,” 28 Alternatives 154 (September 2010) (blogged here).

Alternatives also recently published two other articles I wrote earlier this year, both of which were featured as cover stories: “Stolt-Nielsen Delivers a New FAA Rule — And then Federalizes the Law of Contracts,” 28 Alternatives 121 (June 2010), and “It’s Time for Doctrines: The Supreme Court Wrestles with ‘Severablility’ and the ‘Clear and Unmistakable Standard,” 28 Alternatives 73 (March 2010) (blogged here and here).

Alternatives is a subscription-only publication. Subscription information is available at this page, as well as at the publisher’s, John Wiley & Sons’s, website here.

I would like once again to take this opportunity to thank CPR, and Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives, for their kind assistance and support in featuring my articles. CPR is one of the most prestigious ADR organizations in the United States, and, as I have said before, Russ is a very intelligent, dedicated and professional editor with whom it is a pleasure to work.

A Very Brief Look at the Arbitration-Related Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act

July 30th, 2010 Uncategorized Comments Off

On July 21, 2010 President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) (here). Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the “Bureau”), which has jurisdiction over consumer contracts for the sale of financial products and services.

Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Bureau to study mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration in contracts under its jurisdiction and report back to Congress. The agency will then be authorized to either ban or regulate pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts under its jurisdiction, provided that the “Bureau finds that such prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.” The Bureau’s findings must “be consistent” with its study.

Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank Act likewise authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to “prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations hereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of investors.’’ Section 921 also authorizes the SEC to ban or regulate pre-dispute arbitration in contracts between “customers or clients of any investment adviser.”

In addition, Section 1414 of the Dodd-Frank bans pre-dispute arbitration in residential mortgages and home-equity loans, and Section 922 renders unenforceable pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate whistleblower claims.

How Will Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp. Change Reinsurance Arbitration Practice?

June 4th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Reinsurance Arbitration, Uncategorized, United States Supreme Court Comments Off

Part III

A. Introduction

In Part I (here) we explained why the standard for challenging an award based on its outcome is important in reinsurance arbitration practice. And, after briefly reviewing pre-Stolt-Nielsen law on outcome-based standards of review, we explained how Stolt-Nielsen has established for the lower courts a fairly searching standard of review. Part II (here) explored the legal and practical implications of that standard of review.

This Part III turns to the other key area that will likely change because of Stolt-Nielsen: Consolidated reinsurance-arbitration practice.

As most reinsurance practitioners know, there is a brief history relevant to this subject and that will be the focus of this post. For to fully understand the implications of Stolt-Nielsen on consolidated reinsurance-arbitration practice, it is necessary to understand how the pre-Stolt-Nielsen practice evolved.

Parts IV (here) and V (here, here and here) will address how Stolt-Nielsen will likely change consolidated reinsurance-arbitration practice, and what the implications of those changes are to the industry. Continue Reading »

Richard Faulkner and Philip J. Loree Jr. Quoted in Business Insurance on Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson

May 8th, 2010 Uncategorized Comments Off

Our friend Richard Faulkner, a partner in the Richardson, Texas law firm of Blume Faulkner, P.L.L.C., I, and others were quoted in a Business Insurance article on the Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson case pending in the United States Supreme Court. The article is available here.

Richard’s quote was “The 9th Circuit’s decision flies in the face of virtually every well-reasoned decision on arbitrability and jurisdiction[.]” I could not agree with him more.

For those of you that do not know Richard, he has decades of experience in the arbitration, mediation and ADR fields and is a contributing author to Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (6th Ed.). His practice includes acting as a neutral arbitrator or mediator, serving on construction dispute boards, and representing clients in domestic and international arbitration-law-related matters. Recently he represented Dub Herring Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. before the United States Supreme Court as an amicus curiae in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., which was decided on April 27, 2010.

My more modest sound bite was: “There’s a lot of attention being paid to this case because it’s very frequent that you have challenges to arbitration agreements on unconscionability grounds made by employees and consumers.”

The Supreme Court is expected to issue its decision in this controversial case by the end of this term in late June. We believe there is a good chance that at least five members of the Court will vote for a reversal, but that outcome is by no means a foregone conclusion. Whatever the result, you will certainly hear about it here at the Forum.

Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

Attorney Fees: Seventh Circuit to Consider Whether Exceeding Powers Challenge to Arbitrators’ Attorney’s Fees Award Warrants FRAP 38 Sanctions

Introduction

Background: The Award of Attorney Fees

SCOTUS Decides Spizzirri, Saying that FAA Section 3 Stays of Litigation Pending Arbitration are Mandatory if Requested

Background

Section 9 | Confirming Awards Part III | Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide

Does an Application to Confirm under Section 9 a Chapter One Domestic Award Require One to File a Full-Blown Law Suit to Confirm an Award?

Confirming Arbitration Awards under Section 9: What Papers does a Party File to Apply for Confirmation of an Award?