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Archive for the ‘Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation’ Category

Overturning Arbitration Awards based on Clear Mistakes of Historical Fact or Conceded Nonfacts: Some Further Thoughts (Part II)

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clear mistakeIn our October 7, 2024, post, “Can a Court under Section 10(a)(4) Overturn an Award Because it was Based on a Clear Mistake of Historical Fact or a Conceded Nonfact?”, we discussed UpHealth Holdings, Inc. v. Glocal Healthcare Sys. PVT, No. 24-cv-3778, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2024), which granted partial vacatur of an arbitration award because it was based on a “nonfact.”  We promised to take a closer, analytical look at UpHealth and its “clear mistake of historical fact or conceded nonfact” vacatur standard, and, in our October 18, 2024 post, Overturning Arbitration Awards Based on Clear Mistakes of Historical Fact or Conceded Nonfacts: Some Further Thoughts (Part I), identified five questions relating to UpHealth that help shed further light on the case and the arbitration award vacatur standard on which it relied:

  1. What is the difference, if any, between a “clear mistake of historical fact” and a “conceded nonfact?”
  2. What is or should be required to establish a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact?”
  3. Assuming Section 10(a)(4) authorizes courts to vacate awards based on a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact,” did the UpHealth district court err by holding that the award against Damodaran was based on a nonfact?
  4. Assuming that the district correctly applied the “conceded nonfact” standard, does it comport with the FAA?
  5. If there is a Seventh Circuit appeal of the UpHealth decision, is it likely the decision will be overturned on appeal, and if so, on what grounds?

That October 18, 2024 post went on to address questions 1 and 2. This Part II address the third question: “Assuming Section 10(a)(4) authorizes courts to vacate awards based on a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact,” did the UpHealth district court err by holding that the award against Damodaran was based on a nonfact?” The author thinks the answer is “yes.” One or more subsequent posts will answer questions 4 and 5.

Discussion

 

Assuming Section 10(a)(4) Authorizes Courts to Vacate Awards Based on a “Clear Mistake of Historical Fact” or a “Conceded Nonfact,” did the UpHealth District Court Err by Holding that the Award against Damodaran was Based on a Nonfact?

The UpHealth Court’s application of the “mistake of historical fact” or “conceded nonfact” standard raises serious questions about whether the Court substituted its judgment for that of the arbitrators. On balance, the author thinks it did for the reasons set forth below (which presume familiarity with our October 7, 2024, and our October 18, 2024, posts).

There are at least three flaws in the Court’s analysis: Continue Reading »

Overturning Arbitration Awards Based on Clear Mistakes of Historical Fact or Conceded Nonfacts: Some Further Thoughts (Part I)

October 18th, 2024 Application to Vacate, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Award Fails to Draw Essence from the Agreement, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Imperfectly Executed Award or Powers, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Exceeding Powers, Vacate Award | Excess of Powers, Vacatur, Vacatur for Conceded Nonfact or Clear Mistake of Historical Fact 1 Comment »

Historical factIn our October 7, 2024, post, “Can a Court under Section 10(a)(4) Overturn an Award Because it was Based on a Clear Mistake of Historical Fact or a Conceded Nonfact?”, we promised  some further analysis of UpHealth Holdings, Inc. v. Glocal Healthcare Sys. PVT, No. 24-cv-3778, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2024), the principal case discussed in that post, which held warranted  partial vacatur of an award because the award was based in part on a “nonfact.”  In this and at least one other post, let’s take a closer, analytical look at UpHealth’s  “clear mistake of historical fact or conceded nonfact” vacatur standard, consider whether UpHealth comports with the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and take an informed guess about how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit might decide the case if there is an appeal.

We’ll focus on the following questions and our answers will presume familiarity with the October 7, 2024, UpHealth post, here:

  1. What is the difference, if any, between a “clear mistake of historical fact” and a “conceded nonfact?”
  2. What is or should be required to establish a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact?”
  3. Assuming Section 10(a)(4) authorizes courts to vacate awards based on a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact,” did the UpHealth district court err by holding that the award against Damodaran was based on a nonfact?
  4. Assuming that the district correctly applied the “conceded nonfact” standard, does it comport with the FAA?
  5. If there is a Seventh Circuit appeal of the UpHealth decision, is it likely the decision will be overturned on appeal, and if so, on what grounds?

This Part I addresses questions 1 and 2. One or more subsequent posts will address questions 3 through 5.

Discussion

 

What is the Difference, if any, between a “Clear Mistake of Historical Fact” and a “Conceded Nonfact?”

 The standard adopted in UpHealth—which was derived from Electronics Corp. of Am. v. International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, 492 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1974); National Post Office, Mailhandlers, Watchmen, Messengers & Grp. Leaders Div, Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 1985) (Stewart, Associate Justice (ret.), sitting by designation), and Mollison-Turner v. Lynch Auto Grp., No. 01 6340, 2002 WL 1046704, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2002)—authorizes vacatur of awards based on: (a) a “clear mistake of historical fact” or (b) a “conceded nonfact.” Both of these bases for vacating an award may, at least to some, suggest a fairly broad authorization to vacate awards that is not already encompassed within the manifest disregard of the agreement (a/k/a “essence of the agreement”) standard. That is especially so of vacatur based on a “clear mistake of historical fact.” Continue Reading »

Southern District of California Dismisses Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

September 25th, 2024 Amount in Controversy, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Look Through, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Vacate, Vacatur No Comments »

vacate subject-matter jurisdictionWe’ve repeatedly emphasized that—particularly since  Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022)—subject-matter jurisdiction issues arising out of petitions to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct arbitration awards present traps for the unwary. (See, e.g., posts here, , herevacate subject matter jurisdiction, and here.) White v. U.S. Center For SafeSport, No. 22-cv-04468-JD, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2024), illustrates another subject- matter jurisdiction problem that arises, especially post-Badgerow: Is the amount-in-controversy requirement met when a petitioner seeks to vacate a “take nothing” award? The Court said the answer is “no,” at least in the circumstances of the case before it.

Petition to Vacate: Background

Respondent, United States Center for SafeSport (“SafeSport”) has been charged by Congress with “investigat[ing] and adjudicat[ing] allegations of sexual abuse and misconduct within U.S. Olympic and Paralympic organizations. Slip op. at 1 (citing 36 U.S.C. § 220541(a)). SafeSport investigated horse training and riding instructor Charles White (“White”) for allegedly engaging, over a period of three decades, in sexual misconduct against minors and adult females who participated in equestrian sports. Concluding those allegations had merit, SafeSport banned for life White from participating in in Olympic and Paralympic activities.   Slip op. at 1.

SafeSport’s rules provided White with an option to submit to arbitration the question whether the lifetime ban was warranted. White pursued that option but the arbitrator made an award upholding the ban. Slip op. at 1-2.

White petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of California to vacate the award under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). He alleged diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which required him to show not only diversity of citizenship but also that the amount-in-controversy exceeded $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

The petition sought to: (a) vacate the award, which awarded neither him nor anyone else any monetary relief, and simply upheld the lifetime ban; or (b) remand the award for reconsideration. The petition was bereft of any allegations or evidence demonstrating that the amount-in-controversy requirement was met. Slip op. at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).

The Court ordered White to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed on subject matter jurisdiction grounds. Initially, White submitted to the Court a declaration stating “he had lost more than $75,000 in income as a hay dealer and horse stable operator ‘as a direct result’ of the arbitration decision.” Slip op. at 2 (quoting Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 4). The Court dismissed the case because White did not amend his petition to make those allegations but granted leave for White “to ‘articulate the basis for his claim that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,’ among other possible amendments.” Slip op. at 2 (quoting Dkt. No. 47).

White’s amended petition “include[d] the hay dealer and stable operator losses mentioned in his declaration[,]” and “contend[ed] that the losses were ‘a direct result of [the arbitrator’s] decision, which upheld the sanction of lifetime ineligibility to participate in the sport.’” Slip op. at 2 (quoting Dkt. No. 48 ¶ 10).

Discussion: No Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Petition to Vacate

Focusing on the allegation that the losses directly resulted from the arbitrator “upheld[ing]” the ban, the Court found White’s amended subject-matter jurisdiction allegations to be flawed. “Vacating the arbitration decision or remanding for new arbitration proceedings,” said the Court, “which is the sole relief White seeks in the amended petition, might start the arbitration process anew, but it would not overrule or otherwise reverse the ban imposed by SafeSport.” Slip op. at 2 (record citation omitted).

“The SafeSport ban[,]” explained the Court, “remains in full effect unless an arbitrator were to decide otherwise, which has not happened.” Slip op. at 2. Even if the Court vacated the award, that “would not restore to White the income he says he lost in his hay and stables businesses.” Slip op. at 2. White would not recover any of its losses because, even in the event of vacatur, the lifetime ban would remain effective. Slip op. at 3.

The Court explained that where, as here, an action seeks “nonmonetary relief, ‘the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.’” Slip op. at 3 (quoting Maine Community Health Options v. Albertsons Cos., Inc., 993 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 2021))(quotation and citation omitted).

The Court concluded that White had failed to satisfy his burden to show that the amount in controversy requirement had been met “because a remand for further arbitration proceedings would not terminate or reverse the SafeSport ban, and would not restore the lost income White alleges. . . .” Slip op. at 3 (citations omitted).

White argued that Badgerow’s requirement that “the determination of subject matter jurisdiction over petitions to vacate under the FAA looks only to ‘the face of the application itself[,]’” Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 9, was inapplicable. According to White, that requirement applied only when the basis for the petition was federal question, as it was in Badgerow. Slip op. at 3. But the Court said “there is no good reason why an FAA petition based on diversity jurisdiction should be treated any differently[]” from one falling under federal question jurisdiction, and White offered none. Slip op. at 3.

But the Court did not decide whether or not White’s argument might have merit “because, as discussed, White’s petition comes up short under established principles of diversity jurisdiction.” Slip op. at 3.

The Court also pointed out that White’s reliance on Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2005), was misplaced. Theis was a legal malpractice case in which the arbitrator awarded no monetary relief to either side. The client plaintiff filed in federal court a notice of motion to vacate, an application to vacate and a complaint seeking more than $200 million in damages. The defendant law firm moved to confirm the award. The Court denied the motion to vacate, granted the motion to confirm and entered summary judgment for the law firm on the complaint.

The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction based on “‘the amount at stake in the underlying litigation.’” Slip op. at 4 (quoting 400 F.3d at 662-65.) “Because[,]” said the Court, the [Theis] plaintiff ‘sought to obtain by its district court complaint substantially what it had sought to obtain in the arbitration,’ the circuit court had no trouble concluding that the prayer for more than $200 million in damages established the required amount in controversy.” Slip op. at 4 (quoting 400 F.3d at 662-65).

The Court said the circumstances here were completely different in that there were no damages claims before the arbitrator, and that, in any event, “[i]t is also not clear that Theis survives Badgerow and its rejection of the ‘look-through’ approach to subject matter jurisdiction.” Slip op. at 4 (citing Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 9). We are not sure that is necessarily so because Theis involved a claim seeking more than $200 million damages, and the amount in controversy was not solely based (and did not have to be based) on the amount in controversy in the arbitration but on the $200 million-plus amount the complaint sought.

The Court found that granting further leave to amend was unwarranted and “dismissed [the case] on jurisdictional grounds without prejudice to a vacatur proceeding in state court, as circumstances might permit.”  Slip op. at 4.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has nearly 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act or state arbitration law, as well as in insurance or reinsurance-related and other matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

 Photo Acknowledgment

The photos featured in this post were licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

 

Ineffective Objections and Untimely Filings Lead to FAA Forfeiture: Sivanesan v. YBF, LLC, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4327 (2d Dep’t 2024)

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Objections Must be Timely and Effective in Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Including Litigation Relating to Consulting AgreementsA good chunk of FAA practice and procedure —including FAA practice and procedure in state court—involves knowing when, how, and why to make timely and effective objections and filings in arbitration enforcement litigation.  Sivanesan v. YBF, LLC, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4327 (2d Dep’t 2024), which New York’s Appellate Division, Second Department, decided on August 28, 2024, illustrates this point well.

Appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement, did not agree to arbitrate any matters, and did not clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. But the Court found that they participated in the arbitration without lodging adequate objections to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and did not timely file in the confirmation litigation their petition to vacate the awards at issue. Accordingly, the Appellants were—by their participation in the arbitration without effective objections to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction—deemed to have impliedly consented to arbitrate all issues before the arbitrator, including whether they were bound by the contract and arbitration agreement as successors-in-interest. Not a happy place to be.

Background

The transactions pertinent to Sivanesan began in 2008 when YBF, LLC (“YBF”) sold to Cosmetics Specialties, East LLC (“CSE”) an exclusive license to Continue Reading »

Sanctions: Seventh Circuit Awards $40,000 in FRAP 38 Fees and Costs in Zurich v. Sun Holdings Case

August 28th, 2024 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Attorney Fee Shifting, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Confirmed, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Confirm Award | Exceeding Powers, Exceeding Powers, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, FAA Section 9, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, Section 9, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Attorney Fees, Vacate Award | Attorney's Fees, Vacate Award | Exceeding Powers, Vacate Award | Excess of Powers, Vacatur No Comments »

sanctionsWe previously discussed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Zurich Ins. Co. v. Sun Holdings, Inc., 103 F.4th 475 (7th Cir. 2024) (Easterbrook, J.), in which the award challenger Sun Holdings, Inc. (“Sun Holdings”) claimed that the arbitrators exceeded their powers by imposing as sanctions a $175,000.00 attorney fee award, which they claimed, among other things, was barred by the language of the contract. (See our prior post, here.) The problem was that the arbitrators at least arguably interpreted the language in question and concluded that it did not bar the award of attorney fees in question. And the attorney fee  award comported with New York law and the American Arbitration Association Commercial Rules, both of which the parties made part of their agreement.

The challenger further undermined its position by not acknowledging the existence of controlling Seventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court authority and engaging in the arbitration proceedings what the Seventh Circuit believed was recalcitrant behavior. The challenger compounded that by attempting to second guess various determinations made by the arbitrators.

That this strategy backfired, exposing Sun Holdings to sanctions, is not surprising. It resulted in the Court issuing an order to show cause providing the challenger 14 days “to show cause why sanctions, including but not limited to an award of attorneys’ fees, should not be imposed for this frivolous appeal.” Zurich, slip op. at 5 (citing Fed. R. App. P. 38).

The Court,  on July 1, 2024,  after considering Sun Holdings challenger’s response to the order to show cause, determined that Fed. R. App. P. (“FRAP”) 38 sanctions were warranted.  The Court “conclude[d] that Sun Holdings must compensate American Zurich for the legal fees and other costs that it was unnecessarily forced to incur by Sun’s unnecessary appeal.” July 3, 2024, Order, No 23-3134, Dkt. 42 at 1 of 2 (7th Cir. July 3, 2024) (available on PACER).

In response to the Order to Show Cause, Sun Holdings argued “that it did not litigate in bad faith because it was entitled to contest the Second Circuit’s understanding of New York law, as represented in ReliaStar Life Insurance Co. v. EMC National Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 86-89 (2d Cir. 2009).” Dk. 42 at 1 of 2. (Our posts on ReliaStar are here and here.)

“But[,]” said the Court, “the dominant theme of [Sun Holdings’] brief in this court was that we should review and reject the arbitrators’ interpretation of its contract with American Zurich. That line of argument is incompatible with an agreement to arbitrate, as our opinion explains.” Dk. 42 at 1 of 2. The Court proceeded to quote in further support the following passage from its opinion:

[A]s if to highlight the fact that it disdains the limits on judicial review of arbitral awards, Sun wants us to reexamine the arbitrators’ conclusion that it engaged in frivolous conduct (it was “just putting on a defense,” Sun insists) and wants us to say that the arbitrators overestimated the amount of excess fees that American Zurich was compelled to incur. These arguments are unrelated to contractual meaning. They are unabashed requests to contradict the arbitrators’ findings, something the Federal Arbitration Act forbids.

Dk.42 at 2 of 2 (quoting  American Zurich Ins. Co. v. Sun Holdings, Inc. 103 F.4th 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2024) (Easterbrook, J.)).

The Court said “Sun Holdings’ response to our order to show cause does not address that baseless aspect of its appellate argument.” Dk. 42 at 2 of 2. Sanctions, concluded the Court, would be imposed.

Having determined that FRAP 38 sanctions were warranted, the Court ordered American Zurich “to file a statement of the fees and costs incurred in defending its judgment,” giving Sun Holdings an opportunity to respond.

American Zurich originally sought $46,300.30 in fees and costs, but amended its statement to seek $75,250.80. August 21, 2024, Fees and Costs Order, No 23-3134, Dkt. 47 at 1 -2 of 2 (7th Cir. August 21, 2024) (available on PACER).

But the Court ordered Sun Holdings to “pay $40,000 to American Zurich as compensation for this frivolous appeal.” Dkt. 47 at 2 of 2. The Court said that it “declined to award the full amount sought by American Zurich[]” because “[a]n award exceeding [$40,000.00] is difficult to justify, given that much of the legal work should have preceded the appeal and we are not awarding fees for legal work in the district court.” Dkt. 47 at 2 of 2.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has nearly 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

 Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

D.C. Circuit Says it has No Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Competing Claims to Confirm or Vacate Award Made Pursuant to Collective Bargaining Agreement   

August 21st, 2024 Application to Confirm, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Labor Arbitration, Labor Law, LMRA Section 301, LMRA Section 301(a), Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit No Comments »

Subject-Matter JurisdictionWe’ve made over the last several months months a point of discussing arbitration-enforcement litigation cases addressing the subject-matter jurisdiction because—particularly in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)—it is not only complex but frequently  counterintuitive. (See here, here, and here.) This case— International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Consol Energy Inc., ___ F.4d ___, No. 22-7110, slip op. (D.C. Cir. August 9, 2024)—caught our eye because the Court held that that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff on one ground and over the defendants’ counterclaim on an independent ground, Article III standing.

Background

The United Mine Workers of America (the “Union”) and coal mining companies (the “Mining Companies”), all subsidiaries of  Consol Energy, Inc. (“Consol”), signed a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”)  but Consol did not. The CBA provided for arbitration of grievances. It also provided to Union members lifetime health care benefits. The Union claims that the Mining Companies could not reduce benefits unilaterally, even if a member no longer mined coal.

For its part Consol was the Mining Companies’ health care administrator. Prior to the CBA’s expiration date, Consol informed the Mining Companies’ mining employees that Consol would consider modifying miner benefits once the CBA expired.

That prompted a retired miner to file a grievance against Consol, an arbitration followed, and with the support of the Union, the miner obtained an award in his favor. The arbitrators determined they had jurisdiction over Consol, a nonsignatory to the CBA, which by the time the arbitration took place, had expired. They also determined that the proposed benefit modifications would violate the CBA and made an award that prohibited Consol from making them.

The Union brought against Consol and the Mining Companies an action in district court to confirm the award, invoking Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) Section 301(a)’s grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over actions “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Consul and the Mining Companies brought a separate action to vacate the award, and the district court consolidated the two cases.

Prior to the district court reaching its decision Consol was split into two successor entities and otherwise ceased to exist. One of the two was joined but the district court dismissed it because its business did not concern coal mining. The other successor entity (the parent of the Mining Companies) was never made a party. The Mining Companies remained parties to the consolidated action.

The district court dismissed on standing grounds the Union’s confirmation action. It found the Union suffered no injury because there was no CBA violation. While Consul proposed to modify benefits it never did so. But the district court nevertheless determined on the merits that there was no basis for vacating the award, either. An appeal by both parties followed.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The D.C. Circuit’s Decision

The D.C. Court of Appeals determined that “[n]o party in this appeal has shown that federal courts have jurisdiction over its claim.” United Mine Workers, slip op. at 8. It therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Union’s claim, vacated the district court’s determination on the merits of the vacatur counterclaim, and remanded the counterclaim with instructions to dismiss it on standing grounds. Id.

The District Court had No Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Confirm the Award

Continue Reading »

Attorney Fees: Seventh Circuit to Consider Whether Exceeding Powers Challenge to Arbitrators’ Attorney’s Fees Award Warrants FRAP 38 Sanctions

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Introduction

Attorney's Fees | Contract InterpretationMost challenges to arbitration awards—including attorney fees awards— fail because the standards of review are so demanding. The bar is exceedingly high by design. Otherwise—the reasoning goes—courts would “open[] the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (citations and quotations omitted; some parenthetical material in original).

But the narrow margin for success is not a free pass for challengers to advance arguments that do not, in a court’s view, have a legitimate, good faith basis in the facts and the law, or in a reasonable argument for reversal or modification of the law.

A recent case in point is Circuit Judge Easterbrook’s decision in American Zurich Ins. Co. v. Sun Holdings, Inc., No. 23-3134, slip op. at 1 (7th Cir. June 3, 2024) (Easterbrook, J.). The award challenger claimed the arbitrators exceeded their power by imposing as a sanction an award of $175,000.00 in attorney fees because the contract allegedly barred such an attorney fees award. The problem was that the arbitrators at least arguably interpreted the language in question and concluded that it did not bar the award of attorney fees in question. Moreover,  the attorney fees  award comported with New York law and the American Arbitration Association Commercial Rules, both of which the parties made part of their agreement.

The Seventh Circuit has signaled that it believes there was no good faith basis for the challenge and that the challenger has offered none, apart from its insistence that its interpretation was the only one even barely plausible. The challenger appears to have further undermined its litigation position by engaging in what the Seventh Circuit believes was recalcitrant behavior in the arbitration proceedings, and, according to the Court, not acknowledging the existence of controlling Seventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court authority controverting its position. The challenger compounded that by asserting—contrary to FAA Sections 10 and 11— additional award challenges that the Court concluded were simply attempts to second guess various determinations made by the arbitrators.

That this strategy backfired should come as no surprise. It resulted in the Court issuing an order to show cause providing the challenger 14 days “to show cause why sanctions, including but not limited to an award of attorneys’ fees, should not be imposed for this frivolous appeal.” Zurich, slip op. at 5 (citing Fed. R. App. P. 38). At the time of this writing no decision has been made by the Court concerning whether it will, in fact, impose sanctions.

Background: The Award of Attorney Fees

Petitioner Sun Holdings, Inc. (“Sun” or the “Award Challenger”) is a Texas- Continue Reading »

SCOTUS Decides Spizzirri, Saying that FAA Section 3 Stays of Litigation Pending Arbitration are Mandatory if Requested

May 21st, 2024 Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Practice, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 16, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Look Through, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Section 16, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Stay Pending Appeal, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Textualism, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on SCOTUS Decides Spizzirri, Saying that FAA Section 3 Stays of Litigation Pending Arbitration are Mandatory if Requested

Section 3 Stay of LitigationOn May 16, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) in Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. ___, No 22-1218, slip op. (U.S. May 16, 2024), decided 9-0 that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) does not “permit[] a court to dismiss the case instead of issuing a stay when the dispute is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay pending arbitration.” 601 U.S. at ___; slip op. at 1.

In an opinion written by Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court concluded that the “text, structure, and purpose” of Section 3 and the FAA all “point to the same conclusion: When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration , the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.” 601 U.S. at ___, slip op. at 3. The Court therefore held that if a lawsuit “involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a Section 3 stay, the Court must stay the litigation. 601 U.S. at ___; slip op. at 6.

The Court’s opinion resolves a long-standing and deepening split in the circuits, which the Court left open in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 87 n.2 (2000), and Lamps Plus v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 181 n.1 (2019). That split in the circuits is discussed in note 1 of the Court’s opinion. 601 U.S. at ___ n.1, slip op. at 2-3 n.1 (citing cases).

Background

The underlying merits litigation that resulted in an order granting a motion to compel arbitration—but a dismissal despite the request for a Section 3 stay— was a state court action between current and former drivers for a delivery service and the operators of that service. Claims were made under state and federal employment laws based on alleged misclassification of the drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. Claimants sought damages for sick leave and overtime wages.

Defendants removed the case to federal district court in Arizona and moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the action. Claimants conceded arbitrability but argued that the action should be stayed under Section 3.

Ninth circuit precedent granted district courts considering an application to stay litigation under Section 3 the discretion to either stay or dismiss the action. Relying on that precedent, the district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that all claims in the litigation had been ordered to arbitration.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but two judges concurred, suggesting that this Ninth Circuit precedent was wrong and that SCOTUS should resolve the split in the circuits concerning whether a requested Section 3 stay was mandatory when claims in the litigation are subject to arbitration and a stay is requested.

SCOTUS granted certiorari, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and resolved the split. Continue Reading »

Weighing the “Jurisdictional Anchor”: Post-Badgerow Second Circuit Subject Matter Jurisdiction Requirements for Applications to Confirm, Modify, or Vacate Arbitration Awards

November 13th, 2023 Amount in Controversy, Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Practice, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Confirm, Application to Enforce Arbitral Summons, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitral Subpoenas, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Confirmation of Awards, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, FAA Section 16, Federal Arbitration Act 202, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 202, Federal Arbitration Act Section 203, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Section 5, Federal Arbitration Act Section 7, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Modify or Correct Award, Motion to Compel Arbitration, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Petition to Enforce Arbitral Summons, Petition to Modify Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Section 10, Section 11, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Section 5, Section 7, Section 9, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off on Weighing the “Jurisdictional Anchor”: Post-Badgerow Second Circuit Subject Matter Jurisdiction Requirements for Applications to Confirm, Modify, or Vacate Arbitration Awards

Jurisdictional Anchor | Subject Matter JurisdictionThe U.S. Supreme Court decision, Badgerow v. Walters, 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022) (discussed here), requires that an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (usually diversity) must appear on the face of petitions to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards, and, by extension, petitions to enforce arbitral subpoenas or appoint arbitrators. See Badgerow, 142 S. Ct. at 1314, 1320. That independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction cannot be established by “looking through” to the underlying arbitration proceeding. In other words, the federal court cannot base subject matter jurisdiction on whether the court would have had subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of the controversy had they been submitted it to court rather than to arbitration.  See Badgerow, 142 S. Ct. at 1314, 1320.

Badgerow does not change the rule that federal question jurisdiction over a Section 4 petition to compel arbitration can be established by “looking through” to the underlying dispute that is or is claimed to be subject to arbitration. 142 S. Ct. at 1314; see  Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 53 (2009); Hermès of Paris, Inc. v. Swain, 867 F.3d 321, 324-26 (2d Cir. 2017) (diversity of citizenship not determined by “look through”).

Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act expressly authorizes a Court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction on that basis: “A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4; see Badgerow, 142 S. Ct. at 1317.

Unlike Section 4, Sections 5 (appointment of arbitrators), 7 (arbitral subpoena enforcement), 9 (confirmation of awards), 10 (vacatur of awards), and 11 (modification of awards), do not expressly authorize the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction on a “look through” basis.  See 142 S. Ct. at 1317-18; 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, & 11.

Badgerow, in the specific context of an action commenced by petition to vacate an award under FAA Section 10—which, in turn, prompted a cross-petition to confirm under FAA Section 9—held that the absence in Sections 9 and 10 of Section 4’s express language authorizing subject matter jurisdiction based on “look through” meant that Congress did not authorize “look through” subject matter jurisdiction for Section 9 and 10 claims (and presumably for claims seeking relief under Sections 5, 7, or 11). See 142 S. Ct. at 1319.

An independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction is required, and in the absence of a federal question appearing on the face of the petition (such as a claim for relief under Chapter Two of the FAA, see 9 U.S.C. § 203; 28 U.S.C. § 1331), the only possible basis for subject matter jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). And there could be no diversity jurisdiction in Badgerow because the parties to the petitions were citizens of the same state. See 142 S. Ct. at 1316.

Badgerow’s reasoning certainly applies to independent, summary proceedings in which the only relief sought is under the FAA. But does it apply with equal force where litigation on the merits of an arbitrable or allegedly arbitrable dispute has commenced, and the motion to compel arbitration is made by motion in the pending action, which is stayed pending arbitration? Can the stayed merits litigation act as what former Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in his Badgerow dissent, referred to as a “jurisdictional anchor” for not only the motion to compel arbitration, but also other subsequent applications for pre- or post-award FAA relief relating to the arbitration?  See Badgerow, 142 S. Ct. at 1326 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

That is an open question in the Second Circuit after Badgerow, although pre-Badgerow the answer was yes. Let’s look at it more closely and try to get a sense of how the Second Circuit might rule on it considering Badgerow. Continue Reading »

Subject Matter Jurisdiction in FAA Proceedings: Eighth Circuit Demonstrates It’s a Trap for the Unwary

August 23rd, 2023 Amount in Controversy, Application to Compel Arbitration, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Award Vacated, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Confirmation of Awards, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Section 5, Federal Arbitration Act Section 7, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Look Through, or Modify Award, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Petition to Enforce Arbitral Summons, Petition to Modify Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Section 10, Section 11, Section 4, Section 5, Section 7, Section 9, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Comments Off on Subject Matter Jurisdiction in FAA Proceedings: Eighth Circuit Demonstrates It’s a Trap for the Unwary

Introduction

Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Petition to Confirm | Petition to Vacate The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently decided a case that provides a good—and simple—example of how subject matter jurisdiction can be a trap for the unwary, especially for parties seeking to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). In Prospect Funding Holdings (N.Y.) v. Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., No. 22-1871, slip op. (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 2023), the Eighth Circuit vacated a district court’s judgment vacating two arbitration awards because the petitioner failed to plead the citizenship of the parties and therefore could not establish the requisite independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. But there was more to it than that. Continue Reading »