In a case arising under Section 301 of the NLRA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “determine[d] whether an arbitration award failed to draw its essence from the agreement when an arbitrator ignored the parties’ agreed upon procedural rules for conducting the arbitration.” Advantage Veterans Servs. of Walterboro, LLC v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l, Local 7898, No. 22-1268, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. June 15, 2023). The Fourth Circuit said, “[u]nder the language of the agreement here, the answer is yes[,]” and— reversing the district court’s order—vacated the award. Slip op. at 2 & 12.
Advantage Veterans is a proverbial breath of fresh air for those who wish—by way of clear, unambiguous, and precise contract language—to circumscribe the authority of arbitrators by conditioning the enforceability of an award on compliance with certain clear procedural rules. That is not to say it authorizes vacatur of an award every time the arbitrator does not comply with a clear procedural rule set forth in (or incorporated by) an arbitration agreement. The doctrine of procedural arbitrability counsels deference to an arbitrator’s procedural decisions that even arguably represent the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract, and disputes concerning arbitrator failure to comply with procedural provisions are frequently disposed of on that basis. See, e.g., BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 27-29, 33-36 (2014).
But at least where parties expressly condition enforceability of an award on compliance with a clear procedural rule, Advantage Veterans gives life to the parties’ clearly expressed intent that an arbitration to take place only as explicitly prescribed. Continue Reading »
Introduction: Arbitrator Disclosure and Evident Partiality
Part II of our Businesspersons’ Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) FAQ guide on evident partiality discussed evident partiality standards and how they are designed to enforce the parties’ expectations of neutrality without significantly undermining the finality of arbitration awards. (See Part II.) This Part III discusses arbitrator disclosure procedures and requirements and how, as a matter of arbitration procedure, they implement evident partiality standards and facilitate judicial determination of whether an arbitrator is guilty of evident partiality. It also provides a list of certain U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals cases that have either held that an arbitrator was guilty of evident partiality or remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on evident partiality.
Evident Partiality and Disclosure: Presumed v. Actual Bias
“Evident partiality” challenges typically arise out of one of two scenarios. First, there are “presumed bias” cases in which the arbitrator’s relationships or interests would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator is biased, even though the challenger cannot prove actual bias.
Second, and considerably less frequently, there are evident partiality challenges based on allegations of actual bias. Suppose a neutral said on the record during the proceedings prior to deliberations: “Party A, frankly I have distrusted your company’s business motives for many years before I was appointed arbitrator in this matter, but hearing your witnesses’ testimony has simply confirmed what I’ve known all along.” While the chances of an arbitrator making such a statement (let alone on the record!) are exceedingly slim to non-existent, it would provide the basis for an evident partiality challenge (which would probably succeed) based on proof of actual bias. SeeMorelite v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984).
The difference between “presumed” and “actual” bias (or prejudice) is essentially one of proof. As its name suggests, “presumed” bias is established by circumstantial evidence, principally relationships or interests, that supports a sufficiently powerful inference of bias. For example, direct evidence of the arbitrator having a material financial interest in the outcome of an arbitration is strong circumstantial evidence that the arbitrator, whether he or she is conscious of it or not, would, as a matter of human nature and experience, likely be predisposed to rule in a way that advanced that financial interest. James Madison’s famous words in Federalist 10 sum it up well: “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” The Federalist No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison)); see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009).
Of course, there is at least a possibility that an arbitrator might not be swayed by her interest in the outcome. Therefore, direct evidence of interest in the outcome does not prove directly that the interested arbitrator was biased or prejudiced. But the inference of bias or prejudice caused by a financial or personal interest in the outcome is sufficiently strong that the Second Circuit, and other circuits, consider clear evidence of an arbitrator’s personal or financial interest in the outcome to be sufficient to establish evident partiality. They require proof of “presumed,” not “actual,” bias.
“Actual bias” (or “actual prejudice”) is established when there is direct evidence that the arbitrator harbored an inappropriate disposition against one party or in favor of another. Since bias and prejudice is a state of mind, direct evidence is exceedingly rare. SeeMorelite, 748 F.2d at 84 (“Bias is always difficult, and indeed often impossible, to ‘prove.’ Unless an arbitrator publicly announces his partiality, or is overheard in a moment of private admission, it is difficult to imagine how ‘proof’ would be obtained.”)
Our focus will be on “presumed bias” cases because they understandably arise with greater frequency. Because judicial evident partiality standards, including the Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard, require a showing less than actual bias, evidence of actual bias sufficient to establish evident partiality would necessarily establish evident partiality under the “reasonable person” standard.
Implementing Evident Partiality Standards Through the Disclosure Process
The now-familiar requirement that arbitrators disclose at the outset of the proceedings non-trivial conflicts of interest (such as a significant, ongoing business relationship with one of the parties) and any other relevant information bearing on the arbitrator’s ability to meet the parties’ expectations of neutrality, was developed to address practical challenges arbitration parties face, facilitate implementation of evident partiality standards, and provide a framework for courts to assess evident partiality claims. Continue Reading »
We’ve seen how the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes confirmation and enforcement of various domestic and foreign arbitration awards falling within its scope. (Seehere, here, here, andhere.) Let’s look at what the Federal Arbitration Act has to say about vacating, modifying, or correcting awards.
The Federal Arbitration Act also provides some limited remedies for challenging arbitration awards where a party can show certain kinds of unusual and material violations of an arbitration agreement by an arbitrator or an opposing party, or an obvious mathematical, typographical, or technical error that appears on the face of the award. These remedies are orders: (a) modifying or correcting the award under Section 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act; or (b) vacating the award in whole or in part under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Vacating an Award under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act
An arbitration award is effectively a contract resulting from the performance of one or more other contracts, including the pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate and the post-dispute submission to arbitration. Two parties agree to appoint arbitrators, submit their dispute to arbitration and abide by the award. The parties ordinarily consent to entry of judgment on the award, and it can be confirmed under Sections 9 or 207 of the Federal Arbitration Act (or a state law equivalent when the Federal Arbitration Act doesn’t apply). Alternatively, it may be enforced through the plenary and summary procedures that apply to ordinary contracts (subject to any special rules governing arbitration awards).
So what happens when things go awry—or at least seem to have gone awry—and the arbitration award is or appears to be fundamentally unfair, divorced from the contract or the result of fraud, bias, or some form of prejudicial misconduct on the part of the arbitrators? Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides a modest safety net in the form of a motion or petition to vacate the award. (State arbitration statutes and law applicable in actions to enforce arbitration awards generally provide similar recourse, but our focus here is on the Federal Arbitration Act.)
Arbitrators are human and occasionally they make awards that cannot be squared with logic and law, and courts may, in appropriate circumstances, vacate those awards as being in manifest the agreement, or in some circuits, in manifest disregard of the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered such an award in Weiss v. Sallie Mae, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-2362, slip op. (Sept. 12, 2019), and solved the problem in a way that imposed minimal costs and delay on the parties and, at the same time, gave effect to the parties’ reasonable contractual expectations, including that the arbitrator would make an award with a colorable basis in the law or the parties’ agreement, not one in manifest disregard of the law or the agreement. It is therefore a good example of a case that promotes arbitration as an alternative to litigation.
Background
W is a student-loan borrower who in 2011 defaulted on a loan issued by S (N is the successor of S, but we shall refer to both as “S”). W gave S her phone number (“Phone Number 1”) when she obtained the loan and consented to S contacting her via an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). S made ATDS calls to her using Phone Number 1 prior to her default on the loan in 2011.
Also prior to her 2011 default W obtained a second telephone number (“Phone Number 2”) but did not give S consent to contact her on that number via an ATDS.
After W’s 2011 default, S contacted W seven or eight times a day at Phone Number 2 via an ATDS, attempting to collect the debt. S made 774 ATDS calls to Phone Number 2 during the period September 16, 2011 through July 1, 2013.
The Arbitration
A dispute arose between W and S about whether S’s ATDS calls had violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and W commenced an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The action was stayed after the parties stipulated to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a student-loan promissory note.
The Award: Was it in Manifest Disregard of the Law or the Agreement?
Following a hearing an arbitrator made an award granting W $108,000 in statutory damages under the TCPA. But the award held that W was a class member in a class action that S had settled. The class-action settlement (the “Arthur Settlement”) “included as a class member, ‘any person who received ATDS calls from [S] between October 27, 2005 and September 14, 2010.’” Slip op. at 5 (citation omitted).
W did not contend that the calls S made to Phone Number 1 violated the TCPA (W had consented to those calls), and W contended that, accordingly, she was not bound by the settlement, even though she had received ATDS on Phone Number 1 during the specified period. The arbitrator, however, found that argument “‘unpersuasive,’” and “ruled that Weiss was a class member and that ‘the proof was conclusive that [S] provided [W] with the required notice of the settlement and of her rights and obligations under the terms of the settlement.’” Slip op. at 5-6 (citation omitted).
The Arthur Settlement “notice offered class members the opportunity to file a ‘consent Revocation’ document by September 15, 2012; absent such a filing, ‘the ATDS calls would not stop and the borrower’s prior consent to give them [sic] would be deemed to have been given.’” Slip op. at 6 (citation omitted; bracketed text in original).
While W contended that she was not aware of the Arthur Settlement, S testified that notice was successfully emailed to W.
The agreement implementing the Arthur Settlement featured a general release, “under which class members were ‘deemed to have fully released and forever discharged [S]’. . . from any and all claims and causes of action, inter alia, ‘that arise out of or are related in any way to the use of an [ATDS]. . . used by any of the Released Parties in connection with efforts to contact or attempt to contact Settlement Class Members including, but not limited to, claims under or for violations of the [TCPA].’” Slip op. at 6 (citations omitted; some bracketed text in original).
Even though the general release, to which the arbitrator determined W was bound, deemed W to have “waived ‘any and all’ TCPA claims effective the date of final judgment in the Arthur Settlement action[,]” the arbitrator’s award did not acknowledge the existence of that release. Slip op. at 6-7. “Instead,” said the Court, “the arbitrator interpreted [W]’s failure to submit a consent revocation pursuant to the Arthur class notice as precluding recovery for any calls placed to [Phone Number 2] after the September 15, 2012 deadline but also as permitting recovery for ATDS calls placed to [Phone Number 2] between September 6, 2011, and September 16, 2012.” Slip op. at 7.
The arbitrator awarded TCPA statutory damages in the amount of $108,500 ($500 per call for 217 calls during the applicable period). W moved to confirm the award and S cross-moved to vacate it.
The district court vacated the award, finding that “by neglecting to ‘apply—or even address—an explicit, unambiguous term of the settlement agreement,’ which “clearly and unambiguously bars recovery for claims until and including the date of the agreement,’ the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.” Slip op. at 7. W appealed.
In Steyn v. CRTV, LLC (In re Steyn), 175 A.D. 3d 1 (1st Dep’t 2019), New York’s Appellate Division, First Department decided a case falling under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) that involved two challenges: one to an award of attorney fees on manifest disregard of the law grounds, and the other to an award that a nonsignatory obtained by joining the petitioner’s counterclaim.
The Court rejected the manifest-disregard challenge to the attorney fee award in favor of a signatory to the arbitration agreement, but held that the trial court should have vacated the award made in favor of a nonsignatory (which included both damages and attorney fees).
Background: Attorney Fee and Arbitrability Challenges
The appeal arose out of a
contract “dispute between Mark Steyn, a renowned author and television and
radio personality, and CRTV, an online television network, currently known as
BlazeTV, which features conservative commentators such as Glenn Beck and Phil
Robertson.” 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 5341, at *2. We’ll call Steyn the “Host” and
CRTV the “Network.”
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