At issue in VIP Mortgage, Inc. v. Gates, ___ F.4th ___, No. 24-7624, slip op. at 1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), was the Ninth Circuit’s so-called “legally dispositive facts” doctrine—which recognizes a rare exception to the rule that courts may not vacate awards for even egregious mistakes of fact. We have discussed in numerous other posts how the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) generally does not permit courts to review arbitration awards for factual or legal error and permits vacatur only on exceedingly narrow grounds, including “manifest disregard of the agreement,” and in some jurisdictions, “manifest disregard of the law.” (See, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here; here, & here.)
Under the Ninth Circuit’s “legally dispositive facts” doctrine courts will vacate an award if the challenger shows: (1) the factual error was dispositive to the legal issue and (2) the arbitrator knew about the undisputed fact when deciding the issue. VIP Mortgage, slip op. at 9. The VIP Mortgage award challenger satisfied the first prong: the parties had previously stipulated to bear their own legal fees and the award of fees to the award defending party directly contravened the stipulation. If that’s all that mattered then the award challenger would have had a strong argument for vacatur under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 668–69, 684 (2010).
But the award challenger failed the second prong, making the case a clear candidate for confirmation. Neither the award challenger nor the award defender brought the stipulation to the arbitrator’s attention. The arbitrator, without the benefit of the stipulation, interpreted what she believed the contract said. She did her job, the parties’ pre-award argument did not rely on (or, as far we can tell, even mention) the stipulation, and the award accordingly could not be vacated.
The first four of those questions were answered in our October 18, October 21, and November 12, 2024, posts. This November 14, 2024, post answers the fifth question: “If there is a [United States Court of Appeals for the] Seventh Circuit appeal of the UpHealth decision, is it likely the decision will be overturned on appeal, and if so, on what grounds?”
We explained in our November 12, 2024, post that UpHealth has appealed the district court decision to the Seventh Circuit. And if you’ve been reading our prior UpHealth posts, then you’ve probably already guessed that the answer is “yes,” it seems likely the Seventh Circuit will reverse the UpHealth decision.
In terms of the grounds, for such a reversal, we think the Seventh Circuit will probably conclude that the only forms of outcome review the Seventh Circuit recognizes is manifest disregard of the contract and violation of public policy, and that UpHealth involves neither of those grounds. That is all the more so where, as here, there is no agreement or concession concerning the allegedly mistaken fact. (See November 12, 2024, post.)
We discussed all of these shortcomings in the UpHealth Court’s analysis in our October 7, 18, 21, and November 12, 2024, posts. We believe that the Seventh Circuit will probably also conclude that the UpHealth court erred by vacating the award in part, particularly since the Seventh Circuit recognizes outcome review in extremely narrow circumstances only and none of those circumstances are present here—where the district court has, for intents and purposes, second-guessed the arbitrator’s fact finding.
It will be interesting to see how the appellee (Damodaran) attempts to square the district court’s decision with Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court authority. We will continue to watch the appeal and report on significant developments.
Contacting the Author
If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.
Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has nearly 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
Photo Acknowledgment
The image featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.
What is the difference, if any, between a “clear mistake of historical fact” and a “conceded nonfact?”
What is or should be required to establish a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact?”
Assuming Section 10(a)(4) authorizes courts to vacate awards based on a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact,” did the UpHealth district court err by holding that the award against Damodaran was based on a nonfact?
Assuming that the district correctly applied the “conceded nonfact” standard, does it comport with the FAA?
If there is a Seventh Circuit appeal of the UpHealth decision, is it likely the decision will be overturned on appeal, and if so, on what grounds?
That October 18, 2024 post went on to address questions 1 and 2. This Part II address the third question: “Assuming Section 10(a)(4) authorizes courts to vacate awards based on a “clear mistake of historical fact” or a “conceded nonfact,” did the UpHealth district court err by holding that the award against Damodaran was based on a nonfact?” The author thinks the answer is “yes.” One or more subsequent posts will answer questions 4 and 5.
Discussion
Assuming Section 10(a)(4) Authorizes Courts to Vacate Awards Based on a “Clear Mistake of Historical Fact” or a “Conceded Nonfact,” did the UpHealth District Court Err by Holding that the Award against Damodaran was Based on a Nonfact?
The UpHealth Court’s application of the “mistake of historical fact” or “conceded nonfact” standard raises serious questions about whether the Court substituted its judgment for that of the arbitrators. On balance, the author thinks it did for the reasons set forth below (which presume familiarity with our October 7, 2024, and our October 18, 2024, posts).
There are at least three flaws in the Court’s analysis: Continue Reading »
An arbitration award may be vacated for “manifest disregard of the agreement” if the award does not draw its essence from the contract and instead reflects the arbitrator’s own notions of economic or industrial justice. (See, e.g., here, here, here, here.) Such an award exceeds the arbitrator’s powers within the meaning of Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) and federal common law in Labor Management Relations Act Section 301 cases (which tracks Section 10(a)(4)).
Arbitration awards do not qualify for vacatur under this manifest disregard of the agreement standard unless the arbitrator did not even arguably interpret the agreement. And if you have any doubts about how much extensive leeway arbitrators have to “arguably interpret” contracts, go back and review the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 566-70 (2013).
The margins for a reasonable argument for manifest disregard of the agreement vacatur are slim, for once the arbitrator offers—or the award is otherwise susceptible to—an even barely plausible interpretation supporting the arbitrator’s award, then it’s game over, even if the barely plausible interpretation is one a court would almost certainly not adopt as its own.
The award before the Court in StoneMor, was the product of an arbitrator who “did just that[,]” and the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment vacating that award—an award which resulted from manifest disregard of the agreement. Slip op. at 6 & 3. Because the Court was able to conclude that the award was not based on—and did not otherwise reflect—an even barely colorable interpretation of the contract, vacatur was warranted. Continue Reading »
Arbitrators are human and occasionally they make awards that cannot be squared with logic and law, and courts may, in appropriate circumstances, vacate those awards as being in manifest the agreement, or in some circuits, in manifest disregard of the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered such an award in Weiss v. Sallie Mae, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-2362, slip op. (Sept. 12, 2019), and solved the problem in a way that imposed minimal costs and delay on the parties and, at the same time, gave effect to the parties’ reasonable contractual expectations, including that the arbitrator would make an award with a colorable basis in the law or the parties’ agreement, not one in manifest disregard of the law or the agreement. It is therefore a good example of a case that promotes arbitration as an alternative to litigation.
Background
W is a student-loan borrower who in 2011 defaulted on a loan issued by S (N is the successor of S, but we shall refer to both as “S”). W gave S her phone number (“Phone Number 1”) when she obtained the loan and consented to S contacting her via an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). S made ATDS calls to her using Phone Number 1 prior to her default on the loan in 2011.
Also prior to her 2011 default W obtained a second telephone number (“Phone Number 2”) but did not give S consent to contact her on that number via an ATDS.
After W’s 2011 default, S contacted W seven or eight times a day at Phone Number 2 via an ATDS, attempting to collect the debt. S made 774 ATDS calls to Phone Number 2 during the period September 16, 2011 through July 1, 2013.
The Arbitration
A dispute arose between W and S about whether S’s ATDS calls had violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and W commenced an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The action was stayed after the parties stipulated to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a student-loan promissory note.
The Award: Was it in Manifest Disregard of the Law or the Agreement?
Following a hearing an arbitrator made an award granting W $108,000 in statutory damages under the TCPA. But the award held that W was a class member in a class action that S had settled. The class-action settlement (the “Arthur Settlement”) “included as a class member, ‘any person who received ATDS calls from [S] between October 27, 2005 and September 14, 2010.’” Slip op. at 5 (citation omitted).
W did not contend that the calls S made to Phone Number 1 violated the TCPA (W had consented to those calls), and W contended that, accordingly, she was not bound by the settlement, even though she had received ATDS on Phone Number 1 during the specified period. The arbitrator, however, found that argument “‘unpersuasive,’” and “ruled that Weiss was a class member and that ‘the proof was conclusive that [S] provided [W] with the required notice of the settlement and of her rights and obligations under the terms of the settlement.’” Slip op. at 5-6 (citation omitted).
The Arthur Settlement “notice offered class members the opportunity to file a ‘consent Revocation’ document by September 15, 2012; absent such a filing, ‘the ATDS calls would not stop and the borrower’s prior consent to give them [sic] would be deemed to have been given.’” Slip op. at 6 (citation omitted; bracketed text in original).
While W contended that she was not aware of the Arthur Settlement, S testified that notice was successfully emailed to W.
The agreement implementing the Arthur Settlement featured a general release, “under which class members were ‘deemed to have fully released and forever discharged [S]’. . . from any and all claims and causes of action, inter alia, ‘that arise out of or are related in any way to the use of an [ATDS]. . . used by any of the Released Parties in connection with efforts to contact or attempt to contact Settlement Class Members including, but not limited to, claims under or for violations of the [TCPA].’” Slip op. at 6 (citations omitted; some bracketed text in original).
Even though the general release, to which the arbitrator determined W was bound, deemed W to have “waived ‘any and all’ TCPA claims effective the date of final judgment in the Arthur Settlement action[,]” the arbitrator’s award did not acknowledge the existence of that release. Slip op. at 6-7. “Instead,” said the Court, “the arbitrator interpreted [W]’s failure to submit a consent revocation pursuant to the Arthur class notice as precluding recovery for any calls placed to [Phone Number 2] after the September 15, 2012 deadline but also as permitting recovery for ATDS calls placed to [Phone Number 2] between September 6, 2011, and September 16, 2012.” Slip op. at 7.
The arbitrator awarded TCPA statutory damages in the amount of $108,500 ($500 per call for 217 calls during the applicable period). W moved to confirm the award and S cross-moved to vacate it.
The district court vacated the award, finding that “by neglecting to ‘apply—or even address—an explicit, unambiguous term of the settlement agreement,’ which “clearly and unambiguously bars recovery for claims until and including the date of the agreement,’ the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.” Slip op. at 7. W appealed.
Part I of this post discussed how the Second and Fifth Circuits, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bucsek, ___ F.3d ___, No. 17-881, slip op. (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 2019), and 20/20 Comms. Inc. v. Lennox Crawford, ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-10260 (5th Cir. July 22, 2019), suggest a trend toward what might (tongue-in-cheek) be called a “Clear and Unmistakable Outcome Exception” to the First Options Reverse Presumption of Arbitrability (a/k/a the “Clear and Unmistakable Rule”).
Under this Clear and Unmistakable Outcome Exception to the Clear and Unmistakable Rule, courts consider the merits of an underlying arbitrability issue as part of their analysis of whether the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability issues.
But the Clear and Unmistakable Outcome Exception runs directly counter to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Schein v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 524 (January 8, 2019), and thus contravenes the Federal Arbitration Act as interpreted by Schein. 139 S. Ct. at 527-28, 529-31.
This Part II analyzes and discusses how Met Life and 20/20 Comm. effectively made an end run around Schein and considers what might have motivated those Courts to rule as they did.
Making an End Run
Around Schein?
When, prior to 20/20 Comm. we wrote about Met Life, we said it “an important decision because it means in future cases where parties have not expressly agreed to arbitrate arbitrability questions, but have agreed to a very broad arbitration agreement, the question whether the parties’ have nevertheless clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability questions may turn, at least in part, on an analysis of the merits of the arbitrability question presented.” (See here. )
But after the Fifth Circuit decided 20/20 Comm. this July, in comments we made to Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives, the Newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (“CPR”)—which were reproduced with our consent in Mr. Zhan Tze’s CPR Speaks blog article about 20/20 Comm. (here)—we expressed the belief that the Fifth Circuit was (whether intentionally or unintentionally) making an end run around Schein, effectively creating an exception to the Clear and Unmistakable Rule.
After analyzing 20/20 Comm. and comparing it to
the Second Circuit’s Met Life decision, we concluded that the
Second Circuit’s decision also ran counter to Schein.
Schein’s
Abrogation of the “Wholly Groundless Exception” to the Clear and Unmistakable Rule
In Schein the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated the so-called “wholly groundless exception” to the Clear and Unmistakable Rule. Prior to Schein certain courts, including the Fifth Circuit, held that even when parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability questions, courts could effectively circumvent the parties’ agreement and decide for itself arbitrability challenges that it determined were “wholly groundless.”
The rationale Schein used to jettison the “wholly groundless exception” to the Clear and Unmistakable Rule is incompatible with the rationales the Second and Fifth Circuit used to support their decisions in Met Life and 20/20 Comm.
Under FAA Section 2, the Schein Court explained, “arbitration is a matter of contract, and courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms.” Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 529 (citation omitted). When those contracts delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator, “a court may not override the contract[,]” and has “no power to decide the arbitrability issue.” 139 S. Ct. at 529. That is so even where a Court “thinks that the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is wholly groundless.” 139 S. Ct. at 529.
Schein explained that its conclusion was supported not only by the FAA’s text, but also by U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Citing and quoting cases decided under Section 301 of the Labor Management and Relations Act, the Court explained that courts may not “‘rule on the potential merits of the underlying’ claim that is assigned by contract to an arbitrator, ‘even if it appears to the court to be frivolous[,]’” and that “[a] court has “‘no business weighing the merits of the grievance’” because the “‘agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.’” 139 S. Ct. at 529 (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649–650 (1986) and Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)).
This “principle,” said the Schein Court, “applies with equal force to the threshold issue of arbitrability[]”—for “[j]ust as a court may not decide a merits question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator, a court may not decide an arbitrability question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator.” 139 S. Ct. at 530.
Exception to Clear and Unmistakable Rule? Why the Second and Fifth Circuit Decisions Conflict with Schein
Suppose arbitrators decide an issue within the scope of their authority but do so in manifest disregard the parties’ contract. Do they exceed their authority by making an award that has not even a barely colorable basis in the parties’ contract or in applicable law?
The answer to that question, is, of course, “yes,” and over the years we’ve discussed in a number of posts how arbitrators can exceed their powers under Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(4) or Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act by making awards in manifest disregard of the parties’ agreement. (See Loree Reinsurance and Arbitration Law Forum Posts here, here, here, here, here, here,here, here, and here.) As discussed in those posts, the U.S. Supreme Court has on multiple occasions ruled that commercial and labor arbitrators can exceed their powers by making an award that manifestly disregards—or does not “draw its essence” from—the parties’ agreement. SeeStolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Inc., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1768-70 (2010); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2067, 2068 (2013); Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
In our April 12, 2019 post (here) we reviewed how it is that the limited review powers courts have to vacate commercial and labor arbitration awards are designed to provide a limited, but very important, safety net to protect parties against egregious, material violations of arbitration agreements. Without that limited protection, the risks associated with agreeing to arbitrate would be intolerably high and parties would be much less apt to opt for arbitration over court litigation.
Courts vacate arbitration awards where arbitrators act outside the scope of their authority by ruling on issues that the parties did not agree to submit to them. That’s what happened in Brock Indus. Servs., LLC v. Laborers’ Int’l Union., __ F.3d ___, No. 17-2597, slip op. (7th Cir. April 8, 2019), which we discussed in our April 12, 2019 post here.
But to obtain vacatur of an award based on manifest disregard of the agreement, however, an award challenger must satisfy an exceedingly demanding standard. We’ve addressed the parameters of that standard in a number of other posts. (See, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, here,here, here, and here. Our blog has also tried to give a feel for how Courts apply (or are supposed to apply) the standard by comparing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Stolt-Nielsen, which held that an award should be vacated for manifest disregard of the agreement, to the Supreme Court decision in Oxford, which held that an award should not be vacated under that manifest disregard standard. (See Loree Reinsurance and Arbitration Law Forum posts here, here, and here.) And from time-to-time we’ve reported on other cases that have applied the standard.
While challenges to awards based on manifest disregard of
the agreement are not uncommon, a very large majority of those challenges are
either virtually certain to fail or at least highly unlikely to succeed. It is
a relatively small universe of remaining, close cases that pose the biggest
challenges for parties and courts.
Today we’ll look at one of those close cases, which was decided by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and explain why the case failed to satisfy the demanding standard, even though, at least at first glance, it may be difficult to square the arbitration award with the parties’ agreement.
A choice-of-law provision is as much a part of a parties’ contract as any other, and an arbitrator might manifiestly disregard the parties’ contractual choice-of-law, which might provide grounds for vacating the award under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). But, as well-illustrated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eigth Circuit’s decision in Beumer Corp. v. ProEnergy Servs., LLC, ___ F.3d ____, slip op. (8th Cir. August 8, 2018), the circumstances that might justify such a decision would be very unusual, to say the least.
Beumer Corp. v. ProEnergy Servs., LLC
Choice-of-Law Provision 2
Owner and Contractor had a construction contract that contained an arbitration agreement, limitation-of-liability, provision, and a Missouri choice-of-law clause. The Owner complained that the Contractor’s work was deficient and, accordingly, no payment was due. The Contractor commenced arbitration for the amount due under the contract and the Owner counterclaimed for damages.
The parties disputed the scope and enforceability of their contract’s limitation of liability provision, which stated:
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing or any other term in this Contract, the total liability of Contractor for any loss, indemnity, damage or delay of any kind will not under any circumstances exceed 100% of the Contract Sum.
The contract contained a broad Missouri choice-of-law clause, and provided that a prevailing party could collect its attorney’s fees.
The Award
Choice-of-Law Provision 3
The Arbitrator ruled that the clause was enforceable, that the Contract Sum (i.e., the liability cap) was $699,702.39., and that the terms “loss, indemnity, damage or delay of any kind” did not include the prevailing party’s contractual right to attorney fees. The Arbitrator thus awarded Beumer: (a) $699,702.39 in damages; (b) $191,680.14 in pre-judgment interest; (c) post-judgment interest at 9%; and (d) $916,027.90 in attorney’s fees and expenses.
On its motion to vacate the Award the Contractor did not dispute that the Arbitrator “arguably construed” the limitation of liability clause, but contended that the Arbitrator exceeded its powers by “disregarding” the Missouri choice-of-law clause, because: (a) the Arbitrator relied on caselaw from four jurisdictions outside of Missouri to support his construction of the limitation of liability provision as exclusive of costs and attorney fees, and did not cite any Missouri decisions on this construction question; and (b) the Contractor claimed that the Missouri cases required a cost-inclusive interpretation of the clause, not a cost-plus one.
The Arbitrator did not Disregard the Choice-of-Law Provision
Choice-of-Law Provision 4
Did the Arbitrator exceed his powers by ruling that the limitation of liability clause did not limit liability for contractual attorney fees? The Eighth Circuit, in a well-reasoned decision, said the answer was “no.” Continue Reading »
What constitutes a “final arbitration award” for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act is important because it bears on whether an award can be confirmed, vacated, or modified under Sections 9, 10, or 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). We addressed the basics concerning final awards in a 2009 post, here.
In Northfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 883 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with the question whether an award (the “Appraisal Award”), convened under an agreement’s appraisal clause, and issued by three appraisers, was a final arbitration award under the FAA. The unusual procedural posture of the case raised an additional, related question: whether under the FAA an arbitration panel, convened under the arbitration provision of the parties’ agreement, had the authority to declare the Appraisal Award to be a final award. That question matters, for if an arbitration panel has that power, then its decision concerning finality is subject only to the very highly deferential review permitted by Section 10 of the FAA. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068-69 (2013).
Concededly with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we wonder whether a different litigation and appellate strategy might have yielded a different outcome. The Court held that the Appraisal Award was not final, and remanded the matter back to the appraisers. But the Court did not, for the reasons set forth below, definitively answer the “who” question. The Court’s decision that the Appraisal Award was not final was unquestionably correct if one considers from a purely objective standpoint, without deference to the Arbitration Award, which declared that the Award was final. But the correct outcome would be considerably less certain had the Railroad sought confirmation of the Arbitration Award and urged the Court to accord deference to the arbitrators who made it.
The dispute between Northfolk Southern Railway Co. (the “Railroad” or the “Appraisal Award Defending Party”) and Sprint Communications Co., L.P. (the “Carrier” or the “Appraisal Award Challenging Party”) arose out of a 25-year-term 1987 licensing agreement (the “Agreement”) under which the Carrier’s predecessor licensed from the Railroad’s predecessor the right to use for fiber-optics-cable purposes certain parts of the Railroad’s rights of way. The Carrier renewed that Agreement for an additional 25-year term (the “renewed Agreement term”), and a dispute arose about the renewal price. Continue Reading »
New York’s arbitration law (Article 75 of the CPLR), like the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), strictly limits award challenges premised on an arbitrator’s disregard of the parties’ contract. Arbitrator interpretations of the parties’ agreement cannot be second-guessed, even if the arbitrator has “disregarded” “the apparent, or even the plain, meaning of the words of the contract….”Maross Constr. v Central N. Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 66 N.Y 2d 341, 346 (1985) (quotations and citations omitted). To succeed, an award challenger must show that the award “is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power.” Kowaleski v. New York State Dep’t Correctional Serv., 16 N.Y. 3d 85, 91 (2010).
In City of New York v. District Council 37, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2018 NY Slip Op 3220 (1st Dep’t May 3, 2018), the New York’s Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department set aside an award because it exceeded “a specifically enumerated limitation” on arbitral power: The parties’ agreement prohibited the arbitrator from adding to or modifying the agreement.
“The arbitrator’s decision,” said the Court, “rewrote the contract for the parties by expanding the number of workers entitled to the [collective bargaining agreement’s] assignment differential, when the contract expressly limited the differential to workers at a specific facility.” 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 3220 at *1.
Acknowledging that “[a] provision in a contract that the arbitrator may not alter or modify a contract does not limit the arbitrator’s power to resolve the dispute by interpreting the contract based on his or her findings as to the parties’ intent[,]” the Court explained that “an award should be vacated where it is not derived from the contract, but from the deliberate and intentional consideration of matters outside the contract.” 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 3220 at *1.
To learn more about vacating awards based on an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the contract click here, here, here, here, here, and here.
Photo Acknowledgement:
The photo featured in this post was licensed fromYay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.
Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
Please see also the information and links set forth on each footer page of the The Loree Law Firm website of which this blog is a part (http://www.loreelawfirm.com), and in the disclaimer that appears in the bottom right corner of each post page of this blog.
Disclaimer: The content of this blog is not intended to be legal advice and should not be construed as such. The views expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Loree Law Firm or any of its current or former clients.