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Archive for the ‘New York Arbitration Law (CPLR Article 75)’ Category

Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide II: Three Threshold Questions about the Federal Arbitration Act

January 21st, 2020 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, FAA Chapter 3, FAA Preemption of State Law, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, New York Arbitration Law (CPLR Article 75), New York Convention, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Panama Convention, Practice and Procedure, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court 1 Comment »
Federal Arbitration Act | Arbitrator

This second instalment of the Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide addresses three threshold questions pertinent to the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA” or “Federal Arbitration Act”):

1. Does Chapter 1 of the FAA apply to my arbitration agreement?

2. Assuming it does, will a federal district court have subject matter jurisdiction over FAA litigation concerning the agreement or any awards made under it?

3. Does the Federal Arbitration Act apply in state court?

Does Chapter 1 of the FAA Apply to My Arbitration Agreement?

If your written arbitration agreement is contained in a maritime contract or a contract affecting commerce, or concerns a dispute arising out of such a contract, then it falls under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, unless it falls within Section 1’s exemption for contracts of employment of transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. (See here.) It may also fall under Chapters 2 or 3 of the FAA, which implement the New York and Panama Conventions.

In our first instalment of this FAQ guide (here) we explained that Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, applies to written, pre-dispute arbitration agreements in: (a) “maritime contract[s]” (“Maritime Contracts”); or (b) “contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving commerce. . . .” (“Contracts Affecting Commerce”). It also applies to written post-dispute arbitration agreements “to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such [Maritime Contracts or Contracts Affecting Commerce], or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof. . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 2; see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-282 (1995)Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 55-58 (2003).

Section 2’s requirement that an arbitration agreement be “written” seems simple enough, and, for the most part, it is, at least in wholly domestic arbitrations to which Chapters 2 or 3 of the FAA do not concurrently apply. But there are some caveats.

First, just because a contract is required to be “written” doesn’t necessarily mean the arbitration agreement must be signed. The arbitration agreement between the parties need only be in writing, although the arbitration-agreement proponent would need to show that the parties assented to the writing.

For example, suppose A agrees to provide services for B and further agrees that any disputes arising out of or relating to their agreement will be submitted to arbitration. A and B proceed to memorialize their agreement in a writing, including the agreement to arbitrate, spelling out the essential terms of their agreement. While the writing is not signed or initialed, both parties agree that it reflects the essential terms of the parties’ bargain. The written memorialization of the agreement is sufficient to establish a “written” agreement, even though it is not signed by the party opposing its enforcement. 

Second, provided there is a written agreement between at least two parties,  persons who are not parties to that agreement (“nonparties”) may, in appropriate circumstances, enforce the agreement or be bound by it if general principles of state law permit that result. Such general principles include “‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel[.] . . .’” . Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (citations omitted). This Term the United States Supreme Court is to determine whether such principles apply in cases governed by Chapter 2.

As respects whether a “contract” “evidenc[es] a transaction involving commerce,” the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2 broadly to mean the Federal Arbitration Act applies to arbitration agreements in contracts or transactions that “affect” commerce, that is, to any contract or transaction that Congress could regulate in the full exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281-82; U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3 (giving Congress power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes”).

Whether a contract “affects” commerce depends on the facts concerning, among other things, the parties, the contract’s subject matter, and the actual or contemplated transactions constituting the contract’s performance or contemplated performance. See Alafabco, 539 U.S. at 56-57. A party does not have to demonstrate that the contract has a “specific” or “substantial” “effect upon interstate commerce if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent a general practice subject to federal control.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted).  The question is whether the “aggregate economic activity in question” “bear[s] on interstate commerce in a substantial way.” Id. at 57.

Assuming that Chapter 1 of the FAA Applies to my Arbitration Agreement, Will a Federal District Court have Subject Matter jurisdiction over FAA Litigation Concerning the Agreement or any Awards Made under it?

Not necessarily. Unless an arbitration agreement also falls under Chapters 2 or 3 of the FAA, then there must be an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.

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Attorney Fees and Arbitrability Addressed by New York Appellate Court

July 30th, 2019 Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Confirmed, Award Vacated, Awards, Choice-of-Law Provisions, Confirm Award | Attorney Fees, Confirm Award | Exceeding Powers, Confirm Award | Manifest Disregard of the Law, Confirmation of Awards, Contract Interpretation, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Exceeding Powers, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Manifest Disregard of the Law, New York Arbitration Law (CPLR Article 75), Practice and Procedure, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Arbitrability, Vacate Award | Attorney Fees, Vacate Award | Exceeding Powers, Vacate Award | Excess of Powers, Vacate Award | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Vacate Award | Manifest Disregard of the Law, Vacatur Comments Off on Attorney Fees and Arbitrability Addressed by New York Appellate Court
Attorney Fees in Arbitration | TV

In Steyn v. CRTV, LLC (In re Steyn), 175 A.D. 3d 1 (1st Dep’t 2019), New York’s Appellate Division, First Department decided a case falling under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) that involved two challenges: one to an award of attorney fees on manifest disregard of the law grounds, and the other to an award that a nonsignatory obtained by joining the petitioner’s counterclaim.

The Court rejected the manifest-disregard challenge to the attorney fee award in favor of a signatory to the arbitration agreement, but held that the trial court should have vacated the award made in favor of a nonsignatory (which included both damages and attorney fees).

Background: Attorney Fee and Arbitrability Challenges

Terms and Conditions

The appeal arose out of a contract “dispute between Mark Steyn, a renowned author and television and radio personality, and CRTV, an online television network, currently known as BlazeTV, which features conservative commentators such as Glenn Beck and Phil Robertson.” 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 5341, at *2. We’ll call Steyn the “Host” and CRTV the “Network.”

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Appellate Division, First Department Vacates Arbitration Award Because it Rewrote the Parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement

July 13th, 2018 Appellate Practice, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Labor Arbitration, Manifest Disregard of the Agreement, New York Arbitration Law (CPLR Article 75), New York State Courts Comments Off on Appellate Division, First Department Vacates Arbitration Award Because it Rewrote the Parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement

yay-1663484-digitalNew York’s arbitration law (Article 75 of the CPLR), like the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), strictly limits award challenges premised on an arbitrator’s disregard of the parties’ contract. Arbitrator interpretations of the parties’ agreement cannot be second-guessed, even if the arbitrator has “disregarded” “the apparent, or even the plain, meaning of the words of the contract….” Maross Constr. v Central N. Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 66 N.Y 2d 341, 346 (1985) (quotations and citations omitted). To succeed, an award challenger must show that the  award “is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power.” Kowaleski  v. New York State Dep’t Correctional Serv., 16 N.Y. 3d 85, 91 (2010).

In City of New York v. District Council 37, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2018 NY Slip Op 3220 (1st Dep’t May 3, 2018), the New York’s Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department set aside an award because it exceeded “a specifically enumerated limitation” on arbitral power: The parties’ agreement prohibited the arbitrator from adding to or modifying the agreement.

“The arbitrator’s decision,” said the Court, “rewrote the contract for the parties by expanding the number of workers entitled to the [collective bargaining agreement’s] assignment differential, when the contract expressly limited the differential to workers at a specific facility.” 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 3220 at *1.

Acknowledging that “[a] provision in a contract that the arbitrator may not alter or modify a contract does not limit the arbitrator’s power to resolve the dispute by interpreting the contract based on his or her findings as to the parties’ intent[,]” the Court explained that “an award should be vacated where it is not derived from the contract, but from the deliberate and intentional consideration of matters outside the contract.” 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 3220 at *1.

To learn more about vacating awards based on an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the contract click here, here, here, here, here, and here.

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