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Archive for the ‘Arbitration as a Matter of Consent’ Category

First American Title Arbitration Decision: Tenth Circuit Says Nonsignatory Escrow Agent Can’t Compel Arbitration

September 23rd, 2025 Appellate Practice, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Arbitration, Arbitrability, Arbitrability - Equitable Estoppel, Arbitrability - Nonsignatories, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Estoppel, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 1, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Formation of Arbitration Agreement, Intended Beneficiaries, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, Section 2, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Third-Party Beneficiaries, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Waiver of Arbitration No Comments »

First American Title Arbitration DecisionThe Tenth Circuit’s First American Title arbitration decision, Fucci v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 24-4051, slip op. (10th Cir. Sep 10, 2025), clarifies the limits of arbitration enforcement by nonsignatories under Florida and Ohio law, and recognizes that the arbitration agreement itself may further restrict that enforcement.

As the Supreme Court recognized in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U. S. 624, 631 (2009), and as we discussed in a 2009 post, “traditional principles of state law allow a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, [and] waiver and estoppel.” 556 U.S. at 631. The First American Title arbitration decision’s nonsignatories argued for enforcement of the arbitration agreement on the ground they were allegedly parties, third-party beneficiaries, or agents. They also sought enforcement under equitable estoppel principles. But the Court rejected all of their  arguments and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for an order staying litigation and compelling arbitration.

The First American Title Arbitration Decision: Background

Real estate investors bought interests in Ohio and Florida event-center projects through Purchase and Sale Agreements (“PSAs”) Continue Reading »

Sixth Circuit Says Employee Physician Assistant Gets to Litigate Her Religious Discrimination Claims Because the Employer Defendants were Guilty of Section 3 Arbitration Default

September 18th, 2025 American Arbitration Association, Amicus Brief Submissions, Appellate Practice, Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Applicability of the FAA, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Providers, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Charles Bennett, Default in Proceeding with Arbitration, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Forfeiture, Practice and Procedure, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 3 Default, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Waiver of Arbitration No Comments »

Section 3 Arbitration Default | Kloosterman Introduction

Does Section 3 arbitration default result from moving to dismiss the entire case on the merits? The Sixth Circuit says yes.

Since Morgan v. Sundance, 596 U. S. 411 (2022), most of the cases concerning loss of arbitration rights by litigation conduct have focused not on prejudice—Morgan nixed the requirement that arbitration opponents show prejudice to establish forfeiture or waiver, 596 U.S. at 1-2—but on what type and degree of inconsistent-with-arbitration conduct results in a loss of arbitration rights.

But on August 27, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, took a slightly different tack on Section 3 arbitration default. In Kloosterman v. Metropolitan Hospital, No. 24-1398, slip op. (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025), the Court reversed a district court order that had compelled arbitration of a physician assistant (“PA”)’s religious discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit made two significant rulings bearing on loss of arbitration rights by litigation conduct.

First, the Court held— in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Eric Continue Reading »

Flores Second Circuit Arbitration Decision Rejects the NFL’s Constitution’s “Arbitration” Provision, Saying it is “Arbitration in Name Only”

August 29th, 2025 Applicability of the FAA, Application to Compel Arbitration, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Disinterestedness, Effective Vindication Doctrine, Evident Partiality, FAA Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Independence, LMRA Section 301, Questions of Arbitrability, Section 10, Section 4, Sports Arbitration, Unconscionability, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Vacate Award | 10(a)(2), Vacate Award | Evident Partiality 1 Comment »

Flores Second Circuit Arbitration Decision

The Flores Second Circuit Arbitration Decision and the Scope of the FAA

Introduction

The Flores Second Circuit arbitration decision, Flores v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., No. 23-1185-cv, slip op. (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2025), may be a watershed moment in federal arbitration law. In rejecting the National Foot Ball League (“NFL”)’s attempt to compel arbitration, the court held that the league’s dispute resolution provision—vesting unilateral authority in the Commissioner, an executive officer of one of the arbitration opponent’s adversaries —was “arbitration in name only” and thus unprotected by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Beyond its immediate implications for Brian Flores’s racial discrimination claims, the ruling could (and should) reshape how courts evaluate the independence, neutrality, and fundamental fairness of dispute resolution agreements that are alleged to be FAA-governed arbitration agreements, particularly in employment and sports law contexts.

The Flores Second Circuit decision, authored by United States Senior Circuit Judge José A. Cabranes, may have far reaching consequences concerning the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, the enforceability of  dispute resolution agreements, and the viability and applicability of the “effective vindication” doctrine. It also has the potential to—and should—change for the better the legal landscape governing post-award evident partiality challenges. (For discussions of evident partiality see here, here, here, here, and here.)

In Flores the Court held NFL coach Brian Flores was not required to arbitrate his 42 U.S.C. § 1981 racial discrimination claims against the NFL, the New York Football Giants, the Denver  Broncos, and the Houston Texans. Flores agreed to the NFL’s dispute resolution scheme, which was set forth in  Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League (the “NFL Constitution”) and incorporated by reference into two of Flores’s club-specific employment agreements.

That NFL dispute resolution scheme purported to designate the NFL Commissioner— who runs the league and works for the franchise owners Flores accused of race discrimination—as the arbitrator.  The Second Circuit held that “Flores’s agreement under Continue Reading »

Some Things to Consider Seriously Before You Agree to Arbitrate: An Arbitration Award may Direct You to Pay Your Adversary’s Attorney’s Fees

March 7th, 2025 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Fees, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Arbitration Risks, Attorney Fee Shifting, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Bad Faith, Charles Bennett, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Outcome Risk, Practice and Procedure, Richard D. Faulkner, Small and Medium-Sized Business Arbitration Risk, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, Uncategorized Comments Off on Some Things to Consider Seriously Before You Agree to Arbitrate: An Arbitration Award may Direct You to Pay Your Adversary’s Attorney’s Fees

Attorney's Fees in ArbitrationThose who agree to arbitration expose themselves to potential awards of attorney’s fees in cases where courts would likely not award fees.

If you’re a small business or an individual there’s a good chance you’re not fully familiar with certain of the risks associated with arbitration. Clients frequently consult with me when they find themselves saddled with unfavorable awards, and some of these persons are ones who, through no fault of their own, did not appreciate the risks involved and might  consequently have missed opportunities to better manage them. In many instances these persons were represented by attorneys who understood that subject matter of the arbitrated disputes, and who were skilled courtroom litigators, but who were not necessarily as well-versed in arbitration-law as are arbitration and arbitration-law practitioners.

This is more than simply an anecdotal observation. My good friends, colleagues, and sometimes co-counsel, Richard D. Faulkner and Charles (“Chuck”) Bennett, who also practice in this field, tell me they share this view and that their experiences are aligned with my own. (Here is a post concerning a Federalist-Society-sponsored webinar Rick, Chuck, and I participated in last year.) Other arbitration attorneys with whom I have spoken also agree.

Readers armed with some practical knowledge may be better able to avoid, mitigate or otherwise manage arbitration risks. It is in that spirit that we discuss a risk that tends to be more severe in arbitration than it is in court litigation:  your exposure to an award of attorney’s fees. As always, nothing we say here is or should be construed as legal advice. If you require legal advice you should engage and consult with an attorney.

Exposure to Liability for Your Adversary’s Legal Fees

A commonly overlooked risk associated with agreeing to arbitrate is that, if you lose, you might be on the wrong end of an award that requires you to reimburse your adversary for some or all of the fees it incurred in the arbitration. To be sure, there is a risk that in court litigation, the court may assess attorney’s fees against a losing party, but as we’ll see, the risk is generally higher in arbitration than it is in court litigation. Worse yet, in arbitration the ability to challenge meaningfully  such an award (or any other award) in court is extremely circumscribed under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The same is generally so where state arbitration law applies.

No one likes paying attorney fees but they are a necessary incident of dispute resolution, especially resolution of high-dollar disputes. But imagine not only having to pay your own attorney’s fees, but also those of your adversary, an adversary who, in effect, is reimbursed for the fees it incurred in making your life miserable. Continue Reading »

Ineffective Objections and Untimely Filings Lead to FAA Forfeiture: Sivanesan v. YBF, LLC, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4327 (2d Dep’t 2024)

September 4th, 2024 Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Application to Confirm, Application to Vacate, Arbitrability, Arbitrability - Nonsignatories, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Confirmed, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Confirm Award | Exceeding Powers, Confirmation of Awards, Delegation Agreements, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, FAA Section 11, FAA Section 9, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, First Department, First Options Reverse Presumption of Arbitrability, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Formation of Arbitration Agreement, Grounds for Vacatur, Modify or Correct Award, New York Arbitration Law (CPLR Article 75), Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Procedural Arbitrability, Questions of Arbitrability, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, Second Department, Section 10, Section 11, Section 9, Service of Process, State Arbitration Law, Time Limit for Vacating, Modifying, or Correcting Award, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Arbitrability, Vacate Award | Excess of Powers, Vacate Award | Existence of Arbitration Agreement Comments Off on Ineffective Objections and Untimely Filings Lead to FAA Forfeiture: Sivanesan v. YBF, LLC, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4327 (2d Dep’t 2024)

Objections Must be Timely and Effective in Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Including Litigation Relating to Consulting AgreementsA good chunk of FAA practice and procedure —including FAA practice and procedure in state court—involves knowing when, how, and why to make timely and effective objections and filings in arbitration enforcement litigation.  Sivanesan v. YBF, LLC, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4327 (2d Dep’t 2024), which New York’s Appellate Division, Second Department, decided on August 28, 2024, illustrates this point well.

Appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement, did not agree to arbitrate any matters, and did not clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. But the Court found that they participated in the arbitration without lodging adequate objections to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and did not timely file in the confirmation litigation their petition to vacate the awards at issue. Accordingly, the Appellants were—by their participation in the arbitration without effective objections to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction—deemed to have impliedly consented to arbitrate all issues before the arbitrator, including whether they were bound by the contract and arbitration agreement as successors-in-interest. Not a happy place to be.

Background

The transactions pertinent to Sivanesan began in 2008 when YBF, LLC (“YBF”) sold to Cosmetics Specialties, East LLC (“CSE”) an exclusive license to Continue Reading »

Manifest Disregard of the Agreement: Third Circuit Says Arbitrator Rewrote the 10-Day Time Limit For Grievance Filing and Affirms District Court Judgment Vacating Award

July 19th, 2024 Application to Vacate, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Fails to Draw Essence from the Agreement, Award Irrational, Award Vacated, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Exceeding Powers, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Labor Arbitration, LMRA Section 301, Manifest Disregard of the Agreement, Petition to Vacate Award, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Vacate, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Exceeding Powers, Vacate Award | Excess of Powers, Vacatur 1 Comment »

disregard of the agreementAn arbitration award may be vacated for “manifest disregard of the agreement” if the award does not draw its essence from the contract and instead reflects the arbitrator’s own notions of economic or industrial justice. (See, e.g., here, hereherehere.)  Such an award exceeds the arbitrator’s powers within the meaning of Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) and federal common law in Labor Management Relations Act Section 301 cases (which tracks Section 10(a)(4)).

Arbitration awards do not qualify for vacatur under this manifest disregard of the agreement standard unless the arbitrator did not even arguably interpret the agreement. And if you have any doubts about how much extensive leeway arbitrators have to “arguably interpret” contracts, go back and review the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in  Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 566-70 (2013).

The margins for a reasonable argument for manifest disregard of the agreement vacatur are slim, for once the arbitrator offers—or the award is otherwise susceptible to—an even barely plausible interpretation supporting the arbitrator’s award, then it’s game over, even if the barely plausible interpretation is one a court would almost certainly not adopt as its own.

But in StoneMor, Inc. v. The Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, Local 469, ___ F.4d ___, No. 23-1489, slip op. (3d Cir. July 10, 2024), the Third Circuit reminds everyone that, while it is “‘a steep climb to vacate an . . . award[,]’” slip op. at 6 (quoting France v. Bernstein, 43 F.4th 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2022)), the Court’s “review is ‘not toothless,’ and [it] will reverse if the arbitrator ‘rewrites the contract[.]’” Slip op. at 6 (quoting Independent Lab’y EmployeesUnion, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Research & Engineering Co., 11 F.4th 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2021)). (You can read our France v. Bernstein post here.)

The award before the Court in StoneMor, was the product of an arbitrator who “did just that[,]” and the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment vacating that award—an award which resulted from manifest disregard of the agreement. Slip op. at 6 & 3. Because the Court was able to conclude that the award was not based on—and did not otherwise reflect—an even barely colorable interpretation of the contract, vacatur was warranted. Continue Reading »

Seventh Circuit Blocks Mass Arbitration: Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.  

July 16th, 2024 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Fees, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Class Arbitration Waivers, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Delegation Agreements, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 202, Federal Arbitration Act Section 203, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Mass Arbitration, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Procedural Arbitrability, Questions of Arbitrability, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 4, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Comments Off on Seventh Circuit Blocks Mass Arbitration: Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.  

Mass ArbitrationIntroduction: Mass Arbitration

For many years consumers, employees, and others fought hard—with varying degrees of success—to compel class arbitration, and sellers, employers, and other more economically powerful entities fought equally hard to compel separate arbitrations in multi-claimant situations. Over time, companies included in their agreements—and courts enforced—clear class-arbitration waivers.

That might have been the end of the story but for a stroke of genius on the part of certain plaintiffs’ attorneys. These clever attorneys devised what is now known as “mass arbitration.”

In mass arbitration, as in class arbitration, multiple claimants—each represented by the same lawyer or group of lawyers—assert at the same time numerous  claims against a corporate defendant.

The result is that business entity defendants may be are forced to pay upfront hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in arbitration provider and arbitrator fees as a precondition to defending thousands of individual arbitration proceedings that raise one or more common issues.

Saddling the business entity defendants at the outset with those enormous arbitration fees obviously puts them in an untenable settlement position. The business entities also incur very substantial legal costs for arbitration-related litigation.

Given the vigor with which business entities have opposed class arbitration—which, despite its cumbersome nature, purports to be (but really isn’t) a workable mechanism for resolving multiple, similar, arbitral claims—one can hardly fault a judge for concluding that business entity defendants have reaped what they’ve sown. But it would be strange to think that Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) arbitration should, in multiple claimant situations, boil down to the business entity choosing one form of economic extortion (endless, inefficient, and prohibitively expensive class arbitration) over another (being forced to pay millions of dollars of arbitration fees upfront before being able to defend any of the individual arbitrations).

There have been some recent efforts on the part of arbitration providers to amend their rules to address mass arbitration in a more equitable manner. But those rules, and the ins, outs, and idiosyncrasies of mass arbitration are beyond this post’s ambit.

Our focus instead is on a very important mass-arbitration development: the first U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision to address mass arbitration, Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 23-2842, slip op. (7th Cir. July 1, 2024). The case is especially significant because it may portend the end of mass arbitration, at least in the form it typically takes.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit derailed petitioners’ efforts to compel judicially the respondent to pay millions of dollars of arbitration fees demanded by mass arbitration claimants. It did so in two blows, the second more decisive than the first. Continue Reading »

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Coinbase II and Promulgates a New Arbitrability Rule Applicable to Multiple, Conflicting Contracts

June 11th, 2024 Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Equal Footing Principle, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, First Options Reverse Presumption of Arbitrability, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Forum Selection Agreements, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Motion to Compel Arbitration, Professor Angela Downes, Richard D. Faulkner, Russ Bleemer, Section 2, Separability, Severability, Substantive Arbitrability, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court 1 Comment »

Introduction

 

Coinbase II - Dogecoin Photo

Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. ___ (2024) (“Coinbase II”), which the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) decided on May 23, 2024, was the last of the three arbitration-law cases SCOTUS heard and decided this 2023 Term. Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) (“CPR Alternatives”), recently interviewed University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law Professor Angela Downes; arbitrator, mediator, arbitration-law attorney, and former judge, Richard D. Faulkner; and the author about Coinbase II, and the other two cases, Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St.LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024), and Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. ___ (2024). (See posts here and interview here.) Russ also interviewed Angela, Rick, and the author about Coinbase II back when SCOTUS granted certiorari to hear it, an interview you can view here (see also post, here).

Coinbase II concerned the allocation of power between courts and arbitrators in a situation in which agreements with conflicting dispute-resolution provisions cover or appear to cover some or all of the same, disputed subject matter. The general principles and rules of arbitrability, as applied to the facts,  did not clearly answer the question of who gets to decide whether the parties’ merits dispute was arbitrable, and so the Court created a new rule of arbitrability: “where. . . parties have agreed to two contracts—one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts—a court must decide which contract governs.” Coinbase II, slip op. at 8. Applying the new rule to the facts, the Court concluded “that a court, not an arbitrator must decide whether the [Coinbase II] parties’ first agreement was superseded by their second.” Slip op. at 8.

Coinbase II: Background

Petitioner Coinbase, Inc. (“Coinbase”) is a cryptocurrency exchange platform Continue Reading »

International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) Interviews Professor Angela Downes, Richard D. Faulkner, and Philip J. Loree Jr. about the Three SCOTUS Cases Decided this Term and More  

June 3rd, 2024 Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, CPR Alternatives, CPR Video Interviews, Delegation Agreements, Exemption from FAA, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 1, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 3, FAA Transportation Worker Exemption, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Courts, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, First Options Reverse Presumption of Arbitrability, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Forum Selection Agreements, Loree and Faulkner Interviews, Professor Angela Downes, Questions of Arbitrability, Richard D. Faulkner, Russ Bleemer, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, United States Supreme Court 1 Comment »

CPR SCOTUS Wrap Up

As readers may know, over the last four years or so, our friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) (“CPR Alternatives”), has hosted presentations about significant arbitration-law developments (principally in the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”)) that feature interviews of our friends and colleagues: Professor Angela Downes, University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law Professor of Practice and Assistant Director of Experiential Education; arbitrator, mediator, arbitration-law attorney, and former judge, Richard D. Faulkner; and yours truly, Loree Law Firm principal, Philip J. Loree Jr.  (See, e.g., here, here, and here.) These interviews are posted on CPR’s YouTube channel, @CPRInstituteOnline.

On Wednesday, May 29, 2024, Russ interviewed Professor Downes, Rick and me about the three arbitration cases SCOTUS heard and decided this 2023 Term: (a) Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024); (b) Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. ___ (2024); and (c) Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. ___ (2024). We also discussed what one might expect on the arbitration front from the 2024 SCOTUS Term, Samsung’s mass arbitration case pending in the Seventh Circuit, and recent, controversial arbitration awards rendered against a major U.S. retail pharmacy company and their implications. You can view that interview here.

As always, we express our gratitude to Russ and CPR for hosting these interviews, and, along with Angela and Rick, look forward to contributing to future programs hosted by CPR.

On a related matter,  CPR Alternatives recently published parts I and II of our article discussing and analyzing SmartSky Networks LLC v. DAG Wireless Ltd., ___ F.4th ___, No. 22-1253, slip op. (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2024) (available at https://bit.ly/4aviBLS). That case has created a split in the circuits concerning whether a Court having the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear a federal question lawsuit on the merits, and thus the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant a Section 3 stay of litigation pending arbitration, can be deemed to have subject matter jurisdiction over a post-award application to confirm, vacate, or modify an award—or an application to appoint an arbitrator or enforce a Section 5  arbitral summons—in circumstances where, if the application were made in a standalone, independent action, the Court would not have had subject matter jurisdiction under Badgerow. Prior to Spizzirri, we wrote a number of articles concerning this sometimes-vexing issue. (See here, here, and here.)

Part I of the article is entitled Philip J. Loree Jr., The Fourth Circuit Weighs the Post-Badgerow Jurisdictional Anchor—and Finds It Won’t Set, 42 Alternatives 73 (May 2024), and was published in the May 2024 issue of Alternatives. Part II is entitled Philip J. Loree Jr., More on Independent Actions and the “Jurisdictional Anchor”: Where the Law on Award Enforcement May Be Going, 42 Alternatives 95 (June 2024), which was published in the June 2024 issue of Alternatives. We recently submitted to Alternatives a short, post-script article about how the Spizzirri case, which was not decided until after the other two articles had been submitted, might bear on SmartSky. We expect that article will be published in CPR Alternatives next issue.

Although CPR Alternatives is a subscription-only publication (available to CPR Members only), Russ has said that upon email request, CPR will provide, for fair use purposes only, a copy of each of these articles. You can make your  request by emailing Alternatives@cpradr.org.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has nearly 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance or reinsurance-related and other matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

 Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

 

New York Arbitration Law Focus: Appellate Division, Second Department Vacates Attorney’s Fee Award Because it was Irrational and Violated New York Public Policy

December 7th, 2023 Application to Confirm, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Attorney Fee Shifting, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Fails to Draw Essence from the Agreement, Award Irrational, Award Vacated, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, CPLR Article 75, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Exceeding Powers, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Making Decisions about Arbitration, New York Arbitration Law (CPLR Article 75), New York State Courts, Outcome Risk, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Policy, Practice and Procedure, Public Policy, Second Department, State Arbitration Law, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, Vacate, Vacate Award | Attorney Fees, Vacate Award | Attorney's Fees, Vacate Award | Public Policy, Vacatur Comments Off on New York Arbitration Law Focus: Appellate Division, Second Department Vacates Attorney’s Fee Award Because it was Irrational and Violated New York Public Policy

Attorney's FeesThe question before the Appellate Division, Second Department in In re D & W Cent. Station Fire Alarm Co. v. Flatiron Hotel, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 6136 (2d Dep’t Nov. 29, 2023), was whether an arbitration award had to be vacated because the amount of fees the arbitrator awarded was irrational and excessive and therefore exceeded the arbitrator’s powers under N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. (“CPLR”) 7511(b)(1)(iii). The arbitrator awarded fees that were 13.5 times the amount the prevailing party’s attorney said it charged its client on an hourly basis. The fee award was 44% of the amount the arbitrators awarded for the prevailing party’s claim. See 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 6136 at *1.

The Court concluded that the fee award was irrational and violative of New York’s strong public policy against the enforcement of contracts or claims for excessive legal fees. It therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to confirm and denying the motion to vacate, and remanded the matter back to the trial court. See 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 6136 at *2.

Flatiron Hotel is of particular interest because it shows that there is authority under New York arbitration law for challenging successfully awards of legal fees that are authorized by the parties’ contract but are off the rails in their amount. While not a high-stakes arbitration involving hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees, it was one where the losing party was socked with a fee that was so far out of proportion of what it consented to pay that there was nothing whatosever in the record to support it.

Fortunately for the appellant in Flatiron Hotel, the Appellate Division set aside the fee award even though the standard of review for granting such relief is highly deferential. While decisions vacating awards are understandably quite rare, this was one where vacatur was quite appropriate, as we shall see. Continue Reading »