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Posts Tagged ‘Existence’

Ineffective Objections and Untimely Filings Lead to FAA Forfeiture: Sivanesan v. YBF, LLC, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4327 (2d Dep’t 2024)

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Objections Must be Timely and Effective in Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Including Litigation Relating to Consulting AgreementsA good chunk of FAA practice and procedure —including FAA practice and procedure in state court—involves knowing when, how, and why to make timely and effective objections and filings in arbitration enforcement litigation.  Sivanesan v. YBF, LLC, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4327 (2d Dep’t 2024), which New York’s Appellate Division, Second Department, decided on August 28, 2024, illustrates this point well.

Appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement, did not agree to arbitrate any matters, and did not clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. But the Court found that they participated in the arbitration without lodging adequate objections to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and did not timely file in the confirmation litigation their petition to vacate the awards at issue. Accordingly, the Appellants were—by their participation in the arbitration without effective objections to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction—deemed to have impliedly consented to arbitrate all issues before the arbitrator, including whether they were bound by the contract and arbitration agreement as successors-in-interest. Not a happy place to be.

Background

The transactions pertinent to Sivanesan began in 2008 when YBF, LLC (“YBF”) sold to Cosmetics Specialties, East LLC (“CSE”) an exclusive license to Continue Reading »

Seventh Circuit Blocks Mass Arbitration: Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.  

July 16th, 2024 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Fees, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Class Arbitration Waivers, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Delegation Agreements, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 202, Federal Arbitration Act Section 203, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Mass Arbitration, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Procedural Arbitrability, Questions of Arbitrability, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 4, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Comments Off on Seventh Circuit Blocks Mass Arbitration: Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.  

Mass ArbitrationIntroduction: Mass Arbitration

For many years consumers, employees, and others fought hard—with varying degrees of success—to compel class arbitration, and sellers, employers, and other more economically powerful entities fought equally hard to compel separate arbitrations in multi-claimant situations. Over time, companies included in their agreements—and courts enforced—clear class-arbitration waivers.

That might have been the end of the story but for a stroke of genius on the part of certain plaintiffs’ attorneys. These clever attorneys devised what is now known as “mass arbitration.”

In mass arbitration, as in class arbitration, multiple claimants—each represented by the same lawyer or group of lawyers—assert at the same time numerous  claims against a corporate defendant.

The result is that business entity defendants may be are forced to pay upfront hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in arbitration provider and arbitrator fees as a precondition to defending thousands of individual arbitration proceedings that raise one or more common issues.

Saddling the business entity defendants at the outset with those enormous arbitration fees obviously puts them in an untenable settlement position. The business entities also incur very substantial legal costs for arbitration-related litigation.

Given the vigor with which business entities have opposed class arbitration—which, despite its cumbersome nature, purports to be (but really isn’t) a workable mechanism for resolving multiple, similar, arbitral claims—one can hardly fault a judge for concluding that business entity defendants have reaped what they’ve sown. But it would be strange to think that Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) arbitration should, in multiple claimant situations, boil down to the business entity choosing one form of economic extortion (endless, inefficient, and prohibitively expensive class arbitration) over another (being forced to pay millions of dollars of arbitration fees upfront before being able to defend any of the individual arbitrations).

There have been some recent efforts on the part of arbitration providers to amend their rules to address mass arbitration in a more equitable manner. But those rules, and the ins, outs, and idiosyncrasies of mass arbitration are beyond this post’s ambit.

Our focus instead is on a very important mass-arbitration development: the first U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision to address mass arbitration, Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 23-2842, slip op. (7th Cir. July 1, 2024). The case is especially significant because it may portend the end of mass arbitration, at least in the form it typically takes.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit derailed petitioners’ efforts to compel judicially the respondent to pay millions of dollars of arbitration fees demanded by mass arbitration claimants. It did so in two blows, the second more decisive than the first. Continue Reading »

S.K.A.V. v. Independent Specialty Ins. Co.: Fifth Circuit Decides Louisiana Statute Invalidating Arbitration Agreements in Insurance Contracts Applies to Surplus Lines Policies

June 27th, 2024 Anti-Arbitration Statutes, Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Application to Compel Arbitration, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreement Invalid, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Delegation Agreements, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Preemption of State Law, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Formation of Arbitration Agreement, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, Insurance Contracts, Louisiana Supreme Court, McCarran-Ferguson Act, Motion to Compel Arbitration, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Questions of Arbitrability, Section 2, Section 4, State Arbitration Law, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, Statutory Interpretation and Construction, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Comments Off on S.K.A.V. v. Independent Specialty Ins. Co.: Fifth Circuit Decides Louisiana Statute Invalidating Arbitration Agreements in Insurance Contracts Applies to Surplus Lines Policies

Introduction: LA Stat. Ann. § 22.868 and its Application to Surplus Lines Policies

surplus lines policy regulation

Louisiana has a statute, LA Stat. Ann. § 22.868, that courts have construed to make unenforceable arbitration provisions in insurance contracts, including surplus lines policies. The statute has an exception or savings provision that removes from the statute’s scope “a forum or venue selection clause in a policy form that is not subject to approval by the Department of Insurance[,]” LA Stat. Ann. § 22.868(D), for example, a venue- or forum-selection provision in a surplus lines policy.

The question before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in S.K.A.V. v. Independent Specialty Ins. Co., ___ F.4th ___, No. 23-30293, slip op. (5th Cir. June 5, 2024), was whether the statute invalidates arbitration provisions contained in surplus lines insurance policies, that is, whether arbitration provisions in such contracts fall within the subsection (D) exception. Predicting how it thinks the Louisiana Supreme Court would rule if faced with the question, the Court held that the subsection (D) exemption did not apply, and accordingly, the statute rendered unenforceable arbitration agreements in surplus lines contracts. The Court accordingly affirmed the judgment of the district court, which denied the arbitration proponent’s motion to compel arbitration.

Pushing the Elephant Out of the Room. . .

Before taking a closer look at how the Court arrived at its conclusion, let’s deal with the “elephant in the room.” Why is the Court in a case governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) even considering enforcing a state statute that would (or could) render unenforceable an FAA-governed arbitration agreement? Doesn’t the FAA preempt state law that puts arbitration agreements on a different footing than other contracts?

The answer is “undoubtedly”, but, as insurance and reinsurance practitioners know, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, et seq., “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).

LA Stat. Ann. § 22.868 has been construed to be one that “regulat[es] the business insurance[,]” and the FAA is not an “Act [that] specifically relates to the business of insurance. . . .” Section 22.868 thus “reverse preempts” the FAA under McCarran-Ferguson. See slip op. at 2. (See, e.g., here.)

The Court’s Interpretation of Section 22.868, Including its Surplus Lines Policy Exemption

  LA Stat. Ann. § 22.868, provides, in pertinent part: Continue Reading »