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Unlawful Limitations Period Provision Renders Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable Says South Carolina Supreme Court

January 2nd, 2025 Contract Defenses, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Policy, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Public Policy, Section 2, Section 4, Severability, South Carolina Supreme Court, State Courts No Comments »

Severability of Limitations Provision: Introduction

Limitations

One defense to a motion to compel arbitration is that the arbitration agreement on which the movant relies is, as a matter of arbitration-neutral state law, void or unenforceable on public policy grounds. (See, e.g., here.) But if only one term or provision of an arbitration agreement is unenforceable on public policy grounds, can that offending provision simply be removed from the contract and the rest of the arbitration agreement enforced?

In Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC, No. 28245, slip op. (S.C. Sup. Ct. December 11, 2024), the South Carolina Supreme Court said the answer depends principally on the intent of the parties. And as respects the adhesive, “take-it-or-leave-it” home sale contract before it, the Court said the answer was no.

By statute South Carolina prohibits and deems void contractual provisions that purport to shorten the statute of limitations. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-140 (2005).  In Mungo Homes, the defendant sold the plaintiff a new home, the contract of sale for which contained an arbitration agreement that said: “Each and every demand for arbitration shall be made within ninety (90) days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen, except that any claim, dispute or matter in question not asserted within said time periods shall be deemed waived and forever barred.” Slip op. at 2 (quotation omitted). The parties agreed that provision violated Section 15-3-140.

The question before South Carolina’s highest court was whether the provision could be severed from the contract, leaving intact the rest of the arbitration agreement, and the contract containing it (the “container contract”), or whether that unlawful provision rendered invalid and unenforceable the entire arbitration agreement. In Huskins the Court held that the limitations period provision could not be severed and the arbitration agreement was accordingly unenforceable on public policy grounds. The container contract was not affected by the Court’s decision. Slip op. at 6.

Discussion

Severability of Limitations Provision: Party Intent and Relevance of not Including a Severability Clause in the Agreement

The Court said “[t]he only question we are left with is whether we should sever the illegal term and let the remainder of the arbitration agreement stand.” Slip op. at 3. The touchstone for answering that question was party intent: “whether an agreement can be modified so its remaining provisions survive [generally] depends upon what the parties intended.” Slip op. at 2.

The Court observed that the parties did not include in their contract a severability provision and the contract otherwise did not suggest the parties intended the arbitration agreement to survive if any part of it, including the limitations provision, was deemed void. Slip op. at 2.

The Court explained that the absence of a severability clause, in and of itself, may be grounds for not severing an unenforceable clause from a contract. For courts are not supposed to “rewrite contracts” but (subject to certain exceptions) enforce them according to their terms. Slip op. at 2.

But the Court decided not to rest its decision solely on the parties’ decision not to include a severability clause in their contract. The Court explained that, in the absence of a severability clause, Courts are reluctant to impose severability on the parties. Slip op. at 2-3. Yet “devotion to that principle[,]” said the Court, “can work a cost to other interests. It can exact a needless forfeiture or cause unjust enrichment, tossing out the essence of a bargained for exchange over a trivial technicality.” Slip op. at 3 (citation omitted).

Severability of the Limitations Provision: Common Law, South Carolina Law, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts

The Court briefly discussed pertinent English common law, and U.S. and South Carolina precedent on the severability issue, explaining how courts have “stricken illegal parts from contracts and upheld the legal parts, as long as the central purpose of the parties’ agreement did not depend on the illegal part.” Slip op at 3. South Carolina, said the Court, “followed this main current and interpreted contracts as severable if consistent with the parties’ intent.” Slip op. at 3 (citations omitted).

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, said the Court, “takes the further view that if only part of a contract term is unenforceable on the grounds of public policy, a court may enforce the rest of the term as long as 1) ‘the performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is not an essential part of the agreed exchange’ and 2) the party seeking to enforce the term ‘obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.’” Slip op. at 3-4 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184). Restatement (Second) Section 184’s comments, in turn, “emphasize that ‘a court will not aid a party who has taken advantage of his dominant bargaining power to extract from the other party a promise that is clearly so broad as to offend public policy by redrafting the agreement so as to make a part of the promise enforceable.’” Slip op. at 4 (quoting Restatement (Second) § 184, comment b).

No Question of Fact that the Parties did not Intend to Permit Severability of the Limitations Provision

The Court determined that, although party intent is often a question of fact, there were three reasons why there was no such question concerning party intent not to allow severability:

  1. The parties did not agree to a severability clause;
  2. The contract’s merger clause states that the “contract ‘embodies the entire agreement’ and that it can only ‘be amended or modified’ by a writing executed by both the Huskins and Mungo[;]” and
  3. Mungo conceded that the contract was an adhesion contract.

Slip op. at 4.

The Court found that the contract was offered on a “‘take it or leave it’” basis, drafted by Mungo, deemed nonnegotiable, and not editable by the Huskins. Slip op. at 4. “This forceful proof,” said the Court, “of Mungo’s intent that the contract could not be tinkered with convinces us we should not rewrite it now.” Slip op. at 4.

The Court further concluded that the illegal provision in the arbitration agreement was material because it would be outcome determinative of many disputes. Slip op. at 4. The Court viewed the provision not as a “mere ‘ancillary logistical concern’ of the arbitration agreement” but  “a brash push to accomplish through arbitration something our statutory law forbids.” Slip op. at 4 (citation omitted). Were the Court to to “lift[] out the clause, the legal statute limitations period (which in most cases allows claims to be filed within three years of their reasonable discovery) would drop in.” Slip op. at 4 (parenthetical material in original). That “would rewrite arbitration agreement to expand the statute of limitations by several orders of magnitude.” Slip op. at 4.

Arbitration, said the Court, is designed “to provide an alternative way to resolve disputes in a fair an efficient manner[,]” but “Mungo designed its arbitration provision not to streamline the resolution of disputes but to reduce their number” by greatly reducing the limitation period for bring those disputes. Slip op. at 4. The Court “conclud[ed] Mungo’s manipulative skirting of South Carolina public policy goes to the core of the arbitration agreement and weighs heavily against severance.” Slip op. at 4-5 (citations omitted)

The Court ruled that it would not save the arbitration agreement by severing the offending limitations provision, finding that because this was an “adhesion contract” it was “highly doubtful that the parties truly intended for severance to apply.” Slip op. at 5 (citation omitted). The contract was a consumer home-purchase agreement, triggering the “public policy concerns that [Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC, 437 S.C. 596, 619-20 (2022)] eloquently addressed.” Slip op. at 5.

Permitting Severance would Provide a Perverse Incentive for Dominant Parties to Include in Adhesion Contracts Illegal Contract Provisions

“We have[,]” said the Court, been steadfast in protecting home buyers from unscrupulous and overreaching terms, and applying severance here would erode that laudable public policy.” Slip op. at 5 (citation omitted). Mungo wanted an “adhesion contract so its terms could not be varied and would stick[,]” and, now, “Mungo was stuck with its choice.” Slip op. at 5. Finding otherwise would ensure there was “no downside to throwing in blatantly illegal terms, betting they will go unchallenged or, at worst, that courts will throw them out and enforce the rest.” Slip op. at 5 (citations omitted).

The Court thus did not sever the offending contract provision and held that the arbitration agreement was therefore unenforceable. Slip op. at 6. It further found that the container contract contract was not affected by the Court’s ruling. Slip op. at 6.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has nearly 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

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New York Arbitration Law Focus: Appellate Division, Second Department Vacates Attorney’s Fee Award Because it was Irrational and Violated New York Public Policy

December 7th, 2023 Application to Confirm, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Attorney Fee Shifting, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Fails to Draw Essence from the Agreement, Award Irrational, Award Vacated, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, CPLR Article 75, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Exceeding Powers, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Making Decisions about Arbitration, New York Arbitration Law (CPLR Article 75), New York State Courts, Outcome Risk, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Policy, Practice and Procedure, Public Policy, Second Department, State Arbitration Law, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, Vacate, Vacate Award | Attorney Fees, Vacate Award | Attorney's Fees, Vacate Award | Public Policy, Vacatur Comments Off on New York Arbitration Law Focus: Appellate Division, Second Department Vacates Attorney’s Fee Award Because it was Irrational and Violated New York Public Policy

Attorney's FeesThe question before the Appellate Division, Second Department in In re D & W Cent. Station Fire Alarm Co. v. Flatiron Hotel, ___ A.D. 3d ___, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 6136 (2d Dep’t Nov. 29, 2023), was whether an arbitration award had to be vacated because the amount of fees the arbitrator awarded was irrational and excessive and therefore exceeded the arbitrator’s powers under N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. (“CPLR”) 7511(b)(1)(iii). The arbitrator awarded fees that were 13.5 times the amount the prevailing party’s attorney said it charged its client on an hourly basis. The fee award was 44% of the amount the arbitrators awarded for the prevailing party’s claim. See 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 6136 at *1.

The Court concluded that the fee award was irrational and violative of New York’s strong public policy against the enforcement of contracts or claims for excessive legal fees. It therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to confirm and denying the motion to vacate, and remanded the matter back to the trial court. See 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 6136 at *2.

Flatiron Hotel is of particular interest because it shows that there is authority under New York arbitration law for challenging successfully awards of legal fees that are authorized by the parties’ contract but are off the rails in their amount. While not a high-stakes arbitration involving hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees, it was one where the losing party was socked with a fee that was so far out of proportion of what it consented to pay that there was nothing whatosever in the record to support it.

Fortunately for the appellant in Flatiron Hotel, the Appellate Division set aside the fee award even though the standard of review for granting such relief is highly deferential. While decisions vacating awards are understandably quite rare, this was one where vacatur was quite appropriate, as we shall see. Continue Reading »

2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb?

July 18th, 2022 Amount in Controversy, Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Application to Appoint Arbitrator, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitrability, Arbitral Subpoenas, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Transportation Worker Exemption, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Section 5, Federal Arbitration Act Section 7, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Federal Courts, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, International Arbitration, International Judicial Assistance, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Look Through, Modify or Correct Award, Moses Cone Principle, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Petition to Modify Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Policy, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Presumption of Arbitrability, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 10, Section 11, Section 1782, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 9, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, Statutory Interpretation and Construction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Substantive Arbitrability, Textualism, United States Supreme Court, Vacatur, Waiver of Arbitration Comments Off on 2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb?

Introduction: This Term’s SCOTUS Arbitration Cases 

SCOTUS FAA CasesThe 2021 Term was a busy and controversial one for the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) regarding abortion, First Amendment rights, Second Amendment rights, and administrative agency power.  However, many may not know SCOTUS decided four Federal Arbitration Act cases during the 2021 Term (the “FAA Cases”), as well as a pair of cases consolidated into one concerning whether U.S. Courts may provide under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 judicial assistance to international arbitration panels sited abroad. See Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U. S. ____, No. 20–1573, slip op. (June 15, 2022) (construing FAA); ZF Automotive US, Inc., et al. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. ___, No. 21–401, slip op. (June 13, 2022) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1782); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. ___, No. 21-309, slip op. (June 6, 2022) (construing FAA); Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. ___, No. 21-328, slip op. (May 23, 2022) (construing FAA); Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. ___, No. 20-1143, slip op. (March 31, 2022) (construing FAA).  

Three of the SCOTUS FAA Cases, Badgerow, Morgan, and Southwest Airlines signal SCOTUS’s apparent intention to construe strictly the Federal Arbitration Act’s text without indulging in any pro-arbitration presumptions or applying arbitration-specific rules intentionally encouraging arbitration-friendly outcomes. ZF Automotive, the 28 U.S.C. § 1782 judicial-assistance case also  employed a strict, textualist approach to interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1782, used the FAA to help support its conclusion, and held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 did not authorize U.S. district courts to provide judicial assistance to private arbitration panels sited abroad—an outcome not particularly solicitous of international arbitration. It is therefore at least indirectly supportive of the more textually oriented and arbitration-neutral approach SCOTUS appears to have endorsed with special force during the 2021 Term.  

The SCOTUS 2021 Term FAA Cases are not the first ones in which the Court applied textualist interpretations to the FAA. There are others. See, e.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) (discussed here and here). But common themes in three of those FAA Cases—echoed in ZF Automotive —suggest a marked trend by the Court to interpret the FAA in a less expansive manner that is not presumptively arbitration friendly. The expression of these common themes in four cases decided in a single term is particularly significant because Morgan, Southwest Airlines, and ZF Automotive were decided unanimously by all participating Justices and Badgerow was decided 8-1, with now retired Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissenting.  

Many previous FAA SCOTUS decisions of the last three or four decades have been very indulgent of arbitration. The Court encouraged arbitration proliferation far beyond B-2-B commercial and industry arbitration between sophisticated and resource-laden entities of roughly equal bargaining power.  Arbitration was introduced into consumer and employment disputes and other disputes involving persons (including businesses) of vastly disparate resources and sophistication. SCOTUS made arbitration agreements readily enforceable, interpreted them expansively in favor of arbitration, limited defenses to arbitration agreements and awards, and promoted arbitration to make it, at least in the eyes of some, an attractive alternative to litigation. Critics challenged that view and assailed arbitration as “do it yourself court reform.”  The SCOTUS arbitration decisions developed and implemented an expansive federal policy in favor of arbitration and a presumption of arbitrability and championed a very pro-arbitration approach to arbitration law in general.  

That SCOTUS, the lower federal courts, and eventually even the skeptical state courts that are bound by its FAA decisions, have been solicitous and supportive of arbitration is unsurprising. The assumed (but not necessarily realized) benefits of arbitration have long been touted by academics and promoted by business and industry representatives.  Of course, courts have for many years recognized that arbitration helps reduce docket congestion, which was exacerbated by COVID and remains a problem today, even with the help of proliferated arbitration proceedings. Arbitral dispute resolution is also a very impressive business sector in and of itself, generating billions in revenues for law firms, arbitrators, and arbitration providers. It therefore has many proponents.  

But Badgerow, Morgan, Southwest Airlines, and ZF Automotive suggest that SCOTUS is rethinking its prior expansive, and highly-arbitration-friendly approach to the FAA and might be more willing to entertain seriously arguments for interpreting: (a) arbitration agreements less expansively, and more like ordinary contracts; and (b) Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA strictly according to their text and not in an exceedingly narrow manner designed to encourage, arbitration-award-favoring outcomes. These cases may also embolden lower courts, especially the state courts, to do the same. Continue Reading »