In late 2025, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”) presented a CPR Speaks YouTube program entitled “Hot Topics: Year-End Wrap-Up, and 2026 Look-Ahead, on Appellate Arbitration Cases.” Moderated by our friend and colleague, Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of CPR (“CPR Alternatives”), the program brought together a panel of highly experienced arbitration practitioners to discuss recent appellate arbitration developments and to assess issues likely to command attention in the current 2025 Supreme Court Term and beyond.
The panel included Professor Angela Downes, University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law(“UNTD”) Professor of Practice, UNTD Assistant Director of Experiential Education, and JAMS Neutral (arbitrator and mediator); Richard D. Faulkner, veteran arbitration and appellate practitioner, arbitrator, mediator, former trial judge, prosecutor, and law professor; and the author, Philip J. Loree Jr., principal of The Loree Law Firm; founder, author, and editor of the Arbitration Law Forum; and former BigLaw partner, who focuses his practice on arbitration and appellate and trial-court arbitration litigation.
You can review the video of the presentation here. This was the 17th arbitration-related, CPR-sponsored video presentation in which Mr. Loree and other members of the panel have participated. Russ is to be thanked profusely not only for hosting and moderating the program, but also posting links and citation references to blog posts, articles and cases relevant to the matters discussed.
While the discussion canvassed a wide range of cases, the panel placed particular emphasis on two matters in which the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) has granted certiorari: Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 25-83 (U.S.) and Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 24-935 (U.S.). Together, those cases underscore the Court’s renewed engagement with arbitration-related procedural and jurisdictional questions under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”).
This post summarizes the panel’s discussion of these important appellate arbitration developments, focusing primarily on Jules and Flowers and the issues they present. It then turns to other appellate decisions that have recently shaped the arbitration-law landscape.
Appellate Arbitration Developments: Supreme Court Certiorari as the Organizing Principle
A central premise of the CPR program was that Supreme Court certiorari activity is itself a critically important signal indicating the direction in which arbitration law is trending at the appellate level. . Even where arbitration doctrine appears settled, the Court’s willingness to take certain cases—and its refusal to take others—often reveals where doctrinal fault lines have emerged or are emerging.
In this respect, Jules and Flowers Foods are especially significant. Both cases present issues that go to the scope and operation of the FAA, but neither involves a frontal assault on arbitration enforceability. To be sure, their outcomes will in Flowers determine whether, under the facts, Section 1 of the FAA exempts from the FAA certain end-point workers who transport goods without crossing borders, and in Jules, whether an FAA-governed arbitration award must be confirmed in a state, rather than federal, forum. Instead, they raise jurisdictional questions that can determine whether arbitration-related disputes are heard in federal court at all (Jules) or in any court under the FAA (Flowers).
Key Appellate Arbitration-Law Development I: Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties—Continuing or Anchor Subject Matter Jurisdiction Following a Section 3 Stay and a Section 4 Motion to Compel
In Jules, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a federal court that stays an action pending arbitration under FAA § 3, and compels arbitration under Section 4, retains subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate post-arbitration applications to confirm or vacate the award under FAA §§ 9 or 10.
Although narrow in formulation, the question is complex and has sweeping practical consequences, particularly in light of the Court’s 2022 decision in Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022), which sharply limited federal courts’ ability to exercise so-called “look-through” jurisdiction over post-arbitration proceedings.
As the panel emphasized, Jules sits at the intersection of two doctrinal developments in appellate arbitration law:
- Mandatory stays under FAA § 3, increasingly reinforced by Supreme Court precedent, which apply only when a party requests the stay and a court finds referable to arbitration a claim that is the subject or part of a pending federal-court lawsuit on the merits; and
- Following Badgerow, restricted federal jurisdiction over pre- or post-award arbitration enforcement proceedings, at least where those proceedings are standalone, independent proceedings that do not arise out of a preexisting but stayed federal-court lawsuit.
If a federal court in a lawsuit on the merits of a dispute compels arbitration, and if a party requests a stay of the federal lawsuit pending arbitration, then under Smith v. Spizzirri, 144 S. Ct. 1173 (2024), the federal court must grant the stay. But if the same court lacks jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting award, the practical utility of the initially selected and stayed federal forum is substantially diminished, and serious questions arise about whether Congress intended the FAA to permit such a result.
This is especially so since finding jurisdiction based on the preexisting jurisdiction of the federal lawsuit does not implicate any concerns about “looking through” to the underlying arbitration proceeding. As long as jurisdiction is based on the jurisdiction of the Court in the underlying lawsuit, then there is no “look through”—it’s really just “look at”—if there was subject matter jurisdiction over the stayed lawsuit, then there should presumably be subject matter jurisdiction over a motion made in that stayed lawsuit for relief under the FAA relating to the subject matter of that stayed lawsuit. See Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 15 (“Jurisdiction to decide the case includes jurisdiction to decide the motion; there is no need to “look through” the motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court.”) The tension associated with all of this is what Jules brings to the fore.
CPR’s discussion of the case highlights how lower courts have divided on this issue and why the Supreme Court guidance is required. (See CPR’s analysis of Jules here.)
SmartSky Networks v. DAG Wireless: Context for the Jules Question
Against that backdrop, the panel discussed SmartSky Networks LLC v. DAG Wireless Ltd., 70 F.4th 615 (4th Cir. 2023), a Fourth Circuit decision addressing whether a federal court that compelled arbitration, and stayed proceedings pending arbitration, retained jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting award. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in Jules that the district court, which had federal question jurisdiction over a lawsuit on the merits, had continuing subject matter or anchor jurisdiction over post-award enforcement proceedings because it had granted a Section 3 stay and a Section 4 motion to compel arbitration. In SmartSky, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the diametrically opposite conclusion in a case involving essentially the same material facts as Jules.
Importantly, as the panel made clear, SmartSky was not discussed as an end in itself. Rather, it served as a concrete illustration of the jurisdictional problem now before the U.S. Supreme Court in Jules. The resolution of Jules will most likely determine whether SmartSky is a good law, a very important question to appellate and trial-court arbitration law practitioners.
SmartSky, unlike Jules, concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over post-arbitration proceedings, notwithstanding the Section 3 stay. That approach reflects a strict reading of Badgerow and highlights the risk that federal courts may become jurisdictionally stranded after compelling arbitration. That would leave a significant amount of additional FAA litigation to the state courts, who would be expected to apply the FAA to substantive matters but be free to apply state arbitration law to procedural matters.
The panel discussed how courts have taken different approaches, creating uncertainty for practitioners and litigants alike. These divergent outcomes underscore why Supreme Court review is warranted.
As CPR’s year-end materials explain, SmartSky and Jules, taken together, demonstrate the kind of materially different approaches to the same important issue that often prompt a grant of certiorari. (See CPR’s overview here.)
Key Appellate Arbitration-Law Development II: Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock— FAA § 1 and the Scope of the Transportation Worker Exemption
The panel also discussed Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 25-121 (U.S.), the other case in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari. Flowers Foods concerns the scope of the FAA § 1 exemption for certain “transportation workers” and the criteria courts should apply in determining whether that exemption applies.
The question before the Court is: “[a]re workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do
not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—’transportation workers’ ‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’ for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act’s § 1 exemption?”
Continuing Uncertainty Under FAA § 1
Although the Supreme Court has addressed FAA § 1 in recent years, the panel noted that lower courts continue to struggle with its application, particularly in cases involving workers who perform mixed or indirect transportation-related functions, or where (as here) a bona fide question arises concerning whether the workers are engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of FAA § 1.
Flowers Foods presents an opportunity for the Court to clarify how broadly—or narrowly—the exemption should be construed, with significant implications for employment arbitration and independent contractor agreements.
The panel emphasized that FAA § 1 litigation has become one of the most active areas of appellate arbitration law, making the Court’s intervention both timely and consequential.
Other Appellate Developments Discussed
With the cert-granted-recently Supreme Court cases as the anchor, the panel surveyed several additional appellate decisions that illustrate broader trends:
- International arbitration and sovereign immunity, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 145 S.Ct. 1572 (2025), addressing a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., personal jurisdiction issue arising out of an award enforcement matter.
- FAA preemption of State Law, as reflected in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.5th 310 (2025) (finding no preemption of state law concerning prompt payment of arbitrator fees).
- Consumer arbitration and unconscionability, including Live Nation v. Heckman, 69 F.4th 1257 (9th Cir. 2023).
- Severability of illegal arbitration agreement provisions and contract enforcement, discussed through Mungo Homes LLC v. Huskins, 379 S.C. 199, 665 S.E.2d 590 (S.C. 2023). (For a discussion of Mungo Homes, see here.)
- FAA §3 stays and procedural consequences, as discussed in Smith v. Spizzirri, 144 S. Ct. 1173 (2024). (For a discussion of Spizzirri, see here.)
- Flores v. New York Football Giants, Inc.,104 F.4th 205 (2d Cir. 2024), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that required disputes to be arbitrated by an arbitrator who lacked independence from the parties. (For a discussion of Flores, see here.)
Practical Implications for Arbitration Practitioners
The panel’s discussion yielded several practical takeaways, including:
- Arbitration law disputes increasingly turn on procedural and jurisdictional mechanics rather than on arbitration’s legitimacy as a dispute resolution mechanism.
- At least until the Supreme Court decides Jules, federal subject matter jurisdiction based on an “anchor” or “continuing jurisdiction” theory cannot be assumed simply because the court has compelled arbitration and stayed litigation pending arbitration.
- Strategic decisions at the motion-to-compel stage may determine whether other FAA litigation will proceed in state, rather than federal court.
- Arbitration clause drafting should account for jurisdictional endgames—including vertical (state vs. federal) choice of law—not just enforceability generally.
Looking Ahead to 2026
As the panel concluded, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jules and Flowers Foods are likely to shape arbitration practice well beyond the this 2025 Term, and the Court’s 2026 Term, which starts later next year. Together, they reflect a Court that is less concerned with whether arbitration is favored, and more concerned with how arbitration fits within the text of the FAA concerning subject matter jurisdiction and exemptions to FAA applicability.
For arbitration practitioners, staying attuned to these developments is critical. Programs like CPR’s year-end “Hot Topics” discussion provide an invaluable forum for understanding not just where arbitration law has been—but where it is heading.
Contacting the Author
If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.
Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and trial court and appellate arbitration-related litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.
This blog features links to several arbitration-related videos and webinars in which Mr. Loree appears.
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Photo Acknowledgment
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A—an Ontario-based corporation–commences a New York state court lawsuit against B—a New York-based corporation–in New York state court for breach of contract. The contract contains a mandatory New York choice-of-forum clause and a very broad choice-of-law provision, which, among other things, designates New York law to govern the contract and its “enforcement.” If Ontario’s two-year statute of limitations applies, then the suit is time barred, but if New York’s six-year statute of limitations applies, then the suit is timely. Is A’s suit barred by the statute-of-limitations? 
