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CPR’s March 27 Appellate Arbitration Video Panel: Jules, Flowers Foods, Goff, and Bruce

arbitration video CPR

The International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (“CPR”) presented on March 27, 2026, the latest instalment of its long-running hot-topics in arbitration video series: “Hot Topics: The Supreme Court’s March on Arbitration.” Our good friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, moderated the presentation. The panelists were our other good friends and colleagues Professor Angela Downes and Richard D. Faulkner— plus the author, Philip J. Loree Jr.

This developments in arbitration video looked backward to the March 25, 2026, Supreme Court argument in Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 24-935 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2026), forward to the March 30 argument in Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 25-83 (U.S. argued Mar. 30, 2026), and sideways to certain consequential circuit decisions, including USAA Savings Bank v. Goff, No. 25-1730, slip op. (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2026), and Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, No. 25-5210, slip op. (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026). This was the eighteenth CPR arbitration video presentation this panel (or most of it), has given during the past four or five years.

The March 27, 2026, Video

The March 27 program is best understood not as a one-off webinar, but as the newest installment in a continuing conversation about where appellate arbitration law is heading. CPR’s December 2025 year-end program had already previewed Jules and Flowers Foods, the two U.S. Supreme Court arbitration-law cases the Court has thus far accepted this 2025 Term for review.

What the March 27, 2026, Video Shows About the Current State of Arbitration Law

This latest arbitration video shows that the four featured matters are different on their facts but closely related in what they reveal about the present state of arbitration law. None is a frontal assault on arbitration. Each instead concerns a doctrinal pressure point: where post-award litigation belongs, who falls within the FAA’s Section 1 transportation-worker exemption, when courts will conclude that arbitrators exceeded the bounds of the contract by not interpreting it, and how far Congress’s Ending Forced Arbitration Act (“EFAA”) carve-out extends once sexual-harassment or sexual-assault claims are pleaded together with other claims not covered by the EFAA.

In that respect, Jules remained the centerpiece. Jules asks whether a federal court that properly exercised federal question jurisdiction over an action, and then stayed that action pending arbitration under FAA Section 3, may later adjudicate post-award FAA motions without having a new and independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. The question is narrow only on the surface. In practical terms, it concerns whether a federal court that has federal question jurisdiction over the merits dispute, and pursuant to FAA Section 3 stays the litigation pending arbitration of the merits dispute, may, at the request of one of the parties, and without having a new and independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (such as diversity), complete the job after the award returns, or whether the parties must instead start over in state court. The CPR panel’s discussion came only days before the March 30 argument, which made the presentation a timely and useful preview of one of the Court’s most important FAA jurisdiction-related cases since Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022), and Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472 (2024).

Readers who view the March 27, 2026 presentation and the subsequent March 30, 2026 oral argument can see that the panelists’ comments were largely or entirely on the mark. CPR Speaks followed the argument with a very thoughtful same-day report, Supreme Court Hears Case on Federal Courts’ Powers to Confirm Arbitration Awards. A decision likely will issue before the close of the October 2025 Term in late June.

Flowers Foods concerns the scope of FAA Section 1’s transportation-worker exemption. But both Jules and Flowers Foods share an important feature: both concern where the FAA stops, and both therefore affect whether arbitration disputes will be resolved in court, in arbitration, or in some jurisdictional or procedural limbo between the two. The March 27 program accordingly framed Flowers not as an isolated exemption dispute, but as part of the Court’s broader and continuing effort to define the FAA’s boundaries with greater textual precision.

The panel also highlighted two significant circuit courts of appeals decisions that underscore how much important arbitration doctrine is shaped outside the U.S. Supreme Court. In Goff, the Seventh Circuit addressed a rare circumstance in which a court vacated an award on the ground that the arbitrator had, disregarded the parties’ contract and thus did not even arguably interpret it. That issue is significant not because courts often vacate awards on that basis, but because they rarely do. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569, 572-73 (2013), made clear how narrow the path is for setting aside an award under FAA Section 10(a)(4) when the arbitrator is at least arguably construing the agreement. A decision like Goff therefore commands attention because it tests the line between genuine contract interpretation and an arbitrator’s substitution of her own notions of “[economic] justice” or “sound policy.” See id. at 569; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672, 675 (2010).

Bruce, in turn, is one of the most important circuit-court decisions construing the EFAA. The Sixth Circuit adopted what is sometimes called the entire-case rule: when a case includes an EFAA-covered sexual-harassment dispute, the statute renders the arbitration agreement unenforceable as to the whole case, not merely as to the EFAA-covered claims. See Bruce, slip op. at 17-19. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that reading, the decision is consequential because it gives the statute a broader practical effect than a claim-by-claim approach would have done. The March 27 CPR program usefully placed Bruce in the same conversation as Jules, Flowers Foods, and Goff because all four cases illuminate a common theme: appellate courts are increasingly defining arbitration law through technical yet consequential disputes over scope, forum, remedy, and statutory carve-outs, rather than through generalized debates about whether the federal policy in favor of arbitration should in a given case drive an arbitration-friendly outcome.

The presentation also illustrated the value of continuity among panelists. Professor Downes, Rick Faulkner, Russ Bleemer, and the author bring different vantage points to the discussion: academic, arbitral, appellate- and district-court practitioner, and editorial. Because the same group has returned repeatedly over several years, the programs have developed into something more useful than mere episodic commentary.

For readers of The Arbitration Law Forum, the key takeaway is straightforward. The March 27 program is worth watching not only for its discussion of the four featured cases, but also for the broader picture it paints. The doctrinal stakes of the Supreme Court’s arbitration docket are larger than they first appear. Lower federal courts continue to generate important arbitration law at a brisk pace. And many of the most consequential disputes now concern not whether arbitration will or should be enforced in the abstract, but how courts define the boundaries of arbitral power, arbitral forum, and arbitral exception. This eighteenth CPR presentation captures, in one discussion, several of the issues likely to shape arbitration-law practice in the months and years ahead.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration law, or arbitration-related litigation, then you may contact the author at pjl1@loreelawirm.com or +1 (516) 941-6094.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of The Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and arbitration-law matters. The Loree Law Firm’s website is https://loreelawfirm.com/.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

FAA § 1 | Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC: Second Circuit Rejects Bakery’s Creative Bid to Avoid Drivers’ FAA Section 1 Exemption

January 10th, 2026 Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 1, FAA Section 4, FAA Transportation Worker Exemption, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Motion to Compel Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) § 1 (“FAA § 1”) provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. In New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the Supreme Court held that, as of 1925, “contracts of employment” was not a term of art limited to employer-employee relationships, but a capacious phrase referring to agreements “to perform work,” including independent-contractor arrangements. 586 U.S. 105, 113–21 (2019). (Posts discussing FAA § 1, including New Prime, are here, here, here, here, & here.)

In Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC, No. 24-2103-cv, slip op. (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that distribution agreements signed by single-worker corporate entities—entities the company required delivery drivers to form as a condition of keeping their routes—were “contracts of employment” within FAA § 1, so the FAA could not be used to compel arbitration. See Silva, slip op. at 2, 18–20.

The “transportation worker” exemption continues to generate litigation and businesses Continue Reading »

The EFAA—Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act: A Practical Overview

January 5th, 2026 Anti-Arbitration Statutes, Applicability of the FAA, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreement Invalid, Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Delegation Agreements, Delegation Provision, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Employment Arbitration, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, FAA Chapter 4, FAA Section 1, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 401, FAA Section 402, Limitations on Arbitrability, Post-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, Practice and Procedure, Predispute Arbitration Agreements, Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Disputes, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Comments Off

Introduction

The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the “EFAA”) is one of the most significant statutory changes to federal arbitration law in decades. Codified as Chapter 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402, the EFAA limits the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual assault or sexual harassment.

Narrow in subject matter but broad in consequence, it affects domestic and international arbitration agreements, overrides delegation clauses, alters who decides arbitrability, and raises difficult questions about timing, scope, and case management. Federal courts—including circuit courts of appeals—have already begun to grapple with these issues, and more appellate guidance will likely be forthcoming.

This post provides a high-level overview of (1) what the EFAA says, (2) how it works in practice, and (3) the key issues courts have addressed so far, without extensive case-by-case discussion and analysis.

What the EFAA Says

EFAA Covered Agreements and Covered Disputes

The EFAA applies to two types of contractual provisions:

A “Predispute arbitration agreement,” which is an “agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet arisen when the agreement was made,” 9 U.S.C. § 401(1); and
A “Predispute joint-action waiver,” which is an “agreement, whether or not part of a predispute arbitration agreement, that would prohibit, or waive the right of, one of the parties to the agreement to participate in a joint, class, or collective action in a judicial, arbitral, administrative, or other forum, concerning a dispute that has not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement[,]” id. § 401(2).

The statute applies only if the dispute qualifies as either a “sexual assault dispute,” which is defined by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2246 or similar state or tribal law, id. § 401(3); or a “sexual harassment dispute,” which is defined broadly as a dispute “relating to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law,” id. § 401(4).

The definitions of sexual harassment and assault are intentionally expansive and incorporate the relevant substantive law governing the claim.

EFAA Operative Rule

Section 402(a) is the statute’s principal substantive command: Continue Reading »

Hot Topics in Appellate Arbitration: Supreme Court Review, Jurisdictional Fault Lines, and a Look Ahead to 2026

appellate arbitration-law developments In late 2025, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”) presented a CPR Speaks YouTube program entitled “Hot Topics: Year-End Wrap-Up, and 2026 Look-Ahead, on Appellate Arbitration Cases.” Moderated by our friend and colleague, Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of CPR (“CPR Alternatives”), the program brought together a panel of highly experienced arbitration practitioners to discuss recent appellate arbitration developments and to assess issues likely to command attention in the current 2025 Supreme Court Term and beyond.

The panel included Professor Angela Downes, University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law(“UNTD”) Professor of Practice, UNTD Assistant Director of Experiential Education, and JAMS Neutral (arbitrator and mediator); Richard D. Faulkner, veteran arbitration and appellate practitioner, arbitrator, mediator, former trial judge, prosecutor, and law professor; and the author, Philip J. Loree Jr., principal of The Loree Law Firm; founder, author, and editor of the Arbitration Law Forum; and former BigLaw partner, who focuses his practice on arbitration and appellate and trial-court arbitration litigation.

You can review the video of the presentation here. This was the 17th arbitration-related, CPR-sponsored video presentation in which Mr. Loree and other members of the panel have participated. Russ is to be thanked profusely not only for hosting and moderating the program, but also posting links and citation references to blog posts, articles and cases relevant to the matters discussed.

While the discussion canvassed a wide range of cases, the panel placed particular emphasis on two matters in which the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) has granted certiorari: Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 25-83 (U.S.) and Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 24-935 (U.S.). Together, those cases underscore the Court’s renewed engagement with arbitration-related procedural and jurisdictional questions under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”).

This post summarizes the panel’s discussion of these important appellate arbitration developments, focusing primarily on Jules and Flowers and the issues they present. It then turns to other appellate decisions that have recently shaped the arbitration-law landscape.

Appellate Arbitration Developments: Supreme Court Certiorari as the Organizing Principle

A central premise of the CPR program was that Supreme Court certiorari activity is itself a critically important signal indicating the direction in which arbitration law is trending at the appellate level. . Even where arbitration doctrine appears settled, the Court’s willingness to take certain cases—and its refusal to take others—often reveals where doctrinal fault lines have emerged or are emerging.

In this respect, Jules and Flowers Foods are especially significant. Both cases present issues that go to the scope and operation of the FAA, but neither involves a frontal assault on arbitration enforceability. To be sure, their outcomes will in Flowers determine whether, under the facts, Section 1 of the FAA exempts from the FAA certain end-point workers who transport goods without crossing borders, and in Jules, whether an FAA-governed arbitration award must be confirmed in a state, rather than federal, forum. Instead, they raise jurisdictional questions that can determine whether arbitration-related disputes are heard in federal court at all (Jules) or in any court under the FAA (Flowers).

Key Appellate Arbitration-Law Development I: Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties—Continuing or Anchor Subject Matter Jurisdiction Following a Section 3 Stay and a Section 4 Motion to Compel

In Jules, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a federal court that stays an action pending arbitration under FAA § 3, and compels arbitration under Section 4, retains subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate post-arbitration applications to confirm or vacate the award under FAA §§ 9 or 10.

Although narrow in formulation, the question is complex and has sweeping practical consequences, particularly in light of the Court’s 2022 decision in Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022), which sharply limited federal courts’ ability to exercise so-called “look-through” jurisdiction over post-arbitration proceedings.

As the panel emphasized, Jules sits at the intersection of two doctrinal developments in appellate arbitration law:

Mandatory stays under FAA § 3, increasingly reinforced by Supreme Court precedent, which apply only when a party requests the stay and a court finds referable to arbitration a claim that is the subject or part of a pending federal-court lawsuit on the merits; and
Following Badgerow, restricted federal jurisdiction over pre- or post-award arbitration enforcement proceedings, at least where those proceedings are standalone, independent proceedings that do not arise out of a preexisting but stayed federal-court lawsuit.

If a federal court in a lawsuit on the merits of a dispute compels arbitration, and if a party requests a stay of the federal lawsuit pending arbitration, then under Smith v. Spizzirri, 144 S. Ct. 1173 (2024), the federal court must grant the stay. But if the same court lacks jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting award, the practical utility of the initially selected and stayed federal forum is substantially diminished, and serious questions arise about whether Congress intended the FAA to permit such a result.

This is especially so since finding jurisdiction based on the preexisting jurisdiction of the federal lawsuit does not implicate any concerns about “looking through” to the underlying arbitration proceeding. As long as jurisdiction is based on the jurisdiction of the Court in the underlying lawsuit, then there is no “look through”—it’s really just “look at”—if there was subject matter jurisdiction over the stayed lawsuit, then there should presumably be subject matter jurisdiction over a motion made in that stayed lawsuit for relief under the FAA relating to the subject matter of that stayed lawsuit. See Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 15 (“Jurisdiction to decide the case includes jurisdiction to decide the motion; there is no need to “look through” the motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court.”) The tension associated with all of this is what Jules brings to the fore.

CPR’s discussion of the case highlights how lower courts have divided on this issue and why the Supreme Court guidance is required. (See CPR’s analysis of Jules here.)

SmartSky Networks v. DAG Wireless: Context for the Jules Question

Against that backdrop, the panel discussed SmartSky Networks LLC v. DAG Wireless Ltd., 70 F.4th 615 (4th Cir. 2023), a Fourth Circuit decision addressing whether a federal court that compelled arbitration, and stayed proceedings pending arbitration, retained jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting award. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in Jules that the district court, which had federal question jurisdiction over a lawsuit on the merits, had continuing subject matter or anchor jurisdiction over post-award enforcement proceedings because it had granted a Section 3 stay and a Section 4 motion to compel arbitration. In SmartSky, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the diametrically opposite conclusion in a case involving essentially the same material facts as Jules.

Importantly, as the panel made clear, SmartSky was not discussed as an end in itself. Rather, it served as a concrete illustration of the jurisdictional problem now before the U.S. Supreme Court in Jules. The resolution of Jules will most likely determine whether SmartSky is a good law, a very important question to appellate and trial-court arbitration law practitioners.

SmartSky, unlike Jules, concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over post-arbitration proceedings, notwithstanding the Section 3 stay. That approach reflects a strict reading of Badgerow and highlights the risk that federal courts may become jurisdictionally stranded after compelling arbitration. That would leave a significant amount of additional FAA litigation to the state courts, who would be expected to apply the FAA to substantive matters but be free to apply state arbitration law to procedural matters.

The panel discussed how courts have taken different approaches, creating uncertainty for practitioners and litigants alike. These divergent outcomes underscore why Supreme Court review is warranted.

As CPR’s year-end materials explain, SmartSky and Jules, taken together, demonstrate the kind of materially different approaches to the same important issue that often prompt a grant of certiorari. (See CPR’s overview here.)

Key Appellate Arbitration-Law Development II: Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock— FAA § 1 and the Scope of the Transportation Worker Exemption

The panel also discussed Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 25-121 (U.S.), the other case in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari. Flowers Foods concerns the scope of the FAA § 1 exemption for certain “transportation workers” and the criteria courts should apply in determining whether that exemption applies.

The question before the Court is: “[a]re workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do
not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—’transportation workers’ ‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’ for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act’s § 1 exemption?”

Continuing Uncertainty Under FAA § 1

Although the Supreme Court has addressed FAA § 1 in recent years, the panel noted that lower courts continue to struggle with its application, particularly in cases involving workers who perform mixed or indirect transportation-related functions, or where (as here) a bona fide question arises concerning whether the workers are engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of FAA § 1.

Flowers Foods presents an opportunity for the Court to clarify how broadly—or narrowly—the exemption should be construed, with significant implications for employment arbitration and independent contractor agreements.

The panel emphasized that FAA § 1 litigation has become one of the most active areas of appellate arbitration law, making the Court’s intervention both timely and consequential.

Other Appellate Developments Discussed

With the cert-granted-recently Supreme Court cases as the anchor, the panel surveyed several additional appellate decisions that illustrate broader trends:

International arbitration and sovereign immunity, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 145 S.Ct. 1572 (2025), addressing a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., personal jurisdiction issue arising out of an award enforcement matter.
FAA preemption of State Law, as reflected in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.5th 310 (2025) (finding no preemption of state law concerning prompt payment of arbitrator fees).
Consumer arbitration and unconscionability, including Live Nation v. Heckman, 69 F.4th 1257 (9th Cir. 2023).
Severability of illegal arbitration agreement provisions and contract enforcement, discussed through Mungo Homes LLC v. Huskins, 379 S.C. 199, 665 S.E.2d 590 (S.C. 2023). (For a discussion of Mungo Homes, see here.)
FAA §3 stays and procedural consequences, as discussed in Smith v. Spizzirri, 144 S. Ct. 1173 (2024). (For a discussion of Spizzirri, see here.)
Flores v. New York Football Giants, Inc.,104 F.4th 205 (2d Cir. 2024), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that required disputes to be arbitrated by an arbitrator who lacked independence from the parties. (For a discussion of Flores, see here.)

Practical Implications for Arbitration Practitioners

The panel’s discussion yielded several practical takeaways, including:

Arbitration law disputes increasingly turn on procedural and jurisdictional mechanics rather than on arbitration’s legitimacy as a dispute resolution mechanism.
At least until the Supreme Court decides Jules, federal subject matter jurisdiction based on an “anchor” or “continuing jurisdiction” theory cannot be assumed simply because the court has compelled arbitration and stayed litigation pending arbitration.
Strategic decisions at the motion-to-compel stage may determine whether other FAA litigation will proceed in state, rather than federal court.
Arbitration clause drafting should account for jurisdictional endgames—including vertical (state vs. federal) choice of law—not just enforceability generally.

Looking Ahead to 2026

As the panel concluded, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jules and Flowers Foods are likely to shape arbitration practice well beyond the this 2025 Term, and the Court’s 2026 Term, which starts later next year. Together, they reflect a Court that is less concerned with whether arbitration is favored, and more concerned with how arbitration fits within the text of the FAA concerning subject matter jurisdiction and exemptions to FAA applicability.

For arbitration practitioners, staying attuned to these developments is critical. Programs like CPR’s year-end “Hot Topics” discussion provide an invaluable forum for understanding not just where arbitration law has been—but where it is heading.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and trial court and appellate arbitration-related litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

This blog features links to several arbitration-related videos and webinars in which Mr. Loree appears.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Sixth Circuit Says Employee Physician Assistant Gets to Litigate Her Religious Discrimination Claims Because the Employer Defendants were Guilty of Section 3 Arbitration Default

September 18th, 2025 American Arbitration Association, Amicus Brief Submissions, Appellate Practice, Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Applicability of the FAA, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Providers, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Charles Bennett, Default in Proceeding with Arbitration, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Forfeiture, Practice and Procedure, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 3 Default, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Waiver of Arbitration Comments Off

Introduction

Does Section 3 arbitration default result from moving to dismiss the entire case on the merits? The Sixth Circuit says yes.

Since Morgan v. Sundance, 596 U. S. 411 (2022), most of the cases concerning loss of arbitration rights by litigation conduct have focused not on prejudice—Morgan nixed the requirement that arbitration opponents show prejudice to establish forfeiture or waiver, 596 U.S. at 1-2—but on what type and degree of inconsistent-with-arbitration conduct results in a loss of arbitration rights.

But on August 27, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, took a slightly different tack on Section 3 arbitration default. In Kloosterman v. Metropolitan Hospital, No. 24-1398, slip op. (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025), the Court reversed a district court order that had compelled arbitration of a physician assistant (“PA”)’s religious discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit made two significant rulings bearing on loss of arbitration rights by litigation conduct.

First, the Court held— in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Eric Continue Reading »

New York’s Highest Court Rules that Arbitrator’s Statutory Treble Damages Award against Town Should have been Vacated

April 7th, 2025 Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Practice, Application to Confirm, Application to Vacate, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Vacated, Challenging Arbitration Awards, CPLR Article 75, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, New York Appellate Division, New York Court of Appeals, New York State Courts, Petition to Vacate Award, Policy, Public Policy, Punitive Damages, Questions of Arbitrability, Remedies, Sovereign Immunity, Substantive Arbitrability, Treble Damages, Uncategorized, Vacate, Vacate Award | Arbitrability, Vacate Award | Exceeding Powers, Vacate Award | Public Policy Comments Off

Introduction

Under New York law, can an arbitrator lawfully award statutory treble damages against the State or its political subdivisions?

New York prohibits punitive damage awards in suits against the State and its political subdivisions, including of course, towns. See Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 386 (1987). Public funds are available only to compensate for damages suffered because the key “justifications for punitive damages—punishment and deterrence—are hardly advanced when applied to a governmental unit.” Sharapata v Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 338 (1982).

This prohibition on punitive damage awards is also based on the precept that the sovereign’s liability extends no farther than its waiver of immunity. As the New York Court of Appeals—New York’s highest Court—said in Sharapata, “we hold today that the waiver of sovereign immunity effected by section 8 of the Court of Claims Act does not permit punitive damages to be assessed against the State or its political subdivisions.” 56 N.Y.2d at 334.

But assuming treble damages are punitive in nature, can an arbitrator’s award imposing punitive damages be vacated because it violates New York public policy? Recently before the Court, in Matter of Rosbaugh v. Town of Lodi, 2025 NY Slip Op 01406 at *1 (N.Y. Mar. 13, 2025), was the question whether an arbitrator’s treble damages award against the Town of Lodi (the “Town”), made under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) § 861, was punitive in nature and thus contrary to New York public policy. The Court said the answer is yes and held the award must be vacated.

One might expect that Rosbaugh would have discussed briefly New York arbitration law authorizing vacatur of awards that violate public policy but it did not. The focus of the decision was instead on whether the Court could, without violating New York public policy, impose on and enforce against the Town any judgment imposing an RPAPL 861 treble damage remedy, irrespective of whether the judgment resulted or would result from: (a) a plenary, judicial trial on the merits; or (b) a summary proceeding to enter judgment on an arbitration award imposing that remedy. Because the prohibition applies to any suit against the state or its subdivisions, whether on the merits or to confirm an arbitration award, it was arbitration neutral and it did not necessarily require a meaningful discussion of arbitration law to hold that the award had to be vacated.

But perhaps the Court downplayed the arbitration law aspects of the decision because it thought doing otherwise might inadvertently encourage more public-policy challenges to the confirmation of arbitration awards than the law warrants. The line between what may be an egregious mistake of law—which is ordinarily not subject to New York Civ. Prac. L. & R. (“CPLR”) Article 75 review—and a violation of an important New York public policy—which can be a basis for vacatur of an award, see Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 33 N.Y.2d 229, 235-36 (1973)— can sometimes be blurry. The Court may have wanted to downplay arbitration law to avoid encouraging award challengers from unnecessarily, and erroneously, seeking vacatur of awards based on unreviewable legal errors which, while serious, do not amount to violations of “so strong a public policy as to require vacating an award. . . .” 33 N.Y.2d at 231-32.

Also left undiscussed was how New York arbitration law provided an independent, alternative ground on which the courts might have vacated the award. Under New York arbitration law—but not the Federal Arbitration Act—arbitrators to not have the power, and cannot be empowered by agreement, to award punitive damages. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 357, 359-60 (1976); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-64 (1995) (discussing difference between New York law and the FAA concerning arbitrability of punitive damages).

In Rosbaugh, the party who challenged the treble damage award was a municipality, which had a strong, sovereign-immunity-based public policy argument against the assessment of punitive damages. But had the Town been a private person, then it would, it seems to the author, have had at least a basis to argue that for the reasons explained by the Court in Rosbaugh, the treble-damage award had to be vacated under Garrity because of its punitive nature.

Background and Procedural History

Plaintiffs were landowners who owned land abutting one side of a dirt road in upstate New York. They had trees on their property, some of which apparently overhung the road, which was owned and maintained by the Town. The Town claimed that the trees were interfering with the right-of-way.

Presumably concluding that the trees were within the right-of-way, the Town proceeded to hire a tree service company to remove or trim them The company trimmed or cut down 55 trees that were on the plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff sued the Town and the company seeking, among other remedies, treble damages under RPAPL 861(1).

Ultimately the parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator found for the plaintiffs, awarding three-times the “‘stumpage value’ of the damaged or destroyed trees.” 2025 NY Slip Op 01406 at *1 (quotations in original). The trial court upheld the award and a divided panel of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed.

New York’s highest court said “[t]he sole issue on appeal is whether treble damages under RPAPL 861 are punitive in nature , making them unavailable in a suit against a municipality.” 2025 NY Slip Op 01406 at *1. It concluded that they were punitive and that the award had to be vacated. See 2025 NY Slip Op 01406 at *3.

Whether Statutory Treble Damages are Punitive Depends on the Intent of the Legislature

As a general rule, treble damages are considered to be punitive but the Continue Reading »

Some Things to Consider Seriously Before You Agree to Arbitrate: An Arbitration Award may Direct You to Pay Your Adversary’s Attorney’s Fees

March 7th, 2025 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Fees, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Arbitration Risks, Attorney Fee Shifting, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Bad Faith, Charles Bennett, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Outcome Risk, Practice and Procedure, Richard D. Faulkner, Small and Medium-Sized Business Arbitration Risk, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, Uncategorized Comments Off

Attorney's Fees in Arbitration Those who agree to arbitration expose themselves to potential awards of attorney’s fees in cases where courts would likely not award fees.

If you’re a small business or an individual there’s a good chance you’re not fully familiar with certain of the risks associated with arbitration. Clients frequently consult with me when they find themselves saddled with unfavorable awards, and some of these persons are ones who, through no fault of their own, did not appreciate the risks involved and might consequently have missed opportunities to better manage them. In many instances these persons were represented by attorneys who understood that subject matter of the arbitrated disputes, and who were skilled courtroom litigators, but who were not necessarily as well-versed in arbitration-law as are arbitration and arbitration-law practitioners.

This is more than simply an anecdotal observation. My good friends, colleagues, and sometimes co-counsel, Richard D. Faulkner and Charles (“Chuck”) Bennett, who also practice in this field, tell me they share this view and that their experiences are aligned with my own. (Here is a post concerning a Federalist-Society-sponsored webinar Rick, Chuck, and I participated in last year.) Other arbitration attorneys with whom I have spoken also agree.

Readers armed with some practical knowledge may be better able to avoid, mitigate or otherwise manage arbitration risks. It is in that spirit that we discuss a risk that tends to be more severe in arbitration than it is in court litigation: your exposure to an award of attorney’s fees. As always, nothing we say here is or should be construed as legal advice. If you require legal advice you should engage and consult with an attorney.

Exposure to Liability for Your Adversary’s Legal Fees

A commonly overlooked risk associated with agreeing to arbitrate is that, if you lose, you might be on the wrong end of an award that requires you to reimburse your adversary for some or all of the fees it incurred in the arbitration. To be sure, there is a risk that in court litigation, the court may assess attorney’s fees against a losing party, but as we’ll see, the risk is generally higher in arbitration than it is in court litigation. Worse yet, in arbitration the ability to challenge meaningfully such an award (or any other award) in court is extremely circumscribed under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The same is generally so where state arbitration law applies.

No one likes paying attorney fees but they are a necessary incident of dispute resolution, especially resolution of high-dollar disputes. But imagine not only having to pay your own attorney’s fees, but also those of your adversary, an adversary who, in effect, is reimbursed for the fees it incurred in making your life miserable. Continue Reading »

Modern Perfection, LLC v. Bank of America: Fourth Circuit Says Arbitrator gets to Decide which of Two Contracts’ Conflicting Dispute Resolution Provisions Applies

January 27th, 2025 Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreement Invalid, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Delegation Provision, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Motion to Compel Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 2, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off

Introduction: Delegation Provisions and Modern Perfection

Delegation Provisions | Arbitrability Challenge Delegation provisions clearly and unmistakably assign arbitrability determinations to arbitrators, which means they provide for arbitrators to decide arbitrability-related disputes.

Coinbase v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143 (2024) set forth the allocation of power between courts and arbitrators for four “orders” of arbitrability-related disputes:

A “first order” dispute is “[a] contest over the merits of the dispute[,]” the determination of which “depends on the applicable law and relevant facts.” 602 U.S. at 148 (quotation omitted).
A “second order dispute” concerns “whether [the parties] agreed to arbitrate the merits” of the first order dispute. 602 U.S. at 148 (quotation omitted).
A “third order dispute” concerns “who should have the primary power to decide” a second order dispute.” 602 U.S. at 149.
A “fourth order” dispute is one where there are “multiple agreements that conflict as to the third-order question of who decides arbitrability.” 602 U.S. at 149.

Coinbase held that fourth-order disputes are for the courts, which are to decide them based on “traditional contract principles.” 602 U.S. at 149.

In a recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, Modern Perfection, LLC v. Bank of America, No. 23-1965, slip op. (4^th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025), the Court was faced with what appeared to be a “fourth-order” dispute as defined by Suski. The question was who gets to decide arbitrability questions when one contract contained a broad arbitration agreement and a delegation provision and the other a clause that expressly contemplated judicial resolution of disputes.

The problem was that Suski was not decided until briefing in both the district court and the Fourth Circuit was complete, and the arbitration challengers’ argument centered on the scope of the delegation provisions, not on whether the contracts contemplating judicial resolution of disputes superseded the delegation provisions.

The Suski fourth-order dispute issue was first raised in a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter the challenger submitted once Suski was decided. Because the argument had not been raised in the parties’ appellate briefs, the Court would not hear it, and ruled that, under the terms of the delegation provisions, the arbitrator gets to decide whether the dispute was arbitrable.

Background

Over a five-year period a bank issued to each of six plaintiffs two Continue Reading »

Overturning Arbitration Awards based on Clear Mistakes of Historical Fact or Conceded Nonfacts: Some Further Thoughts (Part IV): Will the Seventh Circuit Reverse the UpHealth District Court?

November 14th, 2024 Appellate Practice, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Agreements, Authority of Arbitrators, Award Fails to Draw Essence from the Agreement, Award Vacated, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Exceeding Powers, FAA Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Manifest Disregard of the Agreement, Manifest Disregard of the Law, Outcome Review, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Standard of Review, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, United States Supreme Court, Vacate, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Manifest Disregard of the Law, Vacatur for Conceded Nonfact or Clear Mistake of Historical Fact Comments Off

Will the Seventh Circuit reverse the judgment in the UpHealth case?

In our October 7, 2024, post, “Can a Court under Section 10(a)(4) Overturn an Award Because it was Based on a Clear Mistake of Historical Fact or a Conceded Nonfact?”, we discudssed UpHealth Holdings, Inc. v. Glocal Healthcare Sys. PVT, No. 24-cv-3778, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2024), which granted partial vacatur of an arbitration award because it was, said the Court, based on a “nonfact.” Our October 18, 2024 post, Overturning Arbitration Awards based on Clear Mistakes of Historical Fact or Conceded Nonfacts: Some Further Thoughts (Part I), identified five questions relating to UpHealth designed to shed further light on the case and the arbitration award vacatur standard on which the Court relied.

The first four of those questions were answered in our October 18, October 21, and November 12, 2024, posts. This November 14, 2024, post answers the fifth question: “If there is a [United States Court of Appeals for the] Seventh Circuit appeal of the UpHealth decision, is it likely the decision will be overturned on appeal, and if so, on what grounds?”

We explained in our November 12, 2024, post that UpHealth has appealed the district court decision to the Seventh Circuit. And if you’ve been reading our prior UpHealth posts, then you’ve probably already guessed that the answer is “yes,” it seems likely the Seventh Circuit will reverse the UpHealth decision.

In terms of the grounds, for such a reversal, we think the Seventh Circuit will probably conclude that the only forms of outcome review the Seventh Circuit recognizes is manifest disregard of the contract and violation of public policy, and that UpHealth involves neither of those grounds. That is all the more so where, as here, there is no agreement or concession concerning the allegedly mistaken fact. (See November 12, 2024, post.)

We think the Seventh Circuit may also conclude that recognizing vacatur based on a clear mistake of historical fact or a conceded nonfact would embroil courts in review of the arbitrator’s fact findings, including the sufficiency of evidence. Under Seventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court authority, the FAA does not authorize such review. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 566-70 (2013); Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671-72, 676-77 (2010). Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509-10, 511 (2001); Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (Posner, J.); American Zurich Ins. Co. v. Sun Holdings, Inc., 103 F.4th 475, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2024) (Easterbrook, J.); Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir.2001); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Development Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1994).

We discussed all of these shortcomings in the UpHealth Court’s analysis in our October 7, 18, 21, and November 12, 2024, posts. We believe that the Seventh Circuit will probably also conclude that the UpHealth court erred by vacating the award in part, particularly since the Seventh Circuit recognizes outcome review in extremely narrow circumstances only and none of those circumstances are present here—where the district court has, for intents and purposes, second-guessed the arbitrator’s fact finding.

It will be interesting to see how the appellee (Damodaran) attempts to square the district court’s decision with Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court authority. We will continue to watch the appeal and report on significant developments.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has nearly 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The image featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) Interviews Professor Angela Downes, Richard D. Faulkner, and Philip J. Loree Jr. about the Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment Ninth Circuit Mass Arbitration Decision

November 13th, 2024 Appellate Practice, Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Application to Compel Arbitration, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitration Agreement Invalid, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Class Arbitration Waivers, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, CPR Alternatives, CPR Video Interviews, Delegation Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Mass Arbitration, New Era ADR, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Philip J. Loree Jr., Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Professor Angela Downes, Professor Downes, Repeat Players, Richard D. Faulkner, Russ Bleemer, Section 2, Section 4, The Loree Law Firm, Unconscionability, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 1 Comment »

CPR Interview

Heckman

Do you want to learn more about the Heckman mass arbitration case?

As readers may know, over the last four years or so, our friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) (“CPR Alternatives”), has hosted presentations about significant arbitration-law developments (principally in the United States Supreme Court) that feature interviews of our friends and colleagues: Professor Angela Downes, University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law Professor of Practice and Assistant Director of Experiential Education; arbitrator, mediator, arbitration-law attorney, and former judge, Richard D. Faulkner; and yours truly, Loree Law Firm principal, Philip J. Loree Jr. (See, e.g., here, here, here, and here.) These interviews are posted on CPR’s YouTube channel, @CPRInstituteOnline.

On Monday, November 11, 2024, Russ interviewed Professor Downes, Rick and me about the Ninth Circuit’s recent mass-arbitration decision in Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, No. 23-55770, slip op. (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2024). The video is here.

Heckman

The Heckman case centered around unusual mass-arbitration rules promulgated and administered by New Era ADR, which among many other things, included a broad delegation provision, which delegated to the arbitrator the authority to decide the validity of the parties’ arbitration agreement. The parties’ online ticket purchase agreement terms (the “Terms”) provided for arbitration pursuant to the New ERA Rules, which in the Heckman case meant New Era’s Rules for Expedited/Mass Arbitration proceedings.

Plaintiffs commenced in 2022 a putative class action against Live Nation Entertainment and Ticketmaster LLC, alleging that the companies violated the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive practices. Those defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the district court denied the motion, holding that the delegation clause and the arbitration agreement were procedurally and substantively unconscionable under California law.

Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke wrote a very interesting concurring opinion in Heckman in which he said he would have decided the case solely on the ground that the arbitration scheme violated the Discover Bank Rule, which was not preempted by the FAA because the scheme was not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA in 1925. This concurring opinion also discussed in some detail the conflict of interest that arises when arbitrators deciding arbitrability under a delegation clause conclude, or have reason to conclude, that an arbitration provider’s scheme—it’s business model—is unenforceable, pitting the arbitrator’s financial interest in continued employment against his or her neutral-decision-making interests.

Russ, Rick, Angela, and I discuss various aspects pertinent to the Heckman decision in the interview and identify issues that are likely to arise in future cases following the decision.
As always, we express our gratitude to Russ and CPR for hosting these interviews, and, along with Angela and Rick, look forward to contributing to future programs hosted by CPR.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has nearly 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance or reinsurance-related and other commercial and business matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Archive for the ‘Arbitration Agreements’ Category

The March 27, 2026, Video

What the March 27, 2026, Video Shows About the Current State of Arbitration Law

Contacting the Author

Photo Acknowledgment

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Introduction

What the EFAA Says

EFAA Covered Agreements and Covered Disputes

EFAA Operative Rule

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Appellate Arbitration Developments: Supreme Court Certiorari as the Organizing Principle

Key Appellate Arbitration-Law Development I: Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties—Continuing or Anchor Subject Matter Jurisdiction Following a Section 3 Stay and a Section 4 Motion to Compel

SmartSky Networks v. DAG Wireless: Context for the Jules Question

Key Appellate Arbitration-Law Development II: Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock— FAA § 1 and the Scope of the Transportation Worker Exemption

Continuing Uncertainty Under FAA § 1

Other Appellate Developments Discussed

Practical Implications for Arbitration Practitioners

Looking Ahead to 2026

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Introduction

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Introduction

Background and Procedural History

Whether Statutory Treble Damages are Punitive Depends on the Intent of the Legislature

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Exposure to Liability for Your Adversary’s Legal Fees

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Introduction: Delegation Provisions and Modern Perfection

Background

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Contacting the Author

Photo Acknowledgment

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CPR Interview

Heckman

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