Archive for 2026

Carter v. SP Plus Corp. and the Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration: Seventh Circuit Rejects Arbitration Exceptionalism in an FAA Section 16 Ruling Finding no Appellate Jurisdiction

April 21st, 2026 Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Practice, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Contract Formation, Employment Arbitration, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Equal Footing Principle, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, Moses Cone Principle, Policy, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Presumption of Arbitrability, Questions of Arbitrability, Section 2, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit No Comments »

Introduction: Carter  and the Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration

federal policy in favor of arbitration | affidavitUnited States Circuit Judge Judge Frank H. Easterbrook’s opinion in Carter v. SP Plus Corp., No. 25-2127, slip op. at 1-5 (7th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026), is important for two related reasons. First, it carefully distinguishes an immediately appealable denial of a motion to compel arbitration from a non-appealable order refusing to lift a Section 3 stay of litigation pending the district court’s decision on whether an arbitration agreement was formed. Second, and more significantly, it rejects an employer’s attempt to invoke the federal policy favoring arbitration as a reason to relax ordinary procedural and evidentiary rules and resolve doubts in favor of arbitration. The opinion instead applies Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022), according to its terms: arbitration agreements are to be enforced like other contracts, not a favored class of “super contracts” entitled to special treatment. (For a discussion of Morgan, see here.)

We have discussed how, even before Morgan, courts have recognized that the federal policy in favor of arbitration is of limited scope. (See here.)  Essentially, the principle that doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration is not at all a generally applicable rule of decision in arbitration law but rather allows, in a limited context, a pro-arbitration resolution of ambiguities concerning the scope of the arbitration agreement itself. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 301-303 (2010); Lamps Plus v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418-19 (2019).

Nevertheless, arbitration proponents sometimes still contend that the the federal policy in favor of arbitration requires courts to select a pro-arbitration outcome whenever some doubt exists about an arbitration-law-related question.

Carter reminds us that is not so. The Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) does not authorize arbitration-agreement exceptionalism. If ordinary litigation principles cut against agreement enforcement, then the result should be the same as obtains in any other ordinary contract action. See Carter, slip op. at 4-5; Morgan, 596 U.S. at 418. Outside of its limited role in requiring the summary resolution of contract ambiguities in the scope of the arbitration agreement itself—something that spares arbitration-law litigants (and courts)  from having to conduct lengthy trials to resolve contract ambiguities about scope—the federal policy in favor of arbitration plays no meaningful role, apart from ensuring that arbitration agreements are on an equal footing with other contracts.

Carter is of interest because it concerns FAA Section 16 interlocutory appeals, FAA Section 4 formation disputes, and Morgan‘s continuing role in curbing overbroad invocations of pro-arbitration policy.

Background

Carter, an employee, sued SP Plus Corporation, the employer,  under state and federal minimum-wage statutes. Shortly thereafter,  the district judge stayed the litigation in favor of Continue Reading »

O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services: The Ninth Rejects Non-Mutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel as a Basis for Invalidating Arbitration Agreements

April 15th, 2026 Arbitration Agreement Invalid, Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Class Action Arbitration, Class and Collective Proceedings, Contract Defenses, Delegation Agreements, Delegation Provision, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 13, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 13, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, Issue Preclusion, Mass Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Preclusion Doctrines, Preclusive Effect of Awards, Res Judicata or Claim Preclusion, Section 13, Section 2, Section 3 Default, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit No Comments »

Introduction

non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppelIn O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc., No. 25-1528, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026), the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court ruling that invoked non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel to deem unconscionable hundreds of separate, bilateral arbitration agreements agreements between a corporate health care provider and its individual, nurse employees. O’Dell, a 3-0 opinion, is of  interest to entity and individual parties litigating gateway arbitrability disputes arising out of  mass, class, or collective proceedings.

Background

The case concerned wage-related claims asserted by travel-nurse employees against a healthcare provider, Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Aya”). As a condition of employment, Aya required its employees to sign arbitration agreements containing similar terms. The agreements also contained delegation provisions that required an arbitrator, rather than a court, to decide arbitration-agreement validity disputes. Id. at 4-6. (You can read about delegation provisions here and here.)

The district court initially sent four named plaintiffs’ disputes to four separate arbitrations each to be decided by a different, individual arbitrator. The results were evenly split: Two arbitrators held the agreements unconscionable based on their fee allocation and venue provisions; the other two ruled that the agreements were enforceable, determining that a savings clause (presumably providing  for severability) cured any unconscionability problem. Id. at 6. The district court confirmed three of the four awards, refusing to confirm one of the awards because of Aya’s alleged failure to pay the arbitration fee.  Id.

After 255 additional plaintiffs opted into a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”) collective action, the district court declined to send their disputes to arbitration. Instead, invoking non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel, the district court gave preclusive effect to the two arbitral rulings invalidating the agreements, refused to give the same effect to the two rulings upholding the agreements, and held that Aya was barred by collateral estoppel from enforcing the remaining agreements. Id. at 6-7.

The Court did not accord preclusive effect to the two awards that upheld the agreement to arbitrate, dismissing them as not “reasoned” or “thorough.” Id. at 7.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Offensive, Non-Mutual Collateral Estoppel: The Question Presented

The Ninth Circuit considered whether “application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements is compatible with the Federal Arbitration Act [(the “FAA”)].” Id. at 4. The Court said the answer was no. Id. at 4-5, 12-13.

The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis: Non-Mutual, Offensive  Collateral Estoppl is Incompatible with the FAA

The court’s reasoning was straightforward, but its implications are significant. It began with the FAA’s text.

FAA Section 2 provides, in pertinent part, that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. . . .  9 U.S.C. § 2. Under Section 2, “generally applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” are “grounds for revocation.” Slip op. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted) But there were no such grounds here.

The Ninth Circuit explained that non-mutual offensive issue preclusion is not a “generally applicable contract defense” of the kind contemplated by Section 2’s savings clause. O’Dell, slip op. at 8-9 (quotations and citation omitted). For irrespective of whether a case concerns contract enforceability, this preclusion doctrine may, to avoid relitigation, accord certain judgments preclusive effect. “In other words,” said the Court, “the doctrine is not about contracts or contract defenses.”  It is a judge-made preclusion doctrine which—if used as it was here—would indirectly but effectively invalidate arbitration agreements that the FAA says should be enforced. Id. at 8-10.

It is not a ground for “revocation”—which is “‘[t]he recall of some power, authority, or thing granted, or a destroying or making void of some deed that had existence until the act of revocation made it void.’” Id. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted). “Revocation” under Section 2 “includes fraud, duress, and unconscionability[,]” but “does not pertain to a deficiency with respect to the formation of contracts. . . that might result in “revocation.” Slip op. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted).

Even assuming “revocation broadly encompasses the indirect but effective invalidation of the agreement through preclusion, And to the extent that “revocation broadly encompasses the indirect but effective invalidation of agreements through preclusion,” the doctrine would “contravene critical features of the FAA.” Slip op. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted).

The Court also considered context, considering Sections 3, 4, 10, and 13 of the FAA. Sections 3 and 4 require courts to stay litigation and compel arbitration in accordance with the parties’ agreement once the making of the agreement is not in issue. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. Section 10 provides limited grounds for vacatur focused on defects in the arbitral process, such as corruption, fraud, or evident partiality. Id. § 10. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, nothing in that statutory scheme suggests that Congress contemplated a non-mutual preclusion doctrine that would frustrate arbitrations the parties had separately agreed to undertake. O’Dell, slip op. at 9-10. The court specifically rejected the employees’ reliance on Section 13, reasoning that Section 13 makes confirmed awards enforceable as judgments, but does not authorize using one confirmed award to abrogate distinct arbitration agreements involving other parties. Id. at 12-13.

Application of Offensive, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel Violates Arbitration’s First Principle

The FAA’s first principle—consent, not coercion—provided the Court with a second— and perhaps in some ways, more important—rationale. (For a discussion of arbitration’s “first principle,” see here.) The FAA, the panel explained, presupposes that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion. Id. at 10-11 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 184 (2019)). The employees’ preclusion theory disregarded this first principle. See slip op. at 10-11. As the Court explained, “[p]recluding an arbitration” to which “the parties agreed. . .— because a different arbitrator in a different proceeding had concluded that an agreement between different parties was unconscionable—would render the parties’ consent meaningless.” Slip op. at 11.

Using Offensive, Non-Mutual Collateral Estoppel to Impose a Bellwether Scheme without Party Consent

The court’s third rationale will likely attract the most attention. The district court’s ruling, the panel said, effectively transformed individualized arbitrations into a binding “bellwether” or class-like device without the parties’ consent. Id. at 5, 11-12. That is significant because Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly held that the FAA does not permit courts or arbitrators to impose class  procedures that alter the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration unless there is a contractual basis to do so. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 507-09 (2018) (quotation and citations omitted); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684-87. O’Dell extends that line of authority in an important way. It treats offensive non-mutual preclusion, when used to wipe out separate bilateral arbitrations, as another unauthorized claim aggregation scheme that is inconsistent with the FAA’s consent-based, bilateral structure. See O’Dell, slip op. at 11-13.

The Court said “the imposition here [of an aggregation mechanism] is more concerning than in” prior cases. See slip op. at 11. Because in ordinary class proceedings named representative plaintiffs must “adequately represent” class members. Slip op. at 11. Not so here. “Indeed,” said the Court, under the district court’s logic, just one  arbitration proceeding would be enough to preclude hundreds (or thousands) of other arbitration proceedings.” Slip op. at 12. “That,” remarked the Court, “is a class action stripped of all  its important protective features.” Slip op. at 12. Permitting offensive collateral estoppel to preclude agreed individual arbitrations from taking place “would supplant arbitrations with binding bellwether class actions lacking the procedural safeguards of ordinary class actions.” Slip op. at 12. That would violate the FAA. See Slip op. at 12.

The Court accordingly rejected “this new application of preclusion doctrine as it would be “fundamentally at war with the FAA and undermine Congress’s efforts to protect arbitration from judicial opposition.” Slip op. at 12 (citation omitted).

Implications of the Decision

O’Dell is important for at least three reasons. First, it clarifies that FAA Section 2’s saving clause authorizes only generally applicable contract defenses, not equitable doctrines which apply to litigation generally, as opposed to contract actions specifically. That is especially so, where, as here, the doctrine may, as applied, interfere with arbitration’s key attributes or is otherwise incompatible with arbitration.

Second, O’Dell reminds us that, pursuant to delegation agreements, and in the absence of contractual consent to the contrary, gateway arbitrability disputes are disputes between the parties to the particular individual arbitration agreement at issue. They are, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, to be decided in an arbitration between those parties, not by proxy using  a bellwether aggregation device.

Here, the district court had already enforced the delegation clauses as written by sending the first four validity disputes to arbitration. Id. at 5-6. Once those arbitrations produced mixed results, the district court used the two invalidity awards as a shortcut to avoid further arbitrations. The Ninth Circuit rejected that move. In practical terms, where the parties have agreed to arbitrate gateway validity questions one by one, courts may not convert a few early rulings into a substitute for resolving each of the remaining individual arbitrations. See slip op. at 10-12.

Third, O’Dell has implications for collective, coordinated, and mass arbitration litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel will often look for ways to convert favorable early rulings into leverage across a broader claimant pool. Defendants, too, sometimes seek global effect from threshold rulings. O’Dell does not foreclose contractual bellwether arrangements or other consensual aggregation mechanisms. But it does show that courts may not impose them through non-mutual offensive issue preclusion when the parties agreed to bilateral arbitration. Id. at 11-13.

Conclusion

O’Dell should be read as an important Ninth Circuit reaffirmation of three connected FAA principles: arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms; not all defenses are generally applicable contract defenses, and arbitration remains a matter of consent, not coercion. Where parties agreed to bilateral arbitration, courts may not use non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to create a de facto class, bellwether, or other aggregation mechanism to which the parties never agreed.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

 

CPR’s March 27 Appellate Arbitration Video Panel: Jules, Flowers Foods, Goff, and Bruce

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arbitration video CPR

The International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (“CPR”) presented on March 27, 2026, the latest instalment of its long-running hot-topics in arbitration video series: “Hot Topics: The Supreme Court’s March on Arbitration.” Our good friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, moderated the presentation. The panelists were our other good friends and colleagues Professor Angela Downes and Richard D. Faulkner— plus the author, Philip J. Loree Jr.

This developments in arbitration video looked backward to the March 25, 2026, Supreme Court argument in Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 24-935 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2026), forward to the March 30 argument in Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 25-83 (U.S. argued Mar. 30, 2026), and sideways to certain consequential circuit decisions, including USAA Savings Bank v. Goff, No. 25-1730, slip op. (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2026), and Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, No. 25-5210, slip op. (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026). This was the eighteenth CPR arbitration video presentation this panel (or most of it), has given during the past four or five years.

The March 27, 2026, Video

The March 27 program is best understood not as a one-off webinar, but as the newest installment in a continuing conversation about where appellate arbitration law is heading. CPR’s December 2025 year-end program had already previewed Jules and Flowers Foods, the two U.S. Supreme Court arbitration-law  cases the Court has thus far accepted this 2025 Term for review.

What the March 27, 2026, Video Shows About the Current State of Arbitration Law

This latest arbitration video shows that the four featured matters are different on their facts but closely related in what they reveal about the present state of arbitration law. None is a frontal assault on arbitration. Each instead concerns a doctrinal pressure point: where post-award litigation belongs, who falls within the FAA’s Section 1 transportation-worker exemption, when courts will conclude that arbitrators exceeded the bounds of the contract by not interpreting it, and how far Congress’s Ending Forced Arbitration Act (“EFAA”) carve-out extends once sexual-harassment or sexual-assault claims are pleaded together with other claims not covered by the EFAA.

In that respect, Jules remained the centerpiece. Jules asks whether a federal court that properly exercised federal question jurisdiction over an action, and then stayed that action pending arbitration under FAA Section 3, may later adjudicate post-award FAA motions without having a new and independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. The question is narrow only on the surface. In practical terms, it concerns whether a federal court that has federal question jurisdiction over the merits dispute, and pursuant to FAA Section 3 stays  the litigation pending arbitration of the merits dispute, may, at the request of one of the parties, and without having a new and independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (such as diversity), complete the job after the award returns, or whether the parties must instead start over in state court. The CPR panel’s discussion came only days before the March 30 argument, which made the presentation a timely and useful preview of one of the Court’s most important FAA jurisdiction-related  cases since Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022), and Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472 (2024).

Readers who view the March 27, 2026 presentation and the subsequent March 30, 2026 oral argument can see that the panelists’ comments were largely or entirely on the mark. CPR Speaks followed the argument with a very thoughtful same-day report, Supreme Court Hears Case on Federal Courts’ Powers to Confirm Arbitration Awards. A decision likely will issue before the close of the October 2025 Term in late June.

Flowers Foods concerns the scope of FAA Section 1’s transportation-worker exemption. But both Jules and Flowers Foods share an important feature: both concern where the FAA stops, and both therefore affect whether arbitration disputes will be resolved in court, in arbitration, or in some jurisdictional or procedural limbo between the two. The March 27 program accordingly framed Flowers not as an isolated exemption dispute, but as part of the Court’s broader and continuing effort to define the FAA’s boundaries with greater textual precision.

The panel also highlighted two significant circuit courts of appeals decisions that underscore how much important arbitration doctrine is shaped outside the U.S. Supreme Court. In Goff, the Seventh Circuit addressed a rare circumstance in which a court vacated an award on the ground that the arbitrator had, disregarded the parties’ contract and thus did not even arguably interpret it. That issue is significant not because courts often vacate awards on that basis, but because they rarely do. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569, 572-73 (2013), made clear how narrow the path is for setting aside an award under FAA Section 10(a)(4) when the arbitrator is at least arguably construing the agreement. A decision like Goff therefore commands attention because it tests the line between genuine contract interpretation and an arbitrator’s substitution of her own notions of “[economic] justice” or “sound policy.” See id. at 569; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672, 675 (2010).

Bruce, in turn, is one of the most important circuit-court decisions construing the EFAA. The Sixth Circuit adopted what is sometimes called the entire-case rule: when a case includes an EFAA-covered sexual-harassment dispute, the statute renders the arbitration agreement unenforceable as to the whole case, not merely as to the EFAA-covered claims. See Bruce, slip op. at 17-19. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that reading, the decision is consequential because it gives the statute a broader practical effect than a claim-by-claim approach would have done. The March 27 CPR program usefully placed Bruce in the same conversation as Jules, Flowers Foods, and Goff because all four cases illuminate a common theme: appellate courts are increasingly defining arbitration law through technical yet consequential disputes over scope, forum, remedy, and statutory carve-outs, rather than through  generalized debates about whether the federal policy in favor of arbitration should in a given case drive an arbitration-friendly outcome.

The presentation also illustrated the value of continuity among panelists. Professor Downes, Rick Faulkner, Russ Bleemer, and the author bring different vantage points to the discussion: academic, arbitral, appellate- and district-court practitioner, and editorial. Because the same group has returned repeatedly over several years, the programs have developed into something more useful than mere episodic commentary.

For readers of The Arbitration Law Forum, the key takeaway is straightforward. The March 27 program is worth watching not only for its discussion of the four featured cases, but also for the broader picture it paints. The doctrinal stakes of the Supreme Court’s arbitration docket are larger than they first appear. Lower federal courts continue to generate important arbitration law at a brisk pace. And many of the most consequential disputes now concern not whether arbitration will or should be enforced in the abstract, but how courts define the boundaries of arbitral power, arbitral forum, and arbitral exception. This eighteenth CPR presentation captures, in one discussion, several of the issues likely to shape arbitration-law practice in the months and years ahead.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration law, or arbitration-related litigation, then you may contact the author at pjl1@loreelawirm.com or +1 (516) 941-6094.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of The Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and arbitration-law matters. The Loree Law Firm’s website is https://loreelawfirm.com/.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

 

Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Disputes: The Sixth Circuit Adopts the EFAA Entire-Case Rule in Bruce v. Adams & Reese

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Introduction: Under the EFAA a Covered Sexual Harassment Dispute May Render the Entire Case Non-Arbitrable

Sexual Harassment Disputes and the EFAA | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth CIrcuitThe presence of a sexual harassment claim in a case featuring otherwise arbitrable claims may mean that Chapter 4 of the FAA renders the entire case non-arbitrable. In our recent overview of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of  2021 (the “EFAA”),  we identified the statute’s arguably most consequential open question: when a complaint includes a covered sexual-harassment dispute and non-covered claims, does the EFAA keep the whole lawsuit in court, or only the harassment claim, thereby effectively bifurcating the dispute-resolution process?

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the  Sixth Circuit recently  answered that controversial open question, becoming the first U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to do so. In Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, No. 25-5210, slip op. (6th Cir. Feb 25, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit—in a 2-1 opinion written by U.S. Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore— held that, under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of  2021 (the “EFAA”), a single plausibly pleaded sexual-harassment claim can keep an entire mixed-claim employment case out of arbitration, even if the other non-harassment/non-assault claims would otherwise be arbitrable.

Bruce places the first federal-circuit-court-of-appeals imprimatur on the broad reading of Section 402(a), which several district courts have adopted, and which we flagged in our earlier article as a likely flashpoint. It also raises the stakes of the pleading-stage fight over whether the plaintiff has adequately alleged a covered sexual-harassment or sexual-assault dispute.

In Bruce, adequate pleading was linked to arbitrability: because the plaintiff plausibly pleaded a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim, the employer could not compel arbitration of her ADA claims, which would otherwise have been arbitrable.

What Happened in Bruce

Bruce worked in a law-firm liquor practice that moved from Firm A to Continue Reading »

You Only Get One Shot at Vacatur: The Fourth Circuit Adopts the “Impermissible Collateral Attack” Rule | Center for Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc. v. Accreditation Alliance of Career Schools & Colleges, ___ F.4th ___, No. 25-1372, slip op. (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 2026)

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Introduction

The Fourth Circuit formally adopted a rule several circuits already apply: if an “independent” lawsuit is really an attempt to undo an arbitration outcome, it is an impermissible collateral attack on the award and will be dismissed. That decision reinforces the exclusivity and finality of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)’s confirmation, vacatur, and modification regime.

Separately, the Court made a practical point concerning Section 10(a)(3) prejudicial, procedural misconduct: an arbitrator does not commit “misconduct” by refusing to hear evidence when the arbitration agreement itself limits what is considered the evidentiary record and bars adversarial discovery. The same may be true when, as was the case before the Court, the arbitrator’s standard of review is deferential, and the proffered evidence is not material to the narrow question before the arbitrator.

The Fourth Circuit’s Adoption of the Impermissible Collateral Attack Rule: What Transpired?

The Center for Excellence in Higher Education (CEHE) ran schools accredited by the Accreditation Alliance of Career Schools and Colleges (the Alliance). After years of below-benchmark graduation and employment outcomes, CEHE’s system was placed on probation and repeatedly warned about losing accreditation. The Alliance withdrew accreditation.

CEHE appealed internally, then demanded binding arbitration as contemplated by the parties’ agreement. CEHE sought broad discovery and to introduce evidence outside of that deemed part of the internal appellate record, including information about how Alliance evaluated other schools for accreditation. The arbitration agreement limited arbitration to the record before the internal Appeals Panel and prohibited adversarial discovery. The arbitrator enforced those limits and made an award upholding the accreditation withdrawal.

The Alliance’s accreditation decisions were subject to deferential review only. That, in combination with the FAA, meant two tiers of deference were owed: The arbitrator had to review the Alliance’s decisions deferentially and, as is always the case under Section 10 of the FAA, a court reviewing the arbitrator’s award had to defer to the already deferential award.

CEHE filed in federal court: (i) a motion to vacate and, as part of the same filing, (ii) a complaint alleging due process violations and tortious interference. CEHE sought, in substance, to reverse the withdrawal of accreditation and recover damages flowing from it.

The district court denied vacatur and, as respects the complaint, granted judgment on the pleadings, treating the submission of those papers as an impermissible collateral attack on the award. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in Center for Excellence in Higher Educ. v. Accreditation Alliance of Career Schs. & Colleges, __ F.4th ___, 25-1372 , slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. Feb 05, 2026)

Principal Issues Addressed

The Fourth Circuit’s decision focused on two issues. First, the scope of relief for arbitrator prejudicial procedural misconduct under Section 10(a)(3) in cases where the arbitration agreement limits what comprises the record, forecloses adversarial discovery, or the arbitrator’s standard of review is deferential. (Read more about Section 10(a)(3) here, here, and here.)

Second, when is a post-award lawsuit not a genuinely independent claim but an impermissible collateral attack on the award, that is, an end-run around FAA Sections 10–11?

Contractual Limits on Record Content, Evidence, and Discovery, or a Deferential Standard of Review Imposed on the Arbitrator, Can Foreclose FAA Section 10(a)(3) Prejudicial Procedural Misconduct Claims

CEHE’s motion to vacate asserted the arbitrator denied CEHE a fair opportunity to present “pertinent and material” evidence material evidence by refusing discovery and excluding comparative-accreditation evidence. Center for Excellence, slip op. at 9; 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).

The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument for two reasons. First, the excluded “other schools” material was not “pertinent and material” to the arbitrator’s task. The arbitration was not a free-ranging arbitration featuring de novo review of the Alliance’s decision making. The arbitrator was tasked with determining whether the record adequately supported the Alliance’s accreditation decision, and in making that determination the arbitrator determined that Fourth Circuit precedent required the arbitrator to defer to the Alliance’s decision. Center for Excellence, slip op. at 12-15 (citation omitted). So even assuming evidence about other schools’ accreditation experiences might have rhetorical force or evidentiary value in the context of a different dispute resolution framework, the Court concluded that, considering the deferential standard of review, evidence about other Alliance accreditation decisions was irrelevant. Center for Excellence, slip op. at 10-11, 14-15.

Second, the agreement itself foreclosed the arbitrator from considering the evidence the school argued the arbitrator had to hear or from permitting the adversarial discovery the school argued was required. Center for Excellence, slip op. at 11.  This is a key doctrinal point practitioners should note: Evidence cannot be “pertinent and material to the controversy” under Section 10(a)(3) if the arbitration agreement itself prohibits the arbitrator from considering that evidence. While the Court did not address this point, if the school wanted to challenge those limitations it should have attempted an FAA Section 2 pre-arbitration unconscionability challenge prior to the commencement of the arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (under FAA Section 2, a party may challenge arbitration agreement on unconscionability grounds applicable to contracts generally). The author expresses no view on whether such a challenge might have succeeded.

The arbitration agreement expressly stated that the arbitrator could not consider evidence not in the Appeals Panel record and prohibited adversarial discovery. An arbitrator who enforces those terms is not “refusing to hear” evidence in the procedural misconduct sense; he or she is doing what the parties contracted for. That’s the arbitrator’s job.

This is a recurring theme in FAA jurisprudence: the FAA regulates egregious process breakdowns, but—apart from leaving the door open to a party seeking judicial reformation of an arbitration agreement under Section 2 in an appropriate case—it does not authorize a court to rewrite the parties’ arbitration agreement simply because one side is, after the fact, unhappy with the bargain it struck. See Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder System, Inc., 110 F.3d 892, 895-97 (2d Cir. 1997).

The Big Development: the Fourth Circuit Adopts the “Impermissible Collateral Attack” Rule

The more consequential arbitration-law holding was the Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the impermissible collateral attack rule.

The Premise: FAA §§ 10–11 Provide the Exclusive Route to Overturn or Undo an Award

The court treated it as common ground that a litigant seeking to vacate or modify an award must proceed under the FAA’s narrow vacatur/modification framework—principally §§ 10 and 11. FAA exclusivity and finality has a practical purpose: binding arbitration is designed to resolve the parties’ dispute expeditiously and conclusively.

The Court found adoption of the “impermissible collateral attack rule” necessary to preserve that presumed exclusivity and finality. Allowing disappointed parties to repackage vacatur theories as “independent” tort or constitutional claims would destroy finality, which could make arbitration a less attractive and more expensive alternative to court litigation.

How to Spot a Collateral Attack: Look at Wrongdoing, Harm, and Requested Relief

The Fourth Circuit adopted a functional test used by other circuits, focusing on:

  • The Alleged Wrongdoing. Is it the type of defect that would support vacatur under Section 10 (or modification under Section 11)?
  • The Harm. Does it flow from the award’s effect?
  • The Requested Relief. Is it, in essence, the relief vacatur would provide?

Applied to CEHE, each of the three supported application of the “impermissible collateral attack” rule:

  • The alleged wrongdoing was essentially “the decisionmaker refused to consider evidence”—classic § 10(a)(3) territory.
  • The harms (lost students, reputational damage, financial losses) flowed from the accreditation loss the arbitrator upheld and CEHE sought to overturn.
  • The requested relief—especially injunctive relief reversing the withdrawal—tracked what vacatur would accomplish.

The court also emphasized that a party cannot sanitize an impermissible collateral attack by tweaking remedies. A damages label does not save a claim when the theory of injury is an allegedly  defective arbitration process.

The Punchline: If it’s a Collateral Attack, the Whole Complaint is Tossed

Because the complaint was treated as a collateral attack, it was dismissed in toto, including tortious interference claims that at a cursory glance might appear “independent.”

The breadth of that remedy is significant. It signals that courts will not allow plaintiffs to proceed count-by-count where the thrust of the lawsuit is to overturn the arbitration outcome.

Doctrinal Implications of the Fourth Circuit’s Adoption of the Impermissible Collateral Attack Rule

Center for Excellence does more than announce a new label for a familiar concept. By adopting an “impermissible collateral attack” rule, the Fourth Circuit has supplied a doctrinal framework for defining when post-award litigation concerning claims allegedly independent from a Section 10 or 11 challenge is, in practical effect, an attempt to unwind the award that has already been or would be barred by Sections 9-11 of the FAA.  The decision’s implications extend beyond accreditation disputes and are likely to influence how parties plead, defend, and adjudicate post-award claims in the Fourth Circuit and perhaps elsewhere.

FAA Exclusivity, Finality, and the “Functional” Inquiry

The Court’s central move is to treat FAA Sections 10–11 as the exclusive doctrinal avenue for judicial relief that would set aside, modify, or otherwise negate an arbitral award. That premise is hardly novel, but Center for Excellence gives it operational content by insisting on substance over form. Courts are instructed to look past pleading labels and ask whether the alleged wrong, the asserted injury, and the requested relief are, in substance, a bid to obtain what vacatur or modification would provide (or would have provided had vacatur or modification been granted).

This substance over form approach is significant because it diminishes the viability of a common post-award strategy: coupling a narrow FAA vacatur motion with broader common-law or constitutional claims that seek to re-create, in a new procedural posture, the merits contest that the arbitration ended. Under Center for Excellence, it will be harder to argue that merely changing the cause of action (for example, to tortious interference or due process theories) changes the essential character of the relief sought where the litigation’s gravitational center remains the arbitral outcome.

Collateral Attack Doctrine as Distinct from Claim and Issue Preclusion

The impermissible collateral attack rule overlaps conceptually with res judicata and collateral estoppel, but it is not simply a repackaging of those doctrines. Preclusion asks whether a claim could have been or an issue was litigated and resolved in a prior adjudication. The impermissible collateral attack rule asks a different question: whether the new lawsuit is an improper vehicle for challenging the arbitral award at all, given the FAA’s exclusive remedial structure.

That distinction has practical doctrinal consequences. Preclusion analysis can be fact-intensive (identity of parties, privity, finality, opportunity to litigate, and so forth), and it sometimes requires careful attention to what the arbitral tribunal actually decided. The collateral attack rule can, in appropriate cases, be applied earlier, more categorically, and perhaps with greater ease, because it turns on the nature of the alleged wrong and the relief sought. Center for Excellence therefore provides defendants with an additional—and sometimes simpler—path to dismissal independent of conventional preclusion defenses.

Pleading-Stage Tool that Reinforces the FAA’s Narrow Review

The Fourth Circuit’s approach also matters procedurally: it confirms that a court may identify an impermissible collateral attack at the pleadings stage, without permitting the case to proceed into discovery and merits motion practice. That is consistent with the FAA, which favors speed and finality in award enforcement and sharply limits post-award judicial review. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 6, 9-11.

In that respect, the decision is likely to influence motion practice. Where a complaint is tethered to the award—because the harm is framed as the consequences of the award’s effects and the relief is framed to reverse, enjoin, or effectively nullify those effects—courts have a doctrinal basis to terminate the litigation quickly and early. Conversely, plaintiffs seeking to survive dismissal will need to plead with care, demonstrating that the asserted injury and requested remedy do not depend on re-litigating the arbitral dispute or undercutting the award’s finality.

The Substance of the Remedy Sought Will Often Be Decisive

Center for Excellence highlights that focusing on substance and practicality can drive effective arbitration-law (and other legal) doctrine. Injunctive or declaratory relief that would “reverse” the practical effects of an award is, predictably, the easiest target for a collateral attack defense. But the Court made clear that damages claims are not immune from scrutiny. Where the damages theory is that the arbitration process was defective and the plaintiff’s economic losses flow from the award’s operation, a damages label will not transform the lawsuit into an independent claim.

That focus on the practical effects of the remedies sought will likely shape how plaintiffs draft complaints and how defendants frame dismissal motions. If the requested relief would require the court to adjudicate—directly or indirectly—the propriety of the arbitral process or the correctness of the arbitral outcome, the collateral attack doctrine supplies a doctrinal basis for dismissal even where traditional preclusion doctrines might require more granular analysis.

Interaction with FAA Section 10(a)(3) and Contractually “Closed” Records

Finally, the decision’s Section 10(a)(3) discussion complements the collateral attack holding. The Court treated the arbitration agreement’s limits on discovery and the evidentiary record as materially shaping what can qualify as “pertinent and material evidence” for procedural misconduct purposes. Where parties contract for a closed record (or for review limited to an internal administrative record), an arbitrator’s enforcement of those limits will generally not supply a Section 10(a)(3) hook for vacatur. The same is true when the standard of review governing the arbitrator’s decision making is deferential, as it was here.

Taken together, these strands of the opinion underscore a consistent doctrinal theme: parties who bargain for procedural limits on arbitration—or arguably for deferential review by the arbitrator—should expect courts to enforce the bargain, both by (i) declining to expand Section 10(a)(3) into a vehicle for reengineering the agreed process and (ii) rejecting attempts to achieve the same end through post-award litigation framed as something other than an FAA vacatur or modification proceeding.

Conclusion

Center for Excellence is a clean Fourth Circuit adoption of a rule that arbitration practitioners often assume exists everywhere—but which has not been formally embraced by all other circuits. The rule strengthens award finality by closing a common loophole: a collateral attack on an award that is disguised as something else.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094. PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

When Arbitration-Fee Nonpayment Derails the Process: Tenth Circuit says the Default Lifts the Section 3 Stay, Allowing Litigation to Proceed | Myers v. Papa Texas, LLC, ___ F.4th ___, No. 25-2020, slip op. (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026)

February 18th, 2026 Arbitration Fees, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Default in Proceeding with Arbitration, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Section 3 Default, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Waiver of Arbitration No Comments »

Introduction: a Section 3 Default in Case Where Arbitration Proponent Failed to Pay Arbitration Fees 

Default Under FAA Section 3 in Nonpayment of Arbitration Fees CaseDefault in the FAA Section 3 context is not limited to litigation conduct that establishes waiver of arbitration. In Myers v. Papa Texas, LLC, ___ F.4th ___, No. 25-2020, slip op. (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit made three key points about Section 3 default in a nonpayment of fees case:

  1. A party that fails to pay required arbitration fees and thereby causes the arbitration administrator (here, the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”) to close the case risks being found “in default in proceeding with such arbitration” under FAA § 3, allowing the district court to lift an the stay of litigation and resume the litigation.
  2. In the Tenth Circuit, the “default” inquiry under § 3 is not the same thing as waiver-by-litigation (the usual “did you litigate too much before seeking arbitration?” question). A party can avoid waiver-by-litigation and still default in arbitration by not performing the steps needed to arbitrate, especially payment of arbitration fees.
  3. If you want arbitration, you must be prepared to fund it, comply with the forum’s rules, and build a record showing any inability to pay or good-faith efforts to make arrangements.

What Happened

Luke Myers brought an action against his employer, Papa Texas, LLC, in federal district court. Papa Texas obtained a stay pending arbitration under FAA § 3, and the case moved toward arbitration administered by the AAA.

But arbitration is not free, particularly for business entity defendants. It runs on process—and fees, which (all too often) can be quite substantial.

The AAA demanded payment. Papa Texas did not tender it. After repeated notices and extensions, AAA closed the arbitration for nonpayment—what would one expect? Myers understandably wanted to proceed to litigation and so he asked the Court to lift the stay. Why? Because, said Myers, Papa Texas had “default[ed] in proceeding with arbitration” within the meaning of Section 3.

The district court agreed and lifted the stay. Papa Texas appealed and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

What Arbitration-Law Issues did the Tenth Circuit Principally Address?

Myers resolved two closely-related and important FAA issues:

  1. What “default in proceeding with such arbitration” means under FAA § 3 when arbitration is derailed by nonpayment; and
  2. Whether and to what extent that § 3 “default” inquiry differs from waiver-by-litigation-conduct, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court’s instruction that courts must avoid arbitration-specific procedural rules? See Morgan v. Sundance, 596 U.S. 411, 414, 419 (2022).

Discussion

 

FAA § 3: “Default in Proceeding with such Arbitration” is a Real, Independent Off-Ramp for Arbitration Opponents

Most FAA practitioners instinctively think about waiver when a party engages in litigation conduct that is materially inconsistent with their agreement to arbitrate. But FAA § 3 contains specific limiting language that contemplates waiver not only by litigation conduct but other kinds of “default:” a court “shall…stay the trial…until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3.

That last clause is not window dressing or surplusage. The Tenth Circuit treated it as an independent basis to terminate a previously ordered stay and to allow the litigation to proceed. (For more on Section 3 default, see here , here, and here.)

Default is not Limited to “Waiver by Litigation”

Papa Texas tried to reframe the § 3 default question as if it were the familiar waiver framework: multi-factor tests, litigation conduct, and (prior to Morgan) prejudice. But the Tenth Circuit rejected this category error. Default in arbitration is about whether the party who asked the court to halt litigation and send the dispute to arbitration proceeded with arbitration in a manner consistent with the agreement and the forum’s requirements.

Put differently, a party can “win” the waiver-by-litigation fight but still “lose” under § 3 if it does not move the arbitration forward as required by the agreement and applicable arbitration rules.

Nonpayment that Causes the Administrator to Close the File is Compelling Evidence of Default

The panel relied heavily on practical reality: the AAA closed the case because Papa Texas didn’t pay—despite repeated warnings.

The employer tried to blunt that with alternative glosses (including arguments drawn from other circuits’ approaches and attempts to import broader “totality of the circumstances” standards). But the court viewed the facts as straightforward:

  1. The arbitration forum demanded payment;
  2. The payment obligation was clearly communicated;
  3. The AAA granted extensions;
  4. Nonpayment persisted; and
  5. The forum closed the case.

That sequence supported the district court’s conclusion that the party seeking arbitration had defaulted in proceeding with arbitration.

Ability to Pay can Matter—But You Must Prove it

 A notable aspect of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is what it emphasized as missing: evidence that Papa Texas could not afford the fees or tried to make alternative arrangements.

That matters for two reasons.

First, courts are understandably reluctant to let a party weaponize arbitration costs—especially when the party invoked arbitration to stop litigation—and then refuse to pay, leaving the opposing party with nowhere to go. That’s the kind of “heads, I win, tails you lose” tactic that waiver or default doctrine abhors. Cf. Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) (party opposing waiver “wanted to play heads I win, tails you lose”).

Second, a genuine inability to pay, documented contemporaneously, could change the equities and sometimes the analysis. But the Tenth Circuit found no record support for that kind of inability here.

The Court Resisted “Arbitration-Specific” Procedural Requirements Without Weakening § 3’s Default Clause

Papa Texas attempted to draw energy from the Supreme Court’s insistence that courts not craft arbitration-specific procedural rules. The panel did not disagree with that principle. Instead, it treated § 3’s default clause as plain statutory text: if you’re the one who asked for the stay, you must not be in default while arbitration is pending.

That framing is doctrinally important. It positions § 3 default as a text-based limit on the stay remedy—not a court-made, arbitration-hostile overlay.

Seen through that lens, Section 3 is not a special judge-made  procedural rule favoring arbitration agreements over other contracts. If anything, it is an FAA procedural rule that neither favors nor disfavors arbitration and simply prescribes the circumstances under which a stay is either unavailable in the first place or subject to early termination.

The Default Argument was not Waived

Papa Texas also tried a different tack: even if nonpayment could support § 3 default, Myers supposedly waived the default argument by not emphasizing it when Papa Texas first sought the stay. According to Papa Texas, Myers waived the default argument by intentionally opting not to make at the first available opportunity.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of that contention, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The Court said that the district court “was well within its discretion to conclude that nothing about Myer’s counsel’s explanation [for having earlier argued waiver rather than default], or Myer’s behavior before raising the default argument[]” evidenced an intentional relinquishment of the default argument. Slip op. at 18.

Practice Considerations for Arbitration Proponents and Arbitration Opponents

 

Arbitration Proponents

If you prefer to arbitrate, budget for it and document any inability to pay.

  1. Assume the court will expect the party who demanded arbitration to pay its share of arbitration fees promptly.
  2. If you cannot, create a record: declare the inability, propose structured payment, request fee relief if the rules permit it, and document pertinent communications.
  3. Do not let the administrator close the case and then argue later that you still want arbitration.

Arbitration Opponents

If the other side doesn’t pay, move fast. If your opponent is stalling arbitration by nonpayment:

  1. Request administrator enforcement (warnings, deadlines, and closure).
  2. Return to court and seek an order lifting the stay under FAA § 3 once default is clear.
  3. Preserve the record: notices, invoices, extensions, closure and other communications.

Conclusion

Myers is a clean, practitioner-facing reminder that arbitration is not self-executing. The FAA favors arbitration, but it does not require courts to keep cases on pause while the party who demanded arbitration refuses to do what the arbitration agreement requires.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094. PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

 

VIP Mortgage v. Gates: The Ninth Circuit’s “Legally Dispositive Fact” Doctrine—and a Stolt-Nielsen Parallel

January 17th, 2026 Application to Vacate, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Award Confirmed, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Confirm Award | Exceeding Powers, Confirm Award | Manifest Disregard of the Law, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Manifest Disregard of the Agreement, Manifest Disregard of the Law, Outcome Review, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Exceeding Powers, Vacate Award | Excess of Powers, Vacate Award | Manifest Disregard of the Law Comments Off on VIP Mortgage v. Gates: The Ninth Circuit’s “Legally Dispositive Fact” Doctrine—and a Stolt-Nielsen Parallel

VIP Mortgage: Introduction

VIP Mortgage Manifest Disregard of the AgreementAt issue in VIP Mortgage, Inc. v. Gates, ___ F.4th ___, No. 24-7624, slip op. at 1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), was the Ninth Circuit’s so-called “legally dispositive facts” doctrine—which recognizes a rare exception to the rule that courts may not vacate awards for even egregious mistakes of fact. We have discussed in numerous other posts how the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) generally does not permit courts to review arbitration awards for factual or legal error and permits vacatur only on exceedingly narrow grounds, including “manifest disregard of the agreement,” and in some jurisdictions, “manifest disregard of the law.” (See, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here; here, & here.)

Under the Ninth Circuit’s “legally dispositive facts” doctrine courts will vacate an award if the challenger shows: (1) the factual error was dispositive to the legal issue and (2) the arbitrator knew about the undisputed fact when deciding the issue. VIP Mortgage, slip op. at 9. The VIP Mortgage award challenger satisfied the first prong: the parties had previously stipulated to bear their own legal fees and the award of fees to the award defending party directly contravened the stipulation. If that’s all that mattered then the award challenger would have had a strong argument for vacatur under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 668–69, 684 (2010).

But the award challenger failed the second prong, making the case a clear candidate for confirmation. Neither the award challenger nor the award defender brought the stipulation to the arbitrator’s attention. The arbitrator, without the benefit of the stipulation,  interpreted what she believed the contract said. She did her job, the parties’ pre-award argument did not rely on (or, as far we can tell, even mention) the stipulation, and the award accordingly could not be vacated.

Let’s take a closer look.… Continue Reading »

FAA § 1 | Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC: Second Circuit Rejects Bakery’s Creative Bid to Avoid Drivers’ FAA Section 1 Exemption

January 10th, 2026 Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 1, FAA Section 4, FAA Transportation Worker Exemption, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Motion to Compel Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off on FAA § 1 | Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC: Second Circuit Rejects Bakery’s Creative Bid to Avoid Drivers’ FAA Section 1 Exemption

FAA § 1Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) § 1 (“FAA § 1”) provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. In New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the Supreme Court held that, as of 1925, “contracts of employment” was not a term of art limited to employer-employee relationships, but a capacious phrase referring to agreements “to perform work,” including independent-contractor arrangements. 586 U.S. 105, 113–21 (2019). (Posts discussing FAA § 1, including New Prime, are here, here, here, here, & here.)

In Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC, No. 24-2103-cv, slip op. (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that distribution agreements signed by single-worker corporate entities—entities the company required delivery drivers to form as a condition of keeping their routes—were “contracts of employment” within FAA § 1, so the FAA could not be used to compel arbitration. See Silva, slip op. at 2, 18–20.

The “transportation worker” exemption continues to generate litigation and businesses Continue Reading »

The EFAA—Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act: A Practical Overview

January 5th, 2026 Anti-Arbitration Statutes, Applicability of the FAA, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreement Invalid, Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Delegation Agreements, Delegation Provision, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Employment Arbitration, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, FAA Chapter 4, FAA Section 1, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 401, FAA Section 402, Limitations on Arbitrability, Post-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, Practice and Procedure, Predispute Arbitration Agreements, Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Disputes, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Comments Off on The EFAA—Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act: A Practical Overview

EFAAIntroduction

The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the “EFAA”) is one of the most significant statutory changes to federal arbitration law in decades. Codified as Chapter 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402, the EFAA limits the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual assault or sexual harassment.

Narrow in subject matter but broad in consequence, it affects domestic and international arbitration agreements, overrides delegation clauses, alters who decides arbitrability, and raises difficult questions about timing, scope, and case management. Federal courts—including circuit courts of appeals—have already begun to grapple with these issues, and more appellate guidance will likely be forthcoming.

This post provides a high-level overview of (1) what the EFAA says, (2) how it works in practice, and (3) the key issues courts have addressed so far, without extensive case-by-case discussion and analysis.

What the EFAA Says

 

EFAA Covered Agreements and Covered Disputes

The EFAA applies to two types of contractual provisions:

  1. A “Predispute arbitration agreement,” which is an “agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had  not yet arisen when the agreement was made,” 9 U.S.C. § 401(1); and
  2. A “Predispute joint-action waiver,” which is an “agreement, whether or not part of a predispute arbitration agreement, that would prohibit, or waive the right of, one of the parties to the agreement to participate in a joint, class, or collective action in a judicial, arbitral, administrative, or other forum, concerning a dispute that has not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement[,]” id. § 401(2).

The statute applies only if the dispute qualifies as either a “sexual assault dispute,” which is defined by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2246 or similar state or tribal law, id. § 401(3); or a “sexual harassment dispute,” which is defined broadly as a dispute “relating to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law,” id. § 401(4).

The definitions of sexual harassment and assault  are intentionally expansive and incorporate the relevant substantive law governing the claim.

EFAA Operative Rule

Section 402(a) is the statute’s principal substantive command: Continue Reading »