main image

Posts Tagged ‘U.S. Supreme Court’

« Older Entries

SmartSky: Fourth Circuit Says No Jurisdictional Anchor Post Badgerow

March 23rd, 2024 Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Confirm, Application to Stay Litigation, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Award Confirmed, Confirmation of Awards, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Diversity Jurisdiction, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, FAA Section 10, FAA Section 11, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, FAA Section 9, Federal Arbitration Act 202, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 202, Federal Arbitration Act Section 203, Federal Arbitration Act Section 207, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Federal Courts, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Motion to Compel Arbitration, New York Convention, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Petition to Modify Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Section 10, Section 11, Section 6, Section 9, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 4 Comments »

SmartSky

 

Introduction

This post discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in SmartSky Networks, LLC v. DAG Wireless, Ltd., ___ F.4th ___, No. 22-1253, slip op. (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2024). SmartSky held that, under Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022), if a party makes a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify an award in an action over which the Court has federal-question subject matter jurisdiction, then it must nevertheless demonstrate that the Court would have had subject matter jurisdiction had the motion been brought as a standalone petition to confirm, vacate, or modify. That is so even if the Court has under Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Section 3 stayed the action pending arbitration.

Suppose:

  1. A and B, both New York citizens, entered a contract containing an arbitration agreement;
  2. A and B become embroiled in a dispute that is governed by a federal statute;
  3. A sues B in federal court, properly invoking the federal court’s federal- question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331;
  4. B demands arbitration, and moves to compel arbitration under Section 4 and for a stay of litigation pending arbitration under Section 3;
  5. A unsuccessfully opposes the motion, the Court compels arbitration and grants a Section 3 stay of litigation pending arbitration.
  6. B ultimately obtains a $100,000 (exclusive of costs and interest) award in its favor and moves in the stayed action to confirm the award.
  7. A opposes the motion on the ground the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award.

SmartSky would require the Court to dismiss A’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even though A made the motion in an action over which the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, the Court had compelled the arbitration that resulted in the award, and the Court had stayed the action pending arbitration under Section 3.  There is no federal-question jurisdiction, and because both A and B are citizens of New York, no diversity jurisdiction.

According to SmartSky, the dismissal of the motion to confirm would be required by Badgerow.

Badgerow 

In Badgerow the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) held that a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction—independent from the FAA itself—must appear on the face of a standalone, petition to confirm or vacate an arbitration award and that independent basis cannot be established by “looking through” to the underlying arbitration proceeding that resulted in the award. See Badgerow, 142 S. Ct. at 1314, 1320.

Simply petitioning a court for relief under Sections 9, 10, 0r 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) raises no federal question and does not confer on a court federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction, as strange as that might sound to the uninitiated. In the absence of a federal question appearing on the face of the freestanding petition—such as a claim for relief falling under Chapter Two of the FAA, which implements the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”), see 9 U.S.C. §§ 202, 203; 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or one falling under Chapter Three, which implements or Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Inter-American Convention”), see 9 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq.; 28 U.S.C. § 1331—the only possible basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over such a standalone petition is diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

If there is no diversity jurisdiction, and if the action does not concern an award falling under the New York or Inter-American Conventions, then the substantive provisions of Chapter One still apply but enforcement must be sought in state court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009) (“Given the substantive supremacy of the FAA, but the Act’s nonjurisdictional cast, state courts have a prominent role to play as enforcers of agreements to arbitrate”).

A “Jurisdictional Anchor” Post-Badgerow?

The author explained in a recent Arbitration Law Forum post—Philip J. Loree Jr., Weighing the “Jurisdictional Anchor”: Post-Badgerow Second Circuit Subject Matter Jurisdiction Requirements for Applications to Confirm, Modify, or Vacate Arbitration Awards, Arbitration Law Forum (Nov. 13, 2023) (the “Jurisdictional Anchor Post”)— that Badgerow leaves unanswered an important question. It arises when—in a preexisting action over which the Court already has federal-question subject matter jurisdiction—a Court grants a motion made under Sections 4 and 3 of the FAA to compel arbitration and stay litigation, and a party subsequently moves in the same, stayed action to confirm, vacate, or modify an award resulting from the compelled arbitration. Does the Court in the stayed action have continuing subject matter jurisdiction to hear the parties’ motions to confirm or vacate the award, even though there is no independent basis for federal question or diversity jurisdiction? Can the existing but stayed federal-question lawsuit provide a “jurisdictional anchor” for the motions to confirm or vacate even though the Court would not, under Badgerow, have subject matter jurisdiction over those motions if either were brought as an independent, freestanding petition to confirm or vacate an award?

SmartSky, as we’ve seen, says the answer to those questions is no: the parties moving to confirm or vacate must establish an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction even when the motion is brought in a pre-existing but stayed lawsuit over which the Court undisputedly had federal question  jurisdiction.

SmartSky has flatly rejected the “jurisdictional anchor” theory (a/k/a “anchor jurisdiction”), under which the answer would be yes: the parties do not have to establish an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction because they are filing their motions in a preexisting  stayed action over which the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

SmartSky Caused a Circuit Split Concerning the Viability of Anchor Jurisdiction 

SmartSky‘s conclusion directly conflicts with the only other post-Badgerow U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision to address anchor jurisdiction, Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC, 66 F.4th 1099 (7th Cir. 2023). If we count pre-Badgerow cases, SmartSky also conflict with the pro-anchor-jurisdiction holdings of the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Dodson Int’l Parts v. Williams Int’l Co., 12 F.4th 1212, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing cases).

SmartSky’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Arbitration proponent SmartSky has added to its legal team SCOTUS ace Daniel L. Geyser, Esq., Chair of Haynes and Boone, LLP‘s U.S. Supreme Court Practice,  and, with Mr. Geyser’s assistance, prepared and submitted a very well-written and persuasive Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, which among other things, pointed out the Circuit conflicts which SmartSky has created with both pre- and post-Badgerow decisions and explained why SmartSky believes the Fourth Circuit misconstrued Badgerow and failed to adhere to settled subject-matter-jurisdiction principles. SmartSky, No. 22-1253, Dk. 77.

The Petition also pointed out that, even if SmartSky correctly construed Badgerow, there is an independent basis for jurisdiction under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) because two of the parties are foreign citizens, DAG Wireless LTD (“Wireless”) and David D. Gross.

Both of these persons are, according to SmartSky, identified on the face of the petition as Israeli citizens (Wireless was identified as an Israeli company and D. Gross as an Israeli resident).  Smartksy points out that the award therefore falls under the Convention and its enforcement raises a federal question. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 202, 203, & 207; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 22-1253, Dk. 77 at 13-16.

On March 13, 2024, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition. 22-1253, Dk. 80. That raises the possibility that SmartSky might petition SCOTUS for certiorari, something that wouldn’t surprise the author given that Mr. Geyser has joined its team.  If SmartSky petitions for certiorari, SCOTUS will presumably have to consider whether the current split in the circuits warrants certiorari or whether it should wait until more circuits have ruled on the issue post-Badgerow.  

The author plans to submit to an ADR trade publication an article analyzing and critiquing  SmartSky in some detail. For now, we briefly summarize what transpired in SmartSky and the reasons the Court gave for its ruling. Continue Reading »

International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) Interviews Professor Angela Downes, Richard D. Faulkner, and Philip J. Loree Jr. about the United States Supreme Court Certiorari Grant in FAA Section 1 Dispute: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC  

November 21st, 2023 Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Exemption from FAA, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Loree and Faulkner Interviews, Professor Downes, Richard D. Faulkner, Russ Bleemer, Section 1, Textualism, The Arbitration Law Forum, The Loree Law Firm, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court 1 Comment »

BissonnetteOn September 29, 2023, the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) granted certiorari in Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, No. 23-51 (U.S.), a case that concerns the scope of Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Section 1 exempts from the FAA “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1.

A key question presented by the text of Section 1 is whether the contract is a “contract[] of employment” of a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”  SCOTUS has decided three cases that have addressed that issue—or aspects of it—in one context or another.

In 2001, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Court decided that Section 1’s exemption applied not to all employment contracts, but only to contracts involving “transportation workers.”

In 2019, in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) (discussed here and here) the Court held that the term “contracts of employment” means “agreements to perform work,” irrespective of whether those agreements establish an employer-employee relationship or merely an “independent contractor” relationship.

Finally, on June 6, 2022, in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783 (2022) (discussed here) the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) held that certain ramp supervisors, who worked for Southwest Airlines, whose work frequently included assisting with the loading or unloading of baggage and other cargo on or off airplanes, were members of a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of Section 1. (Southwest Airlines is discussed here.)

The question SCOTUS has taken up in Bissonnette is whether Section 1 includes an additional requirement—one not apparent from either the text of the FAA or any of the above three decisions – that the person performing the work be a member of the “transportation industry.”  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the answer was yes, and SCOTUS granted certiorari.

The reason that the question whether participation in the “transportation industry” is claimed to be relevant to the Section 1 FAA exemption is because the Bissonnette plaintiffs were commercial truck drivers who worked not for companies in the transportation industry but for ones in the baking industry—Flowers Food, Inc. and its two subsidiaries (the “Flowers Companies”). One or more of the Flowers Companies owns and sells “Wonder Bread.”

Each plaintiff had to form a corporation and enter in the name of that entity into a distribution agreement with one of the Flowers, Inc. subsidiaries. Those agreements provided the corporate entities with certain distribution rights in exchange for money. Each contained a mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreement.

The agreements required the plaintiffs to work forty hours per week minimum, driving vehicles to stores in their assigned territories within the State of Connecticut, transporting and delivering defendants’ baked goods (including Wonder Bread) and displaying them in the stores according to the defendants’ specifications.

The agreements subjected the plaintiffs to defendants’ policies and procedures, which regulated, among other things, the time, place, and manner of pickups, and required plaintiffs to report to the warehouse each day to upload data concerning their deliveries and pickups. Plaintiffs had to obtain and insure their own vehicles.

The district court held that the plaintiffs had to arbitrate their FLSA claims with the defendants, the Second Circuit affirmed for different reasons, and SCOTUS will decide the case this Term, which ends in June 2024.

We think it likely that SCOTUS will hold that Section 1’s FAA exemption for transportation workers is not conditioned on the workers being in the “transportation industry.” Provided a worker is within a class of transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, then it should qualify for the Section 1 exemption from the FAA.

Aside from the lack of an FAA textual hook for such an argument (and other reasons outside the scope of this post), just last Term SCOTUS in Saxon, construing the text of Section 1, provided a straightforward test to determine who is exempted from the FAA. The Saxon Court provided an easy test to determine who falls within the scope of FAA Section 1’s exemption. The Court held that “any class of workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders falls within § 1’s exemption.”  Saxon, 142 S. Ct at 1789.  Accordingly, as long as a worker is within a class of transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, it will qualify for the Section 1 exemption.

The workers in Bissonnette are transportation workers because a large part of their work involves driving commercial trucks distributing Flowers’ goods to Flowers retailers in interstate commerce. Just as the Ramp Supervisors in Southwest Airlines were classified as “transportation workers” because they frequently loaded cargo on and off airplanes, so too, will SCOTUS probably rule that the plaintiffs in Bissonnette are “transportation workers” because they frequently drive trucks transporting goods in interstate commerce.

On October 24, 2023, our friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) (“CPR Alternatives”), interviewed our friends and colleagues, University of Professor Angela Downes, University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law Professor of Practice and Assistant Director of Experiential Education; arbitrator, mediator, arbitration-law attorney, and former judge,  Richard D. Faulkner; and yours truly, Loree Law Firm principal, Philip J. Loree Jr., about the Bissonnette certiorari grant, its implications and how SCOTUS might decide the case. You can watch the video-conference interview HERE.

Johnathan Baccay, a CPR Intern, and a second-year law school student, on September 29, 2023 wrote for CPR Speaks (CPR’s blog) an excellent article about Bissonnette, which CPR Speaks published.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Phil Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is a partner and founding member of the Loree Law Firm. He has more than 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

 

 

SCOTUS Decides Coinbase, Ruling that District Court Proceedings on Merits Must be Stayed Pending Interlocutory Appeal of Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration

July 14th, 2023 Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Practice, Application to Compel Arbitration, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 16, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Courts, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Loree and Faulkner Interviews, Richard D. Faulkner, Stay Pending Appeal, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on SCOTUS Decides Coinbase, Ruling that District Court Proceedings on Merits Must be Stayed Pending Interlocutory Appeal of Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration

Coinbase - Stay Pending Appeal

Introduction: Must District Courts Grant a Stay Pending Appeal of an Order Denying a Motion to Compel?  

Section 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes interlocutory appeals of orders denying motions to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) & (C). This is a “rare statutory exception to the usual [federal] rule that parties may not appeal before final judgment.”   Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. ___, No. 22-105, slip op. at 3 (June 23, 2023).  It authorizes interlocutory “appeals of orders denying—but not of orders granting—motions to compel arbitration.” Slip op. at 3 (emphasis in original).

Where such an order is made in a pending litigation on the merits, and an interlocutory appeal is taken, should the trial court litigation on the merits be stayed pending appeal? On June 23, 2023, in Coinbase, the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) ruled 5-4 that the answer was yes: a “district court must stay its pre-trial and trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongoing.” Slip op. at 1.

Discussion

To Stay or Not to Stay: SCOTUS says the Griggs Principle Controls

The Court initially noted the text of Section 16 says nothing about whether a stay of litigation pending an appeal of a denial of a motion to compel is required. See slip op. at 3. That said, “Congress enacted § 16(a) against a clear background principle prescribed by” Court “precedents[,]” which the Court referred to as the “Griggs principle[:]” “[a]n appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, ‘divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.’” Slip op. at 3 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). Continue Reading »

Presumption of Arbitrability: Second Circuit Clarifies the Law

May 30th, 2023 Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Labor Arbitration, Motion to Compel Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Presumption of Arbitrability, Questions of Arbitrability, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Presumption of Arbitrability: Second Circuit Clarifies the Law

Introduction: Presumption of Arbitrability

Presumption of Arbitrability

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007

The presumption of arbitrability—grounded in the federal policy in favor of arbitration—is an important but sometimes misunderstood rule of Labor-Management-Relations-Act (“LMRA”)- and Federal-Arbitration-Act (“FAA”) arbitration law.

According to the presumption, “where. . . parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration counsel that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298-99 (2010) (citations and quotations omitted).

There is an understandable tendency among decision makers and commentators to interpret the presumption broadly, sometimes more broadly than the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”)’s pronouncements warrant. But the presumption is not an overarching command that courts decide arbitration-law disputes in a way that yields arbitration-friendly outcomes. The presumption is, as SCOTUS explained in Granite Rock—and more recently, in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2022)—simply a limited-use tool to assist Courts in resolving ambiguities in arbitration agreements.

The presumption is, SCOTUS has said, “merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”  Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713 (quoting Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 302). “The [federal] policy [in favor of arbitration[,]” SCOTUS said, “is to make ‘arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n. 12 (1967)).

The policy—and the presumption implementing it— merely requires courts to “hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind.” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713. Courts, Morgan said, cannot “devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713 (quotation omitted). For “[t]he federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration.” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713-14 (citation omitted).

Granite Rock and Morgan express SCOTUS’s intention to narrowly limit the application of the presumption of arbitrability and to prohibit its use as an extracontractual basis for justifying enforcement of arbitration agreements more vigorously or expansively than ordinary contracts. (See here (Arbitration Law Forum, 2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb? (July 18, 2022)).) Rather SCOTUS precedent treats it as a default rule of last resort for resolving scope ambiguities in arbitration agreements. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418-19 (2019) (Not applying contra proferentem rule to resolve arbitration-agreement-scope ambiguities  “is consistent with a long line of cases holding that the FAA provides the default rule for resolving. . . [such] ambiguities. . . .”) (citations omitted).

A recent, per curiam decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Second Circuit decision evidences the Second Circuit’s clear intention to follow SCOTUS’s presumption-of-arbitrability guidance and shows how it applies to the question before the Second Circuit in that case: At what point in the interpretative framework for determining arbitrability questions does the presumption of arbitrability come into play? See Local Union 97, Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., ___ F.4d ___, No. 21-2443-cv, slip op. (2d Cir. May 3, 2023) (per curiam).

Niagara Mohawk explains, among other things, that the presumption of arbitrability is a rule of last resort. Courts have no business resolving in favor of arbitration any doubts about the scope of arbitrable issue unless and until the Court has determined that the parties’ arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to whether the dispute is arbitrable. And even if there is an ambiguity, and the presumption applies, the presumption may be rebutted. Continue Reading »

2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb?

July 18th, 2022 Amount in Controversy, Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Application to Appoint Arbitrator, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitrability, Arbitral Subpoenas, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Transportation Worker Exemption, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Section 5, Federal Arbitration Act Section 7, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Federal Courts, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, International Arbitration, International Judicial Assistance, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Look Through, Modify or Correct Award, Moses Cone Principle, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Petition to Modify Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Policy, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Presumption of Arbitrability, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 10, Section 11, Section 1782, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 9, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, Statutory Interpretation and Construction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Substantive Arbitrability, Textualism, United States Supreme Court, Vacatur, Waiver of Arbitration Comments Off on 2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb?

Introduction: This Term’s SCOTUS Arbitration Cases 

SCOTUS FAA CasesThe 2021 Term was a busy and controversial one for the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) regarding abortion, First Amendment rights, Second Amendment rights, and administrative agency power.  However, many may not know SCOTUS decided four Federal Arbitration Act cases during the 2021 Term (the “FAA Cases”), as well as a pair of cases consolidated into one concerning whether U.S. Courts may provide under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 judicial assistance to international arbitration panels sited abroad. See Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U. S. ____, No. 20–1573, slip op. (June 15, 2022) (construing FAA); ZF Automotive US, Inc., et al. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. ___, No. 21–401, slip op. (June 13, 2022) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1782); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. ___, No. 21-309, slip op. (June 6, 2022) (construing FAA); Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. ___, No. 21-328, slip op. (May 23, 2022) (construing FAA); Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. ___, No. 20-1143, slip op. (March 31, 2022) (construing FAA).  

Three of the SCOTUS FAA Cases, Badgerow, Morgan, and Southwest Airlines signal SCOTUS’s apparent intention to construe strictly the Federal Arbitration Act’s text without indulging in any pro-arbitration presumptions or applying arbitration-specific rules intentionally encouraging arbitration-friendly outcomes. ZF Automotive, the 28 U.S.C. § 1782 judicial-assistance case also  employed a strict, textualist approach to interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1782, used the FAA to help support its conclusion, and held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 did not authorize U.S. district courts to provide judicial assistance to private arbitration panels sited abroad—an outcome not particularly solicitous of international arbitration. It is therefore at least indirectly supportive of the more textually oriented and arbitration-neutral approach SCOTUS appears to have endorsed with special force during the 2021 Term.  

The SCOTUS 2021 Term FAA Cases are not the first ones in which the Court applied textualist interpretations to the FAA. There are others. See, e.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) (discussed here and here). But common themes in three of those FAA Cases—echoed in ZF Automotive —suggest a marked trend by the Court to interpret the FAA in a less expansive manner that is not presumptively arbitration friendly. The expression of these common themes in four cases decided in a single term is particularly significant because Morgan, Southwest Airlines, and ZF Automotive were decided unanimously by all participating Justices and Badgerow was decided 8-1, with now retired Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissenting.  

Many previous FAA SCOTUS decisions of the last three or four decades have been very indulgent of arbitration. The Court encouraged arbitration proliferation far beyond B-2-B commercial and industry arbitration between sophisticated and resource-laden entities of roughly equal bargaining power.  Arbitration was introduced into consumer and employment disputes and other disputes involving persons (including businesses) of vastly disparate resources and sophistication. SCOTUS made arbitration agreements readily enforceable, interpreted them expansively in favor of arbitration, limited defenses to arbitration agreements and awards, and promoted arbitration to make it, at least in the eyes of some, an attractive alternative to litigation. Critics challenged that view and assailed arbitration as “do it yourself court reform.”  The SCOTUS arbitration decisions developed and implemented an expansive federal policy in favor of arbitration and a presumption of arbitrability and championed a very pro-arbitration approach to arbitration law in general.  

That SCOTUS, the lower federal courts, and eventually even the skeptical state courts that are bound by its FAA decisions, have been solicitous and supportive of arbitration is unsurprising. The assumed (but not necessarily realized) benefits of arbitration have long been touted by academics and promoted by business and industry representatives.  Of course, courts have for many years recognized that arbitration helps reduce docket congestion, which was exacerbated by COVID and remains a problem today, even with the help of proliferated arbitration proceedings. Arbitral dispute resolution is also a very impressive business sector in and of itself, generating billions in revenues for law firms, arbitrators, and arbitration providers. It therefore has many proponents.  

But Badgerow, Morgan, Southwest Airlines, and ZF Automotive suggest that SCOTUS is rethinking its prior expansive, and highly-arbitration-friendly approach to the FAA and might be more willing to entertain seriously arguments for interpreting: (a) arbitration agreements less expansively, and more like ordinary contracts; and (b) Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA strictly according to their text and not in an exceedingly narrow manner designed to encourage, arbitration-award-favoring outcomes. These cases may also embolden lower courts, especially the state courts, to do the same. Continue Reading »

CPR Interviews Downes, Faulkner & Loree About Recent SCOTUS Developments

December 8th, 2021 Amount in Controversy, Appellate Practice, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Contract Defenses, CPR Speaks Blog of the CPR Institute, Diversity Jurisdiction, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Courts, Federal Question, International Arbitration, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), International Judicial Assistance, Laches, Loree and Faulkner Interviews, Moses Cone Principle, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, United States Supreme Court, Waiver of Arbitration Comments Off on CPR Interviews Downes, Faulkner & Loree About Recent SCOTUS Developments
CPR | SCOTUS | Sundance | Morgan | Interview | Downes | Faulkner | Loree

Steps and columns on the portico of the United States Supreme Court in Washington, DC.

Arbitration is an important topic this year at the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”). On Monday, November 23, 2021 the International Institute of Conflict Protection and Resolution (“CPR”) conducted a video interview of Professor Angela Downes,  Assistant Director of Experiential Education and Professor of Practice Law at the University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law; Dallas-based arbitrator, attorney, and former judge Richard D. Faulkner, Esq.;  and Loree Law Firm principal Philip J. Loree Jr. about three recent SCOTUS arbitration-law developments. To watch and listen to the video-conference interview, CLICK HERE or HERE.

As reported in CPR’s blog, CPR Speaks, the three SCOTUS arbitration-law developments are:

  1. SCOTUS’s recent decision to Grant Certiorari in Morgan v. Sundance Inc., No. 21-328, which will address the question: “Does the arbitration specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court’s instruction that lower courts must ‘place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?’” Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., No. 21-328, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (the “Petition”), Question Presented (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)). (See SCOTUS Docket here for more information and copies of papers.) Prior to SCOTUS granting certiorari, we discussed the Morgan petition in detail here.
  2. Two SCOTUS petitions for certiorari that address the issue whether, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1782’s judicial-assistance provisions, an arbitration panel sited abroad is a “foreign or international tribunal” for purposes of the statute, which permits “any interested person” to seek U.S. judicial assistance to obtain evidence in the U.S. for use abroad. These petitions are AlixPartners LLP v. The Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, No. 21-518, and ZF Automotive US Inc. v. Luxshare Ltd., No. 21-401. Information about these cases is available at Bryanna Rainwater, “The Law on Evidence for Foreign Arbitrations Returns to the Supreme Court,” CPR Speaks(Oct. 22, 2021) (available here) and “CPR Asks Supreme Court to Consider Another Foreign Tribunal Evidence Case,” CPR Speaks (Nov. 12, 2021) (available here).
  3. Badgerow v. Walters, No. 20-1143, a recently-argued SCOTUS case that presents the question “[w]hether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA where the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.” See id., Question Presented Report, here. The case was argued before SCOTUS on November 2, 2021, and you can listen to the oral argument here. The oral argument is discussed in Russ Bleemer, “Supreme Court Hears Badgerow, and Leans to Allowing Federal Courts to Broadly Decide on Arbitration Awards and Challenges,” CPR Speaks (November 2, 2021) (available here).

Our good friend Russ Bleemer, Editor of CPR’s newsletter, Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, did a fantastic job conducting the interview.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Henry Schein Case: CPR Interviews Loree and Faulkner on Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari

June 24th, 2020 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Authority of Arbitrators, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Henry Schein Case: CPR Interviews Loree and Faulkner on Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari
Henry Schein | Supreme Court | Cert. Granted
Steps and columns on the portico of the United States Supreme Court in Washington, DC.

On Monday, June 15, 2020 the International Institute of Conflict Protection and Resolution (“CPR”) interviewed our good friend and colleague Richard D. Faulkner and Loree & Loree partner Philip J. Loree Jr. about the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., No. 19-963. To watch and listen to the video-conference interview, CLICK HERE.

The petition for and grant of certiorari arose out of the Fifth Circuit’s remand decision from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) (available at ) (“Schein I”).

If you’ve been following our posts about the Schein I and the remand decision, Archer and White Sales Inc. v. Henry Schein Inc., 935 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2019) (available at ) (“Schein II”), then you know that the arbitration proponent, Henry Schein, Inc. (“Schein”), petitioned for rehearing en banc of Schein II in fall 2019. (See here, here, here, and here.) In October 2019, while the petition for rehearing en banc was pending, Philip J. Loree Jr. published in Alternatives an article entitled “Back to Scotus’s Schein: A Separability Analysis that Resolves the Problem with the Fifth Circuit Remand,” 37 Alternatives 131 (October 2019).

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc on December 6, 2019. But Schein, a Melville, N.Y.-based dental equipment distributor, filed on January 30, 2020 a petition for certiorari, which asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Fifth Circuit’s Schein II ruling.

The Petition asks the U.S. Supreme Court to determine “[w]hether a provision in an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.” (Petition at I)

We wrote about the Petition in a post CPR Speaks, CPR’s blog, published on February 19, 2020, which was entitled “Schein Returns: Scotus’s Arbitration Remand Is Now Back at the Court.” And we also published in the April 2020 issue of CPR Alternatives an article about the Petition, which was entitled “Schein’s Remand Decision Goes Back to the Supreme Court. What’s Next?,” 38 Alternatives 54 (April 2020) (the “April 2020 Alternatives Article”). 

As noted in the April 2020 Alternatives Article, Schein’s filing of the petition for certiorari prompted Archer & White Sales Inc. (“Respondent” or “Archer & White”), a Plano, Texas, distributor, seller, and servicer of dental equipment, to file a conditional cross-petition (the “Cross Petition”), which in the event the Court granted the Petition asked the Court to determine “[w]hether the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability by incorporating the AAA Rules into their contract.”

The Cross-Petition ultimately prompted Rick Faulkner and Phil Loree Jr. to co-author a two-part article for Alternatives entitled “Schein’s Remand Decision: Should Scotus Review the Provider Rule Incorporation-by-Reference Issue?” Part I was published in the May 2020 issue of Alternatives. Part II was published in the June 2020 issue.

The two-part article argued that, if the Court granted the Petition, it should also grant the Cross-Petition, and address the issue whether the parties, by agreeing to arbitrate “in accordance with” the American Arbitration Assocation’s Commercial Arbitration Rules, clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability issues.

But as it turned out, the Court granted the Petition, but denied the Cross-Petition, one of the issues addressed in the interview.

Our good friend Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives, conducted the interview, and did a great job editing the articles Rick and I wrote about Schein for Alternatives. He also wrote for the CPR Speaks Blog an excellent summary of where things stand in light of the Court’s grant of the Petition. The video of the interview is embedded into that blog post. You can request copies of the articles Rick and Phil wrote about Schein by emailing CPR at alternatives@cpradr.org.  

We also shout-out CPR’s Tania Zamorsky, who, among other things, is the blog master of CPR Speaks, and who coordinated the effort to share copies of the video on CPR’s social media outlets.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

OTO LLC v. Kho: U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner About the Denial

June 10th, 2020 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, California Supreme Court, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Substantive Arbitrability, Unconscionability, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on OTO LLC v. Kho: U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner About the Denial
OTO LLC v. Kho

On June 8, 2020 the United States Supreme Court declined to review OTO LLC v. Kho, a controversial decision of the California Supreme Court, which held that an arbitration agreement was, in the circumstances, unconscionable to the extent that it purported to require an employee to arbitrate wage claims.

The California Supreme Court held that the agreement in OTO was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable under California law, and its decision that the agreement was substantively unconscionable turned on how the agreement’s procedures were less streamlined, and more akin to litigation procedures, than those available under California’s so-called Berman administrative hearing scheme, which California uses to resolve wage claims.

Also on June 8, 2020, CPR Speaks, the blog of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”) published an excellent post on OTO, written by Harvard Law School student and CPR Intern Seorae Ko. The post explains the background of the case in more detail and discusses the arguments advanced in favor of and in opposition to the petition for certiorari.

On June 9, 2020, our friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, CPR’s newsletter, interviewed our friend and colleague Richard D. Faulkner, an arbitrator, arbitration-law practitioner, and former trial judge, and the author, Philip J. Loree Jr., about the OTO denial of certiorari and what it means for practitioners. As always, Russ did a great job conducting the interview.

Today, June 10, 2020, CPR posted that video conference interview on CPR Speaks, and you can watch it HERE.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, the interview, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Phil Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is a partner and founding member of Loree & Loree. He has 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation.

Loree & Loree represents private and government-owned-or-controlled business organizations, and persons acting in their individual or representative capacities, and often serves as co-counsel, local counsel or legal adviser to other domestic and international law firms requiring assistance or support.

Loree & Loree was recently selected by Expertise.com out of a group of 1,763 persons or firms reviewed as one of Expertise.com’s top 18 “Arbitrators & Mediators” in New York City for 2019, and now for 2020. (See here and here.)

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

CPR Speaks Publishes Philip J. Loree Jr.’s Post on Schein’s Return to the U.S. Supreme Court

February 20th, 2020 Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, CPR Speaks Blog of the CPR Institute, Delegation Agreements, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Loree & Loree, Questions of Arbitrability, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Separability, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States Supreme Court 2 Comments »
Schein II
Steps and columns on the portico of the United States Supreme Court in Washington, DC.

If you’ve been following our posts on Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (Jan. 8, 2019) (available at ) (“Schein I”), and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision on remand, Archer and White Sales Inc. v. Henry Schein Inc., 935 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2019) (available at ) (“Schein II”), then you know that the arbitration proponent, Henry Schein, Inc. (“Schein”), petitioned for rehearing en banc. (See here, here, here, and here.)

Well, unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit denied that petition on December 6, 2019. But apparently Schein was at least as disappointed with that ruling as we were, and so Schein filed on January 30, 2020 a petition for certiorari, asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Fifth Circuit’s Schein II ruling. A copy of the Petition is here.

We were delighted—not because we get to write still more articles and posts about Schein I and Schein II, but because, with all due respect to the Fifth Circuit, we think that Schein II was wrongly decided, and that consequently, Schein has been denied the benefit of the arbitration agreement and Delegation Agreement for which it freely bargained. And we hope that the U.S. Supreme Court grants Schein’s petition, reverses the Fifth Circuit decision, and directs the Fifth Circuit to compel arbitration of the parties’ arbitrability dispute as required by the parties’ Delegation Agreement.

On February 19, 2020, our friends at CPR Speaks, the blog of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”), published a post we authored about this development, entitled Schein Returns: Scotus’s Arbitration Remand Is Now Back at the Court, which you can review here.

The post discusses the background of Schein I and Schein II, the events leading up to the petition for certiorari, some of the reasons why we believe Schein II was wrongly decided, and how we believe that it should be decided if SCOTUS grants the petition.

Many thanks to our good friend, Russ Bleemer—a New York attorney who is the editor of CPR’s Alternatives, an international ADR newsletter published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., for his very helpful edits. And a shout-out also to CPR’s Tania Zamorsky, who, among other things, is the blog master of CPR Speaks.

About the Author

Philip J. Loree Jr. is a partner and founding member of Loree & Loree. He has nearly 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation. He is a former partner of the litigation departments of the New York City firms of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP and Rosenman & Colin LLP (now known as Katten Munchin Rosenman LLP).

Loree & Loree represents private and government-owned-or-controlled business organizations, and persons acting in their individual or representative capacities, and often serves as co-counsel, local counsel or legal adviser to other domestic and international law firms requiring assistance or support.

You can contact Phil Loree Jr. at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

SCOTUS Denies Americo and Jupiter Medical Cert. Petitions: All Eyes now on DIRECTV. . . .

May 19th, 2015 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Awards, Choice-of-Law Provisions, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Confirmation of Awards, Consent to Class Arbitration, Contract Interpretation, FAA Preemption of State Law, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, State Courts, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on SCOTUS Denies Americo and Jupiter Medical Cert. Petitions: All Eyes now on DIRECTV. . . .

yay-34842-digital

On March 28, 2015 we reported (here) that the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) had asked for a response to the petition for certiorari in Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2014). In Americo the Texas Supreme Court held that an arbitration award had to be vacated because it was made by a panel not constituted according to the parties’ agreement. The parties’ agreement, among other things, incorporated the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”)’s rules, which at the time the parties entered into the contract followed the traditional, industry arbitration rule that party-appointed arbitrators may be partial, under the control of the appointing party or both. But by the time the dispute arose the AAA Rules had been amended to provide that the parties are presumed to intend to require parties to appoint only neutral arbitrators—that is, arbitrators that are both impartial and independent.

Five Justices of the nine-member Texas Court determined that the parties had agreed that party-appointed arbitrators need not be impartial, only independent. Because the AAA had, contrary to the parties’ agreement, disqualified the challenging party’s first-choice arbitrator on partiality grounds, the panel that rendered the award was not properly constituted and thus exceeded its powers. See 440 S.W.3d at 25. (Copies of our Americo posts are here and here.)

yay-12776482As reported here and here, the losing party requested Supreme  Court review to determine whether the Texas Supreme Court should have deferred to the AAA’s decision on disqualification rather than independently determining whether the parties intended to require party-appointed arbitrators to be neutral. The petition argues that there is a split in the circuits on the issue.

On Monday, May 18, 2015, SCOTUS denied the petition for certiorari.  (You can access the Court’s May 18, 2015 Order List here.)

On Monday May 4, 2015, SCOTUS also denied the petition for certiorari in another Federal Arbitration Act case, Jupiter Medical Center, Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Assoc., No. 14-944, which was decided by the Florida Supreme Court. (You can access the Court’s May 4, 2015 Order List here.) Jupiter Medical Center, like Americo, concerned a post-award challenge under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, and also like Americo, was decided by a state supreme court. In Jupiter Medical, however, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the post-award challenge.

yay-5257980-digitalSupreme Court watchers interested in arbitration cases will have to get their fix next term from DIRECTV v. Imburgia, which we discussed here. Will SCOTUS hold that the California intermediate Court did not give effect to the presumption of arbitrability? Will SCOTUS go even further and explain that, just as a statute cannot be interpreted “‘to destroy itself,'” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting  American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-228 (1998) (quotation omitted)), so too cannot state law contract interpretation rules be applied in a way that would destroy an arbitration agreement to which the Federal Arbitration Act applies? Cf. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,  (1989) (“The question remains whether, assuming the choice-of-law clause meant what the Court of Appeal found it to mean, application of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1281.2(c) is nonetheless pre-empted by the FAA to the extent it is used to stay arbitration under this contract involving interstate commerce.  .  .  . [because] “it would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”)

Stay tuned for DIRECTV.  .  .  .

 

Photo Acknowledgements:

All photos used in the text portion of this post are licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law. Text has been added to image 2 (counting from top to bottom). Hover your mouse pointer over any image to view the Yay Images abbreviation of the photographer’s name.

« Older Entries