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Posts Tagged ‘SCOTUS’

2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb?

July 18th, 2022 Amount in Controversy, Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Application to Appoint Arbitrator, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitrability, Arbitral Subpoenas, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Transportation Worker Exemption, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 11, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Section 5, Federal Arbitration Act Section 7, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Federal Courts, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, Federal Question, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, International Arbitration, International Judicial Assistance, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Look Through, Modify or Correct Award, Moses Cone Principle, Petition or Application to Confirm Award, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Petition to Modify Award, Petition to Vacate Award, Policy, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Presumption of Arbitrability, Richard D. Faulkner, Section 10, Section 11, Section 1782, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 9, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, Statutory Interpretation and Construction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Substantive Arbitrability, Textualism, United States Supreme Court, Vacatur, Waiver of Arbitration Comments Off on 2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb?

Introduction: This Term’s SCOTUS Arbitration Cases 

SCOTUS FAA CasesThe 2021 Term was a busy and controversial one for the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) regarding abortion, First Amendment rights, Second Amendment rights, and administrative agency power.  However, many may not know SCOTUS decided four Federal Arbitration Act cases during the 2021 Term (the “FAA Cases”), as well as a pair of cases consolidated into one concerning whether U.S. Courts may provide under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 judicial assistance to international arbitration panels sited abroad. See Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U. S. ____, No. 20–1573, slip op. (June 15, 2022) (construing FAA); ZF Automotive US, Inc., et al. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. ___, No. 21–401, slip op. (June 13, 2022) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1782); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. ___, No. 21-309, slip op. (June 6, 2022) (construing FAA); Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. ___, No. 21-328, slip op. (May 23, 2022) (construing FAA); Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. ___, No. 20-1143, slip op. (March 31, 2022) (construing FAA).  

Three of the SCOTUS FAA Cases, Badgerow, Morgan, and Southwest Airlines signal SCOTUS’s apparent intention to construe strictly the Federal Arbitration Act’s text without indulging in any pro-arbitration presumptions or applying arbitration-specific rules intentionally encouraging arbitration-friendly outcomes. ZF Automotive, the 28 U.S.C. § 1782 judicial-assistance case also  employed a strict, textualist approach to interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1782, used the FAA to help support its conclusion, and held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 did not authorize U.S. district courts to provide judicial assistance to private arbitration panels sited abroad—an outcome not particularly solicitous of international arbitration. It is therefore at least indirectly supportive of the more textually oriented and arbitration-neutral approach SCOTUS appears to have endorsed with special force during the 2021 Term.  

The SCOTUS 2021 Term FAA Cases are not the first ones in which the Court applied textualist interpretations to the FAA. There are others. See, e.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) (discussed here and here). But common themes in three of those FAA Cases—echoed in ZF Automotive —suggest a marked trend by the Court to interpret the FAA in a less expansive manner that is not presumptively arbitration friendly. The expression of these common themes in four cases decided in a single term is particularly significant because Morgan, Southwest Airlines, and ZF Automotive were decided unanimously by all participating Justices and Badgerow was decided 8-1, with now retired Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissenting.  

Many previous FAA SCOTUS decisions of the last three or four decades have been very indulgent of arbitration. The Court encouraged arbitration proliferation far beyond B-2-B commercial and industry arbitration between sophisticated and resource-laden entities of roughly equal bargaining power.  Arbitration was introduced into consumer and employment disputes and other disputes involving persons (including businesses) of vastly disparate resources and sophistication. SCOTUS made arbitration agreements readily enforceable, interpreted them expansively in favor of arbitration, limited defenses to arbitration agreements and awards, and promoted arbitration to make it, at least in the eyes of some, an attractive alternative to litigation. Critics challenged that view and assailed arbitration as “do it yourself court reform.”  The SCOTUS arbitration decisions developed and implemented an expansive federal policy in favor of arbitration and a presumption of arbitrability and championed a very pro-arbitration approach to arbitration law in general.  

That SCOTUS, the lower federal courts, and eventually even the skeptical state courts that are bound by its FAA decisions, have been solicitous and supportive of arbitration is unsurprising. The assumed (but not necessarily realized) benefits of arbitration have long been touted by academics and promoted by business and industry representatives.  Of course, courts have for many years recognized that arbitration helps reduce docket congestion, which was exacerbated by COVID and remains a problem today, even with the help of proliferated arbitration proceedings. Arbitral dispute resolution is also a very impressive business sector in and of itself, generating billions in revenues for law firms, arbitrators, and arbitration providers. It therefore has many proponents.  

But Badgerow, Morgan, Southwest Airlines, and ZF Automotive suggest that SCOTUS is rethinking its prior expansive, and highly-arbitration-friendly approach to the FAA and might be more willing to entertain seriously arguments for interpreting: (a) arbitration agreements less expansively, and more like ordinary contracts; and (b) Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA strictly according to their text and not in an exceedingly narrow manner designed to encourage, arbitration-award-favoring outcomes. These cases may also embolden lower courts, especially the state courts, to do the same. Continue Reading »

CPR Interviews Downes, Faulkner & Loree About Recent SCOTUS Developments

December 8th, 2021 Amount in Controversy, Appellate Practice, Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Contract Defenses, CPR Speaks Blog of the CPR Institute, Diversity Jurisdiction, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Courts, Federal Question, International Arbitration, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), International Judicial Assistance, Laches, Loree and Faulkner Interviews, Moses Cone Principle, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Petition to Compel Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, United States Supreme Court, Waiver of Arbitration Comments Off on CPR Interviews Downes, Faulkner & Loree About Recent SCOTUS Developments
CPR | SCOTUS | Sundance | Morgan | Interview | Downes | Faulkner | Loree

Steps and columns on the portico of the United States Supreme Court in Washington, DC.

Arbitration is an important topic this year at the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”). On Monday, November 23, 2021 the International Institute of Conflict Protection and Resolution (“CPR”) conducted a video interview of Professor Angela Downes,  Assistant Director of Experiential Education and Professor of Practice Law at the University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law; Dallas-based arbitrator, attorney, and former judge Richard D. Faulkner, Esq.;  and Loree Law Firm principal Philip J. Loree Jr. about three recent SCOTUS arbitration-law developments. To watch and listen to the video-conference interview, CLICK HERE or HERE.

As reported in CPR’s blog, CPR Speaks, the three SCOTUS arbitration-law developments are:

  1. SCOTUS’s recent decision to Grant Certiorari in Morgan v. Sundance Inc.No. 21-328, which will address the question: “Does the arbitration specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court’s instruction that lower courts must ‘place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?’” Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., No. 21-328, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (the “Petition”), Question Presented (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)). (See SCOTUS Docket here for more information and copies of papers.) Prior to SCOTUS granting certiorari, we discussed the Morgan petition in detail here.
  2. Two SCOTUS petitions for certiorari that address the issue whether, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1782’s judicial-assistance provisions, an arbitration panel sited abroad is a “foreign or international tribunal” for purposes of the statute, which permits “any interested person” to seek U.S. judicial assistance to obtain evidence in the U.S. for use abroad. These petitions are AlixPartners LLP v. The Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign StatesNo. 21-518, and ZF Automotive US Inc. v. Luxshare Ltd.No. 21-401. Information about these cases is available at Bryanna Rainwater, “The Law on Evidence for Foreign Arbitrations Returns to the Supreme Court,” CPR Speaks(Oct. 22, 2021) (available here) and “CPR Asks Supreme Court to Consider Another Foreign Tribunal Evidence Case,” CPR Speaks (Nov. 12, 2021) (available here).
  3. Badgerow v. WaltersNo. 20-1143, a recently-argued SCOTUS case that presents the question “[w]hether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA where the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.” See id., Question Presented Report, here. The case was argued before SCOTUS on November 2, 2021, and you can listen to the oral argument here. The oral argument is discussed in Russ Bleemer, “Supreme Court Hears Badgerow, and Leans to Allowing Federal Courts to Broadly Decide on Arbitration Awards and Challenges,” CPR Speaks (November 2, 2021) (available here).

Our good friend Russ Bleemer, Editor of CPR’s newsletter, Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, did a fantastic job conducting the interview.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Waiver of Arbitration: Will the U.S. Supreme Court Resolve the Circuit Split Concerning Prejudice?

September 28th, 2021 Application to Compel Arbitration, Application to Stay Litigation, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Equal Footing Principle, Estoppel, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, Laches, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Prejudice, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, Stay of Litigation, Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration, United States Supreme Court, Waiver of Arbitration 1 Comment »

Waiver of Arbitration based on Litigation-Related Conduct

Waiver | Prejudice | Supreme Court | Cert Granted

United States Supreme Court

Whether an arbitration challenger must show prejudice to establish waiver of arbitration based on litigation-related conduct is an issue that might be the subject of a United States Supreme Court opinion in the not too distant future.

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Section 3 authorizes a stay of litigation in favor of arbitration “providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with . . . arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). The most common application of the “not in default” language occurs when a defendant in a lawsuit delays seeking a Section 3 stay and litigates on the merits. See, generally, Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217-19 (3d Cir. 2007); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 454-56 (2d Cir. 1995).

Defending the suit on the merits—rather than seeking a stay of litigation and moving to compel arbitration—is inconsistent with arbitration and at some point constitutes at least an implied rejection or abandonment of the right to arbitrate. Section 3’s “not in default” condition authorizes a plaintiff resisting a stay to assert that the defendant has waived its right to arbitrate. 9 U.S.C. § 3; see 482 F.3d at 218; 66 F.3d at 454-56.

We discussed waiver of arbitration based on litigation-related conduct in a prior post, here. Under general principles of contract law, waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right.” See, e.g., Professional Staff Congress-City University v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 7 N.Y.3d 458, 465 (2006) (“A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it. . . . Such a waiver must be clear, unmistakable and without ambiguity”) (citations and quotations omitted).

Waiver may be established by demonstrating that a party renounced or abandoned contract rights, whether by its representations or other conduct inconsistent with an intent to assert those rights. See, e.g., Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc. v. Tocqueville Asset Mgmt, L.P., 7 N.Y.3d 96, 104 (2006).

It focuses solely on the conduct of the party charged with waiver—it does not require any showing that the other party detrimentally relied on the conduct or otherwise suffered any prejudice. See, e.g., United Commodities-Greece v. Fidelity Int’l Bank, 64 N.Y.2d 449, 456-57 (1985); Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, 7 N.Y.3d at 104, 106-07; Albert J. Schiff Assoc. v. Flack, 51 N.Y.2d 692, 698-99 (1980).

The concept that another’s untimely assertion of a right has prejudiced a person is central to the equitable doctrine of laches, not waiver. See Capruso v. Village of Kings Point, 23 N.Y. 3d 631, 641 (2014) (“Laches is defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. The essential element of this equitable defense is delay prejudicial to the opposing party.”) (citations and quotations omitted).

Prejudice is also an element required to establish estoppel, which is an equitable bar to enforcement of a contract right. See, e.g., Schiff Assoc., 51 N.Y.2d at 699 (“Distinguished from waiver, of course, is the intervention of principles of equitable estoppel, in an appropriate case, such as where an insurer, though in fact not obligated to provide coverage, without asserting policy defenses or reserving the privilege to do so, undertakes the defense of the case, in reliance on which the insured suffers the detriment of losing the right to control its own defense.”)

Waiver: The Circuit Split on Prejudice

There is a split in the circuits concerning whether a party opposing a stay must not only demonstrate litigation-related conduct inconsistent with arbitration to establish waiver but must also establish prejudice.

Most circuit courts of appeals have determined that prejudice is required to establish waiver of arbitration based on litigation-related conduct. See Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968); Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H. F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988); Carolina Throwing Co. v. S & E Novelty Corp., 442 F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1971); Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co., 781 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1986); O.J. Distrib., Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 356 (6th Cir. 2003); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Freeman, 924 F.2d 157, 158 (8th Cir. 1991); ATSA of Cal., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 702 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1983); S & H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945, 949 (1st Cir. 2014) (prejudice requirement is “tame at best”).

Courts frequently cite the FAA’s federal policy favoring arbitration as justifying a prejudice requirement for waiver. See, e.g., Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 924 F.2d at 158 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). Other circuit courts do not require prejudice. See St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1992); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Rsch. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

State supreme courts are also split.  Compare, e.g., St. Agnes Med. Ctr. v. PacifiCare of Cal., 82 P.3d 727, 738 (Cal. 2003) (prejudice required under state arbitration law); Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 668 A.2d 367, 372 (Conn. 1995) (prejudice required; following Second Circuit authority) with Hudson v. Citibank (S.D.) NA, 387 P.3d 42, 47-49 (Alaska 2016) (prejudice not required under federal law); Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So.2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005) (prejudice not required under federal law);  Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 156 A.3d 807, 819 (Md. 2017) (prejudice not required under state law).

The Morgan SCOTUS Petition: Waiver, Prejudice, and the “Equal Footing” Principle

This raises an important question concerning FAA Section 2’s “equal footing principle,” which has been presented to the Supreme Court in a recent petition for certiorari: “Does the arbitration specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court’s instruction that lower courts must ‘place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?’” Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., No. 21-328, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (the “Petition”), Question Presented (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)). (See SCOTUS Docket here for more information and copies of papers.) Opposition papers are due on October 1, 2021, which means that the Court may grant or deny the petition before the end of 2021.

The question is a substantial one since the purpose of “savings clause” of FAA Section 2 “was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). FAA Section 2’s “savings clause” provides that arbitration agreements falling under the FAA “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.

Courts that require prejudice to establish waiver are arguably making arbitration agreements more enforceable than ordinary contracts. And that may violate the “equal footing” principle.

Back in 2011 the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari seeking review of essentially the same question, but the parties settled the case before it was fully submitted and SCOTUS dismissed it as moot without reaching the merits. Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 562 U.S. 1215 (2011), cert. dismissed, 563 U.S. 1029 (2011) (See SCOTUS Docket here.)

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., presents another opportunity for the Court to resolve the circuit and state supreme court conflicts on litigation-conduct-related waiver. As set forth in the comprehensive and well-written petition, Morgan presents a good vehicle for SCOTUS to resolve a long-standing (and deep) circuit/state-supreme-court conflict, which continues to be worthy of review.

If the Supreme Court grants certiorari; reverses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision, which required the plaintiff to show prejudice; and holds that prejudice is not required to establish waiver, then parties who wish to demand arbitration after being named a defendant in a litigation will need to move promptly to stay litigation and compel arbitration or risk losing the right to do so. While that might create some enforcement risks for parties who wish to arbitrate, it may also reduce, or at least streamline, FAA enforcement proceedings concerning litigation-related-conduct-based waiver.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, or this article, or if you wish to discuss possibly retaining the Loree Law Firm to provide legal advice or other legal representation, please contact the author, Philip Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. has more than 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Monster Energy Case: CPR Interviews Loree and Faulkner on U.S. Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari

June 30th, 2020 Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Providers, Awards, Challenging Arbitration Awards, CPR Speaks Blog of the CPR Institute, Evident Partiality, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Loree & Loree, Loree and Faulkner Interviews, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court, Vacate Award | Evident Partiality, Vacatur Comments Off on Monster Energy Case: CPR Interviews Loree and Faulkner on U.S. Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari
Monster Energy | Loree | Faulkner | Bleemer | CPR

On Monday, June 29, 2020 the International Institute of Conflict Protection and Resolution (“CPR”) interviewed Richard D. Faulkner, Esq. and Loree & Loree partner Philip J. Loree Jr. about the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019). To watch and listen to the video-conference interview, CLICK HERE.

On November 18, 2019 we reported on Monster Energy here. The Ninth Circuit addressed the question whether an award should be vacated for evident partiality if: (a) an arbitrator fails to disclose an ownership interest in an arbitration provider; and (b) the arbitration provider has a nontrivial, repeat-player relationship with a party.

The Court, in a 2-1 decision, held that an arbitrator who failed to disclose his ownership interest in an arbitration provider was guilty of evident partiality because the arbitration provider had a nontrivial business relationship with the repeat player party. The business relationship between the provider and the award proponent was nontrivial because the proponent’s form contracts designated the provider as the arbitration administrator, and over a five-year period, the provider had administered 97 arbitrations for the proponent.

Our good friend Russ Bleemer, Editor of CPR’s newsletter, Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, did a fantastic job conducting the interview. Heather Cameron, a second-year student at Fordham Law School, and a CPR Institute 2020 Summer Intern, wrote for CPR Speaks an excellent post about Monster Energy and the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, which you can read here. The video of the interview is embedded into that post.

A shout-out also to CPR’s Tania Zamorsky, who, among other things, is the blog master of CPR Speaks, and who coordinated the effort to share copies of the video on CPR’s social media outlets.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Henry Schein Case: CPR Interviews Loree and Faulkner on Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari

June 24th, 2020 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Authority of Arbitrators, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Henry Schein Case: CPR Interviews Loree and Faulkner on Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari
Henry Schein | Supreme Court | Cert. Granted
Steps and columns on the portico of the United States Supreme Court in Washington, DC.

On Monday, June 15, 2020 the International Institute of Conflict Protection and Resolution (“CPR”) interviewed our good friend and colleague Richard D. Faulkner and Loree & Loree partner Philip J. Loree Jr. about the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., No. 19-963. To watch and listen to the video-conference interview, CLICK HERE.

The petition for and grant of certiorari arose out of the Fifth Circuit’s remand decision from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) (available at ) (“Schein I”).

If you’ve been following our posts about the Schein I and the remand decision, Archer and White Sales Inc. v. Henry Schein Inc., 935 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2019) (available at ) (“Schein II”), then you know that the arbitration proponent, Henry Schein, Inc. (“Schein”), petitioned for rehearing en banc of Schein II in fall 2019. (See here, herehere, and here.) In October 2019, while the petition for rehearing en banc was pending, Philip J. Loree Jr. published in Alternatives an article entitled “Back to Scotus’s Schein: A Separability Analysis that Resolves the Problem with the Fifth Circuit Remand,” 37 Alternatives 131 (October 2019).

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc on December 6, 2019. But Schein, a Melville, N.Y.-based dental equipment distributor, filed on January 30, 2020 a petition for certiorari, which asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Fifth Circuit’s Schein II ruling.

The Petition asks the U.S. Supreme Court to determine “[w]hether a provision in an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.” (Petition at I)

We wrote about the Petition in a post CPR Speaks, CPR’s blog, published on February 19, 2020, which was entitled “Schein Returns: Scotus’s Arbitration Remand Is Now Back at the Court.” And we also published in the April 2020 issue of CPR Alternatives an article about the Petition, which was entitled “Schein’s Remand Decision Goes Back to the Supreme Court. What’s Next?,” 38 Alternatives 54 (April 2020) (the “April 2020 Alternatives Article”). 

As noted in the April 2020 Alternatives Article, Schein’s filing of the petition for certiorari prompted Archer & White Sales Inc. (“Respondent” or “Archer & White”), a Plano, Texas, distributor, seller, and servicer of dental equipment, to file a conditional cross-petition (the “Cross Petition”), which in the event the Court granted the Petition asked the Court to determine “[w]hether the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability by incorporating the AAA Rules into their contract.”

The Cross-Petition ultimately prompted Rick Faulkner and Phil Loree Jr. to co-author a two-part article for Alternatives entitled “Schein’s Remand Decision: Should Scotus Review the Provider Rule Incorporation-by-Reference Issue?” Part I was published in the May 2020 issue of Alternatives. Part II was published in the June 2020 issue.

The two-part article argued that, if the Court granted the Petition, it should also grant the Cross-Petition, and address the issue whether the parties, by agreeing to arbitrate “in accordance with” the American Arbitration Assocation’s Commercial Arbitration Rules, clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability issues.

But as it turned out, the Court granted the Petition, but denied the Cross-Petition, one of the issues addressed in the interview.

Our good friend Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives, conducted the interview, and did a great job editing the articles Rick and I wrote about Schein for Alternatives. He also wrote for the CPR Speaks Blog an excellent summary of where things stand in light of the Court’s grant of the Petition. The video of the interview is embedded into that blog post. You can request copies of the articles Rick and Phil wrote about Schein by emailing CPR at alternatives@cpradr.org.  

We also shout-out CPR’s Tania Zamorsky, who, among other things, is the blog master of CPR Speaks, and who coordinated the effort to share copies of the video on CPR’s social media outlets.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

OTO LLC v. Kho: U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner About the Denial

June 10th, 2020 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, California Supreme Court, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Substantive Arbitrability, Unconscionability, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on OTO LLC v. Kho: U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner About the Denial
OTO LLC v. Kho

On June 8, 2020 the United States Supreme Court declined to review OTO LLC v. Kho, a controversial decision of the California Supreme Court, which held that an arbitration agreement was, in the circumstances, unconscionable to the extent that it purported to require an employee to arbitrate wage claims.

The California Supreme Court held that the agreement in OTO was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable under California law, and its decision that the agreement was substantively unconscionable turned on how the agreement’s procedures were less streamlined, and more akin to litigation procedures, than those available under California’s so-called Berman administrative hearing scheme, which California uses to resolve wage claims.

Also on June 8, 2020, CPR Speaks, the blog of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”) published an excellent post on OTO, written by Harvard Law School student and CPR Intern Seorae Ko. The post explains the background of the case in more detail and discusses the arguments advanced in favor of and in opposition to the petition for certiorari.

On June 9, 2020, our friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, CPR’s newsletter, interviewed our friend and colleague Richard D. Faulkner, an arbitrator, arbitration-law practitioner, and former trial judge, and the author, Philip J. Loree Jr., about the OTO denial of certiorari and what it means for practitioners. As always, Russ did a great job conducting the interview.

Today, June 10, 2020, CPR posted that video conference interview on CPR Speaks, and you can watch it HERE.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, the interview, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Phil Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is a partner and founding member of Loree & Loree. He has 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation.

Loree & Loree represents private and government-owned-or-controlled business organizations, and persons acting in their individual or representative capacities, and often serves as co-counsel, local counsel or legal adviser to other domestic and international law firms requiring assistance or support.

Loree & Loree was recently selected by Expertise.com out of a group of 1,763 persons or firms reviewed as one of Expertise.com’s top 18 “Arbitrators & Mediators” in New York City for 2019, and now for 2020. (See here and here.)

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews by Video Conference Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner

June 2nd, 2020 ADR Social Media, Arbitrability, Arbitrability - Equitable Estoppel, Arbitrability - Nonsignatories, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, CPR Speaks Blog of the CPR Institute, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, International Arbitration, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Loree & Loree, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Questions of Arbitrability, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews by Video Conference Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner
GE Energy Power

On June 1, 2020 the United States Supreme Court issued its 9-0 decision in GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC. In an opinion authored by Associate Justice Clarence Thomas the Court held that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards did not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. Associate Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion.

On the same day the Court decided GE Power, our friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”), interviewed our friend and colleague Richard D. Faulkner and Philip J. Loree Jr. about the case and what it means for practitioners.

You can watch the video-conference interview HERE.

Also on June 1, 2020 Russ also wrote an excellent post about GE Energy for CPR’s blog, CPR Speaks, which explains in detail the background of the case and the rationale for the Court’s opinion, as well as Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion. You can read that post HERE.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Phil Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is a partner and founding member of Loree & Loree. He has 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation.

Loree & Loree represents private and government-owned-or-controlled business organizations, and persons acting in their individual or representative capacities, and often serves as co-counsel, local counsel or legal adviser to other domestic, and international, law firms requiring assistance or support.

Loree & Loree was recently selected by Expertise.com out of a group of 1,763 persons or firms reviewed as one of Expertise.com’s top 18 “Arbitrators & Mediators” in New York City for 2019, and now for 2020. (See here and here.)

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc. | CPR’s Video Conference Interview of Rick Faulkner and Phil Loree Jr. about Schein’s Second Trip to the the Nation’s Highest Court

May 22nd, 2020 ADR Social Media, American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Arbitration Risks, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, CPR Speaks Blog of the CPR Institute, Delegation Agreements, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Loree & Loree Comments Off on Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc. | CPR’s Video Conference Interview of Rick Faulkner and Phil Loree Jr. about Schein’s Second Trip to the the Nation’s Highest Court
Schein Faulkner Loree

On May 20, 2020, the International Institute of Conflict Protection and Resolution (“CPR”) interviewed our good friend and fellow arbitration attorney Richard D. Faulkner and Loree & Loree partner Philip J. Loree Jr. about a two-part article we wrote about the Schein case for the May 2020 and June 2020 issues of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, CPR’s international ADR newsletter published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  To watch and listen to the video-conference interview, CLICK HERE.

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2018-2019 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: What About Lamps Plus?

June 20th, 2019 Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Practice, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Class Action Arbitration, Clause Construction Award, Consent to Class Arbitration, Contract Interpretation, Contract Interpretation Rules, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, FAA Preemption of State Law, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court 2 Comments »
Lamps Plus - Supreme Court Building
U.S. Supreme Court

On April 24, 2019 in Lamps Plus Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. ___, No. 17-998 (April 24, 2019), the United States Supreme Court considered whether whether consent to class arbitration may be inferred from ambiguous contract language.

In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. the Court held that ambiguity in and of itself was not enough to infer party consent to class arbitration. Parties would have to clearly express their consent to class arbitration before courts could impose it on them under the Federal Arbitration Act.

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SCOTUS Denies Americo and Jupiter Medical Cert. Petitions: All Eyes now on DIRECTV. . . .

May 19th, 2015 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Awards, Choice-of-Law Provisions, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Confirmation of Awards, Consent to Class Arbitration, Contract Interpretation, FAA Preemption of State Law, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, State Courts, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on SCOTUS Denies Americo and Jupiter Medical Cert. Petitions: All Eyes now on DIRECTV. . . .

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On March 28, 2015 we reported (here) that the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) had asked for a response to the petition for certiorari in Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2014). In Americo the Texas Supreme Court held that an arbitration award had to be vacated because it was made by a panel not constituted according to the parties’ agreement. The parties’ agreement, among other things, incorporated the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”)’s rules, which at the time the parties entered into the contract followed the traditional, industry arbitration rule that party-appointed arbitrators may be partial, under the control of the appointing party or both. But by the time the dispute arose the AAA Rules had been amended to provide that the parties are presumed to intend to require parties to appoint only neutral arbitrators—that is, arbitrators that are both impartial and independent.

Five Justices of the nine-member Texas Court determined that the parties had agreed that party-appointed arbitrators need not be impartial, only independent. Because the AAA had, contrary to the parties’ agreement, disqualified the challenging party’s first-choice arbitrator on partiality grounds, the panel that rendered the award was not properly constituted and thus exceeded its powers. See 440 S.W.3d at 25. (Copies of our Americo posts are here and here.)

yay-12776482As reported here and here, the losing party requested Supreme  Court review to determine whether the Texas Supreme Court should have deferred to the AAA’s decision on disqualification rather than independently determining whether the parties intended to require party-appointed arbitrators to be neutral. The petition argues that there is a split in the circuits on the issue.

On Monday, May 18, 2015, SCOTUS denied the petition for certiorari.  (You can access the Court’s May 18, 2015 Order List here.)

On Monday May 4, 2015, SCOTUS also denied the petition for certiorari in another Federal Arbitration Act case, Jupiter Medical Center, Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Assoc., No. 14-944, which was decided by the Florida Supreme Court. (You can access the Court’s May 4, 2015 Order List here.) Jupiter Medical Center, like Americo, concerned a post-award challenge under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, and also like Americo, was decided by a state supreme court. In Jupiter Medical, however, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the post-award challenge.

yay-5257980-digitalSupreme Court watchers interested in arbitration cases will have to get their fix next term from DIRECTV v. Imburgia, which we discussed here. Will SCOTUS hold that the California intermediate Court did not give effect to the presumption of arbitrability? Will SCOTUS go even further and explain that, just as a statute cannot be interpreted “‘to destroy itself,'” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting  American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-228 (1998) (quotation omitted)), so too cannot state law contract interpretation rules be applied in a way that would destroy an arbitration agreement to which the Federal Arbitration Act applies? Cf. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,  (1989) (“The question remains whether, assuming the choice-of-law clause meant what the Court of Appeal found it to mean, application of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1281.2(c) is nonetheless pre-empted by the FAA to the extent it is used to stay arbitration under this contract involving interstate commerce.  .  .  . [because] “it would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”)

Stay tuned for DIRECTV.  .  .  .

 

Photo Acknowledgements:

All photos used in the text portion of this post are licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law. Text has been added to image 2 (counting from top to bottom). Hover your mouse pointer over any image to view the Yay Images abbreviation of the photographer’s name.