We’ve made over the last several months months a point of discussing arbitration-enforcement litigation cases addressing the subject-matter jurisdiction because—particularly in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)—it is not only complex but frequently counterintuitive. (See here, here, and here.) This case— International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Consol Energy Inc., ___ F.4d ___, No. 22-7110, slip op. (D.C. Cir. August 9, 2024)—caught our eye because the Court held that that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff on one ground and over the defendants’ counterclaim on an independent ground, Article III standing.
Background
The United Mine Workers of America (the “Union”) and coal mining companies (the “Mining Companies”), all subsidiaries of Consol Energy, Inc. (“Consol”), signed a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) but Consol did not. The CBA provided for arbitration of grievances. It also provided to Union members lifetime health care benefits. The Union claims that the Mining Companies could not reduce benefits unilaterally, even if a member no longer mined coal.
For its part Consol was the Mining Companies’ health care administrator. Prior to the CBA’s expiration date, Consol informed the Mining Companies’ mining employees that Consol would consider modifying miner benefits once the CBA expired.
That prompted a retired miner to file a grievance against Consol, an arbitration followed, and with the support of the Union, the miner obtained an award in his favor. The arbitrators determined they had jurisdiction over Consol, a nonsignatory to the CBA, which by the time the arbitration took place, had expired. They also determined that the proposed benefit modifications would violate the CBA and made an award that prohibited Consol from making them.
The Union brought against Consol and the Mining Companies an action in district court to confirm the award, invoking Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) Section 301(a)’s grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over actions “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Consul and the Mining Companies brought a separate action to vacate the award, and the district court consolidated the two cases.
Prior to the district court reaching its decision Consol was split into two successor entities and otherwise ceased to exist. One of the two was joined but the district court dismissed it because its business did not concern coal mining. The other successor entity (the parent of the Mining Companies) was never made a party. The Mining Companies remained parties to the consolidated action.
The district court dismissed on standing grounds the Union’s confirmation action. It found the Union suffered no injury because there was no CBA violation. While Consul proposed to modify benefits it never did so. But the district court nevertheless determined on the merits that there was no basis for vacating the award, either. An appeal by both parties followed.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The D.C. Circuit’s Decision
The D.C. Court of Appeals determined that “[n]o party in this appeal has shown that federal courts have jurisdiction over its claim.” United Mine Workers, slip op. at 8. It therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Union’s claim, vacated the district court’s determination on the merits of the vacatur counterclaim, and remanded the counterclaim with instructions to dismiss it on standing grounds. Id.
The District Court had No Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Confirm the Award
In a case arising under Section 301 of the NLRA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “determine[d] whether an arbitration award failed to draw its essence from the agreement when an arbitrator ignored the parties’ agreed upon procedural rules for conducting the arbitration.” Advantage Veterans Servs. of Walterboro, LLC v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l, Local 7898, No. 22-1268, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. June 15, 2023). The Fourth Circuit said, “[u]nder the language of the agreement here, the answer is yes[,]” and— reversing the district court’s order—vacated the award. Slip op. at 2 & 12.
Advantage Veterans is a proverbial breath of fresh air for those who wish—by way of clear, unambiguous, and precise contract language—to circumscribe the authority of arbitrators by conditioning the enforceability of an award on compliance with certain clear procedural rules. That is not to say it authorizes vacatur of an award every time the arbitrator does not comply with a clear procedural rule set forth in (or incorporated by) an arbitration agreement. The doctrine of procedural arbitrability counsels deference to an arbitrator’s procedural decisions that even arguably represent the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract, and disputes concerning arbitrator failure to comply with procedural provisions are frequently disposed of on that basis. See, e.g., BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 27-29, 33-36 (2014).
But at least where parties expressly condition enforceability of an award on compliance with a clear procedural rule, Advantage Veterans gives life to the parties’ clearly expressed intent that an arbitration to take place only as explicitly prescribed. Continue Reading »
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The presumption of arbitrability—grounded in the federal policy in favor of arbitration—is an important but sometimes misunderstood rule of Labor-Management-Relations-Act (“LMRA”)- and Federal-Arbitration-Act (“FAA”) arbitration law.
According to the presumption, “where. . . parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration counsel that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298-99 (2010) (citations and quotations omitted).
There is an understandable tendency among decision makers and commentators to interpret the presumption broadly, sometimes more broadly than the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”)’s pronouncements warrant. But the presumption is not an overarching command that courts decide arbitration-law disputes in a way that yields arbitration-friendly outcomes. The presumption is, as SCOTUS explained in Granite Rock—and more recently, in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2022)—simply a limited-use tool to assist Courts in resolving ambiguities in arbitration agreements.
The presumption is, SCOTUS has said, “merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713 (quoting Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 302). “The [federal] policy [in favor of arbitration[,]” SCOTUS said, “is to make ‘arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n. 12 (1967)).
The policy—and the presumption implementing it— merely requires courts to “hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind.” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713. Courts, Morgan said, cannot “devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713 (quotation omitted). For “[t]he federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration.” Morgan, 142 S. Ct. at 1713-14 (citation omitted).
Granite Rock and Morgan express SCOTUS’s intention to narrowly limit the application of the presumption of arbitrability and to prohibit its use as an extracontractual basis for justifying enforcement of arbitration agreements more vigorously or expansively than ordinary contracts. (See here (Arbitration Law Forum, 2021 Term SCOTUS Arbitration Cases: Is the Pro-Arbitration Tide Beginning to Ebb? (July 18, 2022)).) Rather SCOTUS precedent treats it as a default rule of last resort for resolving scope ambiguities in arbitration agreements. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418-19 (2019) (Not applying contra proferentem rule to resolve arbitration-agreement-scope ambiguities “is consistent with a long line of cases holding that the FAA provides the default rule for resolving. . . [such] ambiguities. . . .”) (citations omitted).
A recent, per curiam decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Second Circuit decision evidences the Second Circuit’s clear intention to follow SCOTUS’s presumption-of-arbitrability guidance and shows how it applies to the question before the Second Circuit in that case: At what point in the interpretative framework for determining arbitrability questions does the presumption of arbitrability come into play? SeeLocal Union 97, Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., ___ F.4d ___, No. 21-2443-cv, slip op. (2d Cir. May 3, 2023) (per curiam).
Niagara Mohawk explains, among other things, that the presumption of arbitrability is a rule of last resort. Courts have no business resolving in favor of arbitration any doubts about the scope of arbitrable issue unless and until the Court has determined that the parties’ arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to whether the dispute is arbitrable. And even if there is an ambiguity, and the presumption applies, the presumption may be rebutted. Continue Reading »
Back in 2009 the Author wrote an article on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009), which held “that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.” 559 U.S. at 274. (See Loree Reins. & Arb. L. Forum Posthere.)
On July 2, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court decision that erroneously applied the Pyett clear and unmistakable standard to the question whether an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) was mandatory or permissive. Finding that the CBA imposed mandatory arbitration, the Second Circuit ruled that the clear and unmistakable standard applied only to the question whether the Employee’s statutory claims were within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”), and not to the mandatory versus permissive question. Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Servs. LLC, ___ F.3d ____, No. 18-0651, slip op. at *8-10 (2d Cir. July 2, 2019).
Applying ordinary contract principles to the question whether the Arbitration Agreement was mandatory or permissive, the Court held that it was mandatory. Slip op. at *10-13. Applying Pyett‘s clear and unmistakable standard to the scope question, it held that the Employee’s statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York’s Labor Law (“NYLL”) were within the scope of the arbitration clause. Slip op. at *13-14.
Finally, the Court held that the arbitration clause did not deny the Employee of due process of law, rejecting the Employee’s argument that it was deprived of due process because it did not personally participate in the selection of the arbitrator named in the arbitration clause. Slip op. at *14-16.
Background
The Employer is a provider of home health care services which employs health and personal care workers that serve elderly clients. The Employee was a member of that staff.
The Employee was required to join a Union of home
health care workers (the “Union”).
At or about the time when the Employee began work for
Employer, the Union and Employer entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(the “CBA”).
The CBA contained an “Adjustment of Disputes” provision (the
“Arbitration Agreement”) that provided, in pertinent part:
B. The parties [the Union and Attending] further agree a goal of this Agreement is to ensure compliance with all federal, state, and local wage hour law and wage parity statutes. Accordingly, to ensure the uniform administration and interpretation of this Agreement in connection with federal, state, and local wage-hour and wage parity statutes, all claims brought by either the Union or Employees, asserting violations of or arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . , New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Law, or New York Labor Law (collectively, the “Covered Statutes”), in any manner, shall be subject exclusively, to the grievance and arbitration procedures described below.
1) The statute of limitations to file a grievance concerning the Covered Statutes shall be consistent with the applicable statutory statute of limitations. All such claims if not resolved in the grievance procedure, including class grievances filed by the Union, or mediation as described below shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration before Elliott Shriftman. . . .
. . . .
4) In the event an Employee has requested, in writing, that the Union process a grievance alleging a violation of the Covered Statutes and the Union declines to process a grievance regarding alleged violations of the Covered Statutes, through the grievance/mediation process or to arbitration following the conclusion of mediation, an Employee solely on behalf of himself/herself, may submit their individual claim to mediation, or following the conclusion of mediation, to arbitration. . . .
Slip op. at *3-4 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis supplied by Court).
On her own behalf, and on behalf of all similarly situated employees, Employee sued Employer in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that Employer had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and provisions of New York’s Labor Law by, among other things, “willfully fail[ing] to pay its workers overtime and spread-of-hours pay. . . .” Slip op. at *4-5.
The Employer moved to compel arbitration, but the
district court denied the motion. The district court ruled that the CBA did not
require that the Employee’s claims be resolved in arbitration.
The district court reached that conclusion on two alternative grounds. First, the district court ruled that the arbitration agreement “violated the Employer’s due process rights due process rights because the arbitrator had been preselected by the Union and [the Employer] without any input from [the Employee].” Slip op. at *5.
Second, and in any event, the district court held that the arbitration agreement was not mandatory, and that accordingly, the Employer was entitled to bring its claims in federal district court. To that end the district court determined that the Arbitration Agreement was “‘at best ambiguous,’ and does not satisfy the clear and unmistakable test applicable to the assessment of purported waivers of union members’ right to bring statutory claims in court when such waivers are part of a collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration provisions.” Slip op. at *5 (quoting district court decision; other quotation omitted).
The Employer appealed.
The Second
Circuit’s Decision
The Second Circuit began by explaining that motions to compel arbitration “ordinarily” present courts with four questions:
(1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the “scope” of the arbitration agreement; (3) whether the plaintiff’s federal statutory claims are “nonarbitrable”; and (4) if some, but not all of the claims in the case are arbitrable, whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.
Slip op. at *6.
But this case presented only the first two questions—whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and if so, what they agreed to arbitrate. Slip op. at *6.
The “clear and unmistakable” standard for determining whether parties to a collective-bargaining agreement agreed to arbitrate statutory claims was a standard that applied only to the second question, that is, the scope of the arbitration agreement. Slip op. at *8-10. According to the Second Circuit, “[t]he district court framed the sole relevant inquiry as whether ‘[a] clause purporting to require arbitration of a [FLSA] claim that is contained in a collective bargaining agreement’ clearly and unmistakably requires arbitration.” Slip op. at *8 (quoting district court decision).
The district court therefore conflated the first two questions and applied the “clear and unmistakable” standard to both. The district court erred in doing so, said the Second Circuit, because “the clear and unmistakable standard does not reflect disfavor of union-negotiated arbitration agreements[,]” but instead “ensures that employees’ right to bring statutory claims in court is not waived by operation of confusing, “very general” arbitration clauses[,]” which, for example, might be reasonably construed to be limited to claims concerning the construction or application of a collective bargaining agreement, even though they might also be reasonably construed to encompass both contract and statutory claims. Slip op. at *9 (citations and quotations omitted).
The Second Circuit said “we ask not whether the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate, but whether, once we have established that an agreement exists, that agreement clearly and unmistakably encompasses the plaintiff’s statutory claims.” Slip op. at *9-10. “The clear and unmistakable standard,” the Court explained, is “therefore. . . specific to the scope question and has no bearing on whether there is an agreement to arbitrate in the first instance.” Slip op. at *10.
Having clarified how the clear and unmistakable standard is supposed to be applied, the Court addressed whether the arbitration agreement was permissive or mandatory, and if mandatory, whether statutory claims were clearly and unmistakably within its scope. The Court held that the arbitration agreement was mandatory and clearly and unmistakably encompassed the statutory claims. Slip op. at *9.
Collective Bargaining Agreement’s Arbitration Clause is Mandatory
The Court
concluded that “[t]he Union was legally authorized to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements on [the Employee’s] behalf[,]” citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a),
which provides that unions “selected for purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees. . . for the purposes of collective bargaining. . . .” 29 U.S.C. §
159(a). The Employee was, accordingly, bound by the CBA, including the Arbitration
Agreement.
The Court next determined that the Arbitration Agreement, when construed as a whole, unambiguously imposed mandatory arbitration on the Employee, not simply an option to arbitrate or litigate. That provision, said the Court, “states that its goal is to ‘ensure the uniform administration and interpretation of [the CBA],’ and that the means by which it will achieve that goal is to require that all claims under the Covered Statutes, brought by the Union or employees, ‘be subject exclusively . . . to the grievance and arbitration procedures described below.” Slip op. at *11 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis added by Court). The Provision further “states that ‘all [claims under the Covered Statutes,] if not resolved in the grievance procedure, . . . shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration.’” Slip op. at *11-12. “On its face,” said the Court, “this language simply does not allow an employee to choose to proceed in a judicial forum.” Slip op. at *12.
The Court explained why it concluded the district court’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement was incorrect. The district court had “focused on subsection (4) of [the Arbitration Agreement][,]” which “states that where an employee has requested that ‘the Union process a grievance alleging a violation of the Covered Statutes,’ but the Union has declined to process that grievance, the employee ‘may submit [this] individual claim to mediation, or following the conclusion of mediation, to arbitration.’” Slip op. at *12 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis supplied by Court). The district court interpreted “‘may’. . . to mean that employees can ‘choose whether to arbitrate’ or pursue their claims in court.” Slip op. at *12 (quoting district court decision).
But the Second Circuit disagreed. Subsection (4) of the Dispute Resolution Provision, said the Court, “is best read as clarifying that when the Union declines to process particular grievances on employees’ behalf, aggrieved employees have two options[:]” “They ‘may’ either (1) submit their claims to meditation and arbitration or (2) abandon the claims entirely.” Slip op. at *12.
The Court said that its interpretation of “may” “makes sense of the provision in isolation but also in the context of the entire agreement.” Slip op. at *12-13 (quotation and citations omitted).
Interpreting “may” differently “is to bring subsection (4) into conflict with the rest of Article 8(B), which. . . manifestly reflects an intent to require arbitration.” Slip op. at *13. The district court’s interpretation, said the Court, “makes little sense in light of [subsection 1 of the Arbitration Agreement]’s requirement that ‘all [claims under the Covered Statutes,] if not resolved in the grievance procedure . . . shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration” Slip op. at *13 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis supplied by Court).
Having concluded the arbitration agreement was mandatory, the Court turned to whether the Employee’s statutory claims were within the scope of that agreement. The Court held that the Arbitration Agreement clearly and unmistakably encompassed those claims, and consequently, the Employee was required to arbitrate those claims.
The Second Circuit explained “that both this Circuit and other sister circuits have interpreted the clear and unmistakable standard to require specific references in the [collective bargaining agreement] either to the statutes in question or to statutory causes of action generally.” Slip op. at *13 (quotation and citation omitted).
The Court explained that a “vague directive” such as “‘any disputes . . . shall be subject to’ a grievance and arbitration procedure. . .” does not suffice, but that, here, the Arbitration Agreement “specifically cites. . . statutes. . . .” including “the FLSA, the New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Law, and [New York’s Labor Law], and requires claims under those statutes to proceed pursuant to [the Arbitration Agreement]’s grievance and arbitration procedures.” Slip op. at *14 (citations and quotations omitted). The Arbitration Agreement thus clearly and unmistakably required arbitration of those statutory claims.
The Employee’s brought claims under the FLSA and the NYLL, those claims are clearly and unambiguously within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement, and consequently, the Employee was required to arbitrate those claims. Slip op. at *14.
The Arbitration Agreement does not Deny the Employee
Due Process of Law
The district court concluded that the Arbitration Agreement denied the Employee “due process because ‘the worker apparently has no part in the selection of the arbitrator.’” Slip op. at *14-15. The Second Circuit disagreed.
The Employee was a member of the Union, and under applicable law, including 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), the “Union had authority to negotiate on behalf of Abdullayeva, and so the fact that she did not personally participate in the selection of the arbitrator does not violate due process.” See slip op. at *15. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Pyett, “unions ‘may agree to the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the employer.’” Slip op. at *15 (quoting Pyett, 556 U.S. at 257). And “‘courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes.’” Slip op. at *15 (quoting American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
The Union was the Employer’s representative “authorized to negotiate ‘conditions of employment,’ including arbitration clauses, with the Employer on behalf of [the Employer’s employees].” The Arbitration Agreement, “including its proviso that ‘claims. . . shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration before Elliot Shriftman,’ was the product of the Union’s negotiation with [the Employer].” Slip op. at *15-16.
New York law requires that “arbitration procedures must generally conform to the ‘due process right of notice and opportunity to defend.’” Slip op. at *16 (quoting Beckman v. Greentree Sec., Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 566, 570 (1996)). But the Employee did “not argue that [the Arbitration Agreement’s] procedures are lacking in notice, or that the selected arbitrator is biased or would conduct arbitration proceedings in bad faith.” Slip op. at *16.
Thus, “the challenged portion of the [Arbitration Agreement], which simply ‘specifies with whom’ arbitration will be conducted in accordance with established Supreme Court precedent, does not violate due process.” Slip op. at *16 (quoting American Exp. Co., 570 U.S. at 233).
Photo Acknowledgements
The photos featured in this post were licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law.
Introduction: Arbitration as a Way to Resolve those Disputes—and Only those Disputes—Parties Submit to Arbitrators
The “first principle” of labor and commercial arbitration law is that “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion” —put differently, arbitration “is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2010) (citation and quotations omitted);First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (citations omitted); Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 295 & n.7, 294 n.6 (2010); AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 648 (1986). That first principle is integrally intertwined with “the central or primary purpose of the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)][,]” which is “to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 679 (citations and quotations omitted).
What happens if the parties agree to submit one category of disputes to a two-person arbitration panel and to submit another category of disputes to a three-person panel?
The deferential Enterprise Wheel/Stolt-Nielsen/Oxford contract-based outcome review standard the U.S. Supreme Court has applied to both labor arbitration awards under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and commercial arbitration awards falling under the Federal Arbitration Act, is fairly simple to articulate yet often difficult to apply, especially in close cases.
InNational Children’s Center, Inc. v. Service Employees Int’l Union, No. 13-1036, slip op. (D.D.C. Sep’t 19, 2014), United States District Court for the District of Columbia was faced with such a case, and the district court judge had to make a tough call. Applying the sometimes elusive standard, the Court concluded that the award had to be vacated. It was a close call— so close, in fact, that others may disagree and support their conclusions with what may appear to be compelling arguments.
On balance, we think the Court did the right thing given the somewhat unusual circumstances the case presented. But at least on some level it doesn’t matter. The district court judge did exactly what a good judge should do: she followed the law and, faced with the task of applying the law to a rather odd set of circumstances, she did so in the way she thought (and we agree) the law should be applied, even though the result was overturning an award.
It is quite likely that on remand the arbitrator will issue an award reaching the same conclusion and that the second award will be judicially enforced. While some might argue that vacatur should have been denied for expediency’s sake, that would not only have been the wrong decision, but a shortsighted one. Continue Reading »
Arbitration is supposed to be a speedy alternative to litigation, and that is supposed to be true as respects commercial or employment arbitration governed by theFederal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) and labor arbitration arising under theRailway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, et. seq., or Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act (a/k/a the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)),29 U.S.C. § 185. Arbitration awards are generally presumed to be valid, which puts the burden on challengers to establish their invalidity, at least provided the challenging party entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement with the defending party.
Adjudicating a non-frivolous award challenge usually takes time, and if the challenge turns out to be valid, an order vacating the award does not usually resolve the underlying dispute, which, absent a settlement, must be resolved through further ADR or judicial proceedings. Delay is inevitable and delay undermines arbitration’s ability to compete with litigation.
The FAA and most or all state arbitration statutes try to minimize delay by not only by restricting t he scope of judicial review of awards, but also by imposing short limitation periods for vacating awards—for example, three months under the FAA and 90 days under many state arbitration statutes. See 9 U.S.C. § 12; see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L.& R. § 7511(a); Fla. Stat. § 682.13(2); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04A.230(2). Some state statutes impose shorter periods. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-420(b) (30 days); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 251, § 12(b) (30 days); but see Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1288 (100 days).
By contrast, a motion or petition to confirm an award is usually subject to a longer statute of limitations. Cases governed by Chapter 1 of the FAA (e.g., domestic arbitrations between domestic parties), for example, are subject to a one-year limitation period. See 9 U.S.C. § 9.
Under the FAA, and presumably under many or most state arbitration statutes, if a party does not bring a timely petition to vacate, and the other moves to confirm after the time period for vacating an award has elapsed, then the challenging party cannot raise grounds for vacatur as defenses to confirmation, even if it does not seek an order vacating the award. See, e.g., Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1984) (FAA);Kutch v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 93, 97-98 (Colo. 1998) (Colorado law); but seeLyden v. Bell, 232 A.D.2d 562, 563 (2d Dep’t 1996) (Where a confirmation proceeding “is commenced after the 90-day period, but within the one-year period. . . .[,] a party may, by cross motion to vacate, oppose the petition for confirmation on any of the grounds in CPLR 7511 even though his time to commence a separate proceeding to vacate or modify under CPLR 7511(a) has expired.”) (citations omitted) (New York law); 1000 Second Avenue Corp. v. Pauline Rose Trust, 171 A.D.2d 429, 430 (1st Dep’t 1991) (“an aggrieved party may wait to challenge an award until the opposing party has moved for its confirmation”) (New York law).
King Soopers might be looked at as a refresher course in how important it is to act quickly and decisively when one finds oneself at the wrong end of an arbitration award that might not meet the modest criteria for summary confirmation or enforcement. While roughly nine years elapsed between the date the employee filed the grievance and the date the arbitrator issued the award, the Court, reversing the district court’s decision to the contrary, held (quite correctly) that King Sooper’s just-over-90-day delay in asserting grounds to vacate the award foreclosed it from opposing the union’s suit to enforce the award. Continue Reading »
So far the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear only one arbitration case governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. granted June 15, 2009 (No. 08-1198), which has been set for oral argument at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, December 9, 2009. (See Russ Kunkel’sLawMemo Arbitration Bloghere.) We have written extensively on Stolt-Nielsen, which concerns whether class arbitration may be imposed on parties whose contracts are silent on that point. (Posts availablehere, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here.)
The Supreme Court has also agreed to hear two labor arbitration cases. The first is Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen (08-604), which is governed by the the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. The RLA, among other things, requires arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (“the Board”) of labor disputes involving railway workers. Union Pacific, for all practical purposes, is therefore not a contractual arbitration case, but an administrative law one, and the outcome will likely have little or no effect on Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence. The Court held oral argument on October 7, 2009. (Oral argument Tr. here)
The second is Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (08-1214), which arises under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The Court is expected to set argument for later this Fall. (See Russ Kunkel’s LawMemo Employment Law Bloghere.) Though not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, Granite Rock, unlike Union Pacific, is a contractual arbitration case. And the outcome may be relevant to cases falling under the Federal Arbitration Act.
We briefly summarize below the issues the Court will presumably address in these labor arbitration cases and discuss why Granite Rock may be more controversial than it appears at first blush. Continue Reading »
On April 4 we reported on 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (Thomas, J.), and published a follow-up post on April 7, 2009 (posts available here and here). The question before the Court was whether “a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)] claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.” The Court told us the answer was “yes.”
That answer, of course, begs the question whether any particular collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) “clearly and unmistakably” requires arbitration of statutory claims. The Court in Shipkevich v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 08-CV-1008 (FB)(JMA), 2009 WL 1706590 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009) recently considered, among other things, whether the CBA before it clearly and unmistakably required arbitration of claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), New York State civil rights legislation, and New York City’s Human Rights Law, and said the answer was “no.” So let’s take a brief look at Shipkevich to get some perspective on what “clear and unmistakable” means. Continue Reading »
On April 29 — a/k/a “Arbitration Fairness Day” – – Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduced the Senate’s version of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (S. 931). The Senate’s version tracks the House version in many respects, but there are some important differences between the two.
The Senate Arbitration Fairness Act adds a Chapter 4 to the Federal Arbitration Act, rather than amending Section 2 of Chapter 1. This Proposed Chapter 4 consists of two sections: Section 401, entitled “Definitions”; and Section 402, entitled “Validity and Enforceability.” Proposed Section 402(a) states: “In General – Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, franchise, or civil rights dispute.” Proposed Section 402(b) provides:
(1) IN GENERAL – An issue as to whether this chapter applies to an arbitration agreement shall be determined under Federal law. The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate to which this chapter applies shall be determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement.
(2) COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS – Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any arbitration provision in a contract between an employer and a labor organization or between labor organizations, except that no such arbitration provision shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforcement of a right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, or a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising therefrom. Continue Reading »
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