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Archive for the ‘Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions’ Category

Evident Partiality | Disclosure | Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting Awards | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Part III

July 7th, 2022 Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Awards, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Evident Partiality, Exceeding Powers, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, Grounds for Vacatur, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, Section 9, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Vacate Award | 10(a)(2), Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Evident Partiality, Vacatur Comments Off on Evident Partiality | Disclosure | Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting Awards | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Part III

Introduction: Arbitrator Disclosure and Evident Partiality

Disclosure | Evident Partiality Part II of our Businesspersons’ Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) FAQ guide on evident partiality discussed evident partiality standards and how they are designed to enforce the parties’ expectations of neutrality without significantly undermining the finality of arbitration awards. (See Part II.) This Part III discusses arbitrator disclosure procedures and requirements and how, as a matter of arbitration procedure, they implement evident partiality standards and facilitate judicial determination of whether an arbitrator is guilty of evident partiality. It also provides a list of certain U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals cases that have either held that an arbitrator was guilty of evident partiality or remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on evident partiality.

Evident Partiality and Disclosure: Presumed v. Actual Bias

“Evident partiality” challenges typically arise out of one of two scenarios.  First, there are “presumed bias” cases in which the arbitrator’s relationships or interests would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator is biased, even though the challenger cannot prove actual bias.

Second, and considerably less frequently, there are evident partiality challenges based on allegations of actual bias.  Suppose a neutral said on the record during the proceedings prior to deliberations:  “Party A, frankly I have distrusted your company’s business motives for many years before I was appointed arbitrator in this matter, but hearing your witnesses’ testimony has simply confirmed what I’ve known all along.”  While the chances of an arbitrator making such a statement (let alone on the record!) are exceedingly slim to non-existent, it would provide the basis for an evident partiality challenge (which would probably succeed) based on proof of actual bias. See Morelite v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984).

The difference between “presumed” and “actual” bias (or prejudice) is essentially one of proof. As its name suggests, “presumed” bias is established by circumstantial evidence, principally relationships or interests, that supports a sufficiently powerful inference of bias. For example, direct evidence of the arbitrator having a material financial interest in the outcome of an arbitration is strong circumstantial evidence that the arbitrator, whether he or she is conscious of it or not, would, as a matter of human nature and experience, likely be predisposed to rule in a way that advanced that financial interest. James Madison’s famous words in Federalist 10 sum it up well: “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” The Federalist No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison)); see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009).

Of course, there is at least a possibility that an arbitrator might not be swayed by her interest in the outcome. Therefore, direct evidence of interest in the outcome does not prove directly that the interested arbitrator was biased or prejudiced. But the inference of bias or prejudice caused by a financial or personal interest in the outcome is sufficiently strong that the Second Circuit, and other circuits, consider clear evidence of an arbitrator’s personal or financial interest in the outcome to be sufficient to establish evident partiality. They require proof of “presumed,” not “actual,” bias.

“Actual bias” (or “actual prejudice”) is established when there is direct evidence that the arbitrator harbored an inappropriate disposition against one party or in favor of another. Since bias and prejudice is a state of mind, direct evidence is exceedingly rare. See Morelite, 748 F.2d at 84 (“Bias is always difficult, and indeed often impossible, to ‘prove.’ Unless an arbitrator publicly announces his partiality, or is overheard in a moment of private admission, it is difficult to imagine how ‘proof’ would be obtained.”)

Our focus will be on “presumed bias” cases because they understandably arise with greater frequency.  Because judicial evident partiality standards, including the Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard, require a showing less than actual bias, evidence of actual bias sufficient to establish evident partiality would necessarily establish evident partiality under the “reasonable person” standard.

Implementing Evident Partiality Standards Through the Disclosure Process

The now-familiar requirement that arbitrators disclose at the outset of the proceedings non-trivial conflicts of interest (such as a significant, ongoing business  relationship with one of the parties) and any other relevant information bearing on the arbitrator’s ability to meet the parties’ expectations of neutrality, was developed to address practical challenges arbitration parties face, facilitate implementation of evident partiality standards, and provide a framework for courts to assess evident partiality claims. Continue Reading »

Evident Partiality | Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting Awards | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Part II

February 3rd, 2022 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Awards, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Evident Partiality, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Party-Appointed Arbitrators, Petition to Vacate Award, Post-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Vacate Award | 10(a)(2), Vacate Award | Evident Partiality, Vacatur Comments Off on Evident Partiality | Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting Awards | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Part II

Evident Partiality

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Evident partiality standards are designed to enforce the parties’ expectations  of neutrality without significantly undermining the finality of arbitration awards. This part II of our Businesspersons’ FAQ guide on evident partiality explains why that is so.  

Evident Partiality Standards and their Source

The subject of what constitutes neutrality for judicial decision makers has long been the subject case law and statutes. Unlike the standards for disqualifying judges, which are set forth for federal judges in 28 U.S.C. § 455, arbitrator neutrality standards in Federal Arbitration Act cases are not expressly set forth by statute—FAA Section 10(a)(2) merely authorizes a court to vacate an award if an arbitrator is “guilty” of “evident partiality.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).

While the FAA Section 10(a)(2) deems “evident partiality” a ground for vacating an award, the FAA does not define the term or establish a baseline impartiality standard that must be met by every arbitrator.  This contrasts starkly with the English Arbitration Act 1996, which imposes on all arbitrators effectively the same standards of impartiality applicable to English judges. See, generally, Arbitration Act 1996 § 33(1).

What constitutes “evident partiality” under the FAA is a question that the federal courts have answered in various ways over the past several decades. In general, evident partiality is assessed according to a sliding scale of sorts, depending on the parties’ agreement and the surrounding circumstances. That should come as no surprise since the whole point of the FAA is to enforce the parties’ agreement to arbitrate according to its terms. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (“[W]e have said on numerous occasions that the central or primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”) (citations and quotations omitted).

What is the Standard in the Second Circuit?

The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted various evident partiality standards, which are based principally on differing interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), a case that we will discuss in detail in an upcoming segment dealing with arbitrator disclosure. Rather than engage in a broad survey and parsing of the various evident partiality standards adopted by various federal courts, let’s focus on the so-called “reasonable person” evident partiality standard that has been adopted by the Second Circuit and a number of other courts.

Under Second Circuit authority an award may be vacated “if a reasonable person would have to conclude” that an arbitrator was biased against one party or partial in favor of another. See Morelite v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters, 748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984); National Football League Mgmt. Council v. National Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 549 (2d Cir. 2016) (“NFL Council”); Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d at 64; Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar, 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007).

The Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard has been construed and applied by many courts since the Second Circuit’s 1984 decision in Morelite, and has been adopted by the First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits.  See, e.g., UBS Fin. Servs. v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 997 F.3d 15, 17-20 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing cases); Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing cases); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1999); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989).

The standard does not require a showing that an arbitrator was actually biased against one party or partial toward another, only that a reasonable person would have to conclude that was so. A determination that a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was financially or personally interested in the outcome, or not independent, would likewise satisfy the standard.

Absent disclosure and a waiver, an arbitrator should be free from any relationships with the parties that a reasonable person would have to conclude would materially compromise his or her ability to decide the case in an impartial manner. See Morelite, 748 F.2d at 84-85 (father-son relationship); Scandinavian Re, 668 F.3d at 72 (“Among the circumstances under which the evident-partiality standard is likely to be met are those in which an arbitrator fails to disclose a relationship or interest that is strongly suggestive of bias in favor of one of the parties”).

Evident Partiality Standards versus Judicial Impartiality Standards 

In the Second Circuit and elsewhere, the standard for disqualifying a judge for partiality or bias is less demanding than that required to vacate an award for evident partiality. Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83; Scandinavian Re, 668 F.3d at 72; see, e.g, Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983). While in the Second Circuit one must demonstrate that a “reasonable person would have to conclude” that an arbitrator is biased against or partial to a party, Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83; Scandinavian Re, 668 F.3d at 72, federal judges are disqualified for bias or partiality “in any proceeding in which [their] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

Though neither the judicial nor the arbitral standard requires a challenger to establish “actual bias,” see Morelite, 748 F.2d at 84, and even though demonstrating judicial partiality or bias is difficult to do, showing that a person “might reasonably” “question” a decisionmaker’s impartiality is a considerably less daunting task than showing that the same “reasonable” person “would have to conclude” that an arbitrator was partial or biased.

The Second Circuit also imposes a heightened evidentiary standard on evident partiality claims. Like fraud claims, they must be established by “clear and convincing evidence.” See NFL Council, 820 F.3d at 548; Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2013).

The particularly demanding standard for establishing evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator certainly serves to make arbitration awards less susceptible to challenge, thereby increasing the odds that an arbitration award and its confirmation  will be the last step in the dispute resolution process, not a starting point for intensive post-award litigation and further arbitration.

It is at least ostensibly designed to reflect realistically what reasonable expectations of neutrality a party who agrees to arbitrate may have. “Parties agree to arbitrate precisely because they prefer a tribunal with expertise regarding the particular subject matter of their dispute,” said the late Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman, speaking for the Court in Morelite, and “[f]amiliarity with a discipline often comes at the expense of complete impartiality.” Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83:

Some commercial fields are quite narrow, and a given expert may be expected to have formed strong views on certain topics, published articles in the field and so forth. Moreover, specific areas tend to breed tightly knit professional communities. Key members are known to one another, and in fact may work with, or for, one another, from time to time. As this Court has noted, ‘[e]xpertise in an industry is accompanied by exposure, in ways large and small, to those engaged in it….’ .  .  .  .  [T]o disqualify any arbitrator who had professional dealings with one of the parties (to say nothing of a social acquaintanceship) would make it impossible, in some circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator at all. Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83 (quoting Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 701 (2d Cir.1978); other citations omitted).

By not requiring neutrals to comply with judicial standards of partiality courts balance the parties’ expectations with the realities of the marketplace.  Particularly in industry arbitration, sought-after arbitrators often have many years of industry experience, which may inform their perspectives on issues important to the industry. Intra-industry issues can pit one segment of the industry against another, and a qualified neutral may have experience in one or both segments.  Some degree of institutional predisposition comes with the territory and does not necessarily disqualify the neutral.  And as industry insiders, arbitrators may know the lawyers and the parties socially and professionally, but those relationships generally do not disqualify the arbitrator from service. 

These practical realities demand what Judge Posner aptly termed a “tradeoff between impartiality and expertise” – the parties bargained for dispute resolution by an industry expert and the benefit of that expertise carries with it the burdens of greater entanglement with the parties, the industry and the issues.  Indeed, if courts required the industry arbitrators — or even commercial arbitrators without an industry-specific focus — to shed or be free from this proverbial baggage, then qualified umpire candidates would be hard to come by.  See Leatherby, 714 F.2d at 679 (“people who arbitrate do so because they prefer a tribunal knowledgeable about the subject matter of their dispute to a generalist court with its austere impartiality but limited knowledge of the subject matter.”)

Another reason the law does not hold neutral arbitrators to the same standards as judges is because arbitration is voluntarySee Leatherby, 714 F.2d at 679. “Courts are coercive, not voluntary, agencies,” and “fear of government oppression” has, over time, prompted the creation of “a judicial system in which impartiality is prized above expertise.” Leatherby, 714 F.2d at 679. Persons elect to submit their disputes to arbitration “because they prefer a tribunal knowledgeable about the subject matter of their dispute to a generalist court with its austere impartiality but limited knowledge of subject matter.” Leatherby, 714 F.2d at 679.

Evident Partiality Standards in Tripartite Arbitration 

An arbitration agreement providing for a single arbitrator is ordinarily presumed to provide for arbitration by a neutral arbitrator, whose neutrality is assessed under the prevailing evident partiality standard. But arbitration agreements often call not for single arbitrators, who are presumed to be neutral, but three-person (a/k/a “tripartite”) panels. 

In reinsurance, and certain other industry arbitrations, for example, the agreement typically requires each party to appoint an arbitrator and for the party-appointed arbitrators to attempt to agree on an umpire or select one by lot drawing, coin toss, Dow Jones pick or like tie-breaking procedure. Unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise, courts generally presume that the parties intended their appointed arbitrators to act as advocates of a sort:

[I]n the main party-appointed arbitrators are supposed to be advocates. In labor arbitration a union may name as its arbitrator the business manager of the local union, and the employer its vice-president for labor relations.  Yet no one believes that the predictable loyalty of these designees spoils the award. (Emphasis in original; citations omitted). Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2002); Certain Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s of London v. Florida Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 892 F.3d 501, 508 (2d Cir. 2018): The principles and circumstances that counsel tolerance of certain undisclosed relationships between arbitrator and litigant are even more indulgent of party-appointed arbitrators, who are expected to serve as de facto advocates . . . The ethos of neutrality that informs the selection of a neutral arbitrator to a tripartite panel does not animate the selection and qualification of arbitrators appointed by the parties. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

The tripartite panel structure is supposed to provide the best of two worlds: (a) two experienced and knowledgeable industry professionals, each acting as an advocate of sorts on behalf of his or her appointing party; and (b) an equally experienced and knowledgeable umpire, who either casts the tie-breaking vote or brokers a consensus. 

An industry’s general acceptance of an advocacy role for party-appointed arbitrators is sometimes evidenced by a practice of the parties authorizing ex parte contact between party-appointed arbitrators and their appointing parties (which may be subject to an agreed cut-off point, such as the submission of pre-hearing briefs).

In the Second Circuit and a number of other jurisdictions, evident partiality standards are generally designed to apply to neutral arbitrators, but not to party-appointed arbitrators, which the parties did not intend to be neutral. Certain Underwriting Members, 892 F.3d at 509-10. According to the Second Circuit, absent arbitrator qualification language to the contrary, “[e]xpecting of party-appointed arbitrators the same level of institutional impartiality applicable to neutrals would impair the process of self-governing dispute resolution.” 892 F.3d at 510.

The Second Circuit, however, does not hold that there are no relationships or other facts  that may establish evident partiality of a non-neutral party-appointed arbitrator. An appointed arbitrator’s violation of a contractual requirement concerning partiality or bias, such as a requirement of “disinterestedness,” may establish evident partiality. Certain Underwriting Members, 892 F.3d at 510. Thus, if an arbitration agreement requires a arbitrator to be “disinterested,” the qualification “would be breached[,]” and evident partiality established, “if the party-appointed arbitrator had a personal or financial stake in the outcome of the arbitration.” 892 F.3d at 510.

In addition, the Second Circuit may vacate an award for a party-appointed arbitrator’s evident partiality “if the party opposing the award can show that the party-appointed arbitrator’s partiality had a prejudicial effect on the award.” Certain Underwriting Members, 892 F.3d at 510-11 (citations and quotations omitted). In theory at least, such prejudice might, in an appropriate case, be established where the record shows that the neutral wanted and attempted to obtain information from a party-appointed arbitration concerning what to make of the party-appointed arbitrator’s arguments and the party-appointed arbitrator provided misleading or false information in response. Cf. Sphere Drake, 307 F.3d at 623 (“[W]e have not been given any reason to think that umpire Huggins wanted more information from Jacks in order to know what to make of Jacks’ arguments during the panel’s deliberations.”)

Other courts say that evident partiality is ordinarily not a ground for disqualifying a partisan arbitrator, evident partiality is available only if it prejudices the challenging party, or the parties’ diminished expectations of party-appointed arbitrator impartiality should be considered as part of the evident partiality calculus. See, generally, Sphere Drake, 307 F.3d at 620;  617, 620 (7th Cir. 2002) (“evident partiality” ground can be waived by consent); Winfrey v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 495 F.3d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 2007) (requiring a showing of prejudice); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 645-46 & 648-49 (6th Cir. 2005) (figuring into the mix the parties’ diminished expectations of impartiality and suggesting that undisclosed social or business relationship may establish evident partiality if it is related “to the subject matter of the” arbitration.)

Although courts will (absent contract language to the contrary) ordinarily assume that the parties intended party-appointed arbitrators to play an advocacy role, there may be disagreement within the industry or among particular parties concerning the degree of partiality permissible.  For example, there are some who believe that robust advocacy is appropriate, while others believe the party-appointed arbitrator should strive to give the appointing party the benefit of the doubt, but ultimately decide the matter according to the evidence and applicable law, custom and practice.  Others may have different views.

The upshot is that the line between the acceptable and unacceptable is both difficult to draw and blurry.  To at least some extent checks on rampant partisanship are imposed by economic considerations:  Party-appointed arbitrators that overstep what other panel members perceive to be proper ethical boundaries risk diminished credibility, influence, and effectiveness, which in turn, may result in fewer appointments. The use of partisan arbitrators, which continues in certain types of industry arbitration, has fallen out of favor in commercial arbitration in general. Rule 18 of the American Arbitration Association’s Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (amended and effective October 1, 2013) (“AAA Commercial Rules”) reverses the presumption that party-appointed arbitrators should be non-neutral. Rule 18(a) says “Any arbitrator shall be impartial and independent and shall perform his or her duties with diligence and in good faith, and shall be subject to disqualification for:”

(i) partiality or lack of independence, (ii) inability or refusal to perform his or her duties with diligence and in good faith, and (iii) any grounds for disqualification provided by applicable law. AAA Commercial Rules R. 18(a).

Rule 18(b) further provides that “The parties may agree in writing.  .  .  that arbitrators directly appointed by a party pursuant to Section R-13 shall be nonneutral, in which case such arbitrators need not be impartial or independent and shall not be subject to disqualification for partiality or lack of independence.”  AAA Commercial Rules R. 18(b).

The AAA rules vest in the AAA the power to “determine whether the arbitrator should be disqualified under the grounds set out above, and shall inform the parties of its decision, which decision shall be conclusive.” AAA Commercial Rules R. 18(c).

Rule 7(c) of the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures likewise reverses the presumption of non-neutrality: “Where the Parties have agreed that each Party is to name one Arbitrator, the Arbitrators so named shall be neutral and independent of the appointing Party, unless the Parties have agreed that they shall be non-neutral.” JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures Effective June 1, 2021 (the “JAMS Rules”) Rule 7(c).

Reversal of the presumption of party-appointed arbitrator non-neutrality are common in arbitration rules (including in international arbitration rules), and where parties incorporate by reference arbitration rules into their contract, those rules will ordinarily be deemed a part of the contract, requiring party-appointed arbitrators to be neutral. See Idea Nuova, Inc. v. GM Licensing Group, Inc., 617 F.3d 177, 180-82 (2d Cir. 2010) (“An agreement to submit commercial disputes to ‘AAA arbitration for resolution’ is properly construed to agree to arbitration pursuant to the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and to incorporate those rules into the Agreement.”)

Tripartite Arbitration: Umpires or Neutral Arbitrators 

Umpires and neutrals are held to higher standards of impartiality than partisan party-appointed arbitrators, and it is to them that ordinary standards of evident partiality apply, such as the Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard. Parties expect them to be fair, objective, open-minded in deliberations and not predisposed to rule in favor of either party before hearing the evidence.  They are supposed to be impartial, but, as previously discussed, they are nevertheless not held to the same rigorous, statutory standards of impartiality applicable to United States federal judges.  See Sphere Drake, 307 F.3d at 621; Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83; see, generally, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (disqualification standards for federal judges). The next instalment will discuss arbitrator disclosure procedures and requirements, which are designed to implement and enforce evident partiality standards; and examples of what does and does not constitute evident partiality.

Contacting the Author

What constitutes evident partiality and under what circumstances is a controversial and sometimes elusive topic. The author has written about it extensively over the years, including hereherehere, and here, as well as in other publications. The author has briefed, argued, or both, a number of U.S. Courts of Appeals and federal district court cases on the subject over the years, including, among others, Certain Underwriting Members of Lloyds of London v. State of Florida, Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 892 F.3d 501 (2018); and Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640 (2005). Both of these important cases are cited in this article.  

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, or the services that the Loree Law Firm offers, then please contact the author, Philip Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. has more than 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation. He is licensed to practice law in New York and before certain federal district and federal appellate courts.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

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Neutrality | Evident Partiality | Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting Arbitration Awards | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Part I

September 20th, 2021 Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Ethics, Evident Partiality, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Party-Appointed Arbitrators, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court, Vacate Award | 10(a)(2), Vacate Award | Corruption, Vacate Award | Evident Partiality, Vacatur Comments Off on Neutrality | Evident Partiality | Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting Arbitration Awards | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Part I

neutral neutrality evident partialitySection 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) authorizes courts to vacate awards “where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. . . .” 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2). The next few instalments will focus on arbitrator neutrality and evident partiality, a later one on corruption. What constitutes evident partiality and under what circumstances is a controversial and sometimes elusive topic. We’ve written about it extensively over the years, including hereherehere, and here, as well as in other publications. The author has briefed, argued, or both, a number of U.S. Courts of Appeals and federal district court cases on the subject over the years, including, among others, Certain Underwriting Members of Lloyds of London v. State of Florida, Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 892 F.3d 501 (2018); and Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640 (2005).

Evident partiality has been the subject of numerous judicial decisions setting forth various standards and applying them to a wide range of fact patterns.  The decisions are not easy to reconcile (some may be irreconcilable) and the standards are often of limited utility. Matters are complicated by judicially created rules concerning disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and the consequences that may or may not flow from those rules.

But “evident partiality” may be easier to grasp if we focus not on abstract standards or ethical constructs, but on the parties’ reasonable expectations of neutrality. Surprisingly, many courts address the subject of “evident partiality” without expressly discussing this important consideration, even when it appears to have been a significant but unstated part of the decision-making calculus. Others have expressly used the parties’ agreement and attendant expectations of neutrality as a guidepost.

Understanding the parties’ reasonable expectations of partiality is only half the battle. One must also understand how those expectations are enforced through judicially created rules governing disclosure and waiver of conflicts of interest, and the relevance of those rules to a motion to vacate an award under FAA Act Section 10(a)(2).

In this instalment of the FAQ Guide our focus is on the parties’ reasonable expectations of arbitrator neutrality; evident partiality standards and how they are supposed to enforce reasonable expectations of neutrality without undermining arbitral finality; differences between evident partiality standards and judicial impartiality standards; and the differing expectations of arbitral neutrality that may attend tripartite arbitration. One or more subsequent instalments will discuss arbitrator disclosure procedures and requirements, which are designed to implement and enforce evident partiality standards; examples of what does and does not constitute evident partiality; and procedural issues pertinent to evident partiality challenges. Continue Reading »

How Section 5 Arbitrator Appointment Works in Practice | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Nuts and Bolts of Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Practice

May 4th, 2020 Application to Appoint Arbitrator, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Arbitrator Vacancy, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 5, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Section 5, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 1 Comment »
contract | Section 5 | Appoint Arbitrator

The last instalment of this post discussed Section 5, the circumstances under which Courts can appoint arbitrators under Section 5, what papers are filed on a Section 5 application, and what the application should show.

This segment addresses the FAQ “How does Section 5 Work in Practice?” Next we’ll address the FAQ “Does Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act Authorize a Court to Appoint a Replacement Arbitrator if an Arbitrator on a Three-Person Panel Dies Prior to the Panel Making an Award?”    

The Arbitrator Selection Process

Once arbitration is demanded, the arbitrator selection process begins.

Arbitration agreements address arbitrator selection in different ways. Sometimes parties simply agree that the process set forth in arbitrator provider rules applies. Sometimes parties specify their own method of selection, and sometimes by their agreement they modify an otherwise agreed provider-rule-governed selection procedure.

The qualifications of the arbitrators, the number of arbitrators to serve, and the procedures (if any) to apply if the parties reach an impasse, are key components of the selection process.

For illustration purposes only let’s consider how, for example, arbitrator selection may work under what we sometimes refer to as the traditional, industry tripartite arbitrator selection model. While that model may vary according to the parties’ agreement, typically it requires the party demanding arbitration to appoint a party appointed arbitrator, and for the other party to appoint its own party appointed arbitrator within X days.

The two appointed arbitrators then select an umpire. Sometimes the parties agree that the appointed arbitrators select three umpire candidates each, strike two from the other’s list, and resolve the tie by coin flip, Dow Jones pick (last digit odd or even), or a like tie-breaking procedure.   

If the other party fails to appoint timely its arbitrator, then the party demanding arbitration gets to appoint that arbitrator, and the arbitration may proceed even if the other party refuses to participate.

In administered arbitration, single arbitrators are often appointed by the arbitration provider generating a list of an odd number of arbitrator candidates and allowing the parties to strike an even number of candidates, with the remaining candidate being appointed as an umpire. Sometimes provision is made for the arbitration provider to submit an additional list if one or both parties request it.  

These are simply examples of how arbitrator selection may proceed. If you’ve agreed to administered arbitration, be sure to check provider rules, for they typically specify the number of arbitrators to serve, their qualifications, how they are to be selected, in situations where the parties do not otherwise agree.  

How does Section 5 Work in Practice?

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Appointing Arbitrators | Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide | Nuts and Bolts of Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Practice

April 29th, 2020 Application to Appoint Arbitrator, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 5, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Section 5, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration 1 Comment »
Appointing Arbitrators

Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act enforces arbitration agreements during the pre-award stage by authorizing orders: (a) staying litigation of arbitrable claims; (b) compelling arbitration; (c) appointing one or more arbitrators; and (d) enforcing arbitral hearing subpoenas. We’ve discussed the basics of the first two of these remedies in prior installments of this post. This and one or more other future installments will address he third: an order appointing arbitrators.

This instalment addresses the following FAQs concerning the judicial appointment of arbitrators under 9 U.S.C. § 5:

  1. Under what Circumstances can a Court Appoint Arbitrators under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act?
  2. What Papers Comprise an Application to Appoint an Arbitrator under Section 5?

The next installment will address the FAQs:

  1. “How does Section 5 Work in Practice?”
  2. “Does Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act authorize a Court to Appoint a Replacement Arbitrator if an Arbitrator Dies Prior to the Making of an Award?”    

Under what Circumstances can a Court Appoint Arbitrators under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that “[i]f in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed. . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 5. This provision of Section 5 reflects “the central or primary purpose of the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)][,]” which is “to ensure that  private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2010) (citation and quotations omitted). It also ensures enforcement of what Circuit Court Judge Richard A. Posner once dubbed the “cornerstone of the arbitral process”: “Selection of the decision maker by or with the consent of the parties. . . . Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d 773, 780 (2005) (Posner, J.); see, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Art. V(1)(d), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (a/k/a the “New York Convention”) (implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, et. seq.) (award subject to challenge where “[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties”); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668, 670 (one of the FAA’s “rules of fundamental importance” is parties “may choose who will resolve specific disputes”) (emphasis added; citations omitted); Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2005) (vacating award by panel not convened in accordance with parties’ agreement); Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 226 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Garage Employees Union, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).

In addition to directing that arbitrator selection and qualification provisions be enforced according to their terms, Section 5 authorizes court intervention for appointing arbitrators in three situations:  

  1. “if no method be provided therein. . . [;]”
  2. “if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method[;] or”
  3. “if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy. . . .”  

9 U.S.C. § 5.

In any of those situations Section 5 authorizes “either party” to make an “application” to the court for an order “designat[ing]” and “appoint[ing] “an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire,” “who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein. . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 5. Section 5 also states that “unless otherwise provided in the agreement arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.”  9 U.S.C. § 5.

Appointing Arbitrators: What Papers Comprise an Application to Appoint an Arbitrator under Section 5?

Like applications under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, and all other applications for relief under the Federal Arbitration Act, an application to appoint arbitrators under Section 5, when brought as an independent legal proceeding in federal district court, is a summary or expedited proceeding, not a regular lawsuit. The application, like all other Federal Arbitration Act applications, is governed by Section 6 of the Act, which provides that “[a]ny application to the court hereunder shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise .  .  .  expressly provided [in the Federal Arbitration Act].” 9 U.S.C. § 6.

In cases where the application to appoint an arbitrator commences an independent proceeding in a federal district court, the papers in support of the application will ordinarily consist of: (a) a notice of application; (b) a summons; (c) the application itself; (d) a memorandum of law in support; and (e) any supporting affidavits or declarations, principally (but not necessarily exclusively) for putting before the court pertinent documents. Sometimes the application is referred to as a “petition,” rather than an “application,” but the variation in nomenclature does not change the substance or legal effect of the paper.

Documents that should be submitted to the Court ordinarily include copies of: (a) the contract containing the arbitration agreement; (b) the arbitration demand and any related correspondence, including with the arbitrator provider; (c) any documents evidencing efforts to appoint an arbitrator or arbitration panel; (d) any documents evidencing the presence of one or more of the three grounds under which Section 5 authorizes a court to appoint an arbitrator; and (e) a list of arbitrators the court should consider appointing, along with their qualifications.

The application should show that: (a) the court has subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue; (b) the parties entered into a written arbitration agreement falling under the Federal Arbitration Act, or that the applicant is entitled to claim against the respondent under a written arbitration agreement; (c) at least one of the three grounds for Section 5 relief is present; (d) appointing an arbitrator from the applicant’s list is warranted in the circumstances, including under the parties’ agreement.

Please note. . .

This guide, including the installments that will follow in later posts, and prior installments, does not purport to be a comprehensive recitation of the rules and principles of arbitration law pertinent or potentially pertinent to the issues discussed. It is designed simply to give clients, prospective clients, and other readers general information that will help educate them about the legal challenges they may face and how engaging a skilled, trustworthy, and experienced arbitration attorney can help them confront those challenges more effectively.

This guide is not intended to be legal advice and it should not be relied upon as such. Nor is it a “do-it-yourself” guide for persons who represent themselves pro se, whether they are forced to do so by financial circumstances or whether they voluntarily elect to do so.

If you want or require arbitration-related legal advice, or representation by an attorney in an arbitration or in litigation about arbitration, then you should request legal advice from an experienced and skilled attorney or law firm with a solid background in arbitration law.

About the Author

Philip J. Loree Jr. is a partner and founding member of Loree & Loree. He has nearly 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation. He is a former partner of the litigation departments of the New York City firms of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP and Rosenman & Colin LLP (now known as Katten Munchin Rosenman LLP).

Loree & Loree represents private and government-owned-or-controlled business organizations, and persons acting in their individual or representative capacities, and often serves as co-counsel, local counsel or legal adviser to other domestic and international law firms requiring assistance or support.

Loree & Loree was recently selected by Expertise.com out of a group of 1,763 persons or firms reviewed as one of Expertise.com’s top 18 “Arbitrators & Mediators” in New York City for 2019, and now for 2020. (See here and here.)

If you have any questions about arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, this article, or any other legal-related matter, you can contact Phil Loree Jr. at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law. Loree & Loree added text to this photo.

Arbitration FAQs: When is an Arbitrator Considered Neutral in a Federal-Arbitration-Act-Governed Arbitration?

April 16th, 2020 Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Challenging Arbitration Awards, Ethics, Evident Partiality, FAA Chapter 1, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Small and Medium-Sized Business Arbitration Risk, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Vacate Award | Evident Partiality, Vacatur Comments Off on Arbitration FAQs: When is an Arbitrator Considered Neutral in a Federal-Arbitration-Act-Governed Arbitration?
neutral neutrality evident partiality

Single arbitrators are required under the Federal Arbitration Act to be neutral unless the parties otherwise agree. See, e.g., Morelite v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters, 748 F.2d 79, 81-85 (2d Cir. 1984). In tripartite arbitration, one arbitrator (usually designated the umpire or chair) is ordinarily required to be neutral, while party-appointed arbitrators are presumed to be non-neutral, except to the extent otherwise required by the parties’ arbitration agreement. See Certain Underwriting Members London v. Florida Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 892 F.3d 501, 510-11 (2d Cir. 2018); Sphere Drake Ins. v. All American Life Ins., 307 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2002); Trustmark Ins. Co. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 631 F.3d 869, 872-74 (7th Cir. 2011). Arbitration provider rules, which may govern arbitrator qualifications in appropriate cases, often provide that all three arbitrators of a tripartite panel are required to be neutral.

Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act—which authorizes federal district courts to vacate arbitration awards “where there was evident partiality…in the arbitrators…”—imposes in part and enforces these neutrality requirements. Section 10(a)(2) establishes that parties who agree to arbitrate can legitimately expect that neutral arbitrators will meet a certain minimal standard of arbitral impartiality, and that arbitrators not appointed as neutrals can, in appropriate circumstances, be held to a substantial, material breach of a stipulated arbitrator qualification requirement related-to, but not necessarily coextensive with, neutrality. See Certain Underwriting Members, 892 F.3d at 510-11; Sphere Drake, 307 F.3d at 622; Trustmark, 631 F.3d at 872-74.

The requirement that an arbitrator be “neutral” can be divided into three, distict  components. The arbitrator must be (a) impartial; (b) disinterested; and (c) independent.

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Provider Rules: Should I Agree to Arbitrate under Them?

March 23rd, 2020 American Arbitration Association, Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitration Providers, Arbitration Risks, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Authority of Arbitrators, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Delegation Agreements, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Evident Partiality, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, FAA Chapter 1, First Options Reverse Presumption of Arbitrability, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, Practice and Procedure 1 Comment »
provider rules

Should your business agree to arbitrate under arbitration provider rules? Well, that depends.

Ideally, you should review those rules to see what they say, and discuss them with a knowledgeable and experienced arbitration attorney, or perhaps with another businessperson who has meaningful experience arbitrating under them. If, after doing your due diligence, you’re satisfied with the rules, understand how they might materially affect your arbitration experience, and are prepared to accept the consequences, then you may want to agree. If not, then you need to consider other options.

Granted, most of us do not bother to review arbitration rules before agreeing to arbitrate, or even to consult briefly with someone who is familiar with how they work in practice. And that can lead to some surprises, some of which may be unpleasant.

Here’s a nonexclusive list of a few things to keep in mind when considering whether to agree to arbitrate under arbitration provider rules:

  1. Agreeing to arbitrate under arbitration rules generally makes those rules part of your agreement, which means they are binding on you like any other part of your arbitration agreement;
  2. Arbitration provider rules generally provide that “arbitrability” issues—i.e., issues about the validity, enforceability, or scope of the arbitration agreement—must be decided by the arbitrator, not the court;
  3. They will govern not only the procedures to be used in the arbitration, but key substantive issues, such as arbitrator selection, arbitrator qualifications, and the number of arbitrators;
  4. They may empower the arbitration provider to resolve, at least in the first instance, questions about arbitrator impartiality, questions that one would otherwise reasonably expect were within the exclusive province of a court;
  5. They may determine whether your arbitration is placed on an expedited or complex-case track; and
  6. They may contain information about arbitration provider fees, which may be steeper than you anticipated.

And this list is by no means comprehensive.

Do any of these things really matter in business arbitration? They do, and to take but a single example, let’s look at how agreeing to provider rules may result in your business forefeiting its right to have a court decide disputes about the validity, enforceability, or scope of the arbitration agreement.

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Second Circuit Says Collective Bargaining Agreement’s Arbitration Clause was Mandatory and did not Deprive Union Employee of Due Process

July 17th, 2019 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Labor Arbitration, Motion to Compel Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Comments Off on Second Circuit Says Collective Bargaining Agreement’s Arbitration Clause was Mandatory and did not Deprive Union Employee of Due Process

collective bargaining

Back in 2009 the Author wrote an article on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009), which held “that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.” 559 U.S. at 274. (See Loree Reins. & Arb. L. Forum Post here.)

On July 2, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court decision that erroneously applied the Pyett clear and unmistakable standard to the question whether an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) was mandatory or permissive. Finding that the CBA imposed mandatory arbitration, the Second Circuit ruled that the clear and unmistakable standard applied only to the question whether the Employee’s statutory claims were within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”), and not to the mandatory versus permissive question. Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Servs. LLC, ___ F.3d ____, No. 18-0651, slip op. at *8-10 (2d Cir. July 2, 2019).

Applying ordinary contract principles to the question whether the Arbitration Agreement was mandatory or permissive, the Court held that it was mandatory. Slip op. at *10-13. Applying Pyett‘s clear and unmistakable standard to the scope question, it held that the Employee’s statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York’s Labor Law (“NYLL”) were within the scope of the arbitration clause. Slip op. at *13-14.

Finally, the Court held that the arbitration clause did not deny the Employee of due process of law, rejecting the Employee’s argument that it was deprived of due process because it did not personally participate in the selection of the arbitrator named in the arbitration clause. Slip op. at *14-16.

Background

collective bargaining home health care

The Employer is a provider of home health care services which employs health and personal care workers that serve elderly clients. The Employee was a member of that staff.

The Employee was required to join a Union of home health care workers (the “Union”).

At or about the time when the Employee began work for Employer, the Union and Employer entered into a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”).

The CBA contained an “Adjustment of Disputes” provision (the “Arbitration Agreement”) that provided, in pertinent part:

B. The parties [the Union and Attending] further agree a goal of this Agreement is to ensure compliance with all federal, state, and local wage hour law and wage parity statutes. Accordingly, to ensure the uniform administration and interpretation of this Agreement in connection with federal, state, and local wage-hour and wage parity statutes, all claims brought by either the Union or Employees, asserting violations of or arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . , New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Law, or New York Labor Law (collectively, the “Covered Statutes”), in any manner, shall be subject exclusively, to the grievance and arbitration procedures described below.

1) The statute of limitations to file a grievance concerning the Covered Statutes shall be consistent with the applicable statutory statute of limitations. All such claims if not resolved in the grievance procedure, including class grievances filed by the Union, or mediation as described below shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration before Elliott Shriftman. . . .

. . . .

4) In the event an Employee has requested, in writing, that the Union process a grievance alleging a violation of the Covered Statutes and the Union declines to process a grievance regarding alleged violations of the Covered Statutes, through the grievance/mediation process or to arbitration following the conclusion of mediation, an Employee solely on behalf of himself/herself, may submit their individual claim to mediation, or following the conclusion of mediation, to arbitration. . . .

Slip op. at *3-4 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis supplied by Court).

On her own behalf, and on behalf of all similarly situated employees, Employee sued Employer in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that Employer had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and provisions of New York’s Labor Law by, among other things, “willfully fail[ing] to pay its workers overtime and spread-of-hours pay. . . .” Slip op. at *4-5.

The Employer moved to compel arbitration, but the district court denied the motion. The district court ruled that the CBA did not require that the Employee’s claims be resolved in arbitration.

The district court reached that conclusion on two alternative grounds. First, the district court ruled that the arbitration agreement “violated the Employer’s due process rights due process rights because the arbitrator had been preselected by the Union and [the Employer] without any input from [the Employee].” Slip op. at *5.

Second, and in any event, the district court held that the arbitration agreement was not mandatory, and that accordingly, the Employer was entitled to bring its claims in federal district court. To that end the district court determined that the Arbitration Agreement was “‘at best ambiguous,’ and does not satisfy the clear and unmistakable test applicable to the assessment of purported waivers of union members’ right to bring statutory claims in court when such waivers are part of a collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration provisions.” Slip op. at *5 (quoting district court decision; other quotation omitted).

The Employer appealed.

The Second Circuit’s Decision

Arbitrability Question 1
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007

The Second Circuit began by explaining that motions to compel arbitration “ordinarily” present courts with four questions:

(1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the “scope” of the arbitration agreement; (3) whether the plaintiff’s federal statutory claims are “nonarbitrable”; and (4) if some, but not all of the claims in the case are arbitrable, whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.

Slip op. at *6.

But this case presented only the first two questions—whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and if so, what they agreed to arbitrate. Slip op. at *6.

The “clear and unmistakable” standard for determining whether parties to a collective-bargaining agreement agreed to arbitrate statutory claims was a standard that applied only to the second question, that is, the scope of the arbitration agreement. Slip op. at *8-10. According to the Second Circuit, “[t]he district court framed the sole relevant inquiry as whether ‘[a] clause purporting to require arbitration of a [FLSA] claim that is contained in a collective bargaining agreement’ clearly and unmistakably requires arbitration.” Slip op. at *8 (quoting district court decision).

The district court therefore conflated the first two questions and applied the “clear and unmistakable” standard to both. The district court erred in doing so, said the Second Circuit, because “the clear and unmistakable standard does not reflect disfavor of union-negotiated arbitration agreements[,]” but instead “ensures that employees’ right to bring statutory claims in court is not waived by operation of confusing, “very general” arbitration clauses[,]” which, for example, might be reasonably construed to be limited to claims concerning the construction or application of a collective bargaining agreement, even though they might also be reasonably construed to encompass both contract and statutory claims. Slip op. at *9 (citations and quotations omitted).

The Second Circuit said “we ask not whether the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate, but whether, once we have established that an agreement exists, that agreement clearly and unmistakably encompasses the plaintiff’s statutory claims.” Slip op. at *9-10. “The clear and unmistakable standard,” the Court explained, is “therefore. . . specific to the scope question and has no bearing on whether there is an agreement to arbitrate in the first instance.” Slip op. at *10.

Having clarified how the clear and unmistakable standard is supposed to be applied, the Court addressed whether the arbitration agreement was permissive or mandatory, and if mandatory, whether statutory claims were  clearly and unmistakably within its scope. The Court held that the arbitration agreement was mandatory and clearly and unmistakably encompassed the statutory claims. Slip op. at *9.

Collective Bargaining Agreement’s Arbitration Clause is Mandatory

 The Court concluded that “[t]he Union was legally authorized to negotiate collective bargaining agreements on [the Employee’s] behalf[,]” citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), which provides that unions “selected for purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees. . . for the purposes of collective bargaining. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The Employee was, accordingly, bound by the CBA, including the Arbitration Agreement.  

The Court next determined that the Arbitration Agreement, when construed as a whole, unambiguously imposed mandatory arbitration on the Employee, not simply an option to arbitrate or litigate. That provision, said the Court, “states that its goal is to ‘ensure the uniform administration and interpretation of [the CBA],’ and that the means by which it will achieve that goal is to require that all claims under the Covered Statutes, brought by the Union or employees, ‘be subject exclusively . . . to the grievance and arbitration procedures described below.” Slip op. at *11 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis added by Court). The Provision further “states that ‘all [claims under the Covered Statutes,] if not resolved in the grievance procedure, . . . shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration.’” Slip op. at *11-12. “On its face,” said the Court, “this language simply does not allow an employee to choose to proceed in a judicial forum.” Slip op. at *12.

The Court explained why it concluded the district court’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement was incorrect. The district court had “focused on subsection (4) of [the Arbitration Agreement][,]” which “states that where an employee has requested that ‘the Union process a grievance alleging a violation of the Covered Statutes,’ but the Union has declined to process that grievance, the employee ‘may submit [this] individual claim to mediation, or following the conclusion of mediation, to arbitration.’” Slip op. at *12 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis supplied by Court). The district court interpreted “‘may’. . . to mean that employees can ‘choose whether to arbitrate’ or pursue their claims in court.” Slip op. at *12 (quoting district court decision).

But the Second Circuit disagreed. Subsection (4) of the Dispute Resolution Provision, said the Court, “is best read as clarifying that when the Union declines to process particular grievances on employees’ behalf, aggrieved employees have two options[:]” “They ‘may’ either (1) submit their claims to meditation and arbitration or (2) abandon the claims entirely.” Slip op. at *12.

The Court said that its interpretation of “may” “makes sense of the provision in isolation but also in the context of the entire agreement.” Slip op. at *12-13 (quotation and citations omitted).

Interpreting “may” differently “is to bring subsection (4) into conflict with the rest of Article 8(B), which. . . manifestly reflects an intent to require arbitration.” Slip op. at *13. The district court’s interpretation, said the Court, “makes little sense in light of [subsection 1 of the Arbitration Agreement]’s requirement that ‘all [claims under the Covered Statutes,] if not resolved in the grievance procedure . . . shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration” Slip op. at *13 (quoting Arbitration Agreement; emphasis supplied by Court).

Collective Bargaining Agreement’s Arbitration Clause Clearly and Unmistakably Encompasses Statutory Claims

Having concluded the arbitration agreement was mandatory, the Court turned to whether the Employee’s statutory claims were within the scope of that agreement. The Court held that the Arbitration Agreement clearly and unmistakably encompassed those claims, and consequently, the Employee was required to arbitrate those claims.  

The Second Circuit explained “that both this Circuit and other sister circuits have interpreted the clear and unmistakable standard to require specific references in the [collective bargaining agreement] either to the statutes in question or to statutory causes of action generally.” Slip op. at *13 (quotation and citation omitted).

The Court explained that a “vague directive” such as “‘any disputes . . . shall be subject to’ a grievance and arbitration procedure. . .” does not suffice, but that, here, the Arbitration Agreement “specifically cites. . . statutes. . . .” including “the FLSA, the New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Law, and [New York’s Labor Law], and requires claims under those statutes to proceed pursuant to [the Arbitration Agreement]’s grievance and arbitration procedures.” Slip op. at *14 (citations and quotations omitted). The Arbitration Agreement thus clearly and unmistakably required arbitration of those statutory claims.  

The Employee’s brought claims under the FLSA and the NYLL, those claims are clearly and unambiguously within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement, and consequently, the Employee was required to arbitrate those claims. Slip op. at *14.  

The Arbitration Agreement does not Deny the Employee Due Process of Law   

The district court concluded that the Arbitration Agreement denied the Employee “due process because ‘the worker apparently has no part in the selection of the arbitrator.’” Slip op. at *14-15. The Second Circuit disagreed.

The Employee was a member of the Union, and under applicable law, including 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), the “Union had authority to negotiate on behalf of Abdullayeva, and so the fact that she did not personally participate in the selection of the arbitrator does not violate due process.” See slip op. at *15. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Pyett, “unions ‘may agree to the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the employer.’” Slip op. at *15 (quoting Pyett, 556 U.S. at 257). And “‘courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes.’” Slip op. at *15 (quoting American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

The Union was the Employer’s representative “authorized to negotiate ‘conditions of employment,’ including arbitration clauses, with the Employer on behalf of [the Employer’s employees].” The Arbitration Agreement, “including its proviso that ‘claims. . . shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration before Elliot Shriftman,’ was the product of the Union’s negotiation with [the Employer].” Slip op. at *15-16.

New York law requires that “arbitration procedures must generally conform to the ‘due process right of notice and opportunity to defend.’” Slip op. at *16 (quoting Beckman v. Greentree Sec., Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 566, 570 (1996)). But the Employee did “not argue that [the Arbitration Agreement’s] procedures are lacking in notice, or that the selected arbitrator is biased or would conduct arbitration proceedings in bad faith.” Slip op. at *16.

Thus, “the challenged portion of the [Arbitration Agreement], which simply ‘specifies with whom’ arbitration will be conducted in accordance with established Supreme Court precedent, does not violate due process.” Slip op. at *16 (quoting American Exp. Co., 570 U.S. at 233).

Photo Acknowledgements

The photos featured in this post were licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law.  

Confluence of the Arcane: Headings Clauses, Arbitration Law and Reinsurance

November 28th, 2016 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Contract Interpretation, Reinsurance Contracts, Uncategorized, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off on Confluence of the Arcane: Headings Clauses, Arbitration Law and Reinsurance

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Introduction

A Headings Clause typically provides that contract provision headings and captions are for reference purposes only, and do not negate, modify or otherwise affect the provisions to which they relate. While arguments can be made for or against Headings Clauses, they are fairly common in commercial contracts.

Contract dispute outcomes rarely turn on the interpretation or application of these clauses. But on November 16, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Infrassure, Ltd. v. First Mutual Trasp. Assur. Co., No. 16-306, slip op. (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order), which not only turned on the meaning and application of a headings clause, but did so in the context of an arbitration-law dispute in a reinsurance case. A confluence of the arcane, indeed!

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Infrassure: Background

Infrassure was a dispute between the parties to a facultative reinsurance contract. The facultative reinsurance contract (the “Certificate”) contained two different arbitration clauses. One was in the body of the pre-printed contract (the “Form Arbitration Clause”). The other was in Endorsement No. 2 (the “Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause”). Endorsement No. 2 was titled “LONDON ARBITRATION AND GOVERNING LAW (UK AND BERMUDA INSURERS ONLY).”

The Form Arbitration Clause provided for arbitration of “any dispute arising out of the interpretation, performance or breach of this Certificate.” It designated a specific set of arbitration rules to govern the arbitration, and provided that “[a]ll arbitrators will be disinterested active or former officers of insurance or reinsurance companies.”

The Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause provided for arbitration of “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof,” and prescribed different arbitration rules. It did not require arbitrators to be active or former officers of insurance or reinsurance companies.

Which Arbitration Clause Applies?

The parties disputed which arbitration clause applied. Reinsurer Infrassure, Ltd. (“Infrassure” or the “Reinsurer”), argued for the Form Arbitration Clause, with its more stringent arbitrator qualification requirements. Cedent First Mutual Transportation Assurance Company (“First Mutual” or the  “Cedent”), a New York State captive insurer of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, apparently wanted to appoint (or nominate) arbitrators or arbitrator candidates who were not current or former officers or directors of insurance or reinsurance companies. It therefore argued that the Endorsement 2 Arbitration Clause applied.

Infrassure, which is a Swiss company, argued that the Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause did not apply because the title of the endorsement contained the parenthetical limitation “(UK and Bermuda Insurers only)” (the “Parenthetical Limitation”). It asserted in the alternative that the Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Clause should be construed to impose the same arbitrator qualification criteria as the Form Arbitration Clause imposed.

The Headings Clause

Headings ClauseFirst Mutual argued that the Certificate’s headings clause (the “Headings Clause,” which the Court refers to as the “Titles Clause”) rendered inapplicable the Parenthetical Limitation. The Headings Clause stated: “The several titles of the various paragraphs of this Certificate (and endorsements … attached hereto) are inserted solely for convenience of reference and will not be deemed in any way to limit or affect the provisions to which they relate.”

“This argument [was] thin,” observed the Court, but a reported opinion was in order, because the dispute “requires us to construe wording that apparently has not been construed before, and that is in a contract that may share features with other standard forms and endorsements.” Slip op. at 4.

Court Holds that Headings Clause did Not Strip the U.K.-and-Bermuda-Insurer-only Limitation on the Scope of Endorsement No. 2

The Court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs (an esteemed member of the reinsurance bar before he was appointed to the Second Circuit), held that the Headings Clause was “unambiguous,” but did not negate the Parenthetical Limitation, even though that limitation appeared in the heading or title of Endorsement No. 2.

The Parenthetical Limitation, said the Court, “is not part of the title itself, though it shares the same line and bolded format.” The Heading Clause’s “purpose.  .  .  is not to strip away an express indication as to the context in which a particular provision operative, but to ensure that the text of a provision is not discounted or altered by the words of its  heading.” Slip op. at 4.

Court finds Further Support for its Conclusion by Applying First Mutual’s Heading Clause Interpretation to other Contract Provisions

The Court found confirmation of the accuracy of its conclusion “by consulting other [Certificate] provisions,” including “critical” ones, which would “would have no meaning at all if the Titles Clause were mechanically applied.” Id.

To illustrate, the Court referred to paragraph 14 of the Certificate, which, states:

Program Policy Limits

Various as per the attached schedule.

Id. (emphasis in original)

The Court observed that applying the Ceding Company’s interpretation of the Headings Clause to Paragraph 14 would reduce that paragraph to “the cryptic provision, ‘Various as per the attached schedule.’” Id. The “heading ‘Program Policy Limits,’ instructs the reader that the phrase ‘Various as per the attached schedule refers to program policy limits, as opposed to some other concern of the reinsurance agreement.” Id. That heading, said the Court, does not purport to contradict, alter or otherwise ambiguate the text that follows, but explains what the otherwise contextually ambiguous (indeed, meaningless) text was intended to mean in the context of the whole contract.

According to the Court, “other provisions beside Paragraph 14 likewise would be rendered meaningless if the [Headings Clause] were applied in the way pressed by First Mutual.” Slip op. at 4.

Given the Court’s holding, it was unnecessary to consider Infrassure’s alternative argument that the arbitrator selection provisions of the Form Arbitration Agreement should be made part of the Endorsement No. 2 Arbitration Agreement. All the Court had to say about this argument was “we need not reach [it], which  is just as well for well for Infrassure.” Slip op. at 5.

 

Photo Acknowledgements:

All photos used in the text portion of this post are licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law. The Yay Images abbreviations of the photographer’s name for each of the three images, in order of their appearance, are:

Image 1: VIPDesignUSA

Image 2: steheap

Image 3: speedfighter

 

 

 

SCOTUS Denies Americo and Jupiter Medical Cert. Petitions: All Eyes now on DIRECTV. . . .

May 19th, 2015 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Awards, Choice-of-Law Provisions, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Confirmation of Awards, Consent to Class Arbitration, Contract Interpretation, FAA Preemption of State Law, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, State Courts, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on SCOTUS Denies Americo and Jupiter Medical Cert. Petitions: All Eyes now on DIRECTV. . . .

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On March 28, 2015 we reported (here) that the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) had asked for a response to the petition for certiorari in Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2014). In Americo the Texas Supreme Court held that an arbitration award had to be vacated because it was made by a panel not constituted according to the parties’ agreement. The parties’ agreement, among other things, incorporated the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”)’s rules, which at the time the parties entered into the contract followed the traditional, industry arbitration rule that party-appointed arbitrators may be partial, under the control of the appointing party or both. But by the time the dispute arose the AAA Rules had been amended to provide that the parties are presumed to intend to require parties to appoint only neutral arbitrators—that is, arbitrators that are both impartial and independent.

Five Justices of the nine-member Texas Court determined that the parties had agreed that party-appointed arbitrators need not be impartial, only independent. Because the AAA had, contrary to the parties’ agreement, disqualified the challenging party’s first-choice arbitrator on partiality grounds, the panel that rendered the award was not properly constituted and thus exceeded its powers. See 440 S.W.3d at 25. (Copies of our Americo posts are here and here.)

yay-12776482As reported here and here, the losing party requested Supreme  Court review to determine whether the Texas Supreme Court should have deferred to the AAA’s decision on disqualification rather than independently determining whether the parties intended to require party-appointed arbitrators to be neutral. The petition argues that there is a split in the circuits on the issue.

On Monday, May 18, 2015, SCOTUS denied the petition for certiorari.  (You can access the Court’s May 18, 2015 Order List here.)

On Monday May 4, 2015, SCOTUS also denied the petition for certiorari in another Federal Arbitration Act case, Jupiter Medical Center, Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Assoc., No. 14-944, which was decided by the Florida Supreme Court. (You can access the Court’s May 4, 2015 Order List here.) Jupiter Medical Center, like Americo, concerned a post-award challenge under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, and also like Americo, was decided by a state supreme court. In Jupiter Medical, however, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the post-award challenge.

yay-5257980-digitalSupreme Court watchers interested in arbitration cases will have to get their fix next term from DIRECTV v. Imburgia, which we discussed here. Will SCOTUS hold that the California intermediate Court did not give effect to the presumption of arbitrability? Will SCOTUS go even further and explain that, just as a statute cannot be interpreted “‘to destroy itself,'” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting  American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-228 (1998) (quotation omitted)), so too cannot state law contract interpretation rules be applied in a way that would destroy an arbitration agreement to which the Federal Arbitration Act applies? Cf. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,  (1989) (“The question remains whether, assuming the choice-of-law clause meant what the Court of Appeal found it to mean, application of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1281.2(c) is nonetheless pre-empted by the FAA to the extent it is used to stay arbitration under this contract involving interstate commerce.  .  .  . [because] “it would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”)

Stay tuned for DIRECTV.  .  .  .

 

Photo Acknowledgements:

All photos used in the text portion of this post are licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law. Text has been added to image 2 (counting from top to bottom). Hover your mouse pointer over any image to view the Yay Images abbreviation of the photographer’s name.