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Posts Tagged ‘United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’

AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion: What Would Cousin Vinny Have to Say About The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Equal Footing Principle?

December 10th, 2010 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, California State Courts, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion: What Would Cousin Vinny Have to Say About The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Equal Footing Principle?

One of my favorite scenes from the movie My Cousin Vinny (1992) is Vincent Laguardia Gambini’s (a/k/a “Vinny’s”) opening statement in the criminal trial of his cousin and cousin’s friend, both of whom were arrested and mistakenly charged for murder and robbery while driving through Alabama.  Vinny (played by Joe Pesci) — a native New Yorker who is as out of place in a rural Alabama courtroom as I suppose anyone could be — dozes off during the prosecution’s opening statement only to be jarred awake by his cousin — who is facing the death penalty — so that he can deliver an opening statement.  He saunters over to the jury, and says, gesturing at the prosecutor, “Everything that guy just said is bull$#!+.  Thank you.”  Then he returns to the defense table.  (Watch the scene here, which begins approximately three minutes and 33 seconds into the clip.)     Continue Reading »

Some Initial Thoughts on the SCOTUS AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion Oral Argument

November 16th, 2010 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, California State Courts, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Some Initial Thoughts on the SCOTUS AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion Oral Argument

As many readers know, on Tuesday, November 9, 2010 the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (blogged here, here, here and here).  You can find the transcript of the argument, here, and the audio, here

After reviewing the oral argument transcript a number of times, and listening to the audio, we still believe it more likely than not that AT&T Mobility will prevail.  We’ll develop that thought further in upcoming installments of our Disputing guest post, “AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion:  Can Discover Bank Withstand Stolt-Nielsen Scrutiny?” (Part I, here).

There have been a number of differing opinions post argument on how the Court will likely rule.  Some believe the argument foreshadows victory for the Concepcions.  Others are not so certain, and still others believe that AT&T Mobility may emerge the victor.  Like all such opinions, they are are really nothing more than educated guesswork, and should be taken with a grain of salt. 

We don’t suggest our take on things is anything more, but we share it for what it is worth.  We think the oral argument was basically a toss-up, and that it mainly confirmed what we already knew or surmised:  That this is a very difficult case, and that the eight Justices who asked questions appear to be split along ideological lines.  We expected no less in light of the 5-3 and 5-4 split decisions in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559  U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); and  Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 

The key point on which the argument shed no meaningful light is what Associate Justice Clarence Thomas makes of this case.  Justice Thomas joined the Stolt-Nielsen and Rent-A-Center majority opinions, but those cases, unlike this one, did not concern the preemptive scope of the Federal Arbitration Act

Preemption is controversial, and its importance extends far beyond the AT&T Mobility case.    Particularly controversial — and very supportive of AT&T Mobility’s position — is the doctrine of “implied preemption,” also known as “conflict” or “obstacle” preemption. In Federal Arbitration Act cases this doctrine tells us that  state laws or policies that undermine “the goals and policies of the FAA” are preempted by the Act.  Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1990).

But Justice Thomas believes that the implied preemption doctrine is unconstitutional.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205 (2009) (Thomas, J. concurring) (“implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are inconsistent with the Constitution.  .  .  .”).  He also believes that Congress intended the Federal Arbitration Act to be a procedural statute that applies only in federal court.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 US 440 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]n state-court proceedings, the FAA cannot be the basis for displacing a state law that prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause contained in a contract that is unenforceable under state law.”). 

He thus believes that state courts can apply state arbitration law as they see fit, irrespective of whether the result would be different had the case been brought in federal court.  While AT&T Mobility — like Stolt-Nielsen and Rent-A-Center — was brought in federal court, and everybody concedes that the Federal Arbitration Act applies, Justice Thomas remains a strong proponent of federalism.  

Justice Thomas’ deference to state law is problematic for AT&T Mobility.  Perhaps AT&T Mobility’s best argument is that the Federal Arbitration Act impliedly preempts the Discover Bank rule for the reasons set forth in Stolt-Nielsen.   Apparently concluding that the Justices in the Stolt-Nielsen majority — including Justice Thomas —  are the ones most likely to support AT&T Mobility’s position, AT&T Mobility deliberately downplayed the implied preemption issue, although it made clear that it believes the Federal Arbitration Act both expressly and impliedly preempts the Discover Bank rule. 

That was a wise strategy given Justice Thomas’ rejection of implied preemption.  Its wisdom was borne out by what transpired at the argument:  of the eight Justices that asked questions, the four more liberal ones (Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia M. Sotomayor and Elena Kagan) appear to be leaning in favor of finding that the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt the Discover Bank rule, while the four more conservative ones (Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Associate Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel J. Alito, Jr.) appear to be leaning in favor of finding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Discover Bank.      

That means Justice Thomas is likely to hold the deciding vote, but where he’ll ultimately cast it, nobody knows (at least outside the Supreme Court).  We believe there are equally plausible reasons why he might vote  for or against preemption.  

We’ll explore all of this and more in our Disputing guest post.  In the meantime, keep an eye out for our next Forum article on AT&T Mobility, which will focus on the highlights of the oral argument and tie them into the express and implied preemption issues that this critically important case presents.    

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: What is the Scope of Federal Preemption in Class Waiver Cases?

September 30th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, Unconscionability, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: What is the Scope of Federal Preemption in Class Waiver Cases?

Part II

Introduction

Part I of this two-part post (here) briefly discussed the background of  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893, a case pending before the United States Supreme Court that will be argued on November 9, 2010.  We now delve into the details of the preemption questions before the Court and take a guess at the outcome. 

Federal Arbitration Act Preemption

The Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt all state law applicable to arbitration agreements, but it expressly preempts state law that conflicts with Section 2, and impliedly preempts all state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress”  embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act.  See Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation omitted). 

Does Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act Expressly Preempt the Discover Bank Rule?

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act declares that arbitration agreements within its scope “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  Section 2 establishes substantive federal law that expressly preempts all conflicting state law, except for state law that permits “the revocation of any contract” or governs the formation, interpretation, or construction of contracts generally. 

The exception to federal preemption is exceedingly narrow, for it saves from preemption only state laws that apply equally across the board to all contracts.  The United States Supreme Court summarized it well when it said:

States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.  What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.  The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal footing, directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’s intent.

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original).   Continue Reading »

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: What is the Scope of Federal Preemption in Class Waiver Cases?

September 30th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: What is the Scope of Federal Preemption in Class Waiver Cases?

Part I

Introduction

In our recent feature “What to Make of the Second Circuit Voiding a Class Action Waiver Under California’s Discover Bank Rule,” we briefly discussed AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893, a case which asks the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s Discover Bank rule.  The Discover Bank rule deems unconscionable class action and class arbitration waivers in adhesive contracts in circumstances where a consumer alleges that a party with superior bargaining power has committed widespread but small-dollar fraud.  Petitioner AT&T Mobility LLC (“AT&T Mobility”) has filed its brief (here); various organizations, including the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, have filed an impressive stack of amicus curiae briefs supporting AT&T Mobility (here); Vincent and Liza Concepcion (the “Concepcions”) have filed their brief, which was posted online earlier today (here); and AT&T will presumably submit a reply brief.  The Court has scheduled argument for November 9, 2010. 

AT&T Mobility is an extremely important case because it will decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts certain state law unconscionability and public-policy-based rules that are principally directed at class arbitration and class action waivers.  This issue has spawned a number of conflicting decisions in the state and federal courts, including Feeney v. Dell, Inc. 454 Mass. 192 (2009), a case we blogged back in 2009 (posts here and here). 

This two-part feature takes a closer look at AT&T Mobility, considers the principal issues before the Court, and ventures a guess on what the outcome will be.   This Part I discusses the background of the case, and Part II (here) outlines Federal Arbitration Act preemption rules, analyzes and explains why we believe the Federal Arbitration Act expressly and impliedly preempts the Discover Bank rule, and provides our best guess as to what the Supreme Court will conclude.     Continue Reading »

The United States Supreme Court Adopts Severability Analysis in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson

June 21st, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, Unconscionability, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on The United States Supreme Court Adopts Severability Analysis in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson

Yesterday the United States Supreme Court decided Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson, ___ U.S. ___, slip op. (June 21, 2010).  Rent-A-Center raised the question whether “a district court may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, where the agreement explicitly assigns that decision to the arbitrator.”  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had said “yes,” but the Supreme Court said “no.”

In a 5-4 opinion by Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, joined in by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Associate Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito, Jr , the Court held that the employee had to arbitrate its claim that certain provisions of an arbitration agreement were allegedly unconscionable because the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability questions, and the employee did not specifically claim that that agreement was unconscionable.  The Court said that the parties’ clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability was, as a matter of federal law, severable from the other provisions of the arbitration agreement, including the ones the employee said were unconscionable.  

Prior to the decision we had advocated in the Forum (here and here), and in our cover story published in the March 2010 issue of Alternatives to the High Cost of  Litigation (blogged here), that the Court should resolve the case in favor of Rent-A-Center using a severability analysis of sorts derived from Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. ___ (2006) and Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).   And that’s exactly what happened, even though neither side advocated or addressed the severability argument before the Court, a point made by Associate Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, which was  joined in by Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.  See Dissenting Op. at 1.  (The district court’s analysis, however, which was reversed by the Ninth Circuit, was, according to the Court, consistent with the Buckeye Check Cashing and Prima Paint severability principle.  See Slip op. at 9.)  Continue Reading »

Professor Aaron Bruhl’s Analysis of Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson (No. 09-497)

February 24th, 2010 Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Professor Aaron Bruhl’s Analysis of Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson (No. 09-497)

Professor Aaron Bruhl, an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center, recently published in PrawfsBlawg a thought-provoking and insightful article on Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson (No. 09-497).  (Post here)  Regular readers no doubt remember that the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Rent-A-Center, and will be hearing argument on April 26, 2010.  (See our prior posts here and here).

Professor Bruhl points out that, in addition to being of interest to those practicing employment, consumer or plain old arbitration law, Rent-A-Center “is just as interesting for those who study federal courts and judicial politics.”   He reminds us that one of the few remaining “safety valves” for challenging arbitration agreements is unconscionability:     

In the last few years, as other routes for challenging arbitration have been closed off, unconscionability has become a surprisingly common and surprisingly effective way of attacking arbitration agreements.  The challenges do not attack arbitration per se – federal law favors arbitration – but instead target various aspects of a particular arbitration process:  a given clause might forbid class arbitrations, bar punitive damages or otherwise restrict remedies, sharply curtail discovery, require a consumer to pay hefty arbitrator’s fees, etc.  There have been many cases on these topics in recent years, and a good number of them sustain the challenge to the arbitration clause.

He notes that the United States Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari in cases where lower courts have invalidated arbitration agreements on state-law unconscionability grounds and the question is whether the invalidation offended the Federal Arbitration Act.  He suspects “the Court has avoided these cases because it feels ill-equipped to resolve whether a lower court is discriminating against arbitration:” 

First, unconscionability analysis often requires a fact-intensive inquiry.  Second, and more important, determining whether a lower court is using unconscionability differently when it comes to arbitration requires an engagement with the details of state law and a comparison of lots of prior unconscionability cases.  Third, and maybe most important of all, a holding that the lower court is applying unconscionability unfairly, especially when the lower court says it is applying the same analysis it applies elsewhere, carries with it some serious expressive baggage.  Essentially, it requires the Supreme Court to say that the lower court is being dishonest.  That happens, but when it does so, it is a big deal (think cases like Bush v. Gore or the cases from the 50s/60s rejecting supposed procedural defaults in the state courts).

 But the Court granted certiorari in Rent-A-Center, a case involving not the merits of a state law unconscionability challenge, but the question who gets to decide unconscionability when the parties clearly and unmistakably submit it to the arbitrators.  Professor Bruhl believes certiorari was granted because addressing the “who” question, and resolving it in favor of arbitration, will cleanly dispose of the unconscionability problem from the standpoint of the federal courts, at least in cases where the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability: 

That doesn’t require diving into the weeds of state law and the record. If the Court assigns the issue to the arbitrator, that will be a very easy rule to monitor for compliance (unlike deciding whether the lower court applied unconscionability correctly).  All of those unconscionability cases out there will instantly become not wrong but irrelevant – because courts won’t be deciding the issue anymore.  And it won’t matter whether some lower courts can be trusted to apply unconscionability correctly, because they will be cut out of the picture. Continue Reading »

SCOTUS Oral Argument in Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc. Set for April 26, 2010

February 17th, 2010 Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on SCOTUS Oral Argument in Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc. Set for April 26, 2010

The United States Supreme Court has set for April 26, 2010 oral argument in Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2009), petition for cert. granted  Jan. 15, 2010 (No. 09-497) (oral argument calendar here).  Jackson addresses the question who decides unconscionability of an arbitration agreement when the agreement clearly and unmistakably says arbitrators decide arbitrability.  The Ninth Circuit said the court decides the question, but we think there is a reasonable chance the United States Supreme Court will reverse.   We touched on some of the reasons why in prior posts, here and here

We shall keep readers apprised of further developments as and when they occur.  .  .  .

SCOTUS Denies Certiorari in All Three Federal Arbitration Act Manifest Disregard Cases Considered at Last Week’s Conference

October 5th, 2009 Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on SCOTUS Denies Certiorari in All Three Federal Arbitration Act Manifest Disregard Cases Considered at Last Week’s Conference

Last week we reported that the United States Supreme Court was considering three petitions for certiorari concerning whether manifest disregard of the law remains a viable ground for vacating or modifying an arbitration award after Hall Street Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel , Inc, 552 U.S. ___, slip op. (March 25, 2008) (post here).  Today the Court denied certiorari in all three cases:  The Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 Fed. Appx. 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (08-1396);  Grain v. Trinity Health, 551 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008) (08-1446); and Improv West Associates v. Comedy Club, Inc.,  553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. ) (08-1529).