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Arbitration Law FAQ: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act

February 27th, 2019 Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Federal Arbitration Act Section 1, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration Comments Off on Arbitration Law FAQ: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act
Chapter 1 Federal Arbitration Act 1

This Arbitration Law FAQ guide briefly explains what the Federal Arbitration Act is, and then answers some frequently asked questions about Chapter 1 of the Act. It is not legal advice, nor a substitute for legal advice, and should not be relied upon as such.

If you desire or require legal advice or representation in a matter concerning commercial, labor, or any other arbitration-law matter, then do not hesitate to contact a skilled and experienced arbitration-law attorney. This guide provides some general information that may be able to assist you in your search for legal representation, or in simply obtaining a better understanding of some arbitration-law basics.

Arbitration Law FAQS: What is the Federal Arbitration Act?

Wholly Groundless Exception 3 - Chapter 1 Federal Arbitration Act 2

The Federal Arbitration Act is a federal statute enacted in 1925 that makes certain (but not all) arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. It was originally, and for many years, known as the “United States Arbitration Act,” but for simplicity’s sake we’ll refer to it as the “Federal Arbitration Act,” the “FAA,” or the “Act.”

It was passed at a time when courts were, for the most part, unwilling to enforce agreements to arbitrate because they thought that such agreements “divested” their “jurisdiction” over disputes that would ordinarily be decided by courts. In other words, many courts thought it wrong for courts to lend their assistance to the enforcement of contracts under which parties would agree to submit their disputes to private decision makers.

Even by the time the FAA was passed, arbitration was not new. For example, it can be traced back at least as far as medieval times, when various guilds used it as a way of resolving disputes according to what became known as the “law merchant,” an informal body of rules and principles that merchants believed should be applied to their disputes, but which common law courts did not, at the time, apply. The first arbitration agreement was reportedly included in a reinsurance contract in the late 18th century, and George Washington apparently included an arbitration clause in his will.  

As originally enacted, the FAA consisted of 15 provisions, section 14 of which Congress repealed in 1947, renumbering as Section 14 former Section 15. In 1970 Congress designated those remaining 14 provisions as “Chapter 1” of the FAA, and added a “Chapter 2,” which consists of various provisions implementing and enabling the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (a/k/a the “New York Convention”). In 1988 Congress added two additional provisions to Chapter 1 of the FAA, Sections 15 and 16. In 1990 Congress added to the FAA a Chapter 3, which consists of provisions implementing and enabling the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (a/k/a the “Panama Convention”).

The remainder of this FAQ guide focuses on Chapter 1 of the FAA.

Arbitration Law FAQs: What does Chapter 1 of the FAA do apart from declaring certain arbitration agreements to be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable?

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act is sometimes referred to as the Act’s “enforcement command.” It is the provision that declares certain (but not all) arbitration agreements to be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.

Under Section 2, “arbitration is a matter of contract, and courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms.” Schein v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. ____, slip op. at *4 (Jan. 8, 2019) (citation and quotation omitted). Section 2 also “requires courts to place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with all other contracts.” Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2017) (quotations and  citations omitted).    

implement

Section 1 of the FAA provides some definitions and exempts from the FAA a fairly limited universe of agreements that would otherwise fall within the scope of the Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 1. The other provisions of Chapter 1 implement the enforcement command by lending judicial support to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. These are briefly summarized below:

Section 3 – Requires courts to stay litigation in favor of arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3.

Section 4 – Provides for courts to compel arbitration.

Section 5 – Provides for courts to appoint arbitrators when there has been a default in the arbitrator selection process.

Section 6 – Provides that motion practice rules apply to applications made under the FAA, thereby expediting the judicial disposition of such applications. 

Section 7 – Provides for the judicial enforcement of certain arbitration subpoenas.

Section 8 – Provides that where the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction is admiralty, then “the party claiming to be aggrieved may begin his proceeding [under the FAA]…by libel and seizure of the vessel or other property….” 9 U.S.C. § 8.

Section 9 – Provides for courts to confirm arbitration awards, that is, enter judgment upon them.

Section 10 – Authorizes courts to vacate arbitration awards in certain limited circumstances.

Section 11 – Authorizes courts to modify or correct arbitration awards in certain limited circumstances.

Section 12 – Provides rules concerning the service of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award, including a three-month time limit.

Section 13 – Specifies papers that must be filed with the clerk on motions to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct awards and provides that judgment entered on orders on such motions has the same force and effect of any other judgment entered by the court.

Section 14 – Specifies that agreements made as of the FAA’s 1925 effective date are subject to the FAA.

Section 15 – Provides that “Enforcement of arbitral agreements, confirmation of arbitral awards, and execution upon judgments based on orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State doctrine.”

Section 16 – Specifies when appeals may be taken from orders made under the FAA, and authorizing appeals from final decisions with respect to arbitration.

How can I tell if an arbitration agreement or award is governed by Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

Commerce

Whether an arbitration agreement falls under the FAA depends on whether: (a) the arbitration agreement is in writing; and (b) is part of a “maritime transaction” or of a contract that affects interstate commerce.

The starting point is, as before, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2’s enforcement command, which provides, with bracketed text added:

[A] A written provision [B] in any maritime transaction or [C] a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce [D] to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or [E] an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, [F] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2.

Section 2’s requirement that an arbitration agreement be “written” (Part [A]) seems simple enough, and, for the most part, it is. But remember, just because a contract is required to be “written” doesn’t mean the arbitration agreement must be signed.

As respects whether a “contract” “evidenc[es] a transaction involving commerce” (Part [C]), the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2 broadly to mean the Federal Arbitration Act applies to arbitration agreements in contracts or transactions that affect commerce, that is, to any contract or transaction that Congress could regulate in the full exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268, 281-82 (1995); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3 (giving Congress power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes”).

Whether a contract “affects” commerce depends on the facts concerning, among other things, the parties, the contract’s subject matter, and the actual or contemplated transactions constituting the contract’s performance or contemplated performance. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003). A party does not have to demonstrate that the contract has a “specific” or “substantial” “effect upon interstate commerce if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent a general practice subject to federal control.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The question is whether the “aggregate economic activity in question” “bear[s] on interstate commerce in a substantial way.” Id. at 57.

Parts [A] through [D]] of Section 2 make the Federal Arbitration Act applicable to written, pre-dispute arbitration “provision[s]” in “maritime transactions” or in “contract[s] evidencing transactions involving commerce….” These arbitration provisions are “pre-dispute” arbitration agreements because they are defined by Part [D] as “provision[s]” “to settle a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or [out of] the refusal to perform the whole or any part” of such contract or transaction….”  9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). In other words, agreements to submit future disputes to arbitration.

Parts [A] through [E] of Section 2 make the FAA applicable also to written, post-dispute arbitration agreements, that is, agreements to arbitrate existing disputes arising out of “maritime transactions” or “contract[s] evidencing transactions involving commerce….”  To that end Part [E] makes Section  2 applicable to “agreement[s] in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of”  “maritime transaction,” (Part [B]) “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” (Part [C]), or “refusal to perform the whole or any part” of such a contract or transaction. (Part[D]). 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).

Arbitration Law FAQs: Are there any Arbitration Agreements Falling Under FAA Section 2 that are Exempt from Chapter 1 of the FAA?

Contracts of Employment 1 Federal Arbitration Act Section 1
Federal Arbitration Act Section 1

Yes. Section 1 of the FAA provides that “nothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” According to the United States Supreme Court, this exemption applies “only” to “contracts of employment of transportation workers.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 119 (2001). But those “contracts of employment” include not only contracts establishing an employer-employee relationship, but also contracts establishing independent contractor relationships. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. ___, slip op.at 6, 7, & 15 (Jan. 15, 2019).

Arbitration Law FAQs: If the Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act applies, does that mean all FAA litigation falling under Chapter 1 can be brought in federal court?

No. Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act does not confer an independent basis for federal court subject matter jurisdiction over applications for the relief authorized by Chapter 1. Put differently making an application under the FAA does not raise a “federal question” over which a federal court could, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, base subject matter jurisdiction.

But that doesn’t mean that federal courts cannot have subject matter jurisdiction over Chapter 1 Federal Arbitration Act proceedings. If the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met, including complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, and an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000.00, excluding interest and costs, then a federal court will have subject matter jurisdiction under the diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Does Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act apply in state court?

Federalism

Yes. State courts are required to enforce arbitration agreements under Section 2 of the FAA. Basically, they must enforce arbitration agreements falling under the FAA, putting them on the same footing as other contracts. See Kindred Nursing Centers, 137 S. Ct. at 1424.     

Most or all states have their own arbitration statutes. New York’s arbitration statute, for example, is codified in Article 75 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”). Depending on applicable state law, state courts may carry out Section 2’s enforcement command using their own arbitration statute’s provisions, even if they are different than those provided by Chapter 1 of the FAA. But if enforcement of the FAA through the provisions of the state’s arbitration code would undermine the purposes and objectives of the FAA, then the offending state arbitration code provisions would be preempted (i.e., superseded) by the FAA to the extent that they conflict with the FAA.

If you are interested in learning more about the Federal Arbitration Act, see here, here, and here.

Photo Acknowledgments:

The photos featured in this post were licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law. L&L added text to the first three photos from the top.

The First Department Affirm’s Citigroup’s Motion to Vacate an Award based on Manifest Disregard of the Law

April 22nd, 2015 Appellate Practice, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Contract Interpretation, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Manifest Disregard of the Agreement, Manifest Disregard of the Law, New York Court of Appeals, New York State Courts, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off on The First Department Affirm’s Citigroup’s Motion to Vacate an Award based on Manifest Disregard of the Law

yay-1274371Earlier this month, New York’s Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a New York County Supreme Court, Commercial Division judgment vacating an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law under the Federal Arbitration Act. See Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Fiorilla, No. 14-747, slip op. (1st Dep’t April 9, 2015). The Court’s characteristically brief opinion does not delve very deeply into the facts or explain the Court’s reasoning in detail, but there’s enough there to make the decision worth noting.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s order vacating the award because the arbitrators apparently denied without explanation one of the parties’ motions to enforce a settlement even though the moving party informed the arbitrators of controlling, New York case law requiring the enforcement of settlement agreements. “Although,” said the Court, “arbitrators have no obligation to explain their awards, when a reviewing court is inclined to hold that an arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law, the failure of the arbitrators to explain the award can be taken into account.” Slip op. at 1 (citing and quoting Matter of Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Bullseye Sec., 291 A.D.2d 255, 256 (1st Dep’t 2002) (quotations omitted)).

While the Court does not directly address the question, it appears that the case arose under the Federal Arbitration Act, because cases interpreting arbitration statute (CPLR Article 75) do not recognize “manifest disregard of the law” as a ground for vacating an award. Under Article 75, the only “outcome review” standards are those that permit vacatur of awards that are irrational, violate a strong public policy or exceed clearly an express limitation on the arbitrators’ authority. See, e.g., Wein & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 471, 477-78 (2006); Matter of New York City Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers’ Union of Am., 6 N.Y.3d 332, 336 (2005).

New York cases interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, however, recognize manifest disregard as a ground for vacating an award. While New York state courts need defer only to the United States Supreme C0urt on federal-law questions, the New York Court of Appeals has traditionally tended to follow established Second Circuit precedent on such issues in Federal Arbitration Act cases. Since the Second Circuit recognizes manifest disregard of the law as a ground for vacating an award under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, so too have the New York State courts, even though the U.S. Supreme Court has left the question open. See Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008); see, e.g., T. Co Metals v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, 592 F.3d 329, 339-40 (2d Cir. 2010) (manifest disregard of the law survives Hall Street); Wein, 6 N.Y.3d at 480-81 (pre-Hall Street New York Court of Appeals follows Second Circuit authority on manifest disregard of the law in Federal Arbitration Act governed case); Tullett Prebon Financial Serv. v. BGC Financial, L.P., 111 A.D.3d 480, 481-82 (1st Dep’t 2013) (applying manifest disregard of the law standard to Federal Arbitration Act governed case post-Hall Street).

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One question the First Department decision prompts is whether resort to manifest disregard of the law was even necessary. The U.S. Supreme Court has unequivocally endorsed post-Hall Street what some refer to in shorthand as the “manifest disregard of the agreement” standard, or “essence from the agreement” standard, under which a court may vacate an award where the arbitrators do not even arguably interpret the agreement. See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2098 (2013); Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010).

Presumably what happened in this case (though the opinion does not say) is that the parties had an agreement that contained an arbitration agreement, and the dispute arose out of or related to that main agreement. One or both parties demanded arbitration, the parties agreed to settle and one of the parties sought to enforce that agreement, which obviously arose out of or related to the main agreement, and was within the scope of issues that the parties agreed to submit and submitted to arbitration.

Under these circumstances it makes little sense to say that the manifest disregard of the agreement standard does not apply because the agreement that was manifestly disregarded was not the main agreement. And if, as the Court said, the arbitrators simply denied the motion to enforce the settlement agreement without comment, it seems to us that it did not even arguably interpret the settlement agreement and thus manifestly disregarded the parties’ agreement.

The opinion, however, relies solely on manifest disregard of the law. Given the uncertainty surrounding whether manifest disregard is a viable ground for vacatur, and the corresponding certainty that manifest disregard of the agreement is a valid basis for vacating an award under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, that sole reliance has the potential to cause relying solely on that standard without any explanation might confuse litigants who are not well-versed in Federal Arbitration Act practice and procedure. We are quite certain, however, that was not the Court’s intention, and there may well be good reasons why the court did not rely on manifest disregard of the agreement as at least an alternative basis for its sound conclusion.

 

Photo Acknowledgements:

All photos used in the text portion of this post are licensed from Yay Images and are subject to copyright protection under applicable law. Text has been added to both images. Hover your mouse pointer over any image to view the Yay Images abbreviation of the photographer’s name.

What Happens when Arbitrators Exceed Clear Limitations on their Authority?

October 24th, 2014 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Contract Interpretation, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, New York State Courts, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off on What Happens when Arbitrators Exceed Clear Limitations on their Authority?

One advantage of arbitration is that parties can define and delineate the scope of disputes they agree to submit to arbitration, the basis on which disputes  can or must be resolved and the scope of the arbitrator’s remedial powers. If parties impose clear limits on an arbitrator’s authority (usually by expressly excluding certain matters from arbitration or expressly providing that an arbitrator cannot or must grant certain remedies), then courts and arbitrators are supposed to enforce those limitations. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 680-81 (2010).

Far too frequently, parties simply agree to a broad arbitration agreement that places no limitations on arbitral power, and when they end up on the wrong-end of an award they didn’t expect, they discover to their dismay that they have no judicial remedy. Whether or not they understood that at the time they agreed to arbitrate is, of course, irrelevant. The only relevant consideration is whether their agreement could be reasonably construed to grant the arbitrator that authority, even if it could also be reasonably construed to withhold it. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (“when a court interprets such provisions in an agreement covered by the FAA, due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration”) (quotation and citation omitted).

But suppose the parties take the time to consider whether they desire to limit arbitral authority, and their arbitration agreement unambiguously expresses an intention to limit arbitral authority to resolve certain disputes or impose certain remedies, or to expressly require that the arbitrators grant certain types of relief, such as fee shifting to a prevailing party. Should a court vacate the award if the arbitrator does not abide by the parties’ unambiguously expressed intentions?  Continue Reading »

ROM Management Reinsurance Mgt. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.: Can Parties Agree State Arbitration Law Governs their Arbitration even if the Federal Arbitration Act Applies?

April 15th, 2014 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Choice-of-Law Provisions, Contract Interpretation, New York Court of Appeals, New York State Courts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Reinsurance Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, Statute of Limitations, Stay of Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on ROM Management Reinsurance Mgt. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.: Can Parties Agree State Arbitration Law Governs their Arbitration even if the Federal Arbitration Act Applies?

Introduction

The Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)’s ordinarily trumps state-law rules of arbitrability in state- and federal-court  disputes involving agreements falling under it.  But what happens when parties to an FAA-governed arbitration agreement have agreed that state law governs their agreement, or the enforcement of their agreement?

Odd as it may seem, the FAA allows parties to agree that state-law rules of arbitrability govern if the parties unambiguously agree that they govern, even if the result is that an issue subject to arbitration under the FAA is excluded from arbitration because of the parties’ choice of state arbitration law. That holds true so long as enforcing the parties’ choice of law does not “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the FAA. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-64 (1995); Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 474-78 (1989); Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v. 55 Liberty Owners Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 247, 252-53 (2005); see, generally, Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, __, 130 S. Ct. 1758,1773-74 (2010). Because the whole point of the FAA is to promote arbitration by enforcing the parties’ arbitration agreement according to its terms, and because parties are free to clearly exclude issues from the scope of their arbitration agreement, giving effect to a applying a state-law rule of arbitrability does not contravene the FAA or its purposes and objectives. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (“[W]e have said on numerous occasions that the central or primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”), 1774 (“Underscoring the consensual nature of private dispute resolution, we have held that parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit[].  .  .  .  [and] may agree to limit the issues they choose to arbitrate.  .  .  .”) (quotations and citations omitted); Volt, 489 U.S. at 476-78.

In Re Rom Management Reinsurance Mgt. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., ___ A.D.3d ___, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01546 (1st Dep’t March 11, 2014).  New York’s Appellate Division, First Department (New York’s intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over New York and Bronx Counties (i.e., New York City’s Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx)), succinctly demonstrated how the parties’ unambiguous agreement to apply state-law arbitrability rules can narrow the issues that the parties would have been required to submit to arbitration had FAA rules of arbitrability applied. Continue Reading »