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Posts Tagged ‘Exceeded Powers’

Can a Court under Section 10(a)(4) Overturn an Award Because it was Based on a Clear Mistake of Historical Fact or a Conceded Nonfact? 

October 7th, 2024 Application to Confirm, Application to Vacate, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Award Fails to Draw Essence from the Agreement, Award Irrational, Award Vacated, Awards, Exceeding Powers, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 10, Federal Arbitration Act Section 10, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Labor Arbitration, LMRA Section 301, Petition to Vacate Award, Practice and Procedure, Section 10, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Vacate, Vacate Award | 10(a)(4), Vacate Award | Exceeding Powers, Vacate Award | Excess of Powers, Vacate Award | Public Policy, Vacatur, Vacatur for Conceded Nonfact or Clear Mistake of Historical Fact 4 Comments »

nonfact | clear historical factCan a court vacate an award because it was based on a clear mistake of historical fact or on a conceded nonfact? Some might consider asking that question to be akin to using fighting words, but it is one that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit may ultimately answer if an appeal of the UPHealth Holdings, Inc. v. Glocal Healthcare Sys. PVT, No. 24-cv-3778, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2024) is taken.

In vacating in part the award in that case the UpHealth district court took a rather bold step, albeit one that has support in two circuit court labor arbitration cases (decided in 1974 and 1985), Electronics Corp. of Am. v. International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, 492 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1974); National Post Office, Mailhandlers, Watchmen, Messengers & Grp. Leaders Div, Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 1985) (Stewart, Associate Justice (ret.), sitting by designation), and at least one district court case, decided under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) in 2002, Mollison-Turner v. Lynch Auto Grp., No. 01 6340, 2002 WL 1046704, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2002). It vacated in part an award because the Court determined the arbitrators strongly relied on a conceded nonfact. Whether UpHealth will withstand appellate review is unclear at this juncture, but at least for the time being, it provides award challengers with some additional support for vacating a very narrow class of questionable but rare awards that feature the kind of unusual circumstances present in UpHealth, Electronics Corp., National Post Office, and Mollison-Turner. Each of these cases presented a situation where an award was based on a clear mistake of historical fact, a conceded nonfact, or both.

This post reviews what transpired in UpHealth. In one or more later posts we shall subject the Court’s decision to analytical scrutiny and consider whether, and if so, to what extent, the notion that an award can be vacated based on a mistake of historical fact or a conceded nonfact will likely gain traction in future cases. We may also consider whether, and if so, to what extent, vacatur on that ground comports with Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) principles, and discuss in more detail Electronics Corp., National Post Office, and Mollison-Turner. 

Legal Background: Outcome Review of Arbitration Awards

Manifest Disregard of the Agreement and Manifest Disregard of the Law

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and in labor arbitration cases, courts can vacate Continue Reading »

Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: Do Arbitrators Necessarily Exceed their Powers by Making an Award that Conflicts with the Unambiguous Terms of the Parties’ Agreement?

November 11th, 2014 Appellate Practice, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Contract Interpretation, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, New York Court of Appeals, New York State Courts, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: Do Arbitrators Necessarily Exceed their Powers by Making an Award that Conflicts with the Unambiguous Terms of the Parties’ Agreement?

We’ve addressed on many occasions the Enterprise WheelStolt-Nielsen/Oxford contract-based outcome review standard, which permits courts to vacate awards when they do not “draw their essence” from the parties’ agreement. Under that standard the “sole question is whether the arbitrators (even arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether [they] got its meaning right or wrong.” See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (parenthetical in original). (See, e.g.,  Loree Reins. & Arb. L. F. posts here, here, here, here, here & here.)

While exceedingly deferential, the standard is not toothless. Arbitration awards that disregard or contravene the clear and unmistakable terms of a contract are subject to vacatur under it. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 676 (panel had “no occasion to ascertain the parties’ intention in the present case because the parties were in complete agreement regarding their intent.”) (quotation omitted); United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract. . . .”). That’s because an arbitrator who makes an award that lacks “any contractual basis” has not even arguably interpreted the contract, and therefore has strayed from his or her task. See Oxford, 133 S. Ct. at 2069 (distinguishing Stolt-Nielsen); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668-69, 672; Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.

An arbitrator whose award contradicts the unambiguous provisions of the parties’ contract may—but will not necessarily—exceed her powers. The answer depends on what the agreement says, what the award says and whether the award is at least arguably grounded in the agreement.

Whether or not a contract or contract term is “ambiguous” depends on whether it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. See, e.g., White v. Continental Cas. Co., 9 N.Y.3d 264, 267 (2007); Greenfield v. Philles Records, 98 N.Y.2d 562, 570-71 (2002). When a contract is unambiguous, a court can interpret it as a matter of law; if it is ambiguous, its meaning is a question of fact for trial.

Can the Interpretation of the Arbitrators be “Unreasonable,” yet still Colorable or Plausible?

The legal standard for lack of ambiguity is that there be only one “reasonable” interpretation of the contract terms, not that there are no other at least barely plausible or barely colorable interpretations of what the contract might mean. In probably the majority of contract interpretation cases concerning alleged contract ambiguity, each litigant supports its position with good-faith, reasonable arguments for why the disputed contract terms are allegedly susceptible to one or more than one meaning. Whenever courts determine that a contract is unambiguous, that conclusion necessarily means that the losing party’s interpretation of the contract is unreasonable as a matter of law. Continue Reading »

Improving Arbitration-Award Making and Enforcement by Faithfully Implementing the Purposes and Objectives of the Federal Arbitration Act

November 13th, 2013 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, General, Grounds for Vacatur, Practice and Procedure, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Improving Arbitration-Award Making and Enforcement by Faithfully Implementing the Purposes and Objectives of the Federal Arbitration Act

Part II:

A Consent-Based Framework

for Making and Enforcing Arbitration Awards

Introduction

In Part I we argued that improving arbitration in general—and the award making and enforcement process in particular—requires persons with a stake in arbitration’s success to adjust how they think about arbitration. We also argued that the purposes and objectives of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) provide a relatively simple analytical framework which, if consistently and properly applied, can help persons with a stake in arbitration’s continued success make decisions that should help facilitate the achievement of that goal.

This Part II discusses that analytical framework, which is based on United States Supreme Court interpretations of the FAA and its purposes and objectives. It posits that arbitration’s improvement and continued success as a dispute resolution mechanism for a broad range of disputes depends on it being an attractive alternative to litigation, and that arbitration can remain such an attractive alternative for a broad range of disputes only if courts, arbitrators, and parties fully and forthrightly accept that arbitration is a matter of contract, and that the awards that it yields should be freely and summarily enforced, provided that they represent a legitimate product of the agreement to arbitrate. Continue Reading »

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter—SCOTUS Reaffirms FAA Section 10(a)(4) Manifest Disregard of the Agreement Outcome Review Standard and Elaborates on Its Scope: Part II.B

August 18th, 2013 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Contract Interpretation, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Practice and Procedure, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter—SCOTUS Reaffirms FAA Section 10(a)(4) Manifest Disregard of the Agreement Outcome Review Standard and Elaborates on Its Scope: Part II.B

 

Part II.B: To what Extent, if at all, will Oxford Likely Influence FAA Law and Practice?

While Oxford is uncontroversial in the sense that it does not purport to change the standard of review applicable to Federal-Arbitration-Act (“FAA”)-governed arbitration awards, it will likely influence FAA arbitration law and practice concerning the judicial review of arbitration awards under FAA Section 10(a)(4) in at least three ways. Continue Reading »