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Posts Tagged ‘Tripartite Arbitration’

Second Circuit Sets Evident Partiality Standard for Party-Appointed Arbitrators on Industry Tripartite Arbitration Panels

July 26th, 2018 Appellate Practice, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Awards, Evident Partiality, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Comments Off on Second Circuit Sets Evident Partiality Standard for Party-Appointed Arbitrators on Industry Tripartite Arbitration Panels

Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) authorizes courts to vacate awards “where there was evident partiality.  .  .  in the arbitrators.  .  .  .” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). As respects neutral arbitrators, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has long held that “[e]vident partiality may be found only where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”  Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).

But, particularly in industry and labor arbitration, the parties do not necessarily intend that party-appointed arbitrators on tripartite panels are neutral, that is, disinterested in the outcome, impartial and independent. Can a party vacate an award based on the “evident partiality” of a non-neutral, party-appointed arbitrator, and if so, what standard applies to such a challenge? Continue Reading »

Small Business B-2-B Arbitration Part II.B.2(C): Other Structural Aspects of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements—Who will the Arbitrators be?  

November 13th, 2014 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Making Decisions about Arbitration, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Small Business B-2-B Arbitration Part II.B.2(C): Other Structural Aspects of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements—Who will the Arbitrators be?  

In Part II.B.2(A) we identified three key structural aspects of pre-dispute B-2-B arbitration, and discussed the first two in that and a subsequent post. This Part II.B.2(C) wraps up our discussion of arbitration-agreement structure by briefly examining a topic that is at least as important as the scope of the agreement: who the decision makers will be and how they will be selected.

As one renowned jurist put it, “selection of the decision maker by or with the consent of the parties is the cornerstone of the arbitral process.”[1] Arbitration allows the parties considerable input into the selection of who the decision makers will be, something that can make it a very attractive alternative to litigation for one or both of the parties. Parties who do not opt out of the court system are left with the luck of draw.

Savvy users of arbitration—and for that matter, most persons with dispute resolution experience in judicial or arbitral forums or both—know that decision makers, whether randomly assigned or selected, are not fungible commodities. Were they fungible, let alone commodities, there would likely be little or no controversy surrounding appointments to the United States Supreme Court.

But differences in judicial philosophy do not have to be based on so-called “liberal,” “moderate” or “conservative” views to be important, and perhaps even outcome-determinative. For example, the composition of a three-judge appellate panel can in many cases significantly influence the outcome of an appeal in many civil cases involving any number of legal and policy issues that are not the subject of discussion, let alone controversy, in the mainstream media.

Presumably many lawyers who argue appeals before three-judge panels (including the author) would scream “halleluiah!” had they the opportunity to select even one member of a three-judge appeals panel—or even if each party got to select one, leaving those two to select a third.

But time and time again, we see situations where parties who could have that opportunity—in the arbitration context, that is— had they negotiated it, or who could have at least participated meaningfully in the selection of one or more arbitrators had they exercised their contract rights with due diligence, end up having little if any meaningful input into the selection process. That type of lost opportunity usually redounds to their detriment, especially when their counterparts not only negotiate arbitrator selection provisions that suit their purposes, but also fully and wisely exercise their arbitrator selection rights. Continue Reading »

Faithful to the “First Principle” of Arbitration Law, the Texas Supreme Court Shores up the “Cornerstone of the Arbitral Process”

August 5th, 2014 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Arbitrator Selection and Qualification Provisions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Contract Interpretation, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Party-Appointed Arbitrators, Practice and Procedure, State Courts, Texas Supreme Court Comments Off on Faithful to the “First Principle” of Arbitration Law, the Texas Supreme Court Shores up the “Cornerstone of the Arbitral Process”

Introduction  

Anyone versed in arbitration-law basics knows that “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2010) (citation and quotations omitted). That is the “first principle” of arbitration law (the “First Principle”) set forth in the Steelworkers’ Trilogy.[1] See, e.g., Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 295 & n.7, 294 n.6 (2010); AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 648 (1986).

The First Principle is integrally intertwined with “the central or primary purpose of the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)][,]” which is “to ensure that  private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 679 (citations and quotations omitted). To “enforce” an arbitration agreement “courts and arbitrators must give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.” Id. When courts do not give effect to the parties’ contractual rights and expectations, they violate the First Principle.

Courts and arbitrators are supposed to apply the First Principle faithfully and rigorously whenever  they interpret or apply material arbitration-agreement-terms, and in “doing so [they] must  not lose sight of the purpose of the exercise: to give effect to the intent of the parties.” See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 679-81. And if that admonition applies with special force in any particular context, it would be in the interpretation and enforcement of arbitrator selection and qualification provisions.

Arbitrator selection provisions are what Circuit Court Judge Richard A. Posner once dubbed the “cornerstone” of the parties’ agreement: “Selection of the decision maker by or with the consent of the parties is the cornerstone of the arbitral process.” Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d 773, 780 (2005) (Posner, J.); see, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 5 (“If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed.  .  .  .”); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Art. V(1)(d), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (a/k/a the “New York Convention”) (implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, et. seq.) (award subject to challenge where “[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties”); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668, 670 (one of the FAA’s “rules of fundamental importance” is parties “may choose who will resolve specific disputes”) (emphasis added; citations omitted); Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2005) (vacating award by panel not convened in accordance with parties’ agreement); Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 226 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Garage Employees Union, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).

Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer

On June 20, 2014, a divided Texas Supreme Court in Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, ___ S.W.3d __, No. 12-0739, slip op. (Tex. June 20, 2014), adhered to and correctly applied the First Principle by holding that an arbitration award had to be vacated because it was made by a panel not constituted according to the parties’ agreement.  Five Justices of the nine-member Court determined that the parties had agreed that party-appointed arbitrators need not be impartial, only independent. Because the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”) had, contrary to the parties’ agreement, disqualified the challenging party’s first-choice arbitrator on partiality grounds, the panel that rendered the award was not properly constituted and thus exceeded its powers. See Slip op. at 10. Continue Reading »

Ninth Circuit Approves Ex Parte Hearing Procedures in Reinsurance Case: United States Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co.

February 7th, 2010 Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, Practice and Procedure, Procedural Misconduct, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Comments Off on Ninth Circuit Approves Ex Parte Hearing Procedures in Reinsurance Case: United States Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co.

I.          Introduction

Back in January the Ninth Circuit decided United States Life Ins. Co. v. Superior National Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, slip op. (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2010), a Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) procedural misconduct decision that affords reinsurance and other arbitrators a good deal of leeway to devise and implement nontraditional procedures for resolving complex problems.   The case centered around a rather unusual procedure the arbitrators ordered and implemented to determine whether the cedents improperly handled some 12,604 contested workers compensation claims.  It also concerned the authority of arbitrators to interpret the scope of the submission and to award a disgorgement of investment income remedy in addition to pre-award interest.  Continue Reading »