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Posts Tagged ‘Nonsignatory’

Second Circuit Denies Motion to Compel Appraisal because Insurer Sought to Submit Question of Law to Appraisers

April 7th, 2019 Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act, Appraisal, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Authority of Arbitrators, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Practice and Procedure, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit No Comments »

In the Second Circuit, appraisal provisions in insurance policies and other contracts are, as a matter of federal common law, considered arbitration agreements for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act. Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate No. 0510135, 707 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013). That is because they “clearly manifest[] an intention by the parties to submit certain disputes to a specified third party for binding resolution.” McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1988); Bakoss, 707 F.3d at 143. That appraisal clauses typically do not use the term “arbitration” is of no moment—all that counts “is that the parties clearly intended to submit some disputes to their chosen instrument [appraisal] for the definitive settlement of certain grievances under the Agreement.” Id. (quotations omitted); see Bakoss, 707 F.3d at 143.

In Milligan v. CCC Info. Servs. Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-cv-1405, slip op. (2d Cir. April 3, 2019) the Second Circuit affirmed a district court decision that denied an insurer (the “Insurer”)’s motion to compel, under the Federal Arbitration Act, appraisal of a dispute concerning the Insurer’s obligation to indemnify the insured (the “Insured”) for total loss of a leased vehicle. The Second Circuit held that the dispute the Insurer sought to submit to appraisal concerned interpretation of the policy, and thus presented a question of law that was outside the scope of the appraisal clause.

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SCA v. Armstrong: Anatomy of the Lance Armstrong Arbitration Award—Part III.B.3: Panel Issue No. 2: Whether the Panel Could Bind Nonsignatory Mr. Stapleton to the Armstrong Arbitration Award

April 13th, 2015 Arbitrability, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Practice and Procedure, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, State Courts Comments Off on SCA v. Armstrong: Anatomy of the Lance Armstrong Arbitration Award—Part III.B.3: Panel Issue No. 2: Whether the Panel Could Bind Nonsignatory Mr. Stapleton to the Armstrong Arbitration Award

 Part III.B.3

Panel’s Analysis of Whether it Had the Authority to Bind Nonsignatory Mr. Stapleton to the Lance Armstrong Arbitration Award (Panel Issue No. 2)

yay-7966136-digitalIn Part III.B.2 we explained why we believe the Panel’s analysis of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute about sanctions (Panel Issue No. 1) was on the mark, and why the state court considering the issue de novo should find it helpful in the event the Armstrong parties challenge the panel’s jurisdiction. Today we briefly examine the Panel’s decision on Panel Issue No. 2: “Which parties are properly subject to this Tribunal’s jurisdiction?” (Award at 5)

The issue arose because the SCA Parties contended that Mr. William Stapleton was bound by the arbitration agreement and award because he executed the Settlement Agreement, albeit apparently only in his capacities as an officer of Tailwind and an authorized agent of Armstrong.  (See Award at 7.)

Like Panel Issue No. 1—whether the parties agreed to arbitrate SCA’s sanctions claims—Panel Issue No. 2 is a question of arbitrability. See Howsam v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941, 946-47 (1995). So, as discussed in Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2, the Court would presumably decide it independently—that is, without according deference to the Panel’s decision— were it necessary for it to decide it in the first place.

The SCA Parties, however, wisely chose to confirm the award as a whole rather than attempt to vacate it in part and confirm it in part, for as the Panel’s decision made very clear, there was no basis for finding Mr. Stapleton to be bound by the award. But even though the Court will presumably not have to address the issue, it is helpful for those interested in learning more about arbitration law to understand why the Panel got it right, and why the Texas Court would likely agree. Continue Reading »