Posts Tagged ‘Federal Arbitration Act’

Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards — Part IV: Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) – Procedural Misconduct

April 26th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Grounds for Vacatur, Procedural Misconduct, Reinsurance Arbitration Comments Off on Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards — Part IV: Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) – Procedural Misconduct

I. Introduction

In this part IV of our Nuts & Bolts vacatur feature, we focus on Section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides in pertinent part (with bracketed numbering and text added for convenience): 

[An arbitration award may be vacated:]

where the arbitrators were guilty [(1)] of misconduct [(a)] in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or [(b)] in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or [(2)] of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced[.]

Section 10(a)(3) might be referred to as a procedural due process provision, and courts sometimes suggests it defines the level of due process that must be present in an arbitration for a court to confirm the award without violating constitutional due process requirements.   We do not find that line of reasoning to be particularly helpful, and its validity is debatable.  But Section 10(a)(3) certainly prescribes a baseline level of procedural protection to parties who agree to arbitrate without expressly specifying procedural protections.  And it imposes a no-harm-no-foul rule:  procedural misconduct or misbehavior — including not following agreed procedural rules — does not undermine an award unless the misconduct or misbehavior prejudiced the challenging party.    Continue Reading »

Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.: What are the Implications for Reinsurance Arbitration?

April 18th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Reinsurance Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.: What are the Implications for Reinsurance Arbitration?

We have written extensively on Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., No. 08-1198, a case pending before the United States Supreme Court in which a decision is expected in the not too distant future.  Stolt-Nielsen presents the question whether a court or arbitration panel may, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, impose class arbitration on a party whose arbitration agreements are silent on that subject.  The answer to that question will likely answer a related question that is of special concern to those involved in reinsurance arbitration:  Can a panel or court impose consolidated arbitration on a party whose arbitration agreements are silent on that subject?  You can read our prior posts on Stolt-Nielsen here,  here, here, here, here, here, here, here,  here, here, here, here, here and here.  (Certain of these posts contain links to articles on Stolt-Nielsen we wrote for Karl Bayer’s Disputing blog.)   

But those posts principally concern the legal issues raised by the case, discuss various ways it might be decided, and argue that the correct answer to the question is that a court or arbitration panel cannot, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, impose class or consolidated arbitration in the face of silence.  To date we have not discussed in any detail the practical implications that the case may have on reinsurance arbitration, if any.  So today let’s look at what those implications may be.  Continue Reading »

Why Bother with Arbitration Law?

April 13th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Ethics, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Reinsurance Arbitration 4 Comments »

Readers are excruciatingly aware of the amount of time and energy we expend on what seems at first blush to be a relatively arcane area of the law:  practice and procedure under the Federal Arbitration Act.  It is a practice area that arises under a single federal statute that consists of three chapters and a handful of rather skeletal provisions.   Why is this stuff so important?    

If you hold yourself out to be a commercial litigator who handles arbitration proceedings arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, then you need to know arbitration law cold (or co-counsel with someone who does).  If you do not, then you have no business representing clients in arbitration proceedings.

In one sense, arbitration law is to the lawyer handling an arbitration what civil procedure law is to the lawyer handling a litigation.  No lawyer cognizant of his or her ethical obligations and professional responsibility would represent a client in a litigation without a good, working knowledge of the applicable procedural code and cases construing it.  Doing so would be a recipe for professional disaster. 

Yet commercial litigators with no experience or expertise in arbitration law sometimes believe their knowledge of court procedure qualifies them to represent parties in arbitration proceedings.  Arbitration is more informal than litigation, so if you know how to litigate, you can certainly arbitrate, right?  Wrong.

Arbitration law is what ensures that arbitration agreements will be enforced, whether that means confirming or vacating an award, compelling arbitration, staying litigation, or what have you.  Without it, arbitration would be, for the most part, an empty gesture.  Parties would have to commence cumbersome plenary actions to enforce awards and obtain specific performance of arbitration agreements, arbitrators would lack subpoena power and breakdowns in the arbitrator selection process could not be remedied (or would be very difficult to remedy).   In short, arbitration would lose much of its appeal because it would be difficult and expensive to enforce, and some aspects of it might not be enforceable at all. 

Perhaps in a perfect world arbitration law would be spelled out for us in great detail in a user-friendly and comprehensive statute or administrative code, which would contain all or most of the answers to the multitude of enforcement-related questions that arise at various stages of arbitration proceedings.  But our world is far from perfect, and in many domestic cases our sole source of statutory guidance is contained in the first chapter of the Federal Arbitration Act, which contains only 16 provisions, 15 of which have been on the books without material revision since 1925.  In “non-domestic domestic cases” — you have to love that informative moniker — which involve, for example, arbitrations taking place in the United States between domestic and international parties, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and its enabling provisions set forth in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, usually come into play, but the Convention and its enabling legislation does not directly answer that many questions. 

So in our imperfect world, the answers must come from the courts.  That would all be well and good if we lived in a country with a single court system, but we do not.  We have a multi-circuit federal court system (over which the United States Supreme Court presides) and a multi-jurisdiction state court system (over which the Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction to hear certain types of appeals).  And the substantive provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are applicable in, and construed by, both state and federal courts. 

Cases involving arbitration law are constantly being decided.  There are currently three-arbitration-law-related cases pending before the United States Supreme Court, and the Court usually decides at least one or two each term.   The federal district and circuit courts regularly churn out decisions on arbitration law, as do state trial, intermediate appellate and supreme courts. 

If state and federal court decisions from various jurisdictions and circuits were fairly uniform on Federal Arbitration Act issues, then perhaps things would be simpler.  But courts are split on a number of issues, and even in situations where different courts might reach the same result on a given set of facts, the rationale each court applies may be different, leading to different outcomes if the facts are changed slightly.   

Apparently someone somewhere decided that things were not quite complicated enough.  So it was necessary to interject some other variables:  horizontal (state-versus-state) and vertical (state versus federal) choice of law issues.  Not all arbitration proceedings are governed solely by the Federal Arbitration Act — it applies only to written arbitration agreements “in maritime transaction[s] or.  .  . contract[s] evidencing.  .  .  transaction[s] involving commerce.  .  .  .”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  When the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply, then the arbitration law of some state will generally apply.  Choice-of-law rules will determine which state’s law applies in a multi-jurisdictional case. 

Even when the Federal Arbitration Act applies, the parties may have agreed that state arbitration law applies, or at least there may be a substantial question whether state arbitration law applies.  Federal and state arbitration law may conflict, and it is necessary to determine which applies.  And sometimes there is a question whether the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state arbitration, or substantive contract, law.  In other cases there may be a question whether state arbitration law fills a gap in federal arbitration law. 

Arbitration-law-related issues can and do arise at all stages of an arbitration proceeding, and arbitration practitioners must keep in mind that litigation under the Federal Arbitration Act may be necessary to enforce a client’s rights or that such litigation may be brought by the other party.  In the beginning stages of an arbitration, for example, issues may arise as to what the arbitration was intended to cover.  A party may demand arbitration on a few claims, but there may be other actual or potential disputes which, if submitted, would fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Depending on what those claims are, and other considerations, the party against whom arbitration is demanded will want to ensure that the arbitration does or does not encompass those claims.  That requires the party to carefully tailor its own submissions and, if necessary, to object to the other party submitting additional issues once the proceedings are underway. 

The party resisting an arbitration demand may have arguments that some or all of the issues that are the subject of the demand are outside the scope of the arbitration clause.  Those arguments must be carefully preserved, and sometimes it is necessary to seek an order staying the arbitration in whole or in part. 

The party seeking arbitration may need to compel arbitration if the other party is resisting arbitration.  That requires court intervention and both parties must be prepared to brief the applicable law and facts.  Or perhaps the arbitration clause is self-executing, allowing a party to appoint a defaulting party’s arbitrator and proceed ex parte.  In that case, the non-defaulting party may be unable to compel arbitration, but must take special care to ensure that the resulting default award is enforceable. 

Arbitrator selection is another area where arbitration-law issues arise.  It might be necessary to compel a party to participate in arbitration selection or request that a court appoint an arbitrator.  If, at some point in the proceedings, one of the arbitrators dies or resigns, a number of important issues must be addressed.  The process of arbitrator disclosure is yet another area where arbitration law must guide strategy.   

Confirming or vacating awards requires knowledge of arbitration law and careful attention to strategy long before an award is rendered.  There may be grounds for vacating an award, but those grounds generally must be preserved during the proceedings.  There are also important deadlines that must be met and those deadlines may be triggered with respect to certain interim final awards long before the arbitration proceeding itself is concluded.  

Once an award is issued issues may arise as to whether it is ambiguous or whether it may be modified by the arbitrators.  Or arbitrators may purport to retain jurisdiction when they are not entitled to do so.  Dealing with these issues requires careful attention to arbitration law.   

When Federal Arbitration Act litigation is necessary, counsel need to know how to address the various procedural issues that arise, including subject matter jurisdiction, service, personal jurisdiction, the necessity of treating the proceeding as a motion and a host of other matters.   And counsel must know the extent to which procedural rules are supplied by the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, the Federal Rules of Procedure or state procedural rules. 

This is just a broad overview:  There are literally dozens of issues that may arise, including ones implicating state general contract law, the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, choice-of-law rules, and federal preemption doctrine.  Handling arbitration-related litigation demands special expertise, just as handling the underlying arbitration demands such expertise.  Practitioners and clients that fail to pay careful attention to this ever-evolving area of the law do so at their peril.

The Agency Model of Arbitral Power: University of Chicago Law School Law and Economics Professor Tom Ginsburg Explains Why Deferential Review Does Not Necessarily Make Arbitration an Effective Substitute for Adjudication

April 7th, 2010 Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on The Agency Model of Arbitral Power: University of Chicago Law School Law and Economics Professor Tom Ginsburg Explains Why Deferential Review Does Not Necessarily Make Arbitration an Effective Substitute for Adjudication

In George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001), then Circuit Judge (now Chief Judge) Frank H. Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:   “What the parties may do, the arbitrator as their mutual agent may do.”  248 F.3d at 581.   Chief Judge Easterbrook made this statement in the course of defining the “manifest disregard” standard of review.  Applying his “agency model,” he concluded that “the ‘manifest disregard’ principle is limited to two possibilities:  an arbitral order requiring the parties to violate the law.  .  . , and an arbitral order that does not adhere to the legal principles specified by contract, and hence unenforceable under § 10(a)(4).”   Id. 

Chief Judge Easterbrook’s “agency” model of arbitral authority is instructive.  Just as agents derive their authority by the consent of the principal (subject to the rules of apparent and implied authority), arbitrators derive their authority from the parties via the arbitration agreement and the submission.  Subject to any restrictions in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrators’ powers to resolve a dispute under a broad arbitration agreement are arguably co-extensive with those of the parties that appointed them. 

But the model is not perfect.  First, unlike agents, arbitrators are not subject to the control of their principals and owe them no fiduciary duties.  Second, analogizing arbitrators as agents of the parties in the way Chief Judge Easterbrook does effectively empowers arbitrators not only to decide cases, but to negotiate settlements that the parties could have entered into.  It therefore does not require arbitrators to even arguably interpret the contract or apply the law:  As long as the arbitrators do not require the parties to violate the law, and as long as the arbitrators are at least arguably faithful to the parties’ expressed choice-of-law, if any, they can reach whatever decision they wish, whether by application of facts to legal norms or by a compromise settlement that may or may not be rooted in the parties’ agreement.    That arguably does not comport with the parties’ presumed, legitimate expectations.  For the arbitrator’s job is to decide cases; settlement is a matter for the parties, and should be subject to the parties’ control. 

University of Chicago Law School Professor Tom Ginsburg has written an excellent white paper that argues that the deferential standard of review espoused by Watts and other courts does not necessarily make arbitration an attractive substitute for litigation.  See Tom Ginsburg, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 502 (2d Series), The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration  (Dec. 2009) (copy available here).  He argues that a more searching standard of review would make the market for arbitrators more transparent, and thus more effective.  He advocates using Chief Judge Easterbrook’s agency model as an analytical framework for allowing parties to choose whether they prefer a very deferential standard of review, like that prescribed in Watts; something akin to de novo review, like that available in litigation; or something in between the two.  Professor Ginsburg is in the process of publishing in the University of Chicago Law Review an article based on his white paper. Continue Reading »

Ninth Circuit Approves Ex Parte Hearing Procedures in Reinsurance Case: United States Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co.

February 7th, 2010 Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, Practice and Procedure, Procedural Misconduct, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Comments Off on Ninth Circuit Approves Ex Parte Hearing Procedures in Reinsurance Case: United States Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co.

I.          Introduction

Back in January the Ninth Circuit decided United States Life Ins. Co. v. Superior National Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, slip op. (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2010), a Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) procedural misconduct decision that affords reinsurance and other arbitrators a good deal of leeway to devise and implement nontraditional procedures for resolving complex problems.   The case centered around a rather unusual procedure the arbitrators ordered and implemented to determine whether the cedents improperly handled some 12,604 contested workers compensation claims.  It also concerned the authority of arbitrators to interpret the scope of the submission and to award a disgorgement of investment income remedy in addition to pre-award interest.  Continue Reading »

SCOTUS Update: United States Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc. Arbitration Unconscionability Case

January 18th, 2010 Unconscionability, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court 5 Comments »

On September 23, 2009 we reported on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, slip op. (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2009), petition for cert. granted  Jan. 15, 2010 (No. 09-497).  (Prior post here)  As reported in Disputing, on January 15, 2010, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear Rent-a-Center West’s appeal.  (Disputing post here) 

As we discussed nearly four months ago Rent-A-Center concerns an important “who” question that arises in unconscionability cases:  When the parties clearly and unmistakably agree that the arbitrators will decide arbitrability questions, who gets to decide whether the arbitration clause is unenforceable on unconscionability grounds? 

We think the question answers itself.  But the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that the court decides the unconscionability question irrespective of the parties clearly expressed intent to the contrary.  We argued that the Ninth Circuit should have applied a severability analysis of sorts, and referred the unconscionability question to the arbitrators.  The “Analysis” section of our prior post is reprinted in pertinent part below:  

There is logic to the rule adopted by the majority in that unconscionability is a state law defense that goes to the enforceability of an agreement.  When a party challenges the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the court ordinarily decides it – unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agree otherwise.  And while the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability,  that agreement was – as is often the case – simply a component of the rest of the arbitration agreement.  If the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable because of unconscionability, then so too must be the agreement to arbitrate arbitrability. 

The problem with the majority’s logic is that it does not distinguish between the enforceability of the clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability and the enforceability of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate all other disputes.  The Rent-A-Center parties envisioned that a dispute concerning the enforceability of their agreement to arbitrate all other disputes would be decided by the arbitrators.  That is what the parties’ agreement said, and the United States Supreme Court has said that parties can enter into such agreements, provided they are clear and unmistakable. 

We think courts would better advance the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act by engaging in a severability analysis of sorts when confronting questions like the one in Rent-A-Center.   When parties agree not only to arbitrate the merits of controversies unrelated to the arbitration clause, but also clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate arbitrability, the latter agreement is tantamount to an arbitration agreement within an arbitration agreement.  One agreement concerns who decides disputes concerning the existence, formation or enforceability of the other agreement.  And the other agreement concerns the parties’ obligation to arbitrate all other disputes.  Each should be analyzed separately under Federal Arbitration Act Section 2. 

What the court did in Rent-A-Center was assume that, if any part of the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for any reason, then the entire arbitration agreement – including the clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability – must fail.  Perhaps ironically, the Court found support for this analysis in the Prima Paint/Buckeye Check Cashing line of cases that hold that an enforceability challenge directed at the contract as a whole – as opposed to the arbitration agreement specifically – must be decided by the arbitrators rather than the court.  Because the challenge here was to a stand-alone arbitration agreement that included a clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability, the Court simply assumed that Federal Arbitration Act Section 2 required the Court to decide it.  But doing so was inconsistent with the parties’ clearly expressed intent that the arbitrators would decide arbitrability questions, at least arbitrability questions that did not concern the enforceability of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate arbitrability. 

The Court should have limited its inquiry to whether the parties’ agreement to arbitrate arbitrability was substantively unconscionable.  If not, then the Court should have directed that the arbitrators decide the question whether the remainder of the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable.  Had the Court looked at the problem from that perspective, we believe it would have concluded that the unconscionability defense did not apply to the parties’ clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate, and that, accordingly, the arbitrators had to decide whether the challenge to the remainder of the arbitration clause had merit.  

.  .  .  . 

So we think the Court should have enforced the agreement to arbitrate arbitrability by committing to the arbitrators the question whether the parties’ agreement to arbitrate all other claims was unconscionable because it was allegedly one-sided.  Had it done so, it would have given full force and effect to the parties’ clearly expressed intentions, the pro-enforcement policies of Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, and the letter and spirit of First Options.

 We shall keep readers apprised of developments as and when they occur.  It will be interesting to see how the United States Supreme Court decides this case.

Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards – Part III.B: Evident Partiality (Enforcing the Parties’ Expectations of Neutrality)

January 12th, 2010 Awards, Evident Partiality, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure 3 Comments »

Introduction

Part III.A of the evident partiality segment of this series discussed the parties’ reasonable expectations of neutrality.  Today we consider how those expectations are enforced. 

“Evident partiality” challenges typically arise out of one of two scenarios.  First, there are “presumed bias” cases in which the arbitrator’s relationship to the parties or the controversy would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator was biased, even though the challenger cannot prove actual bias.    Second, there are evident partiality challenges based on allegations of actual bias.  For example, suppose a neutral said on the record during the proceedings prior to deliberations:  “Party A, frankly I have distrusted your company’s business motives for many years, but hearing your witnesses’ testimony has simply confirmed what I’ve suspected all along.”  While the chances of an arbitrator making such a statement (let alone on the record) are exceedingly slim to non-existent, it would provide the basis for an evident partiality challenge (which would probably succeed) based on proof of actual bias. 

The difference between “presumed” and “actual” bias is simply one of proof.  One is based on circumstantial evidence and the other on direct evidence.  Our focus will be on “presumed bias” cases, because they arise with greater frequency.  Actual bias is very difficult to prove, and if it or something approaching it can be established, then that proof would in any (or most any) event meet the standards necessary to establish evident partiality.    Continue Reading »

Stolt-Nielsen Oral Argument Analysis: Part IV

January 6th, 2010 Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Practice and Procedure, United States Supreme Court 1 Comment »

Introduction

Stolt-Nielsen turns on the allocation of power between courts and arbitrators.   No matter how thoroughly and neatly you parse the issues, the question that repeatedly and continuously begs for an answer is:  who decides?  Answer that question as it relates to one issue and it pops up again in relation to the next. 

Up until Bazzle the Supreme Court did an admirable job of delineating the bounds of arbitral versus judicial authority.  The lines were blurred in Bazzle, where under the peculiar facts there was a question whether the agreement precluded class arbitration.  (See our Disputing guest post here.)  The question required interpretation of ambiguous contract language – a task arbitrators have both the authority and the competence to perform – so it was remanded to the arbitrators.  The four-Justice plurality said the question was not one of arbitrability, but concerned the “kind” of arbitration to which the parties agreed.  

But many of the lower courts — including the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit — read Bazzle to mean that arbitrators have the authority under a broad arbitration agreement to determine whether the parties agreed to class arbitration when their agreements say nothing about class or consolidated arbitration.   That is a very different question from whether an arbitration agreement precludes class arbitration, and it is not one that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen clearly and unmistakably submitted to the arbitrators.      

Stolt-Nielsen presents the United States Supreme Court with a unique opportunity to draw a sharper and stronger line between the arbitrable and non-arbitrable in cases concerning class or consolidated arbitration.  Whether or not the Court will seize it is an open question, because, as explained in Part III, AnimalFeeds has articulated a plausible argument that Stolt-Nielsen has not established the predicate for the Court’s grant of certiorari:  that the parties’ agreements were silent on class arbitration.  If at least five justices are satisfied with the (we believe, unsatisfactory) status quo concerning class arbitration, or otherwise believe that the best course is to allow class arbitration to continue (and even flourish), then AnimalFeed’s argument may provide an interpretive path for a ruling that the case is not properly before the Court.   

Today we explain why accepting AnimaFeeds’ argument would contravene the letter and spirit of the Federal Arbitration Agreement, breed further litigation, and undermine confidence in arbitration as an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism.   More to the point, we discuss why and how the Court can reach the merits of Stolt-Nielsen consistently with how Stolt-Nielsen presented the question.     Continue Reading »

Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards — Part II: Corruption, Fraud and Undue Means

December 19th, 2009 Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Uncategorized 5 Comments »

In this Part II of our Nuts & Bolt feature on vacating arbitration awards (Part I is here) we briefly look at the first statutory ground for vacating an award under the Federal Arbitration Act:  where “[t]he award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. . . .”  9 U.S.C. 10(a)(1).  Cases vacating awards on Section 10(a)(1) are rare, probably because the circumstances that would trigger relief are themselves rare.     

Section 10(a)(1) is an excellent expression of how Section 10 is designed to provide relief in situations where putting a court’s  imprimatur on an award would deprive one of the parties of the benefit of its freely-bargained-for arbitration agreement.   It says that corruption, fraud, or undue means in the procurement of an award, whether perpetrated by the arbitrators or a party, spoils the award (assuming the aggrieved party timely moves to vacate).  There is nothing particularly controversial about that; we suspect few would contend that parties who agree to arbitrate impliedly consent to arbitration resulting in an award procured through outright chicanery.    Continue Reading »

Stolt-Nielsen Oral Argument Analysis: Part I

December 13th, 2009 Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Practice and Procedure, United States Supreme Court 5 Comments »

On December 9, 2009 the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the one Federal Arbitration Act case it has agreed to review this Term:  Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. granted June 15, 2009 (No. 08-1198) (oral argument transcript here).  Stolt-Nielsen concerns whether class or consolidated arbitration may be imposed on parties whose contracts are silent on that point, and we have written extensively about the case, including a series of guest-post articles for the Disputing blog.  (Posts available here,  here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here.)

This multi-part post considers what transpired at oral argument and provides our take on it.  Familiarity with the background facts is presumed and, if necessary, can be gleaned here, here, and here.  Continue Reading »