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O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services: The Ninth Rejects Non-Mutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel as a Basis for Invalidating Arbitration Agreements

April 15th, 2026 Arbitration Agreement Invalid, Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Challenging Arbitration Agreements, Class Action Arbitration, Class and Collective Proceedings, Contract Defenses, Delegation Agreements, Delegation Provision, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Equal Footing Principle, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Section 13, FAA Section 2, FAA Section 3, FAA Section 4, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 13, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, Issue Preclusion, Mass Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Preclusion Doctrines, Preclusive Effect of Awards, Res Judicata or Claim Preclusion, Section 13, Section 2, Section 3 Default, Section 3 Stay of Litigation, Section 4, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit No Comments »

Introduction

non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppelIn O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc., No. 25-1528, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026), the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court ruling that invoked non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel to deem unconscionable hundreds of separate, bilateral arbitration agreements agreements between a corporate health care provider and its individual, nurse employees. O’Dell, a 3-0 opinion, is of  interest to entity and individual parties litigating gateway arbitrability disputes arising out of  mass, class, or collective proceedings.

Background

The case concerned wage-related claims asserted by travel-nurse employees against a healthcare provider, Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Aya”). As a condition of employment, Aya required its employees to sign arbitration agreements containing similar terms. The agreements also contained delegation provisions that required an arbitrator, rather than a court, to decide arbitration-agreement validity disputes. Id. at 4-6. (You can read about delegation provisions here and here.)

The district court initially sent four named plaintiffs’ disputes to four separate arbitrations each to be decided by a different, individual arbitrator. The results were evenly split: Two arbitrators held the agreements unconscionable based on their fee allocation and venue provisions; the other two ruled that the agreements were enforceable, determining that a savings clause (presumably providing  for severability) cured any unconscionability problem. Id. at 6. The district court confirmed three of the four awards, refusing to confirm one of the awards because of Aya’s alleged failure to pay the arbitration fee.  Id.

After 255 additional plaintiffs opted into a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”) collective action, the district court declined to send their disputes to arbitration. Instead, invoking non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel, the district court gave preclusive effect to the two arbitral rulings invalidating the agreements, refused to give the same effect to the two rulings upholding the agreements, and held that Aya was barred by collateral estoppel from enforcing the remaining agreements. Id. at 6-7.

The Court did not accord preclusive effect to the two awards that upheld the agreement to arbitrate, dismissing them as not “reasoned” or “thorough.” Id. at 7.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Offensive, Non-Mutual Collateral Estoppel: The Question Presented

The Ninth Circuit considered whether “application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements is compatible with the Federal Arbitration Act [(the “FAA”)].” Id. at 4. The Court said the answer was no. Id. at 4-5, 12-13.

The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis: Non-Mutual, Offensive  Collateral Estoppl is Incompatible with the FAA

The court’s reasoning was straightforward, but its implications are significant. It began with the FAA’s text.

FAA Section 2 provides, in pertinent part, that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. . . .  9 U.S.C. § 2. Under Section 2, “generally applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” are “grounds for revocation.” Slip op. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted) But there were no such grounds here.

The Ninth Circuit explained that non-mutual offensive issue preclusion is not a “generally applicable contract defense” of the kind contemplated by Section 2’s savings clause. O’Dell, slip op. at 8-9 (quotations and citation omitted). For irrespective of whether a case concerns contract enforceability, this preclusion doctrine may, to avoid relitigation, accord certain judgments preclusive effect. “In other words,” said the Court, “the doctrine is not about contracts or contract defenses.”  It is a judge-made preclusion doctrine which—if used as it was here—would indirectly but effectively invalidate arbitration agreements that the FAA says should be enforced. Id. at 8-10.

It is not a ground for “revocation”—which is “‘[t]he recall of some power, authority, or thing granted, or a destroying or making void of some deed that had existence until the act of revocation made it void.’” Id. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted). “Revocation” under Section 2 “includes fraud, duress, and unconscionability[,]” but “does not pertain to a deficiency with respect to the formation of contracts. . . that might result in “revocation.” Slip op. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted).

Even assuming “revocation broadly encompasses the indirect but effective invalidation of the agreement through preclusion, And to the extent that “revocation broadly encompasses the indirect but effective invalidation of agreements through preclusion,” the doctrine would “contravene critical features of the FAA.” Slip op. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted).

The Court also considered context, considering Sections 3, 4, 10, and 13 of the FAA. Sections 3 and 4 require courts to stay litigation and compel arbitration in accordance with the parties’ agreement once the making of the agreement is not in issue. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. Section 10 provides limited grounds for vacatur focused on defects in the arbitral process, such as corruption, fraud, or evident partiality. Id. § 10. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, nothing in that statutory scheme suggests that Congress contemplated a non-mutual preclusion doctrine that would frustrate arbitrations the parties had separately agreed to undertake. O’Dell, slip op. at 9-10. The court specifically rejected the employees’ reliance on Section 13, reasoning that Section 13 makes confirmed awards enforceable as judgments, but does not authorize using one confirmed award to abrogate distinct arbitration agreements involving other parties. Id. at 12-13.

Application of Offensive, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel Violates Arbitration’s First Principle

The FAA’s first principle—consent, not coercion—provided the Court with a second— and perhaps in some ways, more important—rationale. (For a discussion of arbitration’s “first principle,” see here.) The FAA, the panel explained, presupposes that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion. Id. at 10-11 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 184 (2019)). The employees’ preclusion theory disregarded this first principle. See slip op. at 10-11. As the Court explained, “[p]recluding an arbitration” to which “the parties agreed. . .— because a different arbitrator in a different proceeding had concluded that an agreement between different parties was unconscionable—would render the parties’ consent meaningless.” Slip op. at 11.

Using Offensive, Non-Mutual Collateral Estoppel to Impose a Bellwether Scheme without Party Consent

The court’s third rationale will likely attract the most attention. The district court’s ruling, the panel said, effectively transformed individualized arbitrations into a binding “bellwether” or class-like device without the parties’ consent. Id. at 5, 11-12. That is significant because Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly held that the FAA does not permit courts or arbitrators to impose class  procedures that alter the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration unless there is a contractual basis to do so. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 507-09 (2018) (quotation and citations omitted); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684-87. O’Dell extends that line of authority in an important way. It treats offensive non-mutual preclusion, when used to wipe out separate bilateral arbitrations, as another unauthorized claim aggregation scheme that is inconsistent with the FAA’s consent-based, bilateral structure. See O’Dell, slip op. at 11-13.

The Court said “the imposition here [of an aggregation mechanism] is more concerning than in” prior cases. See slip op. at 11. Because in ordinary class proceedings named representative plaintiffs must “adequately represent” class members. Slip op. at 11. Not so here. “Indeed,” said the Court, under the district court’s logic, just one  arbitration proceeding would be enough to preclude hundreds (or thousands) of other arbitration proceedings.” Slip op. at 12. “That,” remarked the Court, “is a class action stripped of all  its important protective features.” Slip op. at 12. Permitting offensive collateral estoppel to preclude agreed individual arbitrations from taking place “would supplant arbitrations with binding bellwether class actions lacking the procedural safeguards of ordinary class actions.” Slip op. at 12. That would violate the FAA. See Slip op. at 12.

The Court accordingly rejected “this new application of preclusion doctrine as it would be “fundamentally at war with the FAA and undermine Congress’s efforts to protect arbitration from judicial opposition.” Slip op. at 12 (citation omitted).

Implications of the Decision

O’Dell is important for at least three reasons. First, it clarifies that FAA Section 2’s saving clause authorizes only generally applicable contract defenses, not equitable doctrines which apply to litigation generally, as opposed to contract actions specifically. That is especially so, where, as here, the doctrine may, as applied, interfere with arbitration’s key attributes or is otherwise incompatible with arbitration.

Second, O’Dell reminds us that, pursuant to delegation agreements, and in the absence of contractual consent to the contrary, gateway arbitrability disputes are disputes between the parties to the particular individual arbitration agreement at issue. They are, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, to be decided in an arbitration between those parties, not by proxy using  a bellwether aggregation device.

Here, the district court had already enforced the delegation clauses as written by sending the first four validity disputes to arbitration. Id. at 5-6. Once those arbitrations produced mixed results, the district court used the two invalidity awards as a shortcut to avoid further arbitrations. The Ninth Circuit rejected that move. In practical terms, where the parties have agreed to arbitrate gateway validity questions one by one, courts may not convert a few early rulings into a substitute for resolving each of the remaining individual arbitrations. See slip op. at 10-12.

Third, O’Dell has implications for collective, coordinated, and mass arbitration litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel will often look for ways to convert favorable early rulings into leverage across a broader claimant pool. Defendants, too, sometimes seek global effect from threshold rulings. O’Dell does not foreclose contractual bellwether arrangements or other consensual aggregation mechanisms. But it does show that courts may not impose them through non-mutual offensive issue preclusion when the parties agreed to bilateral arbitration. Id. at 11-13.

Conclusion

O’Dell should be read as an important Ninth Circuit reaffirmation of three connected FAA principles: arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms; not all defenses are generally applicable contract defenses, and arbitration remains a matter of consent, not coercion. Where parties agreed to bilateral arbitration, courts may not use non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to create a de facto class, bellwether, or other aggregation mechanism to which the parties never agreed.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, or arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Philip J. Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is principal of the Loree Law Firm, a New York attorney who focuses his practice on arbitration and associated litigation. A former BigLaw partner, he has 35 years of experience representing a wide variety of corporate, other entity, and individual clients in matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as in insurance- or reinsurance-related, and other, matters.

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Gateway Keeping: The Third Circuit Joins the Sixth in Holding that Courts get to Decide whether Parties Consented to Class Arbitration

August 28th, 2014 American Arbitration Association, Appellate Practice, Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Arbitration Provider Rules, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Consent to Class Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Practice and Procedure, Stay of Litigation, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Gateway Keeping: The Third Circuit Joins the Sixth in Holding that Courts get to Decide whether Parties Consented to Class Arbitration

On June 10, 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) considered whether an arbitrator exceeded his powers under Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) Section 10(a)(4) by finding that a fairly run-of-the-mill arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration. Applying the deferential, manifest-disregard-of-the-agreement outcome-review standard authorized by FAA Section 10(a)(4), the Court upheld an arbitrator’s determination that an arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration because the arbitrator had, at least arguably, interpreted the arbitration agreement, albeit in a highly creative and doubtful way. (See Loree Reins. & Arb. L. Forum posts here, here, here & here.)

In a footnote, the Court explained that it “would face a different issue if Oxford had argued below that the availability of class arbitration is a so-called ‘question of arbitrability.’” 133 S. Ct. at 2068 n.2. The Court said that Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 680 (2010), “made clear that this Court has not yet decided” whether class-arbitration-consent presents a question of arbitrability. But “Oxford agreed that the arbitrator should determine whether its contract with Sutter authorized class procedures[,]” and “Oxford submitted that issue to arbitrator not once, but twice—and the second time after Stolt-Nielsen flagged that it might be a question of arbitrability.” 133 S. Ct. at 2068 n.2. (emphasis added)

Had Oxford opted to request the Supreme Court to determine whether class- arbitration consent presented a question of arbitrability, and had the Court determined that it was such a question, then the Court would have determined independently—that is, without deferring to the arbitrator’s decision—whether the parties consented to class arbitration. See BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-138, slip op. at 6 (U.S. March 5, 2014); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 543 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). And we doubt that a majority of the Supreme Court would have upheld the Oxford award had it reviewed the class-arbitration-consent determination de novo. See, e.g., Oxford, 133 S. Ct. at 2071 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If we were reviewing the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract de novo, we would have little trouble concluding that he improperly inferred “[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration … from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685).  

Those who have been tracking developments in class and consolidated arbitration since the turn of this century no doubt recall that, after a plurality of the Court determined in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003), that a class-arbitration-consent-related dispute did not present a question of arbitrability, but merely a procedural question, parties began to submit routinely and unreservedly class-arbitration-consent questions to arbitration.

But after Stolt-Nielsen, and, no doubt with renewed vigor after Oxford, class arbitration opponents began to argue that class-arbitration-consent presented a question of arbitrability for the Court to decide. And U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals are beginning to rule on those challenges.

The first one to do so was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013), where the Court in November 2013 held “that the question whether an arbitration agreement permits classwide arbitration is a gateway matter, which is reserved for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.” 734 F.2d at 599 (quotation and citation omitted).

The second, and most recent Circuit Court of Appeals to rule on the issue, was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 12-4444, slip op. (3rd Cir. July 30, 2014), which on July 30, 2014 “join[ed] the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that.  .  .  “the availability of” class arbitration “is a substantive gateway question rather than a procedural one[,]” and thus “is a question of arbitrability.” Slip op. at 15, 16-17.  The Court’s decision turned on “the critical differences between individual and class arbitration and the significant consequences of that determination for both [a] whose claims are subject to arbitration[;] and [b] the type of controversy to be arbitrated.” Slip op. at 15 (emphasis added). Where, as in Opalinski, the arbitration agreement did not “mention” class arbitration, the Court “believ[ed] the parties would have expected a court, not an arbitrator, to determine the availability of class arbitration[,]” and that was “especially so given the critical differences between individual and class arbitration and the significant consequences” of the class-arbitration-consent determination as respects “whose claims are subject to arbitration and the type of controversy to be arbitrated.” slip op. at 16-17.

The Third Circuit’s Opalinski decision, like the Sixth Circuit’s in Reed Elsevier, is well reasoned and reaches the conclusion we likewise think is required by the Supreme Court’s long-line of arbitrability jurisprudence, and by its post-Bazzle class-arbitration cases, beginning with Stolt-Nielsen. We suspect that other circuits will, for largely the same reasons, that class-arbitration-consent presents a question of arbitrability.

Let’s have a look at what transpired in Opalinski.  .  .  . Continue Reading »