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Posts Tagged ‘California Arbitration Law’

California Supreme Court Upholds Default Judgment Confirming $414,601,200 Default International Arbitration Award

April 20th, 2020 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Award Confirmed, Awards, California Supreme Court, Confirmation of Awards, Default Award, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Chapter 2, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 9, International Arbitration, Personal Jurisdiction, Practice and Procedure, Service of Process Comments Off on California Supreme Court Upholds Default Judgment Confirming $414,601,200 Default International Arbitration Award
default judgment award confirm

On April 2, 2020 the California Supreme Court rejected a service-of-process challenge to a default judgment confirming a $414,601,200 international arbitration award. The parties agreed that notice could be given, and service of process made, by Federal Express (“FedEx”), and the Court held that the petitioner was not required to make service under the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (the “Hague Convention”).  

Facts and Procedural History

Party A, apparently headquartered in the U.S., and Party B, headquartered in China, entered into a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”), which contemplated the two companies forming another. But that didn’t happen and Party A demanded arbitration against Party B under the arbitration agreement in the MOU.

Party A served the arbitration agreement by FedEx, as agreed. Party B did not appear in the arbitration and the arbitrator, after hearing evidence, entered a default arbitration award. Service of the arbitration demand was made by FedEx, and Party B was given notice of each of the proceedings that comprised the arbitration.

The Arbitrator made a default award against B in the amount of $414,601,200. Party A commenced confirmation proceedings in a California state court, serving B by FedEx, as expressly agreed in the parties’ agreement.

But Party B did not appear at the confirmation proceedings, and the Court entered a default judgment confirming the award.

Party B then challenged the default judgment, contending that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it because service was made by FedEx, and not through the procedures prescribed by the Hague Convention.

The trial court rejected the challenge, the intermediate appellate court reversed, and the California Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the intermediate appellate court.

The California Supreme Court’s Decision to Uphold the Default Judgment

The question before the California Supreme Court was whether the Hague Convention preempted the parties’ right to serve by their agreed method of service, FedEx. California’s highest court said the answer was “no.”

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California Appeals Court Says Clause Construction Award is not Final Award Subject to Confirmation or Vacatur

August 29th, 2018 Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Awards, California State Courts, Class Action Arbitration, Clause Construction Award, Confirmation of Awards Comments Off on California Appeals Court Says Clause Construction Award is not Final Award Subject to Confirmation or Vacatur

Introduction

Clause Construction Award 1

Clause Construction Award 1

We have discussed (here) what constitutes a final award under the Federal Arbitration Act, an issue that is important for a host of reasons, but is particularly so to any business faced with an adverse clause construction award. A clause construction award is an interim or partial final arbitration ruling that determines the threshold issue of whether the parties consented to class arbitration.

 

But not all arbitrations – even class arbitrations – are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and even when they are, parties may agree to procedural rules that are different from those of the FAA. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S.Ct. 978, 987-89 (2008); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.,  489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989). In Maplebear, Inc. v. Busick, ___ Cal. App.5th ___, slip op. (Cal. App., 1st Dist. August 21, 2018) (certified for publication), the parties agreed that  “the arbitration would be conducted by JAMS under its rules and procedures; the arbitrator would apply California substantive law; the arbitrator had no ‘power or authority to commit errors of law or legal reasoning’; and ‘[a]ny action to review the arbitration award for legal error or to have it confirmed, corrected or vacated’ would be decided under California law by ‘a California state court of competent jurisdiction.’” Slip op. at 2.

At issue in Maplebear was whether the California courts had jurisdiction to vacate a partial final Clause Construction Award, which concluded that the parties had consented to class arbitration. The California Appeals Court said “no,” which means that—unless the California Supreme Court (or the U.S. Supreme Court) hears an appeal and says otherwise—the parties have to endure through an entire class arbitration procedure before there is any judicial review of the Clause Construction Award. (Whether or not review by the California Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court is even possible given the procedural posture of this case is outside the scope of this post.)

 

An Unfair Burden on the Clause Construction Award Challenger?

Clause Construction Award 2

Clause Construction Award 2

Consider the burden the decision imposes on the class-arbitration opponent. According to the majority opinion in Concepcion, then fairly current American Arbitration Association statistics showed that: (a) “[a]s of September 2009, the AAA had opened 283 class arbitrations[;]” (b) “[o]f those, 121 remained active, and 162 had been settled, withdrawn, or dismissed[;]” (c) “[n]ot a single one, however, had resulted in a final award on the merits[;]” and (d) “[f]or those cases that were no longer active, the median time from filing to settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal—not judgment on the merits—was 583 days, and the mean was 630 days.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011).

Clause Construction Award 4

Clause Construction Award 4

While we have not researched whether more recent statistics tell a different story, it seems quite likely that the Court’s decision on finality means that the class arbitration opponent will have to spend an awful lot of time and money before the issue of class arbitration consent is reviewed by a court, assuming it is ever reviewed.

 

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The Burlage Controversy: Did the Court Usurp Arbitral Power or did the Arbitrator Prejudice the Defendant by Excluding Evidence Material to the Controversy?

October 15th, 2009 Awards, California State Courts, Procedural Misconduct 3 Comments »

 Introduction

Section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes courts to vacate awards “where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct.  .  . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.”  California’s arbitration statute says courts “shall” vacate an award where a party’s rights “were substantially prejudiced . . . by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy . . . .”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1286.2(a)(5) (here). 

On August 31, 2009 the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District decided Burlage v. Superior Court of Ventura Cty., ___ Cal. App. 4th ___, slip op. (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 31, 2009), petition for rehearing granted.  (A copy of the opinion is here.)  At the time we viewed Burlage as an excellent and relatively easy to understand example of how courts should – and do – deal with those relatively rare situations where a party is prejudiced by an arbitrator refusing to hear evidence material to the controversy, whether under the Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) or a state law equivalent like California Civil Code Section 1286.2(a)(5).  While we still believe that the court correctly affirmed the trial court decision vacating the arbitration award, the decision has proved to be more controversial than we initially suspected it would be.   Continue Reading »