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Posts Tagged ‘Associate Justice Clarence Thomas’

GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews by Video Conference Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner

June 2nd, 2020 ADR Social Media, Arbitrability, Arbitrability - Equitable Estoppel, Arbitrability - Nonsignatories, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, CPR Speaks Blog of the CPR Institute, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, International Arbitration, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Loree & Loree, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Questions of Arbitrability, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC | International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Interviews by Video Conference Philip J. Loree Jr. and Richard D. Faulkner
GE Energy Power

On June 1, 2020 the United States Supreme Court issued its 9-0 decision in GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC. In an opinion authored by Associate Justice Clarence Thomas the Court held that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards did not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. Associate Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion.

On the same day the Court decided GE Power, our friend and colleague Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”), interviewed our friend and colleague Richard D. Faulkner and Philip J. Loree Jr. about the case and what it means for practitioners.

You can watch the video-conference interview HERE.

Also on June 1, 2020 Russ also wrote an excellent post about GE Energy for CPR’s blog, CPR Speaks, which explains in detail the background of the case and the rationale for the Court’s opinion, as well as Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion. You can read that post HERE.

Contacting the Author

If you have any questions about this article, arbitration, arbitration-law, arbitration-related litigation, then please contact Phil Loree Jr., at (516) 941-6094 or at PJL1@LoreeLawFirm.com.

Philip J. Loree Jr. is a partner and founding member of Loree & Loree. He has 30 years of experience handling matters arising under the Federal Arbitration Act and in representing a wide variety of clients in arbitration, litigation, and arbitration-related litigation.

Loree & Loree represents private and government-owned-or-controlled business organizations, and persons acting in their individual or representative capacities, and often serves as co-counsel, local counsel or legal adviser to other domestic, and international, law firms requiring assistance or support.

Loree & Loree was recently selected by Expertise.com out of a group of 1,763 persons or firms reviewed as one of Expertise.com’s top 18 “Arbitrators & Mediators” in New York City for 2019, and now for 2020. (See here and here.)

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING NOTICE: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Photo Acknowledgment

The photo featured in this post was licensed from Yay Images and is subject to copyright protection under applicable law.

Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: What do the Terms Arbitrable, Arbitrability, and Question of Arbitrability Mean, and Why do they Matter?

March 26th, 2014 Arbitrability, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Grounds for Vacatur, Practice and Procedure, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: What do the Terms Arbitrable, Arbitrability, and Question of Arbitrability Mean, and Why do they Matter?

 Arbitrable, Arbitrability and Question of Arbitrability

If you’ve ever been unfortunate enough to be privy to a conversation about arbitration law, you probably heard things like:

“The dispute arguably falls within the scope of the agreement and is therefore arbitrable.”

Oxford expressly pointed out that none of the parties argued that consent to class arbitration is a question of arbitrability.”

“Did the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate arbitrability? Because if they did, questions of arbitrability are arbitrable.”

Arbitration-law parlance is probably more arcane and cryptic than it has to be, but it has been with us for several decades and there’s no indication that it is likely to change any time soon. Learning it may be painful, but is usually well worth the modest effort required.

Today we’ll define in plain English some of the most bandied-about arbitration-law terms: “arbitrable,” “arbitrability” and “question of arbitrability.” And in the process we’ll try to explain why these closely-related terms are significant in matters governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). Continue Reading »

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter—SCOTUS Reaffirms FAA Section 10(a)(4) Manifest Disregard of the Agreement Outcome Review Standard and Elaborates on Its Scope: Part I

July 19th, 2013 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Contract Interpretation, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Labor Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter—SCOTUS Reaffirms FAA Section 10(a)(4) Manifest Disregard of the Agreement Outcome Review Standard and Elaborates on Its Scope: Part I

On June 10, 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, No. 12-135, slip op. at 4-5 (U.S. June 10, 2013) (Kagan, J.), unanimously reaffirmed that Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA authorizes courts to vacate awards that are not even arguably based on an interpretation of the parties’ agreement.

While the Court broke no new ground, Associate Justice Elena Kagan’s well-written opinion—together with Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito’s opinion in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)—defines in fairly clear terms the scope of contract-based judicial review Section 10(a)(4) authorizes. Justice Kagan’s opinion raises not only some issues specific to class and consolidated arbitration, but also some relevant to Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)-governed arbitration in general. Continue Reading »

Some Initial Thoughts on the SCOTUS AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion Oral Argument

November 16th, 2010 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, California State Courts, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Some Initial Thoughts on the SCOTUS AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion Oral Argument

As many readers know, on Tuesday, November 9, 2010 the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (blogged here, here, here and here).  You can find the transcript of the argument, here, and the audio, here

After reviewing the oral argument transcript a number of times, and listening to the audio, we still believe it more likely than not that AT&T Mobility will prevail.  We’ll develop that thought further in upcoming installments of our Disputing guest post, “AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion:  Can Discover Bank Withstand Stolt-Nielsen Scrutiny?” (Part I, here).

There have been a number of differing opinions post argument on how the Court will likely rule.  Some believe the argument foreshadows victory for the Concepcions.  Others are not so certain, and still others believe that AT&T Mobility may emerge the victor.  Like all such opinions, they are are really nothing more than educated guesswork, and should be taken with a grain of salt. 

We don’t suggest our take on things is anything more, but we share it for what it is worth.  We think the oral argument was basically a toss-up, and that it mainly confirmed what we already knew or surmised:  That this is a very difficult case, and that the eight Justices who asked questions appear to be split along ideological lines.  We expected no less in light of the 5-3 and 5-4 split decisions in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559  U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); and  Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 

The key point on which the argument shed no meaningful light is what Associate Justice Clarence Thomas makes of this case.  Justice Thomas joined the Stolt-Nielsen and Rent-A-Center majority opinions, but those cases, unlike this one, did not concern the preemptive scope of the Federal Arbitration Act

Preemption is controversial, and its importance extends far beyond the AT&T Mobility case.    Particularly controversial — and very supportive of AT&T Mobility’s position — is the doctrine of “implied preemption,” also known as “conflict” or “obstacle” preemption. In Federal Arbitration Act cases this doctrine tells us that  state laws or policies that undermine “the goals and policies of the FAA” are preempted by the Act.  Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1990).

But Justice Thomas believes that the implied preemption doctrine is unconstitutional.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205 (2009) (Thomas, J. concurring) (“implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are inconsistent with the Constitution.  .  .  .”).  He also believes that Congress intended the Federal Arbitration Act to be a procedural statute that applies only in federal court.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 US 440 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]n state-court proceedings, the FAA cannot be the basis for displacing a state law that prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause contained in a contract that is unenforceable under state law.”). 

He thus believes that state courts can apply state arbitration law as they see fit, irrespective of whether the result would be different had the case been brought in federal court.  While AT&T Mobility — like Stolt-Nielsen and Rent-A-Center — was brought in federal court, and everybody concedes that the Federal Arbitration Act applies, Justice Thomas remains a strong proponent of federalism.  

Justice Thomas’ deference to state law is problematic for AT&T Mobility.  Perhaps AT&T Mobility’s best argument is that the Federal Arbitration Act impliedly preempts the Discover Bank rule for the reasons set forth in Stolt-Nielsen.   Apparently concluding that the Justices in the Stolt-Nielsen majority — including Justice Thomas —  are the ones most likely to support AT&T Mobility’s position, AT&T Mobility deliberately downplayed the implied preemption issue, although it made clear that it believes the Federal Arbitration Act both expressly and impliedly preempts the Discover Bank rule. 

That was a wise strategy given Justice Thomas’ rejection of implied preemption.  Its wisdom was borne out by what transpired at the argument:  of the eight Justices that asked questions, the four more liberal ones (Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia M. Sotomayor and Elena Kagan) appear to be leaning in favor of finding that the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt the Discover Bank rule, while the four more conservative ones (Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Associate Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel J. Alito, Jr.) appear to be leaning in favor of finding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Discover Bank.      

That means Justice Thomas is likely to hold the deciding vote, but where he’ll ultimately cast it, nobody knows (at least outside the Supreme Court).  We believe there are equally plausible reasons why he might vote  for or against preemption.  

We’ll explore all of this and more in our Disputing guest post.  In the meantime, keep an eye out for our next Forum article on AT&T Mobility, which will focus on the highlights of the oral argument and tie them into the express and implied preemption issues that this critically important case presents.