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Posts Tagged ‘American Express Merchants’ Litigation’

The Businessperson’s Federal Arbitration Act FAQ Guide III: Pre-Award Litigation under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act—Gateway Disputes about Whether Arbitration Should Proceed (Part II)

February 4th, 2020 Arbitrability, Arbitrability | Clear and Unmistakable Rule, Arbitrability | Existence of Arbitration Agreement, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Law, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Businessperson's FAQ Guide to the Federal Arbitration Act, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, FAA Chapter 1, FAA Preemption of State Law, Federal Arbitration Act Enforcement Litigation Procedure, Federal Arbitration Act Section 2, Federal Arbitration Act Section 3, Federal Arbitration Act Section 4, Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, First Principle - Consent not Coercion, Gateway Disputes, Gateway Questions, McCarran-Ferguson Act, Moses Cone Principle, Practice and Procedure, Pre-Award Federal Arbitration Act Litigation, Presumption of Arbitrability, Procedural Arbitrability, Questions of Arbitrability, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, Stay of Litigation, Substantive Arbitrability 2 Comments »
gateway disputes

Gateway disputes, which concern whether parties are required to arbitrate a dispute on the merits, are the principal subject of pre-award Federal Arbitration Act litigation. In the last segment of this series, Gateway Disputes about Whether Arbitration Should Proceed (Part I), we answered a number of FAQs concerning gateway disputes, including who gets to decide those disputes:  

  1. What is the Difference between Pre-Award and Post-Award Litigation under the Federal Arbitration Act?
  2. What are Gateway Questions?
  3. Who Decides Gateway Questions?
  4. How do Parties Clearly and Unmistakably Agree to Submit Questions of Arbitrability to Arbitrators?
  5. Are there any Arbitrability Disputes that Courts Decide when the Contract at Issue Clearly and Unmistakably Provides for the Arbitrator to Decide Questions of Arbitrability?

Today we’ll answer some more FAQs about how gateway disputes are decided (or at least are supposed to be decided) by courts and arbitrators:

  1. What is the Presumption of Arbitrability?
  2. Does the Presumption of Arbitrability Apply to all Questions of Arbitrability?
  3. What Law Applies to Determine Gateway Disputes about Arbitrability to which the Presumption of Arbitrability does not Apply?
  4. How is Presumption of Arbitrability Applied to Resolve Gateway Questions about the Scope of an Arbitration Agreement?
  5. What Defenses, if any, Can Parties Assert against Enforcement of an Arbitration Agreement, and what Law Governs these Defenses?

The answers to these questions, along with the answers provided in Part I, will provide you with a solid foundation for understanding how pre-award Federal Arbitration Act litigation works and what to expect if your business is or becomes embroiled in it. The next segment will answer FAQs about the nuts and bolts of pre-award Federal Arbitration Act practice and procedure under Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Act.

What is the Presumption of Arbitrability?

Back in 1983 the U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark decision Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), famously declared that “[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” 

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What to Make of the Second Circuit Voiding a Class Action Waiver Under California’s Discover Bank Rule?

July 23rd, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, California State Courts, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on What to Make of the Second Circuit Voiding a Class Action Waiver Under California’s Discover Bank Rule?

After deciding Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds, Inc. and Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson, the United States Supreme Court left federal arbitration law at a crossroads.  In both cases the Court adhered quite faithfully to its prior Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence, under which it enforces arbitration agreements according to their terms, without regard to other considerations.  In Rent-A-Center the Court implicitly reaffirmed that these pro-enforcement rules apply equally to contracts of adhesion. 

We will find out whether the Court intends to continue down the same path when it decides AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion next term, a case that raises the question whether California’s Discover Bank  unconscionability rule is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  That rule deems unconscionable under California law class-action or class-arbitration waivers where:  (a) “the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which the disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages”; and (b) “it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.  .  .  .”  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162-63 (2005) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1668). 

The Discover Bank rule is grounded in a California-law principle – embodied in Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 – that “contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud.  .  .  are against the policy of the law.”   See Cal. Civ. Code § 1668.  If a company is allegedly engaging in fraudulent acts designed to cheat numerous consumers out of small amounts of money, a class action or class arbitration waiver may, if enforced, effectively act as an exculpatory provision that insulates the company from the consequences of its small scale, but widespread fraud, because the individual, allegedly defrauded consumers have little incentive to pursue separate actions or arbitrations to recoup trivial amounts of damages.  See Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162-63.  Any contract that had that effect – whether it is a class action waiver in an arbitration clause, an exculpatory agreement or a contract that simply forbids class actions  — would be unconscionable under the rule.  

In Fensterstock v. Education Finance Partners, No. 09-1562-cv, slip op. (2d Cir. July 12, 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested one path that the United States Supreme Court might take on Discover Bank preemption.  In an interesting opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Amalya Lyle Kearse, joined by Circuit Judges José A. Cabranes and Chester J. Straub, held that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  According to the Second Circuit, California’s  Discover Bank rule “’places arbitration agreements on the exact same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the context of arbitration,’” and for that reason the rule is not preempted by the Act.  Slip op. at 16-17 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original)). 

On first blush the Second Circuit’s decision seems reasonable.  But there are some important issues lurking beneath the surface that the Supreme Court will need to address when it decides AT&T MobilityContinue Reading »

United States Supreme Court Vacates Judgment in American Express Merchants’ Litigation

May 12th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on United States Supreme Court Vacates Judgment in American Express Merchants’ Litigation

The Supreme Court has issued a summary order in the American Express Merchants’ Litigation that suggests that it believes that Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. ___ , slip op. (2010)  renders class arbitration waivers enforceable despite public policy and other challenges.  Readers may recall that on May 29, 2009 American Express filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the American Express Merchants’ Litigation, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding class action arbitration was invalid and unenforceable under federal public policy grounds in the circumstances presented by the case.  See Re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded sub. nom., American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 08-1473 (May 3, 2010). 

On May 3, 2010 the United States Supreme Court issued a summary order in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 08-1473 granting certiorari, summarily vacating the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and remanding it “for further consideration in light of” Stolt-Nielsen.   Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor “took no part in the consideration or decision” of the petition.   Italian Colors, No. 08-1473 (May 3, 2010) (summary disposition). 

It will be interesting to see what the Second Circuit does with the case on remand.

Update on Federal Arbitration Act Cases Pending in the United States Supreme Court

September 29th, 2009 Awards, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 1 Comment »

Today the United States Supreme Court is considering whether to grant certiorari in three cases that concern whether manifest disregard of the law remains a viable ground for vacating or modifying an arbitration award after Hall Street Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel , Inc, 552 U.S. ___, slip op. (March 25, 2008).  The first is The Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 Fed. Appx. 415 (6th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed May 11, 2009 (08-1396), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that manifest disregard survived Hall Street as an independent ground for vacatur, and that an award in favor of a franchisor must be vacated because the arbitrator manifestly disregarded Maryland franchise law requiring franchisors to disclose certain types of prior criminal convictions.  The Sixth Circuit also found that the franchisor’s failure to disclose the conviction vitiated the arbitration clause contained in the franchise contract, a holding that seems questionable in light of Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). 

The second case is Grain v. Trinity Health, 551 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed May 19, 2009 (08-1446), in which the Sixth Circuit held that the arbitrators’ failure to enforce the parties’ choice of Michigan law as respects the issue of costs and attorney fees — characterized as manifest disregard of the law — was not a valid ground for modifying an arbitration award under Federal Arbitration Act Section 11.  

The third is Improv West Associates v. Comedy Club, Inc.,  553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. ), petition for cert. filed June 8, 2009 (08-1529), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that manifest disregard of the law remained viable after Hall Street because it fell within the ambit of Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(4), and vacated an award on the ground that the arbitrator’s interpretation of applicable state law was “fundamentally incorrect,” albeit made in good faith. 

The briefs in support of and in opposition to both petitions, as well as the lower court decisions, can be obtained by visiting one of our favorite blogs, the SCOTUSblog, here and  here.  It will be interesting to see whether the United States Supreme Court decides to grant certiorari in any or all of these cases.   

On a related matter, Petitioners’ and amici merits briefs in  Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. granted June 15, 2009 (No. 08-1198) can be accessed via the American Bar Association’s website, here.  Respondent’s briefs are due later in October and oral argument has been scheduled for December 9, 2009.  (See Russ Kunkel’s LawMemo Arbitration Blog here).  We have written extensively on Stolt-Nielsen, which concerns whether class arbitration may be imposed on parties whose contracts are silent on that point.  (Posts available here,  here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here.)  

 Finally, we are following the petition for certiorari filed in the American Express Merchants’ Litigation (blogged here), which has not yet come up for conference.   The Amex Merchants’ Litigation concerns whether class arbitration waivers comport with federal antitrust policy. 

We shall keep readers apprised of developments as and when they occur.  .  .  .

Feeney v. Dell Inc.: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Says Class Action Waiver in Arbitration Agreement Governed by the Federal Arbitration Act Violates Massachusetts Public Policy

July 16th, 2009 Arbitrability, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 3 Comments »

Introduction

The validity of class action waivers in arbitration agreements is a controversial subject at the moment.  There is an obvious tension between the pro-enforcement policies of the Federal Arbitration Act and competing state and federal policies favoring class action arbitration or litigation as a vehicle for vindicating consumer rights.  The United States Supreme Court may provide some hint of where it stands on this issue when it decides the Stolt-Nielsen case (blogged here and here), which raises the related issue whether imposing class action arbitration is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act when the parties’ contract is silent on that score.  And the Supreme Court may directly address the issue of whether class action waivers comport with federal policy if it decides to grant certiorari in the American Express Merchants’ Litigation (blogged here).  Today we examine a case in which the question was whether a state policy in favor of consumer class actions could trump the enforcement of an arbitration agreement containing a class-action waiver. 

On July 2, 2009, in Feeney v. Dell Inc., ___ Mass. ___, slip op. (July 2, 2009), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the “SJC”) ruled that a class action waiver contained in a consumer arbitration agreement violated a fundamental Massachusetts public policy favoring class actions, even though the parties had agreed that Texas law, which allows class action waivers, would govern their agreement.  This violation of Massachusetts public policy, said the Court, rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable because the class action waiver was unenforceable and could not be severed from the remainder of the arbitration agreement.  But, in an interesting turn of events, the Court dismissed the consumers’ claims with leave to replead, because they failed to state a claim under Mass. G.L., c. 93A, the applicable consumer protection law. 

The case is somewhat different from other decisions voiding class action waivers because the agreement was voided on state public policy grounds, rather than on state unconscionability grounds, and because the court refused to enforce not only the class action waiver but also a choice-of-law clause indicating the parties’ desire that Texas, not Massachusetts, law would govern the class action waiver issue.  The case gives rise to serious questions concerning federal preemption of Massachusetts state policy. 

In this part I of a two-part post, we summarize the Feeny case.  In part II, which will follow tomorrow or the next day, we shall provide our critical analysis.  Because the publicly available copy of the case does not feature official pagination, we have eliminated jump cites, but provide after quotes pertinent information about internal citations, quotations and the like.    Continue Reading »

More on Stolt-Nielsen: Shouldn’t the Supreme Court Also Grant Certiorari in the American Express Merchants’ Litigation?

June 17th, 2009 Appellate Practice, Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court 5 Comments »

On June 15, we reported briefly on the grant of certiorari in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009) (post available here).  As readers will recall the issue before the Court is whether imposing class arbitration on a party whose arbitration clause is silent on that issue is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. 

On May 29, 2009 American Express filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the American Express Merchants’ Litigation, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding class action arbitration was invalid and unenforceable under the circumstances of that case.  See Re American Express Merchants’ Litigation,  554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed (08-1473) (May 29, 2009).  (A copy of the Second Circuit decision is here, and the Supreme Court Docket sheet is here.)   Opposition papers are due June 29, 2009.  Continue Reading »