Archive for the ‘Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration’ Category

Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: Do Arbitrators Necessarily Exceed their Powers by Making an Award that Conflicts with the Unambiguous Terms of the Parties’ Agreement?

November 11th, 2014 Appellate Practice, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Contract Interpretation, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, New York Court of Appeals, New York State Courts, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: Do Arbitrators Necessarily Exceed their Powers by Making an Award that Conflicts with the Unambiguous Terms of the Parties’ Agreement?

We’ve addressed on many occasions the Enterprise WheelStolt-Nielsen/Oxford contract-based outcome review standard, which permits courts to vacate awards when they do not “draw their essence” from the parties’ agreement. Under that standard the “sole question is whether the arbitrators (even arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether [they] got its meaning right or wrong.” See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (parenthetical in original). (See, e.g.,  Loree Reins. & Arb. L. F. posts here, here, here, here, here & here.)

While exceedingly deferential, the standard is not toothless. Arbitration awards that disregard or contravene the clear and unmistakable terms of a contract are subject to vacatur under it. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 676 (panel had “no occasion to ascertain the parties’ intention in the present case because the parties were in complete agreement regarding their intent.”) (quotation omitted); United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract. . . .”). That’s because an arbitrator who makes an award that lacks “any contractual basis” has not even arguably interpreted the contract, and therefore has strayed from his or her task. See Oxford, 133 S. Ct. at 2069 (distinguishing Stolt-Nielsen); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668-69, 672; Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.

An arbitrator whose award contradicts the unambiguous provisions of the parties’ contract may—but will not necessarily—exceed her powers. The answer depends on what the agreement says, what the award says and whether the award is at least arguably grounded in the agreement.

Whether or not a contract or contract term is “ambiguous” depends on whether it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. See, e.g., White v. Continental Cas. Co., 9 N.Y.3d 264, 267 (2007); Greenfield v. Philles Records, 98 N.Y.2d 562, 570-71 (2002). When a contract is unambiguous, a court can interpret it as a matter of law; if it is ambiguous, its meaning is a question of fact for trial.

Can the Interpretation of the Arbitrators be “Unreasonable,” yet still Colorable or Plausible?

The legal standard for lack of ambiguity is that there be only one “reasonable” interpretation of the contract terms, not that there are no other at least barely plausible or barely colorable interpretations of what the contract might mean. In probably the majority of contract interpretation cases concerning alleged contract ambiguity, each litigant supports its position with good-faith, reasonable arguments for why the disputed contract terms are allegedly susceptible to one or more than one meaning. Whenever courts determine that a contract is unambiguous, that conclusion necessarily means that the losing party’s interpretation of the contract is unreasonable as a matter of law. Continue Reading »

What Happens when Arbitrators Exceed Clear Limitations on their Authority?

October 24th, 2014 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Contract Interpretation, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, New York State Courts, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Comments Off on What Happens when Arbitrators Exceed Clear Limitations on their Authority?

One advantage of arbitration is that parties can define and delineate the scope of disputes they agree to submit to arbitration, the basis on which disputes  can or must be resolved and the scope of the arbitrator’s remedial powers. If parties impose clear limits on an arbitrator’s authority (usually by expressly excluding certain matters from arbitration or expressly providing that an arbitrator cannot or must grant certain remedies), then courts and arbitrators are supposed to enforce those limitations. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 680-81 (2010).

Far too frequently, parties simply agree to a broad arbitration agreement that places no limitations on arbitral power, and when they end up on the wrong-end of an award they didn’t expect, they discover to their dismay that they have no judicial remedy. Whether or not they understood that at the time they agreed to arbitrate is, of course, irrelevant. The only relevant consideration is whether their agreement could be reasonably construed to grant the arbitrator that authority, even if it could also be reasonably construed to withhold it. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (“when a court interprets such provisions in an agreement covered by the FAA, due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration”) (quotation and citation omitted).

But suppose the parties take the time to consider whether they desire to limit arbitral authority, and their arbitration agreement unambiguously expresses an intention to limit arbitral authority to resolve certain disputes or impose certain remedies, or to expressly require that the arbitrators grant certain types of relief, such as fee shifting to a prevailing party. Should a court vacate the award if the arbitrator does not abide by the parties’ unambiguously expressed intentions?  Continue Reading »

Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: I Received an Arbitration Award in my Favor but my Adversary Refuses to Pay it. What can I do?

June 14th, 2014 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Final Awards, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Small Business B-2-B Arbitration, State Arbitration Statutes, State Courts, Statute of Limitations Comments Off on Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: I Received an Arbitration Award in my Favor but my Adversary Refuses to Pay it. What can I do?

Favorable arbitration awards are wonderful things, but they are not self-enforcing. Sometimes the other side voluntarily complies, but if not, there is really not much of anything the arbitrator can do to help.

Arbitrators are not judges and thus do not have the authority to garnish wages, seize property,  foreclose on encumbered property, freeze bank accounts, impose contempt sanctions and so forth. Parties can delegate to arbitrators broad adjudicatory and remedial authority, but that is relevant only to the nature and scope of their awards, and does not confer power on the arbitrators to enforce their awards coercively.

Apart from its potential preclusive effect in subsequent litigation, an arbitration award stands on the same footing as any other privately prepared legal document, such as a contract. It may be intended by the arbitrators and at least one of the parties to have legal effect, but it is up to a court to say what legal effect it has, and,  if necessary, to implement that legal effect through coercive enforcement. A judgment, by contrast, is an official decree that not only can be coercively enforced through subsequent summary proceedings in the same or other courts (including courts in other states and federal judicial districts), but is, to some extent, self-enforcing. A judgment, for example, can ordinarily be filed as a lien on real property, and applicable state or federal law may, for example, authorize attorneys to avail their clients of certain judgment-enforcement-related remedies without prior judicial authorization.

But that doesn’t mean you’re out of luck; it means you need a court to enter judgment on the award, that is, to “confirm” it. Once an award has been reduced to judgment, it can be enforced to the same extent as any other judgment. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 13 (Under Federal Arbitration Act, judgment on award “shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered”); Fla. Stat. § 682.15(1)( “The judgment may be recorded, docketed, and enforced as any other judgment in a civil action.”); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7514(a) (“A judgment shall be entered upon the confirmation of an award.”).

The Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), and most or all state arbitration statutes, authorize courts to confirm awards in summary proceedings. State arbitration-law rules, procedures, limitation periods and the like vary from state to state and frequently from the FAA, and state courts may apply them to FAA-governed awards (provided doing so does not frustrate the purposes and objectives of the FAA).

But let’s keep things simple, and take a brief look at the FAA’s requirements for confirmation applicable in federal court when there is no prior pending action related to the arbitration, and  there are no issues concerning federal subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, sufficiency or service of process, venue (i.e., whether suit should have been brought in another federal judicial district) or the applicability of the FAA.  We’ll also discuss how applications to confirm are supposed to be summary proceedings, why timing of an application is important, and how courts go about deciding them. Continue Reading »

Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: Can I Appeal an Arbitration Award in Court?

May 21st, 2014 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Awards, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Grounds for Vacatur, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure Comments Off on Arbitration and Mediation FAQs: Can I Appeal an Arbitration Award in Court?

Introduction

When a party is on the wrong end of an arbitration award that he, she or it thinks is fundamentally unfair, tainted by impropriety, or disconnected from the agreement the arbitrator was supposed to interpret and apply, the first question that comes to mind is whether there might be some form of recourse available. In court,  the usual avenue of relief from an adverse judgment or order is an appeal.

Can a losing party to an arbitration award governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) appeal it in court? Since private arbitration is an alternative to public, government-sponsored court litigation, since the court system plays an important role in enforcing arbitration agreements, since both arbitration and court litigation share at least some of the same attributes and since in the U.S. procedural due process and the primacy of the rule of law are as dear to us as baseball and apple pie, it is natural to assume that one should be able to appeal an adverse arbitration award.

But one cannot—in any meaningful sense of the word—“appeal” an arbitration award to a court. In court litigation an appeal involves judicial review by an appellate court under which a panel of judges reviews trial-court rulings on questions of law independently—that is, as if the appellate court were deciding the question for itself in the first instance. The appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact on a “clearly erroneous” or “clear error” standard of review, that is, paying a certain degree of deference to the finder of fact (the jury or trial judge). While appellate review thus does not involve a retrial on the merits, it is broad and searching, particularly where outcomes turn solely on questions of law.

The FAA does not authorize courts to review arbitration awards under an appellate standard of review, even if the parties consent to a court applying such a standard. Parties can agree before or after a dispute arises to an arbitration procedure that empowers another arbitrator or panel of arbitrators to review an award under an appellate or some other standard of review, but arbitration awards are subject to very limited and deferential review by courts and then only on a few narrow grounds.

The FAA Award-Enforcement Process

The FAA award enforcement process permits either party to make an application to vacate, modify or correct an award, or an application to “confirm” it, that is, enter judgment on it. Since the deadline for applying to vacate, modify or correct an award is considerably shorter than that for confirming an award, in many cases, parties who are seeking relief from the award make the initial application. If a putative challenging party does not timely seek relief, and the other party seeks confirmation after the expiration of the deadline for making an application to vacate, modify or correct the award, then the challenging party is time-barred from asserting grounds for vacatur or modification, even simply as affirmative defenses to confirmation. (See, e.g., L. Reins. & Arb. Law Forum post here.)

Let’s assume a party makes a timely motion to vacate an award. What will likely then happen is the other party will cross-move to confirm the award. The burden on the party seeking confirmation is pretty modest. Generally the party moving to confirm will need to show that the parties: (a) agreed to arbitrate; (b) consented to entry of judgment on the award; (c) appointed an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators; and (d) submitted the dispute to the arbitrators, who issued the award. The award is presumed valid and the court does not review its outcome or substance.

Once the modest prerequisites for confirmation have been established by a properly supported petition or motion to confirm an award, then the court “must grant” confirmation “unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected” under FAA Sections 10 or 11. 9 U.S.C. § 9. Thus, apart from those relatively rare cases where a party can show that the parties never agreed to arbitrate at all (and that the challenging party did not waive that defense), or perhaps never even impliedly consented to entry of judgment on the award, the only grounds on which the losing party can oppose confirmation are those set forth in Section 10 and 11.

The only exception might be if the award interprets the contract in a way that causes it to violate a well-defined and explicit public policy, or if the remedy the arbitrator awards violates the criminal law or requires one of the parties to do so. For example, one would not expect a court to enter judgment on an award that purported to authorize the prevailing party to inflict bodily harm on the losing party or vice-versa. That principle is simply an application of the contract-law rule that courts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy. See, generally, W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983); United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. King Soopers, 743 F.3d 1310, 1315 (10th Cir. 2014).

Continue Reading »

ROM Management Reinsurance Mgt. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.: Can Parties Agree State Arbitration Law Governs their Arbitration even if the Federal Arbitration Act Applies?

April 15th, 2014 Arbitrability, Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration and Mediation FAQs, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Choice-of-Law Provisions, Contract Interpretation, New York Court of Appeals, New York State Courts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, Reinsurance Arbitration, State Arbitration Law, Statute of Limitations, Stay of Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on ROM Management Reinsurance Mgt. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.: Can Parties Agree State Arbitration Law Governs their Arbitration even if the Federal Arbitration Act Applies?

Introduction

The Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)’s ordinarily trumps state-law rules of arbitrability in state- and federal-court  disputes involving agreements falling under it.  But what happens when parties to an FAA-governed arbitration agreement have agreed that state law governs their agreement, or the enforcement of their agreement?

Odd as it may seem, the FAA allows parties to agree that state-law rules of arbitrability govern if the parties unambiguously agree that they govern, even if the result is that an issue subject to arbitration under the FAA is excluded from arbitration because of the parties’ choice of state arbitration law. That holds true so long as enforcing the parties’ choice of law does not “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the FAA. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-64 (1995); Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 474-78 (1989); Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v. 55 Liberty Owners Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 247, 252-53 (2005); see, generally, Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, __, 130 S. Ct. 1758,1773-74 (2010). Because the whole point of the FAA is to promote arbitration by enforcing the parties’ arbitration agreement according to its terms, and because parties are free to clearly exclude issues from the scope of their arbitration agreement, giving effect to a applying a state-law rule of arbitrability does not contravene the FAA or its purposes and objectives. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (“[W]e have said on numerous occasions that the central or primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”), 1774 (“Underscoring the consensual nature of private dispute resolution, we have held that parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit[].  .  .  .  [and] may agree to limit the issues they choose to arbitrate.  .  .  .”) (quotations and citations omitted); Volt, 489 U.S. at 476-78.

In Re Rom Management Reinsurance Mgt. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., ___ A.D.3d ___, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01546 (1st Dep’t March 11, 2014).  New York’s Appellate Division, First Department (New York’s intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over New York and Bronx Counties (i.e., New York City’s Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx)), succinctly demonstrated how the parties’ unambiguous agreement to apply state-law arbitrability rules can narrow the issues that the parties would have been required to submit to arbitration had FAA rules of arbitrability applied. Continue Reading »

Belz v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney: Does a Petition to Vacate an FAA-Governed Award Timely Commenced in State Court Become Time-Barred Simply Because it is Removed to Federal Court?

April 6th, 2014 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, FAA Preemption of State Law, Grounds for Vacatur, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure, State Arbitration Law, Statute of Limitations, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Belz v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney: Does a Petition to Vacate an FAA-Governed Award Timely Commenced in State Court Become Time-Barred Simply Because it is Removed to Federal Court?

Part I

Belz v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-636-J-34 (MCR), slip op. (M.D. Fla. March 5, 2014), is one of those deceptively complex cases. The petitioner, successor trustee of a family trust (the “Trustee”), timely commenced under the Florida Arbitration Code (the “FAC”) in Florida state court  a petition to vacate an arbitration award by filing it within the 90-day period allowed by state law, but did not serve it until a few days after the three-month period required to vacate an award under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) had elapsed. Compare Fla. Stat. §§ 682.13(2) & 682.17 with 9 U.S.C. §§ 6, 10 & 12.[1]. The petition requested an order vacating the award under both the FAA and the FAC, which allows service to be effected after expiration of the 90-day filing deadline. See Fla. Stat. §§ 682.13 & 682.17.

The respondent, a well-known securities broker-dealer (the “Broker-Dealer”), removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida based on the court’s diversity jurisdiction. In federal court the Broker-Dealer argued that the petition was time-barred because service was not effected within the FAA Section 12’s three-month deadline. The district court agreed and dismissed the petition as time-barred.

The district court apparently thought that, once a court determines that an arbitration agreement falls within the scope of the FAA, all of its provisions—whether substantive, procedural or a combination of the two—supersede their state law counterparts if they conflict in any way with them, irrespective of whether the conflict frustrates the purposes and objectives of the FAA. The court also seems to have thought that the state of Florida could not, independently from the FAA, declare an arbitration agreement falling under the FAA to be valid, irrevocable and enforceable under Florida substantive arbitration law, and enforce that arbitration agreement through Florida’s own statutory, summary procedures that are, for the most part, identical to those provided by the FAA, and, in any event, do not frustrate the purposes and objectives of the FAA.

Belz is deceptively complex because at first glance the case seems relatively straightforward: (a) the FAA applied to the arbitration agreement and award; (b) the FAA’s three-month statute of limitations for vacating an award is not tolled until service is effected; (c) the court determined service was not timely under the FAA; (d) the FAC’s statute of limitations, which requires only that an application for vacatur be filed within the 90-day period, did not apply because the FAA applied; and (d) therefore, the application to vacate was untimely.

But in Belz there was an “elephant in the room,” albeit one well-camouflaged by its inherent complexity: federalism—a principle reflected in the text of the FAA, in the Continue Reading »

How to Make Arbitration Work for Your Business

September 2nd, 2010 Arbitration Agreements, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration Comments Off on How to Make Arbitration Work for Your Business

On September 1, 2010 Gina Passarella of the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer published an excellent article entitled, “Litigators Losing Love of Arbitration Argue for Trials.”  She quotes prominent, Philadelphia-based litigators, all of whom were critical of arbitration as a supposedly speedy and less expensive alternative to adjudication.  On the same day Ms. Passarella’s article was quoted and elaborated upon in Ashby Jones’ article in the Wall Street Journal Law Blog entitled, “Has Arbitration Become More Burdensome than Litigation?”  Both articles were tweeted and retweeted about on Twitter, and posted in certain LinkedIn groups.

The criticism of arbitration expressed in these articles is not new.  For years people (including I) have said that arbitration can be as expensive or more so than litigation.  People have repeatedly complained about how arbitration has become more like “arbigation,” and how Federal Arbitration Act satellite litigation has proliferated.  Or they criticize arbitrators for substituting rough justice for reasoned, legal analysis.  And so on. 

If you are a business person, or someone at a business whose responsibilities include drafting or approving contracts, you might throw up your hands and declare that your business will never, ever even think about agreeing to arbitrate.  But we think that you would be far better off giving more thought to what it is you desire from a system of dispute resolution, and how best to achieve your goals. 

The criticism expressed in the articles, and in the past, is generally valid, albeit misdirected.  It is directed at “arbitration,” as if arbitration was an institution unto itself, imposed on us by the legal system or perhaps by divine order.   

But, at least in B-2-B contracts negotiated at arms’-length, “arbitration” is not something imposed on the parties; it is something the parties impose on themselves.  We, the parties, are the architects of our own dispute resolution system.  If it turns out we designed or agreed to something reminiscent of Charles Dickens’  Bleak House, we should not blame the non-existent institution “arbitration.”  We should blame ourselves, or, more accurately, whomever drafted or approved the Dickensian arbitration agreement. 

The problems we sometimes associate with arbitration could be avoided if parties would give more thought to the type of dispute resolution they desire, and how any particular arbitration agreement — or agreement to administered arbitration under a set of arbitration provider rules — will likely be interpreted, and by whom.  Perhaps the best thing about arbitration is that parties have a lot of leeway not only to select the decisionmakers for their dispute, but also to design and structure the arbitration so that it suits their needs, and proceeds with as much or as little pre-hearing fanfare as the parties desire.  Within some basic limits, parties can structure their agreement as they see fit, and that can be something from which businesses can reap benefits. 

But many parties apparently are not aware of the extent to which arbitration can be tailored to fit particular situations, or simply do not consider the prospect of a future arbitration to be important enough to invest some modest time and effort into considering what is likely to transpire in the event of a dispute.  The problem is compounded by contract drafters, including attorneys, that simply do not have the requisite arbitration, litigation and arbitration-law experience to make informed judgments about whether the agreement they have drafted is likely to suit the parties’ dispute resolution needs.  I have been involved in a number of arbitrations that would have proceeded more expeditiously, efficiently and effectively had they been conducted pursuant to a well-drafted arbitration agreement, instead of one that was apparently selected without a lot of thought given to the type of proceeding the agreement authorized, and whether it was what the parties wanted.  We have all heard horror stories about arbitrations that would not have been so horrifying had the parties placed some limits on how the proceedings were to be conducted.  

The solution to the problem is relatively easy and not very costly.  Hire an arbitration lawyer with litigation, arbitration and arbitration-law experience to help you draft an effective arbitration agreeement that suits your needs and goals.  Depending on the scope of the project, only a few hours of the lawyer’s time may be needed.  And the return on the modest investment could be substantial in the event a dispute ever arises under the contract.

Your arbitration lawyer should initially focus on finding out from you what you desire from your dispute resolution system, and what it is about court adjudication you wish to avoid.  Depending on what your goals are, he or she may recommend that you opt for court adjudication and perhaps add choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses to your contract.  Or he or she may conclude that arbitration can further your goals, and help you draft an arbitration agreement designed to achieve them. 

So if you or your employer or business negotiates contracts with others, and you want more out of dispute resolution than ordinary court adjudication is likely to provide, hire an arbitration lawyer with litigation, arbitration and arbitration-law experience to help guide you along.  You probably won’t incur much in the way of legal fees, and you will be able to take better control of your own dispute-resolution destiny.

Why Bother with Arbitration Law?

April 13th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Ethics, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Reinsurance Arbitration 4 Comments »

Readers are excruciatingly aware of the amount of time and energy we expend on what seems at first blush to be a relatively arcane area of the law:  practice and procedure under the Federal Arbitration Act.  It is a practice area that arises under a single federal statute that consists of three chapters and a handful of rather skeletal provisions.   Why is this stuff so important?    

If you hold yourself out to be a commercial litigator who handles arbitration proceedings arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, then you need to know arbitration law cold (or co-counsel with someone who does).  If you do not, then you have no business representing clients in arbitration proceedings.

In one sense, arbitration law is to the lawyer handling an arbitration what civil procedure law is to the lawyer handling a litigation.  No lawyer cognizant of his or her ethical obligations and professional responsibility would represent a client in a litigation without a good, working knowledge of the applicable procedural code and cases construing it.  Doing so would be a recipe for professional disaster. 

Yet commercial litigators with no experience or expertise in arbitration law sometimes believe their knowledge of court procedure qualifies them to represent parties in arbitration proceedings.  Arbitration is more informal than litigation, so if you know how to litigate, you can certainly arbitrate, right?  Wrong.

Arbitration law is what ensures that arbitration agreements will be enforced, whether that means confirming or vacating an award, compelling arbitration, staying litigation, or what have you.  Without it, arbitration would be, for the most part, an empty gesture.  Parties would have to commence cumbersome plenary actions to enforce awards and obtain specific performance of arbitration agreements, arbitrators would lack subpoena power and breakdowns in the arbitrator selection process could not be remedied (or would be very difficult to remedy).   In short, arbitration would lose much of its appeal because it would be difficult and expensive to enforce, and some aspects of it might not be enforceable at all. 

Perhaps in a perfect world arbitration law would be spelled out for us in great detail in a user-friendly and comprehensive statute or administrative code, which would contain all or most of the answers to the multitude of enforcement-related questions that arise at various stages of arbitration proceedings.  But our world is far from perfect, and in many domestic cases our sole source of statutory guidance is contained in the first chapter of the Federal Arbitration Act, which contains only 16 provisions, 15 of which have been on the books without material revision since 1925.  In “non-domestic domestic cases” — you have to love that informative moniker — which involve, for example, arbitrations taking place in the United States between domestic and international parties, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and its enabling provisions set forth in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, usually come into play, but the Convention and its enabling legislation does not directly answer that many questions. 

So in our imperfect world, the answers must come from the courts.  That would all be well and good if we lived in a country with a single court system, but we do not.  We have a multi-circuit federal court system (over which the United States Supreme Court presides) and a multi-jurisdiction state court system (over which the Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction to hear certain types of appeals).  And the substantive provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are applicable in, and construed by, both state and federal courts. 

Cases involving arbitration law are constantly being decided.  There are currently three-arbitration-law-related cases pending before the United States Supreme Court, and the Court usually decides at least one or two each term.   The federal district and circuit courts regularly churn out decisions on arbitration law, as do state trial, intermediate appellate and supreme courts. 

If state and federal court decisions from various jurisdictions and circuits were fairly uniform on Federal Arbitration Act issues, then perhaps things would be simpler.  But courts are split on a number of issues, and even in situations where different courts might reach the same result on a given set of facts, the rationale each court applies may be different, leading to different outcomes if the facts are changed slightly.   

Apparently someone somewhere decided that things were not quite complicated enough.  So it was necessary to interject some other variables:  horizontal (state-versus-state) and vertical (state versus federal) choice of law issues.  Not all arbitration proceedings are governed solely by the Federal Arbitration Act — it applies only to written arbitration agreements “in maritime transaction[s] or.  .  . contract[s] evidencing.  .  .  transaction[s] involving commerce.  .  .  .”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  When the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply, then the arbitration law of some state will generally apply.  Choice-of-law rules will determine which state’s law applies in a multi-jurisdictional case. 

Even when the Federal Arbitration Act applies, the parties may have agreed that state arbitration law applies, or at least there may be a substantial question whether state arbitration law applies.  Federal and state arbitration law may conflict, and it is necessary to determine which applies.  And sometimes there is a question whether the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state arbitration, or substantive contract, law.  In other cases there may be a question whether state arbitration law fills a gap in federal arbitration law. 

Arbitration-law-related issues can and do arise at all stages of an arbitration proceeding, and arbitration practitioners must keep in mind that litigation under the Federal Arbitration Act may be necessary to enforce a client’s rights or that such litigation may be brought by the other party.  In the beginning stages of an arbitration, for example, issues may arise as to what the arbitration was intended to cover.  A party may demand arbitration on a few claims, but there may be other actual or potential disputes which, if submitted, would fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Depending on what those claims are, and other considerations, the party against whom arbitration is demanded will want to ensure that the arbitration does or does not encompass those claims.  That requires the party to carefully tailor its own submissions and, if necessary, to object to the other party submitting additional issues once the proceedings are underway. 

The party resisting an arbitration demand may have arguments that some or all of the issues that are the subject of the demand are outside the scope of the arbitration clause.  Those arguments must be carefully preserved, and sometimes it is necessary to seek an order staying the arbitration in whole or in part. 

The party seeking arbitration may need to compel arbitration if the other party is resisting arbitration.  That requires court intervention and both parties must be prepared to brief the applicable law and facts.  Or perhaps the arbitration clause is self-executing, allowing a party to appoint a defaulting party’s arbitrator and proceed ex parte.  In that case, the non-defaulting party may be unable to compel arbitration, but must take special care to ensure that the resulting default award is enforceable. 

Arbitrator selection is another area where arbitration-law issues arise.  It might be necessary to compel a party to participate in arbitration selection or request that a court appoint an arbitrator.  If, at some point in the proceedings, one of the arbitrators dies or resigns, a number of important issues must be addressed.  The process of arbitrator disclosure is yet another area where arbitration law must guide strategy.   

Confirming or vacating awards requires knowledge of arbitration law and careful attention to strategy long before an award is rendered.  There may be grounds for vacating an award, but those grounds generally must be preserved during the proceedings.  There are also important deadlines that must be met and those deadlines may be triggered with respect to certain interim final awards long before the arbitration proceeding itself is concluded.  

Once an award is issued issues may arise as to whether it is ambiguous or whether it may be modified by the arbitrators.  Or arbitrators may purport to retain jurisdiction when they are not entitled to do so.  Dealing with these issues requires careful attention to arbitration law.   

When Federal Arbitration Act litigation is necessary, counsel need to know how to address the various procedural issues that arise, including subject matter jurisdiction, service, personal jurisdiction, the necessity of treating the proceeding as a motion and a host of other matters.   And counsel must know the extent to which procedural rules are supplied by the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, the Federal Rules of Procedure or state procedural rules. 

This is just a broad overview:  There are literally dozens of issues that may arise, including ones implicating state general contract law, the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, choice-of-law rules, and federal preemption doctrine.  Handling arbitration-related litigation demands special expertise, just as handling the underlying arbitration demands such expertise.  Practitioners and clients that fail to pay careful attention to this ever-evolving area of the law do so at their peril.

Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards – Part III.B: Evident Partiality (Enforcing the Parties’ Expectations of Neutrality)

January 12th, 2010 Awards, Evident Partiality, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure 3 Comments »

Introduction

Part III.A of the evident partiality segment of this series discussed the parties’ reasonable expectations of neutrality.  Today we consider how those expectations are enforced. 

“Evident partiality” challenges typically arise out of one of two scenarios.  First, there are “presumed bias” cases in which the arbitrator’s relationship to the parties or the controversy would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the arbitrator was biased, even though the challenger cannot prove actual bias.    Second, there are evident partiality challenges based on allegations of actual bias.  For example, suppose a neutral said on the record during the proceedings prior to deliberations:  “Party A, frankly I have distrusted your company’s business motives for many years, but hearing your witnesses’ testimony has simply confirmed what I’ve suspected all along.”  While the chances of an arbitrator making such a statement (let alone on the record) are exceedingly slim to non-existent, it would provide the basis for an evident partiality challenge (which would probably succeed) based on proof of actual bias. 

The difference between “presumed” and “actual” bias is simply one of proof.  One is based on circumstantial evidence and the other on direct evidence.  Our focus will be on “presumed bias” cases, because they arise with greater frequency.  Actual bias is very difficult to prove, and if it or something approaching it can be established, then that proof would in any (or most any) event meet the standards necessary to establish evident partiality.    Continue Reading »

Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards – Part III.A: Evident Partiality (Expectations of the Parties)

January 4th, 2010 Awards, Evident Partiality, Grounds for Vacatur, Nuts & Bolts, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Practice and Procedure 5 Comments »

Introduction

In this Part III of our Nuts & Bolts feature on vacating arbitration awards (Parts I and II  here and here) we consider the second statutory ground for vacating an award under the Federal Arbitration Act:  “where there was evident partiality…in the arbitrators…” 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2).  What constitutes “evident partiality” or arbitral bias has been the subject of numerous judicial decisions setting forth various standards and applying them to a wide range of fact patterns.  The decisions are not easy to reconcile (some may, indeed, be irreconciliable) and generally the standards are of limited utility in practice.  Matters are complicated by judicially-created rules concerning disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and the consequences that may or may not flow from a breach of those rules.  To say “evident partiality” is an elusive subject understates the case.        Continue Reading »