Archive for 2010

Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards — Part IV: Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) – Procedural Misconduct

April 26th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Grounds for Vacatur, Procedural Misconduct, Reinsurance Arbitration Comments Off on Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards — Part IV: Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) – Procedural Misconduct

I. Introduction

In this part IV of our Nuts & Bolts vacatur feature, we focus on Section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides in pertinent part (with bracketed numbering and text added for convenience): 

[An arbitration award may be vacated:]

where the arbitrators were guilty [(1)] of misconduct [(a)] in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or [(b)] in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or [(2)] of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced[.]

Section 10(a)(3) might be referred to as a procedural due process provision, and courts sometimes suggests it defines the level of due process that must be present in an arbitration for a court to confirm the award without violating constitutional due process requirements.   We do not find that line of reasoning to be particularly helpful, and its validity is debatable.  But Section 10(a)(3) certainly prescribes a baseline level of procedural protection to parties who agree to arbitrate without expressly specifying procedural protections.  And it imposes a no-harm-no-foul rule:  procedural misconduct or misbehavior — including not following agreed procedural rules — does not undermine an award unless the misconduct or misbehavior prejudiced the challenging party.    Continue Reading »

Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.: What are the Implications for Reinsurance Arbitration?

April 18th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Reinsurance Arbitration, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.: What are the Implications for Reinsurance Arbitration?

We have written extensively on Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., No. 08-1198, a case pending before the United States Supreme Court in which a decision is expected in the not too distant future.  Stolt-Nielsen presents the question whether a court or arbitration panel may, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, impose class arbitration on a party whose arbitration agreements are silent on that subject.  The answer to that question will likely answer a related question that is of special concern to those involved in reinsurance arbitration:  Can a panel or court impose consolidated arbitration on a party whose arbitration agreements are silent on that subject?  You can read our prior posts on Stolt-Nielsen here,  here, here, here, here, here, here, here,  here, here, here, here, here and here.  (Certain of these posts contain links to articles on Stolt-Nielsen we wrote for Karl Bayer’s Disputing blog.)   

But those posts principally concern the legal issues raised by the case, discuss various ways it might be decided, and argue that the correct answer to the question is that a court or arbitration panel cannot, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, impose class or consolidated arbitration in the face of silence.  To date we have not discussed in any detail the practical implications that the case may have on reinsurance arbitration, if any.  So today let’s look at what those implications may be.  Continue Reading »

Why Bother with Arbitration Law?

April 13th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Ethics, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Reinsurance Arbitration 4 Comments »

Readers are excruciatingly aware of the amount of time and energy we expend on what seems at first blush to be a relatively arcane area of the law:  practice and procedure under the Federal Arbitration Act.  It is a practice area that arises under a single federal statute that consists of three chapters and a handful of rather skeletal provisions.   Why is this stuff so important?    

If you hold yourself out to be a commercial litigator who handles arbitration proceedings arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, then you need to know arbitration law cold (or co-counsel with someone who does).  If you do not, then you have no business representing clients in arbitration proceedings.

In one sense, arbitration law is to the lawyer handling an arbitration what civil procedure law is to the lawyer handling a litigation.  No lawyer cognizant of his or her ethical obligations and professional responsibility would represent a client in a litigation without a good, working knowledge of the applicable procedural code and cases construing it.  Doing so would be a recipe for professional disaster. 

Yet commercial litigators with no experience or expertise in arbitration law sometimes believe their knowledge of court procedure qualifies them to represent parties in arbitration proceedings.  Arbitration is more informal than litigation, so if you know how to litigate, you can certainly arbitrate, right?  Wrong.

Arbitration law is what ensures that arbitration agreements will be enforced, whether that means confirming or vacating an award, compelling arbitration, staying litigation, or what have you.  Without it, arbitration would be, for the most part, an empty gesture.  Parties would have to commence cumbersome plenary actions to enforce awards and obtain specific performance of arbitration agreements, arbitrators would lack subpoena power and breakdowns in the arbitrator selection process could not be remedied (or would be very difficult to remedy).   In short, arbitration would lose much of its appeal because it would be difficult and expensive to enforce, and some aspects of it might not be enforceable at all. 

Perhaps in a perfect world arbitration law would be spelled out for us in great detail in a user-friendly and comprehensive statute or administrative code, which would contain all or most of the answers to the multitude of enforcement-related questions that arise at various stages of arbitration proceedings.  But our world is far from perfect, and in many domestic cases our sole source of statutory guidance is contained in the first chapter of the Federal Arbitration Act, which contains only 16 provisions, 15 of which have been on the books without material revision since 1925.  In “non-domestic domestic cases” — you have to love that informative moniker — which involve, for example, arbitrations taking place in the United States between domestic and international parties, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and its enabling provisions set forth in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, usually come into play, but the Convention and its enabling legislation does not directly answer that many questions. 

So in our imperfect world, the answers must come from the courts.  That would all be well and good if we lived in a country with a single court system, but we do not.  We have a multi-circuit federal court system (over which the United States Supreme Court presides) and a multi-jurisdiction state court system (over which the Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction to hear certain types of appeals).  And the substantive provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are applicable in, and construed by, both state and federal courts. 

Cases involving arbitration law are constantly being decided.  There are currently three-arbitration-law-related cases pending before the United States Supreme Court, and the Court usually decides at least one or two each term.   The federal district and circuit courts regularly churn out decisions on arbitration law, as do state trial, intermediate appellate and supreme courts. 

If state and federal court decisions from various jurisdictions and circuits were fairly uniform on Federal Arbitration Act issues, then perhaps things would be simpler.  But courts are split on a number of issues, and even in situations where different courts might reach the same result on a given set of facts, the rationale each court applies may be different, leading to different outcomes if the facts are changed slightly.   

Apparently someone somewhere decided that things were not quite complicated enough.  So it was necessary to interject some other variables:  horizontal (state-versus-state) and vertical (state versus federal) choice of law issues.  Not all arbitration proceedings are governed solely by the Federal Arbitration Act — it applies only to written arbitration agreements “in maritime transaction[s] or.  .  . contract[s] evidencing.  .  .  transaction[s] involving commerce.  .  .  .”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  When the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply, then the arbitration law of some state will generally apply.  Choice-of-law rules will determine which state’s law applies in a multi-jurisdictional case. 

Even when the Federal Arbitration Act applies, the parties may have agreed that state arbitration law applies, or at least there may be a substantial question whether state arbitration law applies.  Federal and state arbitration law may conflict, and it is necessary to determine which applies.  And sometimes there is a question whether the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state arbitration, or substantive contract, law.  In other cases there may be a question whether state arbitration law fills a gap in federal arbitration law. 

Arbitration-law-related issues can and do arise at all stages of an arbitration proceeding, and arbitration practitioners must keep in mind that litigation under the Federal Arbitration Act may be necessary to enforce a client’s rights or that such litigation may be brought by the other party.  In the beginning stages of an arbitration, for example, issues may arise as to what the arbitration was intended to cover.  A party may demand arbitration on a few claims, but there may be other actual or potential disputes which, if submitted, would fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Depending on what those claims are, and other considerations, the party against whom arbitration is demanded will want to ensure that the arbitration does or does not encompass those claims.  That requires the party to carefully tailor its own submissions and, if necessary, to object to the other party submitting additional issues once the proceedings are underway. 

The party resisting an arbitration demand may have arguments that some or all of the issues that are the subject of the demand are outside the scope of the arbitration clause.  Those arguments must be carefully preserved, and sometimes it is necessary to seek an order staying the arbitration in whole or in part. 

The party seeking arbitration may need to compel arbitration if the other party is resisting arbitration.  That requires court intervention and both parties must be prepared to brief the applicable law and facts.  Or perhaps the arbitration clause is self-executing, allowing a party to appoint a defaulting party’s arbitrator and proceed ex parte.  In that case, the non-defaulting party may be unable to compel arbitration, but must take special care to ensure that the resulting default award is enforceable. 

Arbitrator selection is another area where arbitration-law issues arise.  It might be necessary to compel a party to participate in arbitration selection or request that a court appoint an arbitrator.  If, at some point in the proceedings, one of the arbitrators dies or resigns, a number of important issues must be addressed.  The process of arbitrator disclosure is yet another area where arbitration law must guide strategy.   

Confirming or vacating awards requires knowledge of arbitration law and careful attention to strategy long before an award is rendered.  There may be grounds for vacating an award, but those grounds generally must be preserved during the proceedings.  There are also important deadlines that must be met and those deadlines may be triggered with respect to certain interim final awards long before the arbitration proceeding itself is concluded.  

Once an award is issued issues may arise as to whether it is ambiguous or whether it may be modified by the arbitrators.  Or arbitrators may purport to retain jurisdiction when they are not entitled to do so.  Dealing with these issues requires careful attention to arbitration law.   

When Federal Arbitration Act litigation is necessary, counsel need to know how to address the various procedural issues that arise, including subject matter jurisdiction, service, personal jurisdiction, the necessity of treating the proceeding as a motion and a host of other matters.   And counsel must know the extent to which procedural rules are supplied by the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, the Federal Rules of Procedure or state procedural rules. 

This is just a broad overview:  There are literally dozens of issues that may arise, including ones implicating state general contract law, the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, choice-of-law rules, and federal preemption doctrine.  Handling arbitration-related litigation demands special expertise, just as handling the underlying arbitration demands such expertise.  Practitioners and clients that fail to pay careful attention to this ever-evolving area of the law do so at their peril.

The Agency Model of Arbitral Power: University of Chicago Law School Law and Economics Professor Tom Ginsburg Explains Why Deferential Review Does Not Necessarily Make Arbitration an Effective Substitute for Adjudication

April 7th, 2010 Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on The Agency Model of Arbitral Power: University of Chicago Law School Law and Economics Professor Tom Ginsburg Explains Why Deferential Review Does Not Necessarily Make Arbitration an Effective Substitute for Adjudication

In George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001), then Circuit Judge (now Chief Judge) Frank H. Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:   “What the parties may do, the arbitrator as their mutual agent may do.”  248 F.3d at 581.   Chief Judge Easterbrook made this statement in the course of defining the “manifest disregard” standard of review.  Applying his “agency model,” he concluded that “the ‘manifest disregard’ principle is limited to two possibilities:  an arbitral order requiring the parties to violate the law.  .  . , and an arbitral order that does not adhere to the legal principles specified by contract, and hence unenforceable under § 10(a)(4).”   Id

Chief Judge Easterbrook’s “agency” model of arbitral authority is instructive.  Just as agents derive their authority by the consent of the principal (subject to the rules of apparent and implied authority), arbitrators derive their authority from the parties via the arbitration agreement and the submission.  Subject to any restrictions in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrators’ powers to resolve a dispute under a broad arbitration agreement are arguably co-extensive with those of the parties that appointed them. 

But the model is not perfect.  First, unlike agents, arbitrators are not subject to the control of their principals and owe them no fiduciary duties.  Second, analogizing arbitrators as agents of the parties in the way Chief Judge Easterbrook does effectively empowers arbitrators not only to decide cases, but to negotiate settlements that the parties could have entered into.  It therefore does not require arbitrators to even arguably interpret the contract or apply the law:  As long as the arbitrators do not require the parties to violate the law, and as long as the arbitrators are at least arguably faithful to the parties’ expressed choice-of-law, if any, they can reach whatever decision they wish, whether by application of facts to legal norms or by a compromise settlement that may or may not be rooted in the parties’ agreement.    That arguably does not comport with the parties’ presumed, legitimate expectations.  For the arbitrator’s job is to decide cases; settlement is a matter for the parties, and should be subject to the parties’ control. 

University of Chicago Law School Professor Tom Ginsburg has written an excellent white paper that argues that the deferential standard of review espoused by Watts and other courts does not necessarily make arbitration an attractive substitute for litigation.  See Tom Ginsburg, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 502 (2d Series), The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration  (Dec. 2009) (copy available here).  He argues that a more searching standard of review would make the market for arbitrators more transparent, and thus more effective.  He advocates using Chief Judge Easterbrook’s agency model as an analytical framework for allowing parties to choose whether they prefer a very deferential standard of review, like that prescribed in Watts; something akin to de novo review, like that available in litigation; or something in between the two.  Professor Ginsburg is in the process of publishing in the University of Chicago Law Review an article based on his white paper. Continue Reading »

When Do Cost Provisions in an Arbitration Agreement Effectively Deny a Party a Forum in Which to Vindicate Statutory Rights?

April 6th, 2010 Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, Employment Arbitration, New York Court of Appeals, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on When Do Cost Provisions in an Arbitration Agreement Effectively Deny a Party a Forum in Which to Vindicate Statutory Rights?

Introduction

Under the federal Federal Arbitration Act statutory claims are generally arbitrable if they fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, but arbitrator and arbitration-service-provider fees that may impose undue financial burdens on employees or other individuals seeking to vindicate those rights.   Cost provisions in arbitration agreements allocate these fees and costs, and even when the allocation is 50-50, disputes may arise concerning whether they are so burdensome as to effectively deny one of the parties a forum in which to pursue his or her claims.   

In Green Tree Financial Corp v Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that “the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”  531 U.S. at 90.  And it said that “where, a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring costs that would deter the party from arbitrating the claim.”  531 U.S. at 92.   While the Court did not purport to enunciate the standards courts should apply in evaluating challenges to cost provisions, it held that the “risk” of  “prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”  531 U.S. at 91. Continue Reading »

David J. Abeshouse Is Presenting a CLE Seminar this Wednesday, April 7, 2010: What Dispute Resolution Can Mean For Your Practice

April 3rd, 2010 Commercial and Industry Arbitration and Mediation Group, Events, Mediation Comments Off on David J. Abeshouse Is Presenting a CLE Seminar this Wednesday, April 7, 2010: What Dispute Resolution Can Mean For Your Practice

On April 7, 2010 our good friend David J. Abeshouse, a prominent Long-Island-based B-2-B litigator, arbitrator and mediator, is presenting a complimentary CLE seminar entitled: “Business ADR for Lawyers: What Alternative Dispute Resolution Can Mean For Your Practice.  The 1 ½ hour seminar will, among other things, discuss what ADR is all about; explore some of the many myths and misconceptions about ADR; outline the 3 principal ways that cases can wind up in ADR; and explain how ADR can benefit transactional lawyers, litigators, and clients alike.

The program will be held at the Melville Marriott, 1350 Old Walt Whitman Road, Melville, NY 11747. Breakfast and registration will be held between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., and the seminar will begin at 8:30 a.m. It has been approved for 1.5 New York CLE credits.

Space is limited, so if you are interested in attending, please RSVP by e-mail or fax:

Email: events@ultimateabstract.com

Fax: 631-501-1370

Telephone: 631-423-1600

David is an experienced public speaker and a vigorous advocate of ADR, so the seminar promises to be a very good one.  You can learn more about David’s practice here

I’ll certainly be there, and I hope you’ll be able to attend, too.

International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Newsletter Features Philip J. Loree Jr. Cover Story on Rent-A-Center and Granite Rock

March 16th, 2010 Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, Labor Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Newsletter Features Philip J. Loree Jr. Cover Story on Rent-A-Center and Granite Rock

The March 2010 issue of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, the excellent newsletter of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”), featured as its cover story an article I wrote on Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson, No. 09-497, and Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 08-1214, two of the three cases pending before the United States Supreme Court this term.  The article is entitled “It’s Time for Doctrines: The Supreme Court Wrestles with ‘Severability’ and the ‘Clear and Unmistakable’ Standard.” 

These two cases involve, to some degree, the Buckeye Check Cashing/Prima Paint doctrine of severability—a/k/a “separability.”  Rent-A-Center also examines the “clear and unmistakable doctrine,” under which arbitrators can decide arbitrability questions if the parties clearly and unmistakably so agree. 

Rent-a-Center, which arises under the Federal Arbitration Act,  raises the question whether courts or arbitrators get to decide whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable if the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to submit arbitrability questions to arbitration.  (See our prior posts here, here and here.)   Granite Rock, which arises under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, concerns whether, on the facts presented, arbitration must go forward and what it should encompass.  (See our prior post here.)

In the article I argue that both cases were wrongly decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that, in Granite Rock, the Ninth Circuit reached the right result (an order compelling arbitration) for the wrong reasons.  I predict that the United States Supreme Court will reverse the Rent-A-Center decision and vacate the Granite Rock decision.

Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation is a subscription-only publication.   Anyone interested in obtaining a copy of the article can request one at this page.  Subscription information is available at that page, too, as well as publisher John Wiley & Sons, here.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank CPR, and Russ Bleemer, Editor of Alternatives, for their kind assistance and support in featuring my article.  Russ is not only a keen, professional editor, but a pleasure to work with as well.

First Circuit Considers Whether an Arbitration Clause is Mandatory or Optional: PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc.

March 5th, 2010 Arbitrability, Stay of Litigation, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 1 Comment »

Not all arbitration agreements are mandatory.  Strange as it may seem, some are optional. 

In PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 09-1625, slip op. (1st Cir. Mar. 1, 2010) the Court addressed a claim that the following arbitration clause was optional:

 All disputes, controversies and claims directly or indirectly arising out of or in relation to this Agreement or the validity, interpretation, performance, breach, enforceability of the Agreement (collectively referred to as “Dispute”) shall be resolved amicably between Syntel and PowerShare at an operational level in consultation with the top management of both companies.  If any such Dispute cannot be resolved, as stated above, the same shall be settled in accordance with the principles and procedures of the American Arbitration Association and per the decision of an accredited arbitrator acceptable to both parties.  Nothing in this clause shall prejudice Syntel or PowerShare’s right to seek injunctive relief or any other equitable/legal relief or remedies available under law.

A dispute arose under the parties’ contract, and PowerShare commenced an action in the Federal District  Court in Massachusetts.  Syntel moved for a stay under Federal Arbitration Act Section 3.  PowerShare said the arbitration agreement was optional, a Magistrate Judge denied the motion for a stay, and the District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order.  

The key question before the First Circuit  was whether the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the clause was optional was contrary to law.  The First Circuit reversed, finding that the arbitration clause was mandatory.   (The First Circuit also answered a question about the standard of review under which a district court should review a Magistrate Judge’s decision on a motion to stay litigation under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, but we need not dwell on that.)   

The crux of the Magistrate Judge’s order, and PowerShare’s position on appeal,  was the last sentence of the arbitration clause:  “[n]othing in this clause shall prejudice Syntel or PowerShare’s right to seek injunctive relief or any other equitable/legal relief or remedies available under law.”  The Magistrate Judge read that as preserving a party’s right to seek a jury trial in the event of a dispute — notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the arbitration clause —  because a jury trial is a “remedy” “under law.” 

But the First Circuit disagreed.  According to the First Circuit, the parties’ choice-of-law clause required application of the laws of the United States, which the parties agreed brought into play federal common and statutory law.  Under federal common law, “courts must be guided by commonsense rules of contract construction,” and one of those rules is that “an interpretation which gives effect to all the terms of a contract is preferable to one that harps on isolated provisions, heedless of context.”  (citations and quotation omitted) 

The Court reasoned that interpreting the third sentence as making arbitration optional would be to negate the mandatory nature of the second sentence:  

 [PowerShare’s].  .  .  interpretation cannot be reconciled with the unvarnished language of Paragraph 18’s second sentence.  That sentence states explicitly that disputes between the parties “shall” be settled through arbitration.  The word “shall” denotes obligation, not choice; therefore, accepting PowerShare’s interpretation of the third sentence would drain the second sentence of its essential meaning.  Put bluntly, the word “shall” in the second sentence would be rendered nugatory were we to read the arbitration provision as creating nothing more than an option.  That PowerShare’s interpretation of Paragraph 18 would negate the obvious meaning of the second sentence is a powerful argument against accepting that interpretation.  (citations and quotations omitted). 

The Court concluded that the only “plausible interpretation” of the arbitration clause that gave effect to the “plain meaning” of the second sentence  was that “the second sentence mandates arbitration and the third sentence furnishes the arbitrator with broad legal and equitable powers should either party seek special kinds of relief (say, an injunction).”  

The Court based its decision solely on contract interpretation principles without deciding whether the federal presumption of arbitrability applied.  The presumption of arbitrability requires ambiguities concerning the “scope” of an arbitration clause to be resolved in favor of arbitration.  PowerShare argued that the presumption did not apply where, as here, the question was not the scope of an arbitration clause, but whether a mandatory arbitration clause existed in the first place.

Fourth Circuit Vacates Securities Arbitration Award: Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Bishop

March 2nd, 2010 Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, Securities Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 1 Comment »

I.  Introduction

Arbitration is not a perfect process for resolving disputes, but neither is court adjudication.  One advantage of court adjudication is a fairly rigorous standard of review:  appellate courts generally review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.  By contrast, courts review arbitration awards under the very deferential standards of review prescribed by Sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  The trade-off is one of informality, speed and reduced expense for a heightened risk that the decision maker will commit unreviewable legal and factual errors — even some pretty egregious ones.   

But every so often an arbitration award can be so far off the mark that one of the parties is deprived of the benefit of the bargain it made when it agreed to arbitrate.  These are not cases where the arbitrators merely did a shoddy job, but ones where the arbitrators did not do the job the parties asked them to do.  These are the cases that Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act was designed to address:  ones where “the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final award on the subject matter was not made.” 

Today we take a brief look at Raymond James Financial Serv., Inc. v. Bishop, ___ F.3d ___, No. 09-1038, slip op. (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), a recent example of one of those rare cases.  And we’ll see how how confusion about the scope of Section 10(a)(4) resulting – quite unintentionally – from the United States Supreme Court decision in Hall Street Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel , Inc, 552 U.S. ___, slip op. at __ (March 25, 2008) apparently motivated the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to decide the case solely on the ground that the arbitrators were not authorized to rule on the claim on which they admittedly based their award.  (See, generally,Hall Street Meets Pearl Street: Stolt-Nielsen and the Federal Arbitration Act’s New Section 10(a)(4).”)

The Court reached the right result, but its decision is of limited utility in future cases.  For under many broad arbitration agreements and submissions the arbitrators have authority to rule on pretty much any claim that is related to the subject matter of the  parties’ dispute.  Abitrators may have the authority to resolve a claim, but may do so in a way that has not even a barely colorable justification under the law and facts.   

We would have liked to see the Court rule not only on the authority issue, but also on two other grounds relied upon by the district court:  manifest disregard of the law and the award’s failure to “draw its essence” from the parties’ agreements.  As we have said before, we believe that those grounds are statutorily permitted by Section 10(a)(4), and that they provide a useful safety valve for addressing those (thankfully) rare cases where the arbitrators resolve a dispute within the scope of their authority, but do so in a way that completely deprives one of the parties of the benefit of its arbitration agreement.    Continue Reading »

Professor Aaron Bruhl’s Analysis of Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson (No. 09-497)

February 24th, 2010 Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Supreme Court Comments Off on Professor Aaron Bruhl’s Analysis of Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson (No. 09-497)

Professor Aaron Bruhl, an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center, recently published in PrawfsBlawg a thought-provoking and insightful article on Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson (No. 09-497).  (Post here)  Regular readers no doubt remember that the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Rent-A-Center, and will be hearing argument on April 26, 2010.  (See our prior posts here and here).

Professor Bruhl points out that, in addition to being of interest to those practicing employment, consumer or plain old arbitration law, Rent-A-Center “is just as interesting for those who study federal courts and judicial politics.”   He reminds us that one of the few remaining “safety valves” for challenging arbitration agreements is unconscionability:     

In the last few years, as other routes for challenging arbitration have been closed off, unconscionability has become a surprisingly common and surprisingly effective way of attacking arbitration agreements.  The challenges do not attack arbitration per se – federal law favors arbitration – but instead target various aspects of a particular arbitration process:  a given clause might forbid class arbitrations, bar punitive damages or otherwise restrict remedies, sharply curtail discovery, require a consumer to pay hefty arbitrator’s fees, etc.  There have been many cases on these topics in recent years, and a good number of them sustain the challenge to the arbitration clause.

He notes that the United States Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari in cases where lower courts have invalidated arbitration agreements on state-law unconscionability grounds and the question is whether the invalidation offended the Federal Arbitration Act.  He suspects “the Court has avoided these cases because it feels ill-equipped to resolve whether a lower court is discriminating against arbitration:” 

First, unconscionability analysis often requires a fact-intensive inquiry.  Second, and more important, determining whether a lower court is using unconscionability differently when it comes to arbitration requires an engagement with the details of state law and a comparison of lots of prior unconscionability cases.  Third, and maybe most important of all, a holding that the lower court is applying unconscionability unfairly, especially when the lower court says it is applying the same analysis it applies elsewhere, carries with it some serious expressive baggage.  Essentially, it requires the Supreme Court to say that the lower court is being dishonest.  That happens, but when it does so, it is a big deal (think cases like Bush v. Gore or the cases from the 50s/60s rejecting supposed procedural defaults in the state courts).

 But the Court granted certiorari in Rent-A-Center, a case involving not the merits of a state law unconscionability challenge, but the question who gets to decide unconscionability when the parties clearly and unmistakably submit it to the arbitrators.  Professor Bruhl believes certiorari was granted because addressing the “who” question, and resolving it in favor of arbitration, will cleanly dispose of the unconscionability problem from the standpoint of the federal courts, at least in cases where the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability: 

That doesn’t require diving into the weeds of state law and the record. If the Court assigns the issue to the arbitrator, that will be a very easy rule to monitor for compliance (unlike deciding whether the lower court applied unconscionability correctly).  All of those unconscionability cases out there will instantly become not wrong but irrelevant – because courts won’t be deciding the issue anymore.  And it won’t matter whether some lower courts can be trusted to apply unconscionability correctly, because they will be cut out of the picture. Continue Reading »