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Posts Tagged ‘Federal Arbitration Act’

What to Make of the Second Circuit Voiding a Class Action Waiver Under California’s Discover Bank Rule?

July 23rd, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, California State Courts, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court 5 Comments »

After deciding Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds, Inc. and Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson, the United States Supreme Court left federal arbitration law at a crossroads.  In both cases the Court adhered quite faithfully to its prior Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence, under which it enforces arbitration agreements according to their terms, without regard to other considerations.  In Rent-A-Center the Court implicitly reaffirmed that these pro-enforcement rules apply equally to contracts of adhesion. 

We will find out whether the Court intends to continue down the same path when it decides AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion next term, a case that raises the question whether California’s Discover Bank  unconscionability rule is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  That rule deems unconscionable under California law class-action or class-arbitration waivers where:  (a) “the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which the disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages”; and (b) “it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.  .  .  .”  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162-63 (2005) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1668). 

The Discover Bank rule is grounded in a California-law principle – embodied in Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 – that “contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud.  .  .  are against the policy of the law.”   See Cal. Civ. Code § 1668.  If a company is allegedly engaging in fraudulent acts designed to cheat numerous consumers out of small amounts of money, a class action or class arbitration waiver may, if enforced, effectively act as an exculpatory provision that insulates the company from the consequences of its small scale, but widespread fraud, because the individual, allegedly defrauded consumers have little incentive to pursue separate actions or arbitrations to recoup trivial amounts of damages.  See Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162-63.  Any contract that had that effect – whether it is a class action waiver in an arbitration clause, an exculpatory agreement or a contract that simply forbids class actions  – would be unconscionable under the rule.  

In Fensterstock v. Education Finance Partners, No. 09-1562-cv, slip op. (2d Cir. July 12, 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested one path that the United States Supreme Court might take on Discover Bank preemption.  In an interesting opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Amalya Lyle Kearse, joined by Circuit Judges José A. Cabranes and Chester J. Straub, held that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  According to the Second Circuit, California’s  Discover Bank rule “’places arbitration agreements on the exact same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the context of arbitration,’” and for that reason the rule is not preempted by the Act.  Slip op. at 16-17 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original)). 

On first blush the Second Circuit’s decision seems reasonable.  But there are some important issues lurking beneath the surface that the Supreme Court will need to address when it decides AT&T MobilityContinue Reading »

How Will Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp. Change Reinsurance Arbitration Practice?

July 14th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Reinsurance Arbitration, United States Supreme Court 3 Comments »

Part V.B

A.   Introduction

In Part V.A of our Stolt-Nielsen reinsurance-arbitration practice series (here), we said that after Stolt-Nielsen courts will likely get to decide in the first instance whether the parties consented to consolidated arbitration.  If we are correct, that will be a fundamental change because courts will presumably construe the terms of the parties’ contracts more strictly than many arbitrators might, and those constructions will be subject to appellate review. 

In this Part V.B we consider what a party will likely need to show to persuade a court to consolidate arbitrations, and explain why we believe that courts will not frequently order consolidation.  In Part V.C. we shall explain the strategic and practical implications of the changes that Stolt-Nielsen will likely bring about in consolidated reinsurance-arbitration practice.      Continue Reading »

How Will Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp. Change Reinsurance Arbitration Practice?

June 18th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Practice and Procedure, United States Supreme Court 5 Comments »

Part V.A

A.   Introduction

In this Part V.A of our consolidated-reinsurance-arbitration series, we delve into Stolt-Nielsen’s legal implications on consolidated reinsurance-arbitration practice, focusing on how courts are likely to decide the allocation-of-power question:  Who gets to decide whether the parties consented to consolidated arbitration?  In Part V.B we shall examine Stolt-Nielsen’s other specific legal and practical implications, focusing on what a party will likely need to show to obtain consolidated arbitration and how frequently consolidated arbitration is likely to be granted after Stolt-Nielsen.    

B.   Who Gets to Decide Whether the Parties Consented to Consolidated Arbitration?

Readers will recall from Part III (here) that courts interpreted Bazzle  as governing the allocation-of-power issue.  Now that the Court has said Bazzle never commanded a majority on that issue, and that it remains open, courts must reconsider it not only in the class-, but in the consolidated-arbitration context.   

Consolidated arbitrations, like class arbitrations, raise two types of questions:  Common-dispute and party-consent questions.  We think that courts will likely conclude that both are questions of arbitrability for the court to decide in the first instance, unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agree otherwise.   Arbitrators may play a role in resolving contractual ambiguities identified by the court.  

1.      Who Gets to Decide Common-Dispute Questions?

All consolidated-arbitration questions concern whether at least one arbitration agreement encompasses not only disputes concerning one, but all other contracts at issue.  We call this the “common-dispute” question.    

In some consolidated-arbitration disputes the “common dispute” question is the only one presented.  Suppose reinsurer R  enters into two treaties with cedent C, Contracts A and B, each of which incept on the same date and are in force for one year.  Contract A’s limits are $1 million per occurrence excess a $500,000 retention.  Contract B has per occurrence limits of $2 million excess of $1.5 million.  Both contain broad arbitration clauses under which the parties agreed to arbitrate “any dispute arising out of or relating to this contract.” Continue Reading »

How Will Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp. Change Reinsurance Arbitration Practice?

June 8th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Practice and Procedure, Reinsurance Arbitration, United States Supreme Court 6 Comments »

Part IV

A.   Introduction

In Part I (here) we explained why the standard for challenging an award based on its outcome is important in reinsurance arbitration practice.  And, after briefly reviewing pre-Stolt-Nielsen law on outcome-based standards of review, we explained how the Court has established for itself and the lower courts a fairly searching standard of review.  Part II (here) explored the legal and practical implications of that standard of review.    

Part III (here) turned to the other key area that will likely change because of Stolt-Nielsen — consolidated reinsurance-arbitration practice — and discussed the state of consolidation law pre-Stolt-Nielsen.  This Part IV discusses Stolt-Nielsen’s rationale for finding that imposing class arbitration on parties whose agreements are silent on that point is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, and explores how the Court’s ruling may affect consolidated reinsurance-arbitration practice in general. 

B.   The Supreme Court’s Decides that Imposing Class Arbitration on Parties whose Contracts are Silent on that Score is Inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act

When we last left Stolt-Nielsen, the Court had determined  that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by issuing an award that was based on their own notions of public policy gleaned from other arbitral decisions imposing class arbitration in the face of silence.  When a court vacates an award it has to decide whether to remand the matter to the arbitrators, for Section 10(b) of the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a court to “direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”  The Court decided not to remand, because “there can be only one possible outcome on the facts,” that is, where the parties’ contracts are undisputedly silent on class arbitration, save for the parties’ agreement to a broad arbitration clause.   The Court then set about to explain why that was so.  Continue Reading »

How Will Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp. Change Reinsurance Arbitration Practice?

June 1st, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, United States Supreme Court, labor arbitration 5 Comments »

Part II

A.   Introduction

In Part I (here) we explained why the standard for challenging an award based on its outcome is important in reinsurance arbitration practice.  And, after briefly reviewing pre-Stolt-Nielsen law on outcome-based standards of review, we explained how Stolt-Nielsen has established a fairly searching, standard of review.  This Part II explores the legal and practical implications of that standard of review.    

B.   Legal Implications of the Stolt-Nielsen Decision’s Manifest Disregard of the Agreement Standard of Review

1.  Courts May Interpret Stolt-Nielsen’s Outcome-Based Standard of Review Liberally

Reinsurance-  and other commercial-arbitration awards are now subject to the same standard of review as labor-law awards – and in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court applied that standard of review pretty liberally.  The Court has put to rest the notion that Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(4) vacatur is limited to questions concerning whether the arbitrators decided a matter falling within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement or submission.   The outcome of the arbitration is now subject to at least some, limited scrutiny. 

The focus will now be on whether the arbitrators interpreted, applied and enforced the contract, and applied applicable law or norms.  Express or implied reliance on extra-contractual considerations, such as public policy, may spoil an award, unless those extra-contractual considerations are grounded in applicable law.  Not heeding clear and unambiguous contract language, effectively deleting or disregarding contractual provisions or otherwise rewriting the contract may also subject the award to vacatur.  Continue Reading »

How Will Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp. Change Reinsurance Arbitration Practice?

May 25th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Class Action Arbitration, Class Action Waivers, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Grounds for Vacatur, Practice and Procedure, Reinsurance Arbitration, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States Supreme Court 6 Comments »

Part I

A.     Introduction 

Shortly before the United States Supreme Court decided Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., ___ U.S. ___, slip op. (April 27, 2010), we wrote about the implications the case might have on reinsurance arbitration practice.  (See our post here.)  But since then, you have not heard much from us, other than our brief report (here) about the Supreme Court vacating and remanding to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the American Express Merchants’ Litigation judgment for further consideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen.   One — but by no means the only — reason is that after Stolt-Nielsen was decided, we wrote a comprehensive article on it, which will be published in a subscription-only publication in June. 

But that article – while comprehensive in scope – is directed at folks interested in the Federal Arbitration Act in general, not necessarily those interested in reinsurance arbitration in particular.  And that’s what we want to cover in this multi-part series:  Stolt-Nielsen’s implications on reinsurance arbitration practice. 

Stolt-Nielsen affects reinsurance arbitration in two very important ways.   First, it has set a fairly liberal standard of review that now applies to commercial arbitration awards in cases where a party asserts that the arbitrators exceeded their powers under Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(4) because of the award’s outcome.  That, as we shall see, has all sorts of implications for persons involved in reinsurance arbitrations.

Second, it has changed the rules applicable to consolidated-reinsurance-arbitration practice – or at least it requires a wholesale reevaluation of those rules.  That, too, has a number of important implications for reinsurance-arbitration practice.   

This Part I of the series explains why the standard for challenging an award based on its outcome is important in reinsurance arbitration practice.  And, after briefly reviewing pre-Stolt-Nielsen law on outcome-based standards of review, it explains how Stolt-Nielsen has established for the lower courts a fairly searching standard of review.  Part II (here) will delve into what the implications of that standard of review will likely be. 

Part III (here) will provide the background necessary to understand how Stolt-Nielsen affects the law applicable to consolidated reinsurance arbitration.  Part IV (here) will delve into the details of how Stolt-Nielsen changes – or at least requires reconsideration of – the legal status quo in this area.  And Part V will discuss the implications of all of this.   

We do not set out to discuss the background of Stolt-Nielsen in any detail or to provide a play-by-play of how the Court decided the case.  If you are a regular reader you probably already know the background in detail, and our upcoming article does a pretty good job of mapping out the Court’s reasoning.  Instead, we focus our attention on the aspects of the decision that are relevant to the two key subjects of discussion. 

But before we delve into what Stolt-Nielsen has to say about the standard of review, we pause briefly to address why the standard of review applicable to an outcome-based challenge is so important in reinsurance and other forms of commercial arbitration.  Continue Reading »

Arbitration Nuts & Bolts: Vacating Arbitration Awards — Part IV: Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(3) – Procedural Misconduct

April 26th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Grounds for Vacatur, Procedural Misconduct, Reinsurance Arbitration No Comments »

I. Introduction

In this part IV of our Nuts & Bolts vacatur feature, we focus on Section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides in pertinent part (with bracketed numbering and text added for convenience): 

[An arbitration award may be vacated:]

where the arbitrators were guilty [(1)] of misconduct [(a)] in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or [(b)] in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or [(2)] of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced[.]

Section 10(a)(3) might be referred to as a procedural due process provision, and courts sometimes suggests it defines the level of due process that must be present in an arbitration for a court to confirm the award without violating constitutional due process requirements.   We do not find that line of reasoning to be particularly helpful, and its validity is debatable.  But Section 10(a)(3) certainly prescribes a baseline level of procedural protection to parties who agree to arbitrate without expressly specifying procedural protections.  And it imposes a no-harm-no-foul rule:  procedural misconduct or misbehavior — including not following agreed procedural rules — does not undermine an award unless the misconduct or misbehavior prejudiced the challenging party.    Continue Reading »

Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.: What are the Implications for Reinsurance Arbitration?

April 18th, 2010 Arbitrability, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Authority of Arbitrators, Class Action Arbitration, Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings, Reinsurance Arbitration, United States Supreme Court 1 Comment »

We have written extensively on Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., No. 08-1198, a case pending before the United States Supreme Court in which a decision is expected in the not too distant future.  Stolt-Nielsen presents the question whether a court or arbitration panel may, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, impose class arbitration on a party whose arbitration agreements are silent on that subject.  The answer to that question will likely answer a related question that is of special concern to those involved in reinsurance arbitration:  Can a panel or court impose consolidated arbitration on a party whose arbitration agreements are silent on that subject?  You can read our prior posts on Stolt-Nielsen here,  here, here, here, here, here, here, here,  here, here, here, here, here and here.  (Certain of these posts contain links to articles on Stolt-Nielsen we wrote for Karl Bayer’s Disputing blog.)   

But those posts principally concern the legal issues raised by the case, discuss various ways it might be decided, and argue that the correct answer to the question is that a court or arbitration panel cannot, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, impose class or consolidated arbitration in the face of silence.  To date we have not discussed in any detail the practical implications that the case may have on reinsurance arbitration, if any.  So today let’s look at what those implications may be.  Continue Reading »

Why Bother with Arbitration Law?

April 13th, 2010 Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Ethics, Nuts & Bolts: Arbitration, Reinsurance Arbitration 5 Comments »

Readers are excruciatingly aware of the amount of time and energy we expend on what seems at first blush to be a relatively arcane area of the law:  practice and procedure under the Federal Arbitration Act.  It is a practice area that arises under a single federal statute that consists of three chapters and a handful of rather skeletal provisions.   Why is this stuff so important?    

If you hold yourself out to be a commercial litigator who handles arbitration proceedings arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, then you need to know arbitration law cold (or co-counsel with someone who does).  If you do not, then you have no business representing clients in arbitration proceedings.

In one sense, arbitration law is to the lawyer handling an arbitration what civil procedure law is to the lawyer handling a litigation.  No lawyer cognizant of his or her ethical obligations and professional responsibility would represent a client in a litigation without a good, working knowledge of the applicable procedural code and cases construing it.  Doing so would be a recipe for professional disaster. 

Yet commercial litigators with no experience or expertise in arbitration law sometimes believe their knowledge of court procedure qualifies them to represent parties in arbitration proceedings.  Arbitration is more informal than litigation, so if you know how to litigate, you can certainly arbitrate, right?  Wrong.

Arbitration law is what ensures that arbitration agreements will be enforced, whether that means confirming or vacating an award, compelling arbitration, staying litigation, or what have you.  Without it, arbitration would be, for the most part, an empty gesture.  Parties would have to commence cumbersome plenary actions to enforce awards and obtain specific performance of arbitration agreements, arbitrators would lack subpoena power and breakdowns in the arbitrator selection process could not be remedied (or would be very difficult to remedy).   In short, arbitration would lose much of its appeal because it would be difficult and expensive to enforce, and some aspects of it might not be enforceable at all. 

Perhaps in a perfect world arbitration law would be spelled out for us in great detail in a user-friendly and comprehensive statute or administrative code, which would contain all or most of the answers to the multitude of enforcement-related questions that arise at various stages of arbitration proceedings.  But our world is far from perfect, and in many domestic cases our sole source of statutory guidance is contained in the first chapter of the Federal Arbitration Act, which contains only 16 provisions, 15 of which have been on the books without material revision since 1925.  In “non-domestic domestic cases” — you have to love that informative moniker – which involve, for example, arbitrations taking place in the United States between domestic and international parties, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and its enabling provisions set forth in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, usually come into play, but the Convention and its enabling legislation does not directly answer that many questions. 

So in our imperfect world, the answers must come from the courts.  That would all be well and good if we lived in a country with a single court system, but we do not.  We have a multi-circuit federal court system (over which the United States Supreme Court presides) and a multi-jurisdiction state court system (over which the Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction to hear certain types of appeals).  And the substantive provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are applicable in, and construed by, both state and federal courts. 

Cases involving arbitration law are constantly being decided.  There are currently three-arbitration-law-related cases pending before the United States Supreme Court, and the Court usually decides at least one or two each term.   The federal district and circuit courts regularly churn out decisions on arbitration law, as do state trial, intermediate appellate and supreme courts. 

If state and federal court decisions from various jurisdictions and circuits were fairly uniform on Federal Arbitration Act issues, then perhaps things would be simpler.  But courts are split on a number of issues, and even in situations where different courts might reach the same result on a given set of facts, the rationale each court applies may be different, leading to different outcomes if the facts are changed slightly.   

Apparently someone somewhere decided that things were not quite complicated enough.  So it was necessary to interject some other variables:  horizontal (state-versus-state) and vertical (state versus federal) choice of law issues.  Not all arbitration proceedings are governed solely by the Federal Arbitration Act — it applies only to written arbitration agreements “in maritime transaction[s] or.  .  . contract[s] evidencing.  .  .  transaction[s] involving commerce.  .  .  .”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  When the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply, then the arbitration law of some state will generally apply.  Choice-of-law rules will determine which state’s law applies in a multi-jurisdictional case. 

Even when the Federal Arbitration Act applies, the parties may have agreed that state arbitration law applies, or at least there may be a substantial question whether state arbitration law applies.  Federal and state arbitration law may conflict, and it is necessary to determine which applies.  And sometimes there is a question whether the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state arbitration, or substantive contract, law.  In other cases there may be a question whether state arbitration law fills a gap in federal arbitration law. 

Arbitration-law-related issues can and do arise at all stages of an arbitration proceeding, and arbitration practitioners must keep in mind that litigation under the Federal Arbitration Act may be necessary to enforce a client’s rights or that such litigation may be brought by the other party.  In the beginning stages of an arbitration, for example, issues may arise as to what the arbitration was intended to cover.  A party may demand arbitration on a few claims, but there may be other actual or potential disputes which, if submitted, would fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Depending on what those claims are, and other considerations, the party against whom arbitration is demanded will want to ensure that the arbitration does or does not encompass those claims.  That requires the party to carefully tailor its own submissions and, if necessary, to object to the other party submitting additional issues once the proceedings are underway. 

The party resisting an arbitration demand may have arguments that some or all of the issues that are the subject of the demand are outside the scope of the arbitration clause.  Those arguments must be carefully preserved, and sometimes it is necessary to seek an order staying the arbitration in whole or in part. 

The party seeking arbitration may need to compel arbitration if the other party is resisting arbitration.  That requires court intervention and both parties must be prepared to brief the applicable law and facts.  Or perhaps the arbitration clause is self-executing, allowing a party to appoint a defaulting party’s arbitrator and proceed ex parte.  In that case, the non-defaulting party may be unable to compel arbitration, but must take special care to ensure that the resulting default award is enforceable. 

Arbitrator selection is another area where arbitration-law issues arise.  It might be necessary to compel a party to participate in arbitration selection or request that a court appoint an arbitrator.  If, at some point in the proceedings, one of the arbitrators dies or resigns, a number of important issues must be addressed.  The process of arbitrator disclosure is yet another area where arbitration law must guide strategy.   

Confirming or vacating awards requires knowledge of arbitration law and careful attention to strategy long before an award is rendered.  There may be grounds for vacating an award, but those grounds generally must be preserved during the proceedings.  There are also important deadlines that must be met and those deadlines may be triggered with respect to certain interim final awards long before the arbitration proceeding itself is concluded.  

Once an award is issued issues may arise as to whether it is ambiguous or whether it may be modified by the arbitrators.  Or arbitrators may purport to retain jurisdiction when they are not entitled to do so.  Dealing with these issues requires careful attention to arbitration law.   

When Federal Arbitration Act litigation is necessary, counsel need to know how to address the various procedural issues that arise, including subject matter jurisdiction, service, personal jurisdiction, the necessity of treating the proceeding as a motion and a host of other matters.   And counsel must know the extent to which procedural rules are supplied by the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, the Federal Rules of Procedure or state procedural rules. 

This is just a broad overview:  There are literally dozens of issues that may arise, including ones implicating state general contract law, the Federal Arbitration Act itself, state arbitration law, choice-of-law rules, and federal preemption doctrine.  Handling arbitration-related litigation demands special expertise, just as handling the underlying arbitration demands such expertise.  Practitioners and clients that fail to pay careful attention to this ever-evolving area of the law do so at their peril.

The Agency Model of Arbitral Power: University of Chicago Law School Law and Economics Professor Tom Ginsburg Explains Why Deferential Review Does Not Necessarily Make Arbitration an Effective Substitute for Adjudication

April 7th, 2010 Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States Supreme Court No Comments »

In George Watts & Son v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001), then Circuit Judge (now Chief Judge) Frank H. Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:   “What the parties may do, the arbitrator as their mutual agent may do.”  248 F.3d at 581.   Chief Judge Easterbrook made this statement in the course of defining the “manifest disregard” standard of review.  Applying his “agency model,” he concluded that “the ‘manifest disregard’ principle is limited to two possibilities:  an arbitral order requiring the parties to violate the law.  .  . , and an arbitral order that does not adhere to the legal principles specified by contract, and hence unenforceable under § 10(a)(4).”   Id

Chief Judge Easterbrook’s “agency” model of arbitral authority is instructive.  Just as agents derive their authority by the consent of the principal (subject to the rules of apparent and implied authority), arbitrators derive their authority from the parties via the arbitration agreement and the submission.  Subject to any restrictions in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrators’ powers to resolve a dispute under a broad arbitration agreement are arguably co-extensive with those of the parties that appointed them. 

But the model is not perfect.  First, unlike agents, arbitrators are not subject to the control of their principals and owe them no fiduciary duties.  Second, analogizing arbitrators as agents of the parties in the way Chief Judge Easterbrook does effectively empowers arbitrators not only to decide cases, but to negotiate settlements that the parties could have entered into.  It therefore does not require arbitrators to even arguably interpret the contract or apply the law:  As long as the arbitrators do not require the parties to violate the law, and as long as the arbitrators are at least arguably faithful to the parties’ expressed choice-of-law, if any, they can reach whatever decision they wish, whether by application of facts to legal norms or by a compromise settlement that may or may not be rooted in the parties’ agreement.    That arguably does not comport with the parties’ presumed, legitimate expectations.  For the arbitrator’s job is to decide cases; settlement is a matter for the parties, and should be subject to the parties’ control. 

University of Chicago Law School Professor Tom Ginsburg has written an excellent white paper that argues that the deferential standard of review espoused by Watts and other courts does not necessarily make arbitration an attractive substitute for litigation.  See Tom Ginsburg, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 502 (2d Series), The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration  (Dec. 2009) (copy available here).  He argues that a more searching standard of review would make the market for arbitrators more transparent, and thus more effective.  He advocates using Chief Judge Easterbrook’s agency model as an analytical framework for allowing parties to choose whether they prefer a very deferential standard of review, like that prescribed in Watts; something akin to de novo review, like that available in litigation; or something in between the two.  Professor Ginsburg is in the process of publishing in the University of Chicago Law Review an article based on his white paper. Continue Reading »



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