June 30th, 2009
Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, United States Supreme Court
On April 4 we reported on 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (Thomas, J.), and published a follow-up post on April 7, 2009 (posts available here and here). The question before the Court was whether “a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")] claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.” The Court told us the answer was “yes.” 
That answer, of course, begs the question whether any particular collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) “clearly and unmistakably” requires arbitration of statutory claims. The Court in Shipkevich v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 08-CV-1008 (FB)(JMA), 2009 WL 1706590 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009) recently considered, among other things, whether the CBA before it clearly and unmistakably required arbitration of claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), New York State civil rights legislation, and New York City’s Human Rights Law, and said the answer was “no.” So let’s take a brief look at Shipkevich to get some perspective on what “clear and unmistakable” means. Continue Reading »
April 11th, 2009
Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, Legislative Developments, United States Supreme Court
Part IIIC: Is the Narrow Construction Sustainable?
Introduction
In Part IIIB (here) we discussed in general terms the “Narrow Construction” of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (the “Fairness Act”), which would limit the scope of Proposed Section 2(c) to situations where the party resisting arbitration claims that the arbitration agreement requires predispute arbitration of consumer, franchise, employment or statutory civil rights disputes. We also set forth the five premises on which the Narrow Construction is based. This Part IIIC addresses the validity of those premises. [Because this post frequently refers to Proposed Section 2 and its subsections, we have reproduced at the end the pertinent parts of Proposed Section 2.]
The Narrow Construction is fairly complex. A court choosing it would have to determine each of its five premises to be valid. In addition, the validity of Premise 3 is interlinked to that of Premise 5: Premise 3 is easier to accept when viewed without regard to Premise 5 and Premise 5 is harder to accept when viewed in isolation from Premise 3. If a court believes that Premise 3 is reasonable, but has reservations about its validity, when it considers Premise 3 in conjunction with Premise 5, it may conclude that both are invalid. But if it is confident that Premise 3 is valid, that confidence might lead it to conclude that Premise 5 is valid. These are important considerations that a party advocating one construction or the other should take into account in structuring its argument. Continue Reading »
April 4th, 2009
Arbitrability, Authority of Arbitrators, United States Supreme Court
On April 1 the United States Supreme Court decided 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, ___ U.S. ___ (2009) (Thomas, J.), an interesting case that highlights some of the differences between labor arbitration governed by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (the “FAA”). The question before the Court was whether “a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)] claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.” Slip op. at 25. Reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court said “yes.” See slip op. at 25. Continue Reading »
