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Archive for the ‘Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories’ Category

SCA v. Armstrong: Anatomy of the Lance Armstrong Arbitration Award—Part III.B.3: Panel Issue No. 2: Whether the Panel Could Bind Nonsignatory Mr. Stapleton to the Armstrong Arbitration Award

April 13th, 2015 Arbitrability, Arbitration as a Matter of Consent, Arbitration Practice and Procedure, Attorney Fees and Sanctions, Authority of Arbitrators, Awards, Confirmation of Awards, Grounds for Vacatur, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Practice and Procedure, Rights and Obligations of Nonsignatories, State Courts Comments Off on SCA v. Armstrong: Anatomy of the Lance Armstrong Arbitration Award—Part III.B.3: Panel Issue No. 2: Whether the Panel Could Bind Nonsignatory Mr. Stapleton to the Armstrong Arbitration Award

 Part III.B.3

Panel’s Analysis of Whether it Had the Authority to Bind Nonsignatory Mr. Stapleton to the Lance Armstrong Arbitration Award (Panel Issue No. 2)

yay-7966136-digitalIn Part III.B.2 we explained why we believe the Panel’s analysis of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute about sanctions (Panel Issue No. 1) was on the mark, and why the state court considering the issue de novo should find it helpful in the event the Armstrong parties challenge the panel’s jurisdiction. Today we briefly examine the Panel’s decision on Panel Issue No. 2: “Which parties are properly subject to this Tribunal’s jurisdiction?” (Award at 5)

The issue arose because the SCA Parties contended that Mr. William Stapleton was bound by the arbitration agreement and award because he executed the Settlement Agreement, albeit apparently only in his capacities as an officer of Tailwind and an authorized agent of Armstrong.  (See Award at 7.)

Like Panel Issue No. 1—whether the parties agreed to arbitrate SCA’s sanctions claims—Panel Issue No. 2 is a question of arbitrability. See Howsam v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941, 946-47 (1995). So, as discussed in Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2, the Court would presumably decide it independently—that is, without according deference to the Panel’s decision— were it necessary for it to decide it in the first place.

The SCA Parties, however, wisely chose to confirm the award as a whole rather than attempt to vacate it in part and confirm it in part, for as the Panel’s decision made very clear, there was no basis for finding Mr. Stapleton to be bound by the award. But even though the Court will presumably not have to address the issue, it is helpful for those interested in learning more about arbitration law to understand why the Panel got it right, and why the Texas Court would likely agree. Continue Reading »